

The EU's Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policies and the Turkish perceptions

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Introduction

The European Union has stimulated change in its members and acceding countries in a number of areas, ranging from economic to social policy. One such critical change has been in national foreign policy. This paper attempts to assess the Europeanization of foreign policy in acceding countries by examining the Turkish case. Turkey began its accession negotiations with the European Union on 03 October 2005, which also constituted an important step in Turkish foreign policy decision making. In fact, since the 1999 Helsinki Conference that declared Turkey an official candidate country, the EU has influenced Turkish foreign policy. We ask two interrelated questions about this influence: (i) to what extent did European Union norms on foreign policy diffuse into Turkey and (ii) through which mechanisms and under what conditions did the EU induce change in Turkey. We seek answers to these questions by scrutinizing public perceptions toward the European Union and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and by examining the changing roles and perceptions of Turkish state actors in foreign policy decision making.

The interactions of national foreign policy decision makers at the EU level, and especially in the 2nd pillar institutions, create a process whereby European level norms emerge and are adopted by the member states. European norms include the acceptance of CFSP, identifying with a larger European collectivity, collaboration with other European states in formulating policy, seeking multilateral rather than unilateral solutions to international problems, and the use of diplomatic and economic means rather than military instruments in solving disputes. Once such norms are adopted, they act as boundaries that shape and constrain member state preferences. They guide states when

they formulate their own national foreign policy and become especially critical when the EU prepares its common foreign policy goals. By investigating of how much the Turkish public and policy makers share these norms and accept making joint decisions with the EU states, this paper tries to assess the impact of enlargement policy on norm diffusion in acceding countries.

Another aspect of Europeanization is institutional changes in decision making procedures. According to European norms, foreign policy decisions at the national level should be taken with the involvement of the government, parliament and civil society organizations. The influence of unelected institutions, such as the military and bureaucracy, should be minimal and decision making procedures must be as open to the public as possible. In accordance with this second aspect of Europeanization, this paper assesses whether there has been a change in Turkish civil-military relations during the membership negotiations process. The military has been a critical actor in Turkish foreign policy decision making. A decline in the role of the military in this area would be a significant indicator of institutional change due to the adaptation of EU standards, and therefore a sign of Europeanization. Through which mechanisms does the EU induce change in acceding countries? Do Turkish foreign policy makers and the public develop a European way of conducting foreign policy because it is the appropriate thing to do or because it maximizes utility for Turkish material interests? In other words, is Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy motivated by the logic of appropriateness or the logic of expected consequences?

Europeanization of National Foreign Policy

Europeanization can occur in two distinctly different manners, one would be through formal policy decisions of the EU and its adaptation by national polities, and the second through increased social interactions between European actors and national actors. (Cowles et al. 2001; Knill 2001) The second path is a more constructivist way of treating the process of Europeanization. This does not mean that the process of Europeanization and the EU-inization are the same thing, but that the EU is the only institution that can offer rewards and/or inflict punishments for Europeanization or lack of it. The European collective identity and its norms and rules transcend the European Union without any question, however, because the EU is the only institution with enforcement mechanisms, it becomes the most visible manifestation of the Europeanization process. The Europeanization of national foreign policy is not only assessed through the emergence of a 'European' way of making decisions, i.e. through consent and coordination of policies across member states but also with respect to the formal institutional changes in the foreign policy actors and with respect to the emergence of EU-level norms.

According to Rieker, "national approaches tend to adapt to norms defined by an international community or institution to which they are closely linked; that this adaptation takes place over time, through a socialization process; and that it may also, in the end, lead to changes in national identity." (Rieker 2006) It is through this perspective that the EU's impact on national foreign policy is important, in terms of its ability to shape and influence the emergence of a European identity and the adaptation of national identities as a result. Even though, the final outcome could be assessed as a collective

identity formation through foreign policy, there still would be a difference as to what motivates the national centers for this adaptation. Are the EU member states willing to adapt their foreign policy making to a European way because it is the appropriate thing to do and in the longer run internalize these norms? Or are the EU member states maximizing their utility in achieving their foreign policy goals by a Europeanization of their foreign policy? These are two different motivations for the adaptation process, however, if the utility maximization is the main motivation, then one would expect to see a reversal of the adaptation process when key material interests, such as survival, are at stake. Thus, it is possible to develop two competing hypotheses for the Europeanization process in Turkish foreign policy.

Proposition I: The Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy results from increased social interactions between Turkey and the EU members where an appropriate way of foreign policy making as a norm is diffused among the public as well as the Turkish foreign policy actors.

Proposition II: Turkish foreign policy makers calculate the material benefits of a European way of foreign policy making and adopt these norms and institutional changes in order to maximize utility.

Norm diffusion from the EU into Turkey in the field of foreign policy making would be either possible in line with the logic of appropriateness, where a European way would eventually emerge as a result of increased social interactions and a collective identity formation, or in line with the logic of expected consequences, where the adoption of European way would serve Turkish utility in terms of its material interests.

An important aspect of the EU's impact on expanding its norms to the countries in its periphery, external salience of norms, is with respect to the changing perceptions and practices of decision making in foreign policy. The EU's common foreign and security policy is expected to change the member state governments' decision making in foreign policy issues from relying solely on national governments to a supranational platform. This is the so-called coordination reflex which in turn has constituted the key in the Europeanization of foreign policy. (de Schoutheete 1980) The development of this reflex is central to the Europeanization process as the member states would basically adapt common norms, principles and decision making procedures on foreign policy. It is, then, expected that in acceding countries such as Turkey, the Europeanization of foreign policy would entail reliance on supranationalism, rather than nationalism. The making of joint decisions in foreign policy, instead of unilateral actions, is an impact of Europeanization.

Institutionally, Europeanization would result in the increased role of democratic procedures in foreign policy making. It is expected that foreign policy decisions are taken by elected officials, the parliament and the government rather than appointed officials such as the bureaucrats and the military. In terms of the normative aspect, European values aim to protect and uphold the promotion of democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights and minorities. This is furthered by the predominant view in the EU that there should be limited use of military tools and increased application of diplomatic instruments and economic sanctions to promote foreign policy objectives.

The process of Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey would, therefore, be measured by the degree to which the coordination reflex has developed, by the increased role of the elected officials in foreign policy decisions, decreased role that the military

would play, and increased use of economic and diplomatic instruments in solving disputes. The sharing of European values and norms in foreign policy by the Turkish public would indicate the extent to which the Europeanization process has stimulated change in the general public and the extent to which these norms have been internalized.

Foreign Policy Norm Diffusion among the Turkish Public

Turkey officially became a candidate country for EU membership in the European Council's Helsinki Summit in 1999. This constituted the main turning point in enhancing the EU's power on Turkey in inducing political change. Six years later when the accession negotiations began with Turkey in October 2005, the EU's impact on the Turkish political structures and norms was enhanced by EU conditionality. It is through the perspective of EU membership that Turkey approved a series of political reforms in this six-year period. The EU's political conditionality and the Turkish desire to fulfill these political criteria in order for accession negotiations to begin became critical in triggering a vast political transformation in Turkey which in turn impacted collective identity formation in Turkey. This is not to say that the EU had no impact on Turkey prior to 1999. On the contrary, Turkey and the EU have a long relationship since the signing of the Association Agreement in 1963 and the establishment of a customs union in 1995. However, it was not before the 1999 Summit and the promise of full membership that the EU became an anchor for Turkey's political liberalization and reform process. (Hale 2000; Muftuler-Bac 1997; Onis 2000, 2001; Muftuler-Bac and McLaren 2003) Since our aim is to understand the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy, analysis of the public perceptions positions are important starting points.

The EU's norm diffusion in foreign policy making depends on the emergence of the coordination reflex. (Tonra, 2001) It is possible to assess the degree to which the coordination reflex has developed in Turkey by analyzing the public's perceptions on the EU's role in foreign policy. One can assess the diffusion of foreign policy norms to Turkey by a comparison of Turkish public's views with the EU publics' views on CFSP and the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP).

This is provided by a comparison of the results from the Eurobarometers 67(2007), 68(2007) and 69(2008) questions relevant to EU foreign policy (tables are in the appendix). These results are particularly indicative of the wide differences between the Turkish public and other European publics in terms of the perceived role that the EU plays in foreign and security policies and key concerns such as terrorism. The Turkish foreign policy makers' positions (the government, the military and the foreign ministry) demonstrate that the elite positions in Turkey toward the EU's common foreign and security role matches that of the Turkish public. The analysis of these perceptions, both at the elite and the public level, is particularly telling in illustrating the limits and constraints on the diffusion of Europeanization norm and the coordination reflex in foreign policy making to Turkey.

Turkey shows a marked difference compared to EU members on foreign policy making and collective decisions on foreign policy issues. One manifestation of the coordination reflex could be seen in the European public's perceptions about the role of the national governments versus the EU in the fight against terrorism. According to Eurobarometer 68 of July 2007, in terms of decisions relating to defense against terrorism, 53% of the Turkish public said that this is a decision that should be left to the

national government, and only 43% of the Turkish public agreed that this should be a joint EU decision. These are by far the highest percentages among all the EU members and candidates, since for the EU in general an absolute majority of respondents (81%), answered that the decision to fight terrorism should be made jointly at EU level (for a comparison of these answers, see Table 1).

The Turkish views differ greatly from the rest of the EU on the issue of terrorism. This divergence can be explained by Turkey's struggle against terrorism since 1984. Public perceptions toward terrorism are largely formulated by an historical experience of armed struggle, especially against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Compared with most EU member states, terrorism is an almost everyday occurrence in Turkey, which results in high perceptions of threat and fear that the survival of the state is at stake. The general Turkish public perception is that, in this foreign policy issue, the Turkish national government should act alone rather than jointly with the EU. In other words, when a material interest is perceived to be at stake, namely the security interest, then the public prefers to rely on the national government more. Given these public views on terrorism and the perception that this is an issue that must be dealt with by the national government, it seems that utility maximizing concerns outweigh appropriateness concerns. The Turkish public does not see the solution of terrorism at the EU level as the best way to deal with the problem. The EU is not seen as an actor that should be relied upon or involved in key decisions that involve the security of the state, such on terrorism.

But does the Turkish public believe that the EU is an important actor in other, perhaps less threatening, foreign policy issues? What is the Turkish public opinion on further EU enlargement, common foreign policy toward non-member countries, and

common security and defense policy? Table 2 gives a summary and a comparison of the Turkish and the general EU perceptions with respect to these questions. According to the Eurobarometer results, Turkish public does not fully support the CFSP or the CESDP as the EU publics do. Once the country specific distributions are taken into account, the disparity between Turkey and the rest of the EU becomes even clearer (table 3). The citizens of the EU members are in favor of common foreign and security as well as common defense policies with a predominant majority. Almost three quarters of the respondents in the EU member states are in favor of CFSP and the CESDP whereas only 40% of the Turkish public is in favor. Opposition to these policies is also very high in Turkey. The low level support indicates that norm diffusion into Turkey in common foreign policy is limited. It also suggests that Europeanization is not internalized, and therefore, the logic of appropriateness can not be at work.

It is particularly important to note that there is a sharp difference between the Turkish public and the general EU public in the Don't Know answers. The Turkish Don't Knows in all the three questions are twice the percentage of the Don't Knows in the EU public. The reason for such a high percentage of Don't Knows in the Turkish public could be traced to the absence of a public debate in the Turkish media and politics on the possible implications of the Turkish accession to its foreign policy. The public's lack of knowledge might be a result of the absence of political cues from opinion leaders in Turkey on this critical issue. Equally important, low levels of public awareness on the EU's CFSP and its ramifications might demonstrate the absence of democratic decision making procedures in foreign policy. Since most of the major foreign policy decisions in Turkey are made behind closed doors among the officials of the military, foreign

ministry, and the government, the public might not be well informed. Lack of knowledge is also an important indicator of the limits of norm diffusion into Turkey.

On the issue of further enlargement, the results demonstrate that the Turkish public is in favor of this European foreign policy. Opposition on this issue is very low in Turkey; however it is quite high in EU member states. Compared with the EU members' results, it seems that the Turkish public has the highest level of support to enlargement as a foreign policy issue, while there is a less enthusiastic outlook toward the CFSP and CESDP. It is possible to assume that this difference is because the Turkish public believes that further EU enlargement would benefit Turkey in the long run while other common foreign policy matters would have unknown consequences. When asked if Turkey would benefit or not from being a member of the European Union, a clear majority of the Turkish public has replied that the country would benefit (58% in 2008, 53% in 2007, and 62% in 2006). The benefits associated with membership seem to be mostly material advantages. Around 70% of the Turkish public in 2005 and 2007 stated that they expect the standard of living in Turkey to get better with membership. These results show that Turkish public opinion is supportive of further EU enlargement because this foreign policy would benefit Turkish interests, as our Proposition II suggests.

The results (in table 3) also shows that among those member states that have high perceptions of threat, support to common foreign, security and defense policies are also high. This provides additional empirical support to our Proposition II that utility maximizing calculations lead to increased support to a European way of making foreign policy decisions. Cyprus provides us with an important example. Cyprus joined the EU only in 2004 and did not have the opportunity to increase its social interactions with other

EU members. Yet, support for CFSP is highest in Cyprus. Cyprus is not a member of NATO or NATO's Partnership for Peace Program. As a result, in the 2002 Copenhagen deal on EU-NATO cooperation, Cyprus was kept out of the EU's 2nd pillar integration. Thus, support for CFSP in Cyprus cannot be explained by norm diffusion through increased social interactions in the 2nd pillar. What best explains the 91% support in Cyprus toward a common defense policy is threat perceptions in Cyprus against Turkey. From the logic of consequences perspective, Greek Cypriots support further CFSP integration because this is expected to benefit Cyprus more than Turkey, a candidate country.

There is also a similar result among the Central and Eastern European countries. Even though all of them are now NATO members, the publics in these member states also support both the CFSP and CESDP with very high percentages. This is most likely due to their historical experience with the Soviet Union. Among member states where there is no such past experience with the USSR and who were among the founding members of NATO such as the UK, support to common foreign and defense policies under the EU umbrella are lower. Support to both CFSP and CESDP are pretty low among the neutral counties such as Finland, Austria, Sweden and Ireland. Thus, we can argue that it is the utility maximizing concerns that are instrumental in the emergence of common norms, rather than increased social interactions between the member states.

A further analysis of the Turkish and EU-27's perceptions on CESDP and CFSP demonstrates key differences especially in the questions relating to the creation of a post for foreign minister at the EU level and autonomy from the USA. The ongoing differences between the American and European perspectives on global security are

important in understanding the key issues of contention and the future of NATO. Since NATO has significantly changed in the post Cold War period and in the post 9/11 period, the answers to the question on independence from the USA actually point out to public support to NATO in the future. Thus, the EU members and the Turkish responses on that question are important to assess the level of support to NATO, an intergovernmental organization rather than a supranational one like the EU. This analysis is provided in Table 4. A country by country analysis on these questions also reveals important points in Table 5.

There is a marked difference between the EU-27 and Turkey, specifically with respect to the relative perceptions of the EU-USA relations. The EU citizens predominantly, by 80%, would like to see an independent and autonomous EU foreign policy from the USA. The main implication of that result is with respect to the prospective role that NATO would play in European security. The Turkish public agrees only by 49% to this division between the EU and USA which most probably reflects the dominance of the USA in Turkey's foreign policy and the central role NATO has played in shaping Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War years.

In addition, it is highly interesting that Greece and Cyprus have the highest percentages on the question of EU's independence from the USA. This is most probably a result of the Greek perceptions that the USA is more inclined toward protecting Turkish interests on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea disputes. (Couloumbis 1966, 1983; Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1987:99; Iadtrides 2003) This also fits well with the Greek foreign policy objectives of Europeanizing these conflicts and to find a solution more conducive to Greek positions, as Greece and Cyprus are EU members while Turkey is not. (Ker-

Lindsay 2007) An important note here then would be that the national self-interests of the players would shape to a large extent their perceptions on the CFSP and CESDP rather than the socialization into an EU specific norm. As argued above, Cyprus has the highest level of support to common foreign policy and endorses independence from the USA, even though it became an EU member only in 2004. This is indicative of the relative weight of utility versus norm-based explanations in European foreign policy, and supports empirically our proposition II rather than proposition I.

Differences between the European and Turkish publics on the EU's common foreign and security policy match with divergent views on what kind of a role the EU would play in international politics fifty years from now. This analysis is provided in Table 6. The results of these Eurobarometer questions are important in assessing the relative weight of the EU's normative power versus its hard power. It seems that the public in member states believes that the EU will become a leading diplomatic power in the future. This is an important endorsement of the EU's normative power elements. The military aspects of the EU have lower support, which is expected given the reluctance among the EU public toward militarization.

Especially important is the public's perceptions in European countries and in Turkey as to whether there are common European values. These questions are particularly telling in terms of the EU's impact as a normative power. If the EU is not perceived to share common values, then to what extent can we talk about a normative power? Interestingly, the Turkish and the EU publics' responses on these questions as shown in Table 7 are similar. The Turkish respondents perceive that the Europeans share a common value system, i.e, a collective identity. Yet, even though the Turks feel that the

Europeans share common values and norms, they also think that Turkey is not part of this identity. When, in the 2007 Eurobarometer survey, Turkish citizens were asked “In your opinion, among the following issues, which are those that most create a feeling of community among European Union citizens?”, the most often cited answer was religion, with 41%. Among the Europeans, religion only got 13%. Since most Turkish citizens do not share the same religion with the Europeans, the answer to this question clearly shows that Turks do not see themselves as part of a European collective identity. In 2005, half of the Turkish public feared that further building of the European Union would lead to the loss of national identity and culture. Thus, for a significant portion of the Turkish public, European collective identity does not only develop outside of Turkey, but also threatens national identity. This is yet another important indicator that European norms failed to diffuse among the Turkish public.

If we could deduce the Turkish public’s general views and attitudes toward the EU’s common foreign, security and defense policies from the Eurobarometers, then a relevant question here is the extent to which the Turkish public at large and the Turkish foreign policy makers, specifically the government and military, are sharing the same views. In other words, do the Turkish political actors support the emergence of a common foreign policy and a common security and defense policy at the EU level? Do the Turkish foreign policy makers support an EU-led only foreign policy independent of the USA and therefore NATO? In order to answer these questions, we need to look into the relevant positions of the Turkish foreign policy actors on the EU’s foreign policy role. The next section addresses these questions and assesses the degree to which institutional changes are adopted in Turkey in line with the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy.

The Actors of Foreign Policy Decision Making in Turkey

The positions of the Turkish military and government toward the EU's CFSP and the CESDP has been mostly determined by the changing dynamics of European security in the post-Cold War era, specifically with respect to the transformations of NATO and the EU. The Turkish Armed Forces have traditionally advocated the use of military instruments especially when the strategic interests of the Turkish state were threatened. Because of this inclination, the Turkish military has been lukewarm toward the establishment of common foreign and security policy in Europe. The implications of such a move could potentially isolate Turkey and damage its strategic interests. From the perception of the military, Turkish interests could be safeguarded better if European states continued to cooperate under the umbrella of NATO. The military is specifically sensitive about the involvement of Cyprus, as a member of the EU, in common foreign and security policy.

When the EU began to move toward common defense policy in 1999 with the creation of Rapid Reaction Force, the non-EU European members of NATO, most importantly Turkey, insisted on the application of the Berlin-plus arrangement and the 1999 NATO summit decisions toward NATO-EU cooperation. (Muftuler-Bac 2000, 2007) The Turkish military and foreign ministry argued that NATO assets could be used in EU operations only after all NATO members approve it. In December 2002, during the Copenhagen summit of the European Council, the EU agreed that “the Berlin-plus arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU member states

which are also either NATO members or parties to the ‘Partnerships for Peace’ and which have consequently concluded bilateral security arrangements with NATO.” (Presidency Conclusions 2002a) This decision operationalized EU’s CESDP and also addressed Turkey’s key concerns. Turkey became an equal partner in EU operations, as a NATO member and associate member of the WEU.

As a result, Turkey has contributed and participated in all the EU-led operations that were held since 2003. In addition, Turkey has pledged to contribute to the EU’s Headline Goal for 2010 with 6,000 troops, aircraft and ships. This contribution made Turkey the fifth-largest contributor to the EU force of 60,000. As a NATO member since 1952, Turkey has been an important security provider for Europe and has also been socialized into a common identity that revolved around NATO. Turkey’s willingness to contribute to European security after 2003 shows that the Turkish military and government still support taking joint decisions with other European countries and providing for the security of the continent.

Even though Turkish participation in EU-led operations is an important indicator of diffusion of European norms among decision makers, it is clear that Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy is also conditioned by strategic interests. When the government and especially the military believe that Turkish strategic interests are jeopardized and Turkey is not recognized as an equal partner, there is a tendency to detach from common decisions.

This inclination was exemplified in 2007 when the EU began to plan its operation in Kosovo. From the Turkish point of view, the main problem was that the EU decided to use NATO facilities and at the same time allow for arrangements that would include

Cyprus in this operation. Since Cyprus must be kept out of the EU-led operations using NATO assets according to the 2002 Copenhagen decision, the Turkish military and government saw this as a violation of the Berlin-plus arrangements and a threat to the country's strategic interests. The EU defined the mission as a civilian operative –EULex, and therefore, did not see a problem in the inclusion of Cyprus. The Turkish argument was that it would not matter if the operation was civilian or military as long as it used NATO assets. General Yılmaz Oguz, Turkey's Representative to NATO's Military Command, communicated Turkey's position to the Council of the EU in May 2007 and argued that "Turkey's expectations are not fulfilled and its concerns are not addressed" ("NATO does not give support to PKK"). The Turkish foreign ministry seemed to agree with the military's concerns. The Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Abdullah Gul, declared that

Parameters were already set in 2002. You shouldn't expect further flexibility from Turkey, a country that has introduced major contributions to NATO as an ally, on this issue. It shouldn't solely be Turkey that is expected to be flexible. Like NATO does in these kinds of situations, the EU should find a solution to this issue itself, without using its form of a decision mechanism as an excuse. (Simsek 2007)

This impasse was quite significant for the future of European common foreign policy. As the EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn claimed "this is a problem for Europe and it hurts the EU, and its troops." ("AB Komisyonu Uyesi Olli Rehn'den İlerleme Çağrısı")

Despite calls for cooperation, the Turkish government and military objected to the use of NATO assets in the operation. In March 2008, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer made an attempt to override the Turkish veto by holding an unofficial meeting between the EU and NATO. The Turkish side fiercely reacted to that meeting arguing that this goes against the general rules and practices of NATO "since NATO functions on a consensus basis." (Inanc 2008) Turkey believed that such a meeting cannot

take place without the consent of all members. Even though the meeting was cancelled, the immediate impact of the crisis was felt between the Turkish government and the military.

The military believed that unless the dispute was settled, Turkey should not contribute to the EU mission. However, the government opposed the perceptions of the military. The civilian cabinet was concerned about the possibility that “Turkey might be excluded from the international body which will for some time have a say in the administration of Kosovo.” (Inanc 2008) As a result, the government decided to contribute to the EU’s Kosovo mission. However, the cabinet still agreed with the military on the use of NATO assets. In summer 2008, Turkey effectively said no to the EULex’s access to NATO and vetoed the modalities which would have enabled the EULex to take over from UN forces. (“Turkey row clouds day as NATO backs Kosovo army training”)

Despite the agreement between the military and cabinet on the use of NATO assets, the government still wanted to be part of the EU mission. This is a radical break from past practices since traditionally the civilian cabinet does not oppose the military’s concerns on foreign policy. This is important to note because it reflects on the emerging dynamics of foreign policy decision making in Turkey. It also demonstrates the limits of norm diffusion among Turkish state actors. Even though the government seems to accept (more than the armed forces) working with other European member states and taking joint decisions, the fact is both the civilian cabinet and the military still have concerns when the strategic interests of Turkey are threatened. When there are no such concerns, both actors support Turkish participation in European common security and foreign

policy. The Turkish government's position differed from the military's position in Kosovo and this constituted a first instance where such a break was visible. This could be seen as an illustration of the institutional changes in Turkish foreign policy where the government took the leadership role on a foreign policy issue. This is also indicative of the possible normative impact of the EU.

In foreign policy, the EU transmits norms to its members and candidate countries in two interrelated areas. These areas are, first, foreign policy decision making procedures and second, the use of economic and diplomatic instruments to achieve foreign policy goals. The first dimension relates to the liberal democracy norm that the EU diffuses in the international sphere. According to the liberal democratic model, no unelected group (such as the military, monarchy, judiciary, or bureaucracy) can hold reserve or tutelary powers that can obstruct policy making capabilities of the elected officials. (Linz 1975:182-183, Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995:78) Indeed, highly autonomous military institutions that have the power to shape, determine, and veto foreign and domestic policies are against what the EU considers as the normal way that a democratic regime functions. As a result, foreign policy cannot be determined exclusively by an institution - military or bureaucratic- that is not accountable to the voters in regular national elections.

In European democracies, foreign policy is usually determined by the government with the involvement of civil society groups and after consultation and discussion in the parliament. In contrast, until recently foreign policy decisions in Turkey were taken behind close doors and with the heavy involvement of unelected officials, especially the military and the bureaucrats of the ministry of foreign affairs. (Sayari and Makovsky 2000:2-6) In an ideal-type democracy that fits to EU norms, the armed forces are

accountable to “a single, civilian-directed defense ministry”. (Pion-Berlin 1992:89) Some of the responsibilities of the ministry of defense are to arbitrate between the demands of the government and the military, to determine the roles and missions of the armed forces, and to increase the performance of the armed forces in accomplishing its tasks. (Bruneau and Goetze 2006:71-92) Thus, if the military will be deployed in a foreign mission, this decision is first made by the elected government and the parliament in consultation with civil society groups. Then, it is the responsibility of the ministry of defense, in deliberation with the cabinet and the military, to determine how the mission will take place. Turkey, however, does not fit this pattern because the armed forces are not responsible to the ministry of defense. (Cizre Sakallioglu 1997:159-160) As a result, the military enjoys greater leverage in determining foreign policy and has more say than its counterparts in Europe in decisions pertaining to the deployment of armed forces. This is why the divergence between the Turkish government and the military in 2008 over the Turkish participation in EULex is important and constitutes a significant break with the past.

The EU also transmits as a core norm the use of economic and diplomatic instruments to achieve foreign policy goals. These civilian tools involve seeking international legitimacy, collaborating with others in the region, and looking for solutions in multilateral settings and international or regional institutions. Europeanization of foreign policy entails minimal use of military instruments and force in solving disputes, even in ones that are perceived as high politics, such as border disputes. According to EU norms, employment of diplomatic and economic carrots and sticks are a better and more legitimate way to deal with conflictual situations.

Naturally, this core norm relates with the first one, i.e. democratic foreign policy decision making procedures. If the government collaborates with civil society organizations and confers with the parliament, it is more likely that diplomatic and economic foreign policy tools will be employed more than military instruments. In contrast, the heavy involvement of the armed forces in decision making might produce results where the strategic interests of the country are furthered by the use of military instruments. In many international disputes, the Turkish Armed Forces have advocated the use of coercion rather than civilian instruments. As a result, the involvement of the military in decision making procedures have resulted in more hard-line tactics overall. This might also be seen as empirical proof for our propositions and coincide with our findings on the public's perceptions. When key survival interests are perceived to be in danger by the military, norms and the European way of doing things become less valid in Turkey.

After 1999, the European Union accession process started to affect the powers of the military in Turkish democracy and hence its involvement in foreign policy decision making. The primary way the EU influenced Turkish politics was through the prospect of EU membership and enlargement negotiations –what Ian Manners calls the “procedural diffusion” of EU norms. (2002:244) After Turkey officially became a candidate country, the government passed several reform packages in accordance with the EU accession criteria (Hale 2003:110-118, Muftuler-Bac 2005: 21-29, Ozbudun 2007:179-196). Some of these reforms also affected the role of the military in foreign and domestic policy.

Especially critical were the changes in the powers of the National Security Council (NSC). The members of the NSC include military commanders and members of the

civilian government. The NSC is responsible for “the formulation, establishment and implementation of the national security policy of the state”. It prepares the National Security Policy Document, which determines the necessary actions that must be taken against main security threats. (Robins 2003: 76-77) The 2001 amendment package changed the role of the cabinet vis-à-vis the NSC. While in the past the cabinet was required to “give priority consideration” to the decisions of the NSC, now it is obligated only to “evaluate” the “advice” of the Council. (Ozbudun 2007:193-194, Ozbudun 2002: 27-28) Further changes in the Constitution in July 2003 increased the powers of the civilians relative to the military representatives in the NSC. The secretary general of the NSC, who had previously been a military officer, was replaced by a civilian and his powers were reduced. The number of civilians working in the under-secretariat was increased relative to the military officers and finally the regular meetings of the NSC were reduced from once a month to once every two months. (Heper 2005: 37, Jenkins 2007: 346-347, Turan 2007: 331-332, Ozbudun 2007: 193-195) These reforms reduced the powers of the military in Turkish politics, and thereby we would argue, affected the influence of the armed forces in foreign policy.

The Europeanization of foreign policy decision making procedures was coupled with several changes in the instruments that the Turkish state employed. While in the past the Turkish state used more coercive, hard-line tools to solve conflicts, after Turkey became an official candidate, there was a marked shift toward the use of economic and diplomatic instruments. This change was visible in the way Turkey dealt with the Kurdish problem, Cyprus dispute, Greek-Turkish relations, and the participation of Turkey in EU’s Kosovo mission. (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006; Celik and Rumelili 2006; Kirisci

2004a). In the following pages, we will analyze changes in foreign policy with regards to the Kurdish problem, since this is the best example that demonstrates the use of military versus diplomatic/economic instruments.

The Turkish Armed Forces (among other groups in Turkey) have advocated a military solution to the Kurdish question. This approach argues that the problem in Turkey does not originate from the Kurdish minority per se, but it is a predicament caused by the terrorist organization, PKK. According to this perspective, the problem has been aggravated by the creation of the northern no-flight zone in Iraq after the Gulf War. This strengthened the PKK and allowed it to establish bases across the border. The military approach believes that, for any viable solution in southeast Turkey, the armed forces must first defeat the PKK. After terrorism is eliminated, “economic and social programs... would resolve the problems of the region.” (Kirisci 2004b:283) Thus, this approach does not believe that diplomatic and economic instruments can produce a solution until the PKK and its bases in Northern Iraq are eliminated.

In contrast to this military method, the more Europeanized foreign policy approach favors the use of civilian instruments. Implicit in such a style of foreign policy is the conviction that “the Kurdish problem is a product of increasing demands by Kurds to express their cultural and ethnic identity and the inability of Turkey to adjust to these demands”. (Kirisci 2004b:287) Seen from this perspective, the problem can be solved by recognizing the cultural, ethnic, and political rights of the Kurds in Turkey. In addition, this approach supports establishing better diplomatic relations with the leaders of the autonomous Kurdish government in Northern Iraq, using multilateral mechanisms, and seeking international legitimacy to solve the problem.

While in the past military instruments were used more, Turkish foreign policy on this issue Europeanized in the late 1990s. An important precipitator of EU influence was the success of military instruments in decreasing the power of the PKK. In 1998, Syria had to deport Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, after the Turkish state coerced and threatened war against its neighbor. (Kirisci 2004b:295) Ocalan fled to Italy and this time Turkey exerted considerable pressure to its NATO ally. The leader of the PKK was finally deported from Italy too and captured in the Greek embassy in Kenya. After his arrest, Ocalan called a cease-fire, which effectively ended PKK terrorism for three years.

By 1999, military tactics and coercive approach had paid off and the prospects for Turkish membership in the EU had increased. Consequently, Turkish foreign policy abandoned the use of military instruments and moved closer to the European norms. In August 2002, broadcasting and education became possible in Kurdish. Also in the same year, death penalty in Turkey was abolished. Even though rejecting death penalty was a significant application of an EU norm in itself, it was also a major development because it resolved the question of whether or not the captured leader of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was going to be executed.

After the November 2002 elections, the newly elected Justice and Development Party (JDP) accelerated the reform process and strengthened the economic and diplomatic approach further by enacting six additional constitutional packages and revising the penal code. These amendments, among others, put into operation the previously ratified reforms. As a result, the Turkish Radio and Television started to show some Kurdish programs; at least four Kurdish TV and radio stations in the east began

broadcasting; and in several primary schools, children were able to learn the language. (Grigoriadis 2006:449, Commission of the European Communities 2007:22)

From 1999 until 2004, EU norms on foreign policy decision making and instruments seemed to have gradually diffused into Turkey. However, in 2004, the PKK resumed its activities and carried out several destructive attacks against the Turkish armed forces and the civilian population in the southeast. The most violent attack against the security forces occurred in October 2007, in Hakkari, Dagleca and the biggest assault against civilians (killing two high school students and several other civilians) took place in 3 January 2008 in Diyarbakir. (“Gozler Hukumette”, “Cocuklari da Vurdular”)

Two different developments were perceived as the causes of PKK’s renewed activities, both supporting a return to the use of military instruments. First, the war in Iraq was seen as increasing the chances of an independent Kurdistan in Northern Iraq. The relaxation of authority in the region allowed PKK fighters to cross the border to Turkey more frequently. The second cause for the resumption of PKK activities was seen as the Europeanization of foreign policy itself. The reforms that gave rights to the Kurdish minority and reduced the power of the military and the NSC led to assertions that “EU-induced reform laws have weakened the Turkish state, made it impossible to effectively fight terrorism and encouraged Kurdish separatism.” (Patton 2007:346) As a result of increasing terrorist activities, the use of diplomatic and economic instruments in foreign policy started to lose ground. As our proposition II would suggest, the European way of foreign policy making was adopted as long as it maximized the utility calculations for Turkey. When these norms were seen to conflict with material security interests, there was a shift in foreign policy making back to the past practices.

Even though on occasion the government continued to resist the decisions of the military (like on the decision of Turkey's contribution to the Kosovo mission), some of the instruments that were used on the Kurdish problem were gradually reversed. Education in Kurdish was banned and several court cases were opened against producers that broadcasted in Kurdish. In June 2007, the Council of State dismissed the mayor of a district in Diyarbakir and closed down the Municipality Council because public services were also carried out in Kurdish. Several charges were also made to Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) for being involved with PKK terrorism. In November 2007 the Attorney General appealed to the Constitutional Court to close down the party. ("DTP'ye Kapatma Istemi") One month later, the chairman of the DSP was arrested because he avoided serving in the military by obtaining a fabricated health report. (All male Turkish citizens at a certain age must be conscripted for various months. For the arrest of Nurettin Demirtas, see "Demirtas'a Ucak Korugunde Gozalti")

The Justice and Development Party government also reversed its attacks on the military's role in foreign policy decision making. In November 2007, the Turkish parliament and the JDP government gave the permission to the Turkish Armed Forces to carry out operations in Northern Iraq against PKK camps. In February 2008, the Turkish military crossed the border and attacked PKK bases for eight days. The operation marked a return to military instruments, which also put the armed forces at the center stage. The JDP endorsed this process and let the military carry out its mission. When the return of Turkish troops increased controversy over why the operations did not last longer, the Chief of the General Staff, Yasar Buyukanit, declared that no one asked the operations to be terminated. Even though Buyukanit was replying to claims that the USA pressured the

Turkish Armed Forces to end the operations, he also implied that there was no internal political pressure to stop the mission. This is significant evidence that the JDP government endorsed the military's mission in Northern Iraq. Buyukanit's declaration gives the impression that the government did not get involved in how the military carried out the operation. In the same speech, Buyukanit warned that a political solution in the southeast would strengthen the PKK. In addition, he argued that the terrorist organization recruits members in Turkey mainly because of economic difficulties. ("Uniformami Cikaririm") This is a restatement of the foreign policy that Turkey followed in the 1990s and marks the waning of Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy.

The European Union norms on foreign policy seemed to have lost ground by 2008. From 1999 to 2004, several important steps were taken on these issues. The procedural diffusion of EU norms in Turkey took place after the EU officially declared Turkey as a candidate country. This commitment occurred at the same time with the weakening of the PKK. These developments strengthened the use of economic and diplomatic instruments in Turkish foreign policy at the expense of the military. This was evidenced in March 2008 when the civilian government decided to participate in the Kosovo mission with EU member states contrary to the military's decision. However, reversal of the Europeanization process especially on the Kurdish issue signifies the fragility of these norms and their vulnerable diffusion into Turkey. When terrorist attacks against Turkey increased, the advocates of the use of military instruments in foreign policy legitimized their earlier positions.

Conclusion

One conclusion that can be drawn out of our analysis is that norm diffusion from the EU into Turkey on foreign policy has been weak. First, a comparison of Eurobarometer survey results between the European member states and Turkey indicates that the Turkish public either does not know the role the EU plays in foreign and security policy or is not supportive of further 2nd pillar European integration. Second, Turkish foreign policy decision-makers, such the government and the military, are ambivalent about EU common foreign policy, similar to the Turkish public. There have been several important steps on this issue that suggests the diffusion of EU norms. For example, Turkey participated in all of the EU-led operations after 2003 and initially contributed troops and material to the EU's Rapid Reaction Force. However, Turkish elites have been skeptical of NATO-EU strategic cooperation. Problems arose when it became possible for Cyprus to access NATO assets in Kosovo. Turkey withdrew from the Headline Goal as a response. This demonstrates the fragility of the joint decision making norm and coordination reflex on foreign and security matters in Turkey.

Similarly, the diffusion of democratic foreign policy decision making into Turkey has been weak. Turkish civil-military relations changed especially until 2004, demonstrating the adoption of EU norms. However, when Kurdish terrorism increased, there was a return to military tactics and increasing role of the armed forces. Thus, even though Turkish foreign policy making has been influenced by EU norms, this diffusion is tenuous.

A second conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that norm diffusion becomes problematic when there is a conflict between what is considered as national

interests and EU norms. This is evident in the reactions of the Turkish public on EU cooperation in terrorism. Since Turkey is threatened by terrorism, the public is reluctant to support joint decision making on this issue. Similarly, the key foreign policy decision-makers in Turkey, and especially the military, fear that Kurdish terrorism would disintegrate Turkish territory. They advocate solving the problem at the national level and with the use of military instruments, rather than collaborating with European states and using economic and diplomatic tools. When the threat of Kurdish terrorism declined, Turkish elites were more willing to accept EU norms. However, when the threat increased, some of the EU norms were abandoned. Similarly, when Cyprus was not involved in EU-NATO operations, Turkey was a willing participant, adopting the EU norms on joint action. However, when the threat that Cyprus might gain access to NATO assets increased, Turkey abandoned this norm.

There is a significant correlation between the EU's normative power on Turkey and interest-based calculations among the Turkish elites. Our analysis has found support for proposition II. Turkey adopts European norms in foreign policy for its material benefits. When there is a conflict between what is perceived as a key security concern and European norms, the latter is usually abandoned. Even though under some circumstances, it seems that Turkish foreign policy has Europeanized, this is not because the Turkish public and foreign policy actors believe this is the appropriate thing to do.

A final conclusion is that EU's enlargement policy impacts the diffusion of European norms, only when the prospect of membership is seen credible in the recipient country. This is in line with the argument that norms diffuse better when they positively correlate with utility-based calculations. The Turkish public is supportive of EU

enlargement more than further integration in the 2nd pillar because Turkey is expected to gain more with EU membership. Common defense and security policy in the EU without Turkish membership would not necessarily bring about the same benefits to Turkey. Similar calculations are also evident in EU-NATO cooperation. This issue would not be a problem if Turkey was a member of both NATO and the EU. The applicability of EU norms within Turkey depends on the possibility of Turkish membership to the EU. The Turkish case demonstrates that EU's normative power must be matched with material gains in order for the EU to influence normative change in its periphery.

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
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Appendix

Table 1 -For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly within the European Union?

Fighting Terrorism



Source: Eurobarometer 68, December 2007 Turkey National Report. Question Qa20a.4, p.23.

Table 2 -Question 27: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it?				
Q27.2 A common foreign policy among the Member States of the EU, toward other countries				
	Fall 2006		Spring 2007	
	EU 25	Turkey	EU 27	Turkey
In favor	68%	39%	72%	40%
Against	21%	41%	18%	33%
Don't Know	11%	21%	10%	27%
Q27.3 Support for a common defence and security policy among the EU member states				
	Fall 2006		Spring 2007	
	EU 25	Turkey	EU 27	Turkey
In favor	75%	50%	77%	46%
Against	16%	28%	15%	29%
Don't Know	9%	21%	8%	25%
Q27.4 Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in the future years				
	Fall 2006		Spring 2007	
	EU 25	Turkey	EU 27	Turkey
In favor	46%	50%	49%	50%
Against	42%	29%	39%	26%
Don't Know	12%	21%	12%	24%

Source: Eurobarometer 68, December 2007 Turkey National Report. Question 27, p.25

Table 3			
Country	QA27.2 (CFSP) For %	QA27.3 (CESDP) For %	QA27.4 (Enlargement) For %
Austria	69	68	28
Belgium	78	88	44
Bulgaria	70	78	58
Cyprus	79	91	65
Czech Republic	68	87	65
Denmark	59	72	51
Estonia	72	86	55
Finland	62	65	39
France	70	82	32
Germany	84	87	34
Greece	80	84	56
Hungary	76	79	64
Ireland	67	61	42
Italy	73	75	48
Latvia	74	86	56
Lithuania	77	84	68
Luxembourg	74	83	25
Malta	60	62	62
Netherlands	65	79	50
Poland	81	85	76
Portugal	63	70	51
Romania	65	77	67
Slovakia	78	87	59
Slovenia	82	88	67
Spain	77	79	65
Sweden	50	59	52
United Kingdom	52	56	41
EU 27	72	77	49
Turkey	40	46	50

Source: Eurobarometer 67, field work: April-May 2007, publication November 2007, pp.146-151.

Table 4 -Question A39: Evaluations on the EU's common foreign policy		
QA39.1 The EU should have its own foreign minister who can be the spokesperson for a common EU position		
	EU 27	Turkey
Tend to Agree	69%	50%
Tend to Disagree	18%	12%
Don't Know	13%	38%
QA39.2: The EU's foreign policy should be independent from the USA's foreign policy		
	EU 27	Turkey
Tend to Agree	80%	49%
Tend to Disagree	10%	14%
Don't Know	10%	37%
QA39.3: The EU should have a common immigration policy towards people from outside the EU .		
	EU 25	Turkey
Tend to Agree	75%	43%
Tend to Disagree	14%	17%
Don't Know	11%	40%

Source: Eurobarometer 68, 2007 Turkey National Report. Question 39, p.28

Table 5			
Country	QA39.1 (Foreign Minister) FOR %	QA 39.2 (Independence from the USA) FOR %	QA 39.3 (Common Immigration Policy) FOR %
Austria	68	80	72
Belgium	81	83	85
Bulgaria	81	73	67
Cyprus	69	92	86
Czech Republic	68	80	
Denmark	48	83	71
Estonia	67	79	72
Finland	61	85	65
France	73	83	76
Germany	75	90	83
Greece	67	94	86
Hungary	71	82	79
Ireland	65	77	71
Italy	72	68	72
Latvia	72	78	75
Lithuania	72	77	78
Luxembourg	68	82	76
Malta	68	79	73
Netherlands	74	83	79
Poland	68	80	77
Portugal	61	72	65
Romania	54	65	62
Slovakia	67	84	81
Slovenia	81	88	84
Spain	71	81	78
Sweden	52	89	70
United Kingdom	57	75	68
EU 27	69	80	75
Turkey	50	49	43

Source: Eurobarometer 67, field work: April-May 2007 publication November 2007, pp.166-169 and 471-473.

Table 6 -Question 38: For every item below, the European Union fifty years onwards will.....?						
	EU-27 Spring 2007			Turkey Spring 2007		
	Yes, most probably	No, not probably	Don't Know	Yes, most probably	No, not probably	Don't Know
Have a more valuable currency than the US dollar with the Euro?	61%	22%	17%	38%	20%	42%
Become one of the leading diplomatic powers?	61%	22%	17%	42%	18%	40%
Have its own Army?	56%	26%	18%	32%	24%	44%
Have a President elected by European Citizens?	51%	30%	19%	36%	21%	43%
Only become a secondary economic power?	31%	49%	20%	38%	19%	43%

Source: Eurobarometer 68, 2007 Turkey National Report. Question 38, p.27

Table 7 -Shared Values and Collective Identity		
When compared to other continents, it is much easier to see what Europeans have in common in terms of values		
	EU 27	Turkey
Agree	61%	63%
Disagree	22%	13%
Don't Know	17%	24%
There are no common European values, only global Western values		
	EU 27	Turkey
Agree	44%	25%
Disagree	37%	44%
Don't Know	19%	31%
In your opinion, in terms of shared values, are European Union Member States...?		
	EU 27	Turkey
Close to each other	54%	64%
Distant from each other	34%	10%
Don't Know	12%	26%

Source: Eurobarometer 69, 2008