

## WP 5 – Civil Society and the Public Sphere

### **Euroscepticism in the European Parliament Elections of June 2009 Country Report: Poland**

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### **Introduction**

The Polish society is constantly presenting a very high level of support for the integration of Poland within the European Union. On the other hand however, Poles are electing the political parties which are clearly using the arguments of the Eurosceptics in their political activity, in the national politics, and in European institutions. The following report's aim is to present the overview of the shades of Euroscepticism in Poland, explain its origins and present their presence in the recent EP elections campaign in Poland.

Many researchers have struggled over the appropriate definition of Euroscepticism. Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) classify Euroscepticism in two categories: *soft* and *hard* Eurosceptics. *Soft* Eurosceptics do not oppose European integration in general, but criticise selected aspects of the European Union. Hard Euroscepticism refers to a general rejection of membership of the European Union. As other authors have noticed, the definition of soft Euroscepticism might be too broad and too inclusive, as many political parties in Europe criticise at least some aspect of the European Union (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 300). Kopecký and Mudde created a typology of four possible attitudes towards the EU and European integration: Euro-enthusiasts support both European integration and the European Union, Eurosceptics support European integration, but not its current realisation in the EU, Europragmatists are against the principle of integration, but acknowledge some beneficial or unavoidable aspects of the EU and finally, Eurorejects denounce both the principle of integration and its current shape in the EU

(Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 302-304). Bringing this typology into the Polish context we can follow Krzysztof Jasiecki, who proposed a valuable typology in which he divided the attitudes towards European integration and the EU into three groups: Euro-enthusiasts, Eurorealists and Eurosceptics/Eurorejects (Jasiecki 2004; 90-91). The first one corresponds with Kopecký and Mudde's definition of Euro-enthusiasts. Euro-realists generally support European integration, but point to an adverse impact of certain solutions within the EU, and finally, Eurosceptics/Eurorejects who criticise and denounce the majority or all institutional solutions of European integration and the EU. The focus of this study is on the last category, including both Eurosceptics (in hard and soft form) and Eurorejects.

The controversy over the place and role of Polish society in integrating Europe reflects fundamental divisions in Polish public discourse. Since the very beginning of the system transformation, public discourse in Poland has been framed by two major divides, namely socioeconomic and axiological ones. The socioeconomic divide took the form of a dispute between proponents of neo-liberal free market and an interventionist welfare state. The axiological divide, on the other hand, has been a forum of confrontation between advocates of liberalism and ethnic nationalism. This polar characteristic of public discourse in Poland after 1989 constitutes the background for the European debate. In this framework, following the similar typology proposed by Krzysztof Zuba in 2006, we can identify three main approaches clearly present within the Polish society: 'Euroenthusiasts', firmly support the Polish membership in the EU, 'Eurorealists' who, in principle, acknowledge positive consequences of European integration but raise doubts about some political and economic decisions undertaken by the EU, and finally 'Eurosceptics' who accentuate mainly negative outcomes of Polish membership in the EU, sometimes reaching the extreme pole of the 'Eurorejects'. What emerges out of the analysis of the European discourse in Poland is a significant difference of opinions expressed within the realm of these three modes of thinking.

The only mode of thinking in the European discourse in Poland which maintains the character of coherent socioeconomic and axiological platform is the sub-discourse within the 'Eurosceptic' narrative, which could be called 'Eurorejection'. This sub-discourse is constructed upon a fundamental critique of the very *raison d'être* of the EU as a normative basis for economic, political and social relations in contemporary Europe. The complex nature of the mental maps of European discourse within Polish society could be explained by comparing the essence and substance of the three ideal narratives already identified here as a dispute between 'Euroenthusiasts', 'Eurorealists' and 'Eurosceptics/Eurorejects'. Having reconstructed the main axis of this dispute, we would be in a better position to understand the meaning of the Eurosceptic narrative for the overall dynamics of European discourse within Polish society, in the context of EU membership. The general axis of the debate in Poland as presented and updated by Jasiecki (2004) and is illustrated in table 1.

What seems to be of particular importance in the analysis of the Eurosceptics/Eurorejects narrative in contemporary Polish society is its direct reference to the civilisational heritage of the 17th century Sarmatian idea of Poland as an avant-garde of Western Christianity, safeguarding Europe from the threat of Turkish Islam and Russian Orthodoxy. Within this mode of thinking we may also find reference to the 19th century messianic concept of Poland as the Christ of Nations. More recently, this mode of thinking has been reflected in the interwar concept of National Democracy (Endecja), which inspires contemporary Eurosceptics/Eurorejects in Poland, identifying the main threats to Polish national identity as bolshevism, communism and atheism. This political and axiological tradition denotes a Polish specific form of Euroscepticism/Eurorejecting compared to other variations of this mode of thinking which occur across Europe.

**Table 1. Axis of the debate on Europe**

<b>Dimensions of differences</b>	<b>Euroenthusiasts</b>	<b>Eurorealists</b>	<b>Euroskeptics/Eurorejects</b>
Intellectual assumptions	Tradition of the Enlightenment; theories of modernisation, liberal economy	Tradition of the Enlightenment, neoliberal economy, conservative, Christian-democratic and social-democratic conceptions	Adherence to Sarmatian concept of political philosophy; Poland as avant-garde of Western Christianity, a safeguard from Turkish Islam and Russian Orthodoxy, messianic ideology, national-democratic, anti-communist and anti-Brussels concepts
Concept of state and society	development of civil society within the realm of the EU	Aggregation of individuals and social groups evolving towards supranational organization based on nation-states	Ethnic group based on <i>jus sanguinis</i> principle, national mythology, tradition and culture organized in the form of the nation-state
Justification of European integration	Adaptation to globalisation and new form of regionalisation	Enforced adaptation to external challenges, which, however provides opportunities in Central Europe	Process imposed by the West; a new form of hegemony of Western Europe over Central Europe
Strategic goal of Poland	Further integration as driving force for intensification of economic and social transformation	Integration as a supportive mechanism further economic and social transformation for system transformation	Defence of national identity and state sovereignty from the Brussels-led economic and axiological hegemony
Rationale of proponents	Opportunity to limit civilisational backwardness of Poland	Emphasis on commonality of values with other EU countries; benefits and loss perspective as framework for European discourse	Traditional national and religious values; critique of Brussels's regulatory regime
Perception of main threats	Petrification of outdated structures and institutions	Stagnation or deepening of civilisational distance to leading countries of the EU	Transformation of Poland into market for Western European export, cheap labour force reservoir
Future of the EU	Federal supranational structure	Less centralised form of economic union of nation-states based on intergovernmental cooperation	Union of nation-states based on hegemony and subjugation
Current political recommendations 2009	Prompt ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, adoption of the Charter for Fundamental Rights in full length	Tough negotiations and bargaining aimed at maximalisation of benefits for Poland	Search for alternatives to the EU as a main form for international cooperation

The concept of state and society advocated by them is therefore deeply rooted in a traditionalist perspective of nation and state-building. It is constructed upon religious, cultural and ethnic criteria interwoven with a key role of the *jus sanguinis* principle of citizenship, as well as the importance of national mythology and Catholicism as denominators of Polishness. The vision of integrating Europe deduced from such assumptions and refers directly to the 19th century concept of nation-state as the only legitimate realm of democratic polity, as opposed to the concept of civil society and supranational institutions such as the EU.

The proponents of the Eurosceptics/Eurorejects perspective, perceive Polish membership in the EU as a threat to national identity and state sovereignty. They emphasise the need to remain distant from the main current of European integration. Such attitude is a consequence of perceiving European integration in terms of an imposed Western policy, whose main aim is to subjugate other nations of Europe to the interests of the old EU members by applying instruments of financial and political domination. In this sense, European integration is synonymous to economic and political hegemony of the West over Poland and other East-Central European countries. What, therefore, becomes a moral imperative and a strategic objective for the Euroskeptics, is a defense of Polish sovereignty and national identity. The advocates of such orientation oppose moral liberalism associated with the permission of abortion, euthanasia, homosexual marriage, and genetic engineering, striving to preserve traditional family values, religion and national identity. They also portray the EU as a centralised supranational power, imposing irrational administrative regulations. In this rhetoric, Moscow's ideological dictatorship during the Cold War has presently been replaced by Brussels's economic hegemony. The consequence of Brussels's economic hegemony is downgrading Poland's role in the international relations in the export market, cheap labour force and the reservoir of natural resources. However, what is regarded as a supreme threat to the national economy is the overtaking of control by foreign capital as well as the selloff of national assets.

As it was mentioned earlier, the level of support for the integration and membership to the European Union is, in Poland, one of the highest in the entire European Union. In 2009 85 per cent of Poles support EU membership, while only 9 per cent are against it (CBOS 2009). Since Enlargement the number of those who favour integration reached increased of 20 per cent and those who are oppose it decreased on 20 per cent. Poles not only perceive integration as a positive process (mostly beneficial for the country, and to a lesser extent having a positive influence on their own life), but also support a deepening of the integration. Poles perceive their membership in the EU as a good thing and the number of those satisfied with integration is higher than the EU-average (Eurobarometer 2008). Paradoxically, the positive attitude to the European integration is confirmed by supporters of most of political parties, even those who clearly using the Eurosceptical rhetoric (only four main parties were indicated in the research – none of the Eurorejects). However the PiS electorate witness the lowest support yet still on the very high level of 80 per cent (CBOS 2009). It might then indicate that as regard the Eurosceptical positions of parties - they are not about the integration in general project of integration but rather about the model of European Union. The 2007 research (CBOS 2007) revealed that Poles definitely accept the deepening of integration. The most accepted dimension of integration was economic cooperation. This process is accepted by 85 per cent of Poles (5 per cent more than in 2005 and 14 per cent more than in 2004). Since Enlargement in 2004, more than 60 per cent of Poles also feel attached to the European Union (61 per cent), but as many as 84 per cent felt attached to Europe in May 2006. At the same time, Poles are very strongly attached to their country. 97 per cent of respondents claim that they feel attached to Poland. Attachment to their city, town or village is relatively strong – 93 per cent. We can understand it as a strong attachment to the Poland in Europe.

Generally, the Polish society hardly ever points to a negative impact of the membership on the situation in Poland. The respondents who noticed this negative influence said it can be seen in: the drain on brain and manpower (6 per cent), necessity of the harmonisation to the EU law, standards and norms (6 per cent), dependence on the EU, loss of sovereignty (5 per cent) (CBOS 2007). On the other hand, they do not really see the influence of membership on the quality of the internal, national political situation. Only 17 per cent in 2005, 27 per cent in 2006 and 34 per cent of Poles in 2007 claimed the EU membership influenced the working political system within the country, with 44 per cent, 37 per cent and 34 per cent respectively who said it did not have any impact (CBOS 2007). Moreover, the opinion that membership in the EU did not really influence

Polish national identity, defined in terms of religiosity and patriotism, have remained valid. In 2009, the number of respondents convinced that membership in the EU contributed to the strengthening of patriotism among Poles and rose to 24 per cent (CBPS 2009).

## State of the art literature review

The body of Polish literature on Euroscepticism is very thin. It can be divided into research and literature covering the pre-accession period until 2004 and post-enlargement reality. Moreover, there is a significant amount of research devoted to the traditional circles which promote Eurosceptic ideas such as right-wing parties, however, it does not focus on the European dimension of the phenomenon. The research on Euroscepticism in Poland is mostly divided into a sociological dimension, devoted to the research of attitudes toward integration and on research of political parties and ideologies.

In Polish literature, the term Euroscepticism appeared for the first time in the beginning of 1990s, when Poland initiated its efforts to integrate with western structures and with the European Union in particular. The first big attempt to organize the information of the attitudes sceptical toward European integration was presented in the volume edited by Magdalena Rychter in 1999 and included the article by Andrzej Sakson on the attitudes of Polish society toward the integration with the EU (1999). The quantitative research approach toward the social attitudes within the country, including anti-European trends and xenophobic tendencies, were also presented in the volume; 'Europa i my. Polska i Polacy wobec integracji europejskiej' edited by Wiesława Piątkowska-Stępniać and Lech Rubisz, published in 2000 or by Jan Garlicki in 2006.

At the same time, the various groups of researchers initiated more time-consuming qualitative research on attitudes toward integration. Those various attempts included the themes of scepticism toward integration or simply by fears stemming from various processes at that time, like transformation, Europeanisation etc. We can list the research conducted by the team under leadership of Zdzisław Mach and Dariusz Niedźwiedzki (1998, 2002). This research shed more light on the reasons and origins of certain attitudes.

In 1999 there appeared one of the first publications devoted not only to the general opinions toward integration but also to the Euroscepticism confronted by Euro-optimism in Polish society. Antoni Malinowski concentrated on political parties and ideologies, as well as social resonance of those messages in Polish society (1999). Recently there has also been more research on political parties and political ideologies in the context of integration (Cebul 2007; Cebul 2009; Machaj 2006; Słodkowska, I., Dołbakowska M. 2006).

From another perspective, researchers have focused on the particularly Eurosceptic social groups of the time – predominantly farmers. The most important attempt was the monograph by Lucjan Kocik 'Trauma i Eurosceptycyzm polskiej wsi' published in 2001. This sociological work concentrates on the situation of the Polish countryside during transformation. The author writes about the 'farmers' trauma' understood as alienation of rural areas, the syndrome of Polish peasants' fate, actualization of traditional fatalistic attitudes and traditional strategies of survival. He also introduces the concept of 'eurotrauma' understood as social fears, prejudices and phobias toward the European Union and integration in general.

Another group traditionally open to Eurosceptic attitudes are Catholic right-wing circles. Katarzyna Leszczyńska investigated statements drawn from three of the most popular Polish Catholic periodicals and official documents of the Polish Episcopate, searching for

opinions on the European Union and the idea of Europe. She pointed to three trends within the Catholic Church in Poland: total, selective and affirmative – first of which was characterized by a totally negative stance towards the European Union and the process of European integration in particular (2007, 2009). This circle's opinions about Europe have always been skeptical. Other researchers concentrated on the debate in Europe between Catholic circles and intellectuals, stressing that the most important elements for them are the nation state and the Christian values to which they are strongly devoted (Sokolewicz 2003: 365-366).

During the pre-accession period, the interest of the research on Euroscepticism grew, especially when the country was preparing for the referendum on accession to the European Union. The selection of research initiatives and publications were presented by the team led by Elżbieta Skotnicka-Ilasiewicz, working at the Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej – institution responsible for coordination of Polish integration and negotiation with the EU (2003, 2007). This scholarship concentrates on opinions before the referendum in 2003 and also analyses the results. The team is continuing the research and recently published a selection of papers by various authors for the fifth anniversary of Polish membership (Skotnicka-Ilasiewicz 2009). Another group of researchers dealing with the same topic was working under the leadership of Lena Kolarska-Bobińska at the NGO organisation Instytut Spraw Publicznych. They focused on the opinions and assessment of integration, as well as with the condition of democracy in the context of integration, with stress being put on particular groups such as farmers (Jasiecki 2003; Jasiecki 2004; Kolarska-Bobińska L. 2002; Kolarska-Bobińska L., Kucharczyk J., Zbieranek J. 2008; Roguska B., Strzeszewski M. 2002). Finally, the works on the topic of Euroscepticism were conducted at the Jagiellonian University by a team led by Krystyna Romainiszyn within the project EURONAT (EURONAT Final Report 2004; Romaniszyn 2004; Romaniszyn 2005).

As regards to the second period of research after the 2004, the most important publication on Euroscepticism in Poland is the first real monograph on the topic by Krzysztof Zuba, 'Polski Eurosceptycyzm i Eurorealizm' published in 2006. The author presents both the historical roots and origins of the Eurosceptic attitudes in the country. According to this author, in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, Eurosceptic attitudes may be caused by disappointment with the transition or with European integration as such. Countries, or the social groups which managed to make it through the transformation period successfully, provided stronger support to European integration and the EU, than those who were faced with greater difficulties (Zuba 2006:109). He classified a few of the main fears concerning European integration; some of which were stronger in the post-Communist countries than in Western Europe. Universal fears can be found in both Western and Central Eastern Europe and usually focus on the issues of sovereignty and identity, which according to the Eurosceptics, are threatened by the EU and the process of integration. Central and Eastern European fears refer rather to the predicted problems in the agricultural sector, which were caused by cut-throat competition with the 'old' member states. This kind of threat was mostly seen in Poland, Slovenia and Latvia. The problem of weak and backward agriculture was joined with a fear of the repurchasing of Polish land by the Germans (Zuba 2006:113-114). He analyses the situation in Poland in the context of contemporary European scholarship on the topic. His major focus is put on the political parties in Poland. He divides Euroscepticism and Eurorealism in Poland into two trends: one of national-Catholic provenience and the second a populist-farmer type of rhetoric. The former, as presented in that paper, has a significant importance on the Polish political scene – originating from the strong movements of the type in the interwar period. The latter, is based on the dissatisfaction in the rural, more underdeveloped parts of Poland and utilized by the populist movement of Samoobrona. This camp however is rather losing its significance nowadays.

To sum up the review of the research on Euroscepticism in Poland, we can observe that the research is still not very developed and the phenomenon itself is not fully understood and described. Moreover, the research focused on typical Eurosceptic groups: farmers and right wing circles including Catholic groups. However, as the Western European experience shows, there is much more need to observe and research other groups which might in future be open for such a rhetoric. Moreover, most of the research is directed toward strong Eurosceptics or Eurorejects. However, as Poland became a member of the EU, much more attention has been paid to moderate Euroscepticism because those circles are actively shaping Polish position in the European Union as they are members of various political parties which have been ruling the country since the enlargement. Only recently scholars are also focusing more on the intellectual debate of Europe, including those who could be labelled as soft Eurosceptics (Góra, Mach 2009).

## **Key actors in framing Euroscepticism in Poland**

As discussed above, the dominant arguments used by the Eurosceptic and Euroreject groups in Poland are the common ground for both Euroscepticism and populism, as these two currents are often linked. In both discourses, clear and extreme slogans are the keys to bringing together all those disappointed by the economic transformation; the new political elites established after 1989, and those who expected to gain from integration, yet did not. In Poland, as well as in the other new member states, populists argue that European integration is an elite project where ordinary citizens have no say (Nalewajko 2003).

European integration is seen by Eurosceptics/Eurorejects as a threat to the nation state, an economic and political hegemony of the West over Central Eastern European countries, and is sometimes called 'new colonisation'. As the EU is believed to have ruined Polish national identity and culture, Euroscepticism is a defense of Polish sovereignty and national identity. Eurosceptics and Eurorejects oppose moral liberalism and reject so-called common European values, which they identify with the degeneration of the nation; the legalisation of abortion, euthanasia, homosexual marriage, genetic engineering and the 'civilization of death'. Eurosceptics are usually acting in preservation of traditional family values, religion and national identity, accepting only Christian European values (Zuba 2006: 184-192).

In terms of politics, European opponents see the EU as a centralized supranational power, which leads to the depreciation of solidarity and the welfare state. In this discourse, Poland, is shown as a discriminated, second-category member state, who bears more costs than benefits (see Meseznikov et al. 2008). As shown above, general fears and prejudices are similar, the difference being, that the ideology of the Eurorejects is much more extreme than that of the Eurosceptics, who do not support any form of European cooperation within the EU.

On the Polish political scene, Eurorejects were mostly visible in the years preceding the referendum regarding accession to the EU and the act of accession itself. According to Zuba, we can stress two main conditions of Polish opposition to the EU. The first group represents a significant percentage of farmers within the structure of Polish society and were mostly distrustful towards European integration. The second group is the Polish Catholic Church and its institutions, part of which were extremely Catholic-National and anti-European (Zuba 2006:444). As mentioned above the Eurosceptical/Euroreject voices are mostly spread by the political parties and its leaders. Mostly small parties are concentrating on utilizing Eurorejects rhetoric (LPR, Prawica RP or Samoobrona and even smaller organisations). Moreover, Eurorejects are utilizing the dissatisfaction as being the

side effect of the transformation. Finally, especially recently, there has been an imported Euroscepticism which at the time did not win any interest (i. e. Ganley's Libertas).

The main **Euroreject** actors are League of Polish Families (LPR – Liga Polskich Rodzin) and its youth organisation Młodzież Wszechpolska. The other circle is the Agrarian Populist Party Self-Defense (Samoobrona). The League of Polish Families was established in 2001 by small parties and associations organized around the ideology of National Democracy, referring to inter-war tradition. Its youth wing consider themselves as a reactivation of anti-Semitic and xenophobic youth organizations establish in late 1920s. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the LPR gained nearly 8 per cent of the votes, and became a part of the government, until the accelerated elections in 2007. During the pre-accession campaign, LPR was against joining with the structures of the EU, its '10 points' specifying why one should vote against the EU were distributed all over the country, and were supported by the extreme right wing Catholic radio station – Radio Maryja.

In the 2004 elections to the European Parliament, LPR obtained 15,9 per cent of the votes, and inducted ten deputies into the parliament (Słodkowska 2006). Later, LPR entered the ruling coalition in Poland and due to the strategy of the bigger right wing coalition partner; - PiS, it lost much of its electorate. Moreover, as the costs of integration were to be much fewer than LPR predicted, the party lost social support. In 2007, the party lost in the national elections and did not cross the threshold. Before the European Parliamentary election, LPR decided to join Libertas which was established in January 2009 as a branch of Irish association run by Declan Ganley. Among members of the board are ex-politicians from LPR and PiS as well as from other small right wing parties and associations. Despite the fact that Polish public television was involved in Libertas campaign<sup>1</sup> the party managed to collect only about 1,14 per cent of the votes in the June elections to the European Parliament. Libertas Polska opt for the idea of Europe of Nations and reject the Lisbon Treaty.

Prawica RP is a political party established in 2007 by former PiS politician Marek Jurek, famous for his conservative opinions on abortion. In the 2007 elections, the party established alliance with LPR and conservative UPR, but still didn't manage to enter Parliament. In the 2009 campaign before European Parliament elections, the party declared its objections to ratification of the Lisbon Treaty as well as the federal concept of future integration. Prawica RP managed to collect 1,95 per cent of the votes.

The Self-Defense party was established in the 1990s by farmer activists, who saw European integration as a threat to Polish agrarian interests. The party gained 11 per cent of the votes in the 2005 elections, joined the government, but similarly to LPR, didn't manage to enter parliament in 2007, nor the European parliament in 2009. The phenomenon of this party and its leader Andrzej Lepper is unrepeatable; both party and its electorate can be seen in terms of a political and social anachronism (Zuba 2006:444).

Among the **Polish Eurosceptic parties** we can put both Christian-Democratic formations: hard Eurosceptics from PiS – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) and soft Eurosceptics from the right wing of PO – Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform).

Established in 2001, PiS holds revisionist positions on the major planks of EU integration. The party won parliamentary elections in 2005 (nearly 27 per cent of votes) and established a populist and anti-European government with LPR and Samoobrona, which collapsed in 2007. The Kaczyński brothers and their party tried to realize the idea of 'Europe of Nations' insisting on preserving the EU as a confederation of sovereign states.

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<sup>1</sup> Some members of the board in public TV, as well as its President are former activist of LPR or its youth wing Młodzież Wszechpolska.



PiS is not against the European Union as such, but against the federal frame and of deeper integration, as well as the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter for Fundamental Rights. The party collected 27,4 per cent of the votes in the June elections to the European Parliament and reinforced the UEN fraction in EP.

PO on the other hand, which won the parliamentary elections in 2007, is not a homogeneous party. It consists of right wing associate politicians, who are more eurosceptic than the majority of the party, among whom, Jacek Saryusz Wolski is Chair of the Foreign Affairs Commission in the European Parliament. On the contrary, until 2007 the prominent leader of soft Eurosceptics – Jan Maria Rokita – played a significant role in constructing PO's political programme. Rokita opted for stiff negotiations around the Nice Treaty, and his motto *Nice o muerte* (*Nice or death*) reflected his sceptical attitude towards European institutions and its legal system.

PO is mainly seen as an eurooptimistic party and collected 44,4 per cent of the votes in the June elections to the European Parliament, reinforcing EEP fraction in EP. Their point of view is sometimes called Europragmatism – supporting the EU and the integration process, but strongly emphasizing the Polish national interest – which is highly appreciated by Polish society.

## **Key arenas of framing Euroscepticism in the EU parliamentary election campaign January 2009-June 2009**

The following information are tentative results based mostly on the daily observation of the campaign, not the systematic in-depth analysis which at this moment is ongoing. As a result, more mature and detailed information would be presented later. The most important Eurorejects forum is the media group owned by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, including its flagship initiative: Radio Maryja which was established in 1991 and the state concession for broadcasting is in the hands of 'Zgromadzenie Najświętszego Odkupiciela' – Redemptorists Friary. Its impact is on about 8 per cent of society, however 85 per cent of Poles never listen to Radio Maryja (CBOS 2008). The structure of listeners is composed of elderly, widowed women whose income is mostly based on social pensions, the listeners being uneducated and living in the countryside. The daily newspaper published by the same organisation is the 'Nasz Dziennik'. Finally, the TV station, TRWAM has 3 per cent of publicity. The characteristic of the supporters is that they traditionally present higher turnout than the average and are voting predominantly for PiS and LPR. Another forum for presenting the ideas of the Eurorejects are, certain Catholic media, such as the right wing part of Catholic media like 'Gość Niedzielny' (4 per cent of market) who are presenting clear opinions against European integration. Finally, tabloid press (especially Fakt and Superexpress) have important shares in the market (25 per cent) of daily press and are often presenting Eurosceptical messages.

It should be mentioned that since 2005 the public media in Poland has been dominated by the people connected with the right wing parties (PiS and LPR). Their media consist of television and radio channels which have important shares in the market. National Parliament and the President can exert indirect influence by appointing members of the National Broadcasting Council (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji) which acts as a regulatory body over radio and television channels. The members of KRRiT appoint a board of directors for each media, and these boards are responsible for choosing the acting chairpersons. Since January 2009, the President of the Board of national TV has been Piotr Farfał who is connected with the LPR and of a clear right-wing profile. TVP, during the recent campaign for EP election, supported the Libertas as the LPR became a member of it. However, as the results of Libertas were poor, further research is suppose

to be conducted to find out what the impact TVP really has on the formation of political preferences in the context of European integration.

As regards the digital media and Internet – in Poland the access to the Internet is still predominantly accessible to the urban population, even though more than 35 per cent of the population have access to the medium. The major Eurosceptical websites are rather unpopular and not clearly visible. The most visible type of Eurosceptic message comes from blogs – yet one must remember that it is not the Eurosceptic content that draws public attention, but rather the controversy of the authors. The blog by the politician Janusz Korwin-Mikke is one of the most often visited blogs in Poland followed by the blog by Janusz Palikot, probably the most controversial member of the Polish Parliament and famous for his various political performances. Korwin-Mikke is a former dissident and monarchist, founder of 'Najwyższy Czas' in which he has his column. He criticizes European Union as bureaucratic regime, calling the European Union a euro-backwater (*eurozaścianek*) and persuades that the EU is non-democratic system. Korwin-Mikke and his party (UPR) are against joining a eurozone by Poland. As a member of the Parliament in 1991-1993 he postulated lustration process. His controversial opinions are supported only by a marginal number of voters – he was threefold candidate for President, and voters support decreased from 2,4 per cent in 1995 to 1,4 per cent in 2005. UPR obtained 1,1 per cent of votes in 2009 elections to EP. In both aforementioned cases during the EP elections campaign, the European related topics did not appear often.

A more mature and detailed overview of the arenas where the Eurosceptic and Euroreject's voices were presented during the last EP elections is going to be analysed. Further research is needed to assess the impact of the media on opinions about European integration on Polish society and especially the impact on the formation of their political preferences in European context.

## Conclusions

To conclude, the causes of the apparent strong position of Eurosceptics/Eurorejects and Eurorejects in the Polish public discourse over European integration range from fears of a loss of national identity articulated in both ethnic and religious terms, to possible economic consequences for interest groups such as farmers and industrial workers. As yet, Eurosceptics/Eurorejects have little in common besides their opposition to further integration of Poland within the EU, although they have gained increasing space in the Polish media. There is an ongoing question of how the media are framing and influencing such attitudes. The puzzle was especially visible with the spectacular defeat of Libertas which is strongly promoted by one of the biggest TV broadcasters in Poland .

Politically, the debate remains driven largely by ethnic and religious nationalism. In the future, however, it is likely that Eurosceptics/Eurorejects groups will consolidate upon widespread economic fears to strengthen their strive against the deepening of the political union in Europe. The future research on this increasingly important topic should include, not as it is right now, only the radical positions of hard Eurosceptics and Eurorejects, but also those softer positions which are connected with drafting possible future scenarios for Europe and yet occupying positions of defence of a strong nation-state or a traditional, realist vision of international relations.

Finally, as visible in the report, contemporary Polish Eurosceptics/Eurorejects are predominantly connected with the right wing ideologies. In Western Europe, together with the development of the anti-globalist movements of radical left orientation, there are Eurosceptic opinions coming from the left.. This phenomenon however, is not depicted by the research in Poland and probably not significant. But, as the various trends are transmitted more freely all over Europe, we can also expect, more of such phenomenon in the new member states over the course of time .

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