On Political Representation
Myths and Challenges

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Abstract
In this paper we critically reassess the standard account of political representation, in order to question the mythical foundation of its premises and explain why it can no longer serve as an adequate explanatory framework in the modern political context. We argue that representation was not invented as a second-best solution, that the represented are not always a collective of individuals, that there is an indirect rather than direct link between the represented and the representatives, that representatives can be legitimately chosen by methods other than elections and, finally, that good representation cannot be reduced to responsiveness. Despite the inconsistencies of different theories of representation, the standard account survived long enough for reasons we explain in this paper. The consolidation of the EU as a supranational political arena and the burgeoning activity of transnational actors resulted in a multiplication of structures and opportunities for political representation which seriously challenges the effectiveness and suitability of the standard representation model. Growing complexity, diminishing transparency and the prospect of competing representative claims from concurrent majorities create a volatile dynamic for the future of democracy at both national and EU level.

Keywords
Accountability – Democracy– Democratisation – Legitimacy – Multilevel Governance – Political Representation – Supranationalism
Introduction

All men can understand what representation is.

*Thomas Paine, 1791*

Political representation is the Achilles heel of liberal democracies. While we can imagine political representation outside the frame of liberal democracies, we cannot do the opposite. Contrary to what most theoretical accounts of representation assume, representation and democracy did not develop in consonance. It is not too difficult to envisage a society whose members feel perfectly represented by an autocratic elite and whose demands are efficiently satisfied by a non-democratic system. Indeed, the conceptual and practical history of representation shows that it took a prolonged struggle to arrive at what nowadays seems an inextricable relation. This struggle was fuelled by the reluctance to share power as well as by considerations about the efficient workings of a political system. Moreover, once representation became widely accepted as a democratic mechanism, representative democracy was perceived as a second-best solution, direct democracy remaining the ideal form of democracy. Despite all this, or maybe because of all this, the concept of representation remains hidden behind a cloud of countless definitions, theoretical approaches, platitudes, truisms and different practices. It is only a small step from this elusiveness to come to the tempting conclusion that representation is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie 1956): Debates about representation involve ideological disputes of a kind that cannot be easily settled, and consequently one should position the different definitions to their historically and politically specific contexts. Yet this would be curiously defeatist and relativistic in implication. For what is the point of establishing contestability if we have no way of identifying winners and losers in the ‘contest’? It would seem more accurate to say that understanding representation as an essentially contested concept is a fact statement, while maintaining that representation is essentially contestable is a statement about the nature of representation.¹ In any case, we need a set of elaborate criteria to assess what democratic representation is and what it is not, what is good and what is bad representation, how representation is institutionally endowed, and what kind of tensions are involved in theory as well as in democratic practice. The central criteria are conveniently provided by the standard account of representation, but this account, probably for the sake of coherence, is oddly a-historic.

The standard account of political representation has become more or less accepted and runs as follows: since representation was invented in order to render democracy possible in large political communities, we select and authorise individuals via elections to make decisions on our, the people’s, behalf. Depending on the political system, representatives enjoy different degrees of discretion ranging from delegates to trustees; they show different forms of responsiveness and are subjected to diverse forms of accountability, the most important being legal/constitutional and electoral. Liberal democracies employ variations of this standard account, and their practical as well as theoretical success seems to have made any critical assessment superfluous. However, we discern two general reasons for questioning the standard account of political representation. First, most of its elements are used in different contexts with various meanings and are theoretically underspecified. Neither is it clear what exactly

¹ Thus, essential contestability is a potential not a fact. See also Ball (1988), Conolly (1974), Likes (1947).
is meant by authorisation, social identity, or accountability, nor is it obvious how the various dimensions of representation work together and what the effects of their different combinations are. The result is that going through the respective literature we find an amazing wealth of perspectives: constitutional (Sieyès [1789] 1981), factual, virtual and traditional (Burke [1887] 1994), substantial, descriptive and symbolic (Pitkin 1967), appropriated, estate-bound, imperator and free (Weber 1956), authoritative, consultative and mixed (Kincaid 1999), ascriptive (Griffiths/Wollheim 1960), sovereign and non-sovereign (Leibholz 1966), municipal (Heller 1934), real and fictitious (Sterne 1869), delegated, microcosmic and electoral (Birch 1971), sociological (Sartori 1968), social (Holmberg 1999), monolithic (Rogowski 1981), dynamic (Stimson et al. 1995), promissory, anticipatory, gyroscopic, surrogate (Mansbridge 2003), collective and dyadic (Weissberg 1978), institutional (Jackson/King 1989), executive, parliamentary, functional and territorial (Marsh/Weßels 1997), upstream and downstream (Crum 2008) regional and local representation. 2 Obviously, these adjectives serve as analytical crutches in the desperate attempt to hobble to brighter theoretical horizons. These approaches, or rather combination attempts, address various elements and levels of representation. We can differentiate between adjectives pointing to the object of representation (e.g. microcosmic, descriptive, virtual, collective, institutional), adjectives referring to the activity of representing (e.g. dynamic, constitutional), and adjectives used to describe the process of authorisation and selection of representatives (e.g. electoral, delegated, anticipatory, gyroscopic). Transversal adjectives refer to geographically and politically defined spaces: territorial, and local. And finally, some of the adjectives disclose information about the institutional system of representation (institutional, executive). As much as the delicate fine-tuning of the concept of representation with the help of adjectives is to be admired, conceptual clarity is hard to find.

The second reason why we feel obliged to question the standard account of representation is that current political communities are remarkably different from the ones for which these representation accounts were developed. Be it the rise of transnational decision arenas and actors, the rise of informal representation by interest groups, or perhaps the ever decreasing turnout in Western democracies, to name but a few, the dominance of the nation state as the primary form of organising liberal democracy is being increasingly challenged. The one project which seems to unite most of those challenges or is even the product, reaction or answer to them, is the European integration process. Thomas Paine, Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill, James Madison and other founding fathers of representative theory wrote about a world organised in nation states as the appropriate framework where the authoritative allocation of values takes place. This very framework however, its citizens and its institutions, for better or for worse, are changing rapidly. The models proposed by RECON chart three different ways of how this framework is developed by European integration and in which direction we possibly head. Whether we will see a re-nationalisation, i.e. a strengthening of national systems of representation, a further Europeanization, i.e. a truly integrated European system of representation or something entirely new built on cosmopolitan values, our theories of representation are in dire need of rethinking if we want to safeguard the core values of liberal democracies: equality and public control.

This paper is an attempt to bring some order to the standard account of representation by critically analysing its basic assumptions and perhaps mythical

2 On the different adjectives see Pollak (2007)
connotations. We do so by questioning the main dimensions of the standard account of representation. However worthwhile such an undertaking may be, it would remain oddly incomplete if we would not chart the challenges a modern approach to representation has to face. Taking into consideration the critique of the standard account and the challenges of a modern account of representation, we argue in the conclusion that the emergence of new political frameworks for organising representative systems bears a considerable danger of infringing upon two principles of liberal democracy: transparency and equality.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 reconstructs standard accounts of political representation in detail and analyses its various dimensions. We will do so in the form of drawing up five assumptions most standard accounts share which are then critically assessed. Section 2 asks why an overused and under-theorized standard account has gained such a prominent position. In Section 3 we chart the challenges representative political systems are facing today and, secondly, ask about the effects of those challenges on established liberal democracies already visible. A conclusion sums up our main arguments.

**The standard account of political representation**

Our common conceptions of representation are obsolete.

*Heinz Eulau, 1966*

To begin with, it may be unacceptably simplifying to speak about a standard account of representation. The phenotypes are too manifold, their institutional properties too diverse and their effects too sundry in terms of democratic quality. Nevertheless, on a highly abstract level, and for analytical purpose only, we can identify some conditions which are commonly understood to be part of the genotype of representation.

Everything starts with the assumption that representation means to ‘make present what is absent’ (Pitkin 1967; Birch 1971) – and ‘the absent’ necessarily exists because our *agora* have become too small to accommodate all the citizens entitled to make decisions – or to ‘act in the best interest of the represented’ (Eulau et al. 1959: 743; Pitkin 1967: 209; Przeworski et al. 1999: 2). Since many people purport to know what is best for the rest³, liberal democracies use universal adult suffrage for the selection and authorization of those politicians citizens want to be ruled by. Today’s concept of citizenship makes clear who is entitled to cast her vote and who is not, i.e. who belongs to the people constitutionally and is entitled to select political leaders. In order for this selection process to bring about a proper acting in the best interest of the people two conditions have to be satisfied. Even if we could agree on what this best interest is (usually coined as the common good) we might still differ in how to achieve it. Thus, in order to decide between the different paths leading to the common good, public and transparent competition during electoral campaigns is needed and so is an institutionalized form of competition along the lines of an opposition controlling the government. The former requirement serves to unfold the drama of different options on the stage of politics and the latter is needed for the actors to stay focused.

³ Which is also the normative precondition of equality.
Citizens base their electoral decisions on various grounds. They select and thus authorize representatives on grounds of identity, common interests or expertise (see O’Neill 2001). In the first case, a common identity between representatives and represented is thought to be needed since only belonging to the same social ‘space of experience’ and ‘horizon of expectations’ can guarantee adequate representation. Regardless if this common identity is based on territory, ethnicity, religion, gender, or class, it leads to what is usually called mirror, descriptive, or statistical representation. As Hanna Pitkin (1967) argued in 1967 already, it is not important only who the representatives are; it is much more important what they do. In the 18th century John Adams nicely summed up this point: “a representative legislature should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them” (Peek 1954: 68). Being like the people is a necessary but not a sufficient condition; representatives also need to act like the people. In the debate about the freedom of representatives ‘Brutus’ holds in the Anti-Federalist Papers:

The very term, representative, implies that the person or body chosen for this purpose, should resemble those who appoint them – a representation of the people of America, if it be a true one, must be like the people. […] They are the sign – the people are the thing signified. […] It must then have been intended that those who are placed instead of the people, should possess their sentiments and feelings, and be governed by their interests, or, in other words, should bear the strongest resemblance of those in whose room they are substituted.

(Bailyn 1993: 320)

Those who believe in a shared identity as the necessary basis of representation expect that a person who shares certain ascriptive characteristics with a social group will also represent her demands in the best interest of the group due to the same collective experiences. Those who, on the other hand, insist on common interests emphasize that the accidental sharing of ascriptive characteristics is no guarantee for representation whatsoever. Consequentially they aim at common interests which are not rooted in a specific social identity but are bound to common objectives and a shared belief in the instruments to be used to reach them. If we share interests it is well possible that we also share objectives. A striking example for this is the feminist demand for women representatives in the assembly of the general estates in 1789:

Just as a nobleman cannot represent a plebeian and the latter cannot represent a nobleman, so a man, no matter how honest he may be, cannot represent a woman. Between the representatives and the represented there must be an absolute identity of interests.

(quoted in Phillips 1997: 175)

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4 Those two concepts are obviously borrowed from R. Koselleck (see e.g. 1985).
5 Theophilus Parsons, member of the so-called ‘Essex Junto’ and author of the Essex County Resolution took Adam’s words up two years later: ‘The rights of representation should be so equally and impartially distributed, that the representatives should have the same views, and interests with the people at large. They should think, feel, and act like them, and in fine, should be an exact miniature of their constituents. They should be […] the whole body politic, with all it’s property, rights, and privileges, reduced to a smaller scale, with every part being diminished in just proportion.’ Quoted in Handlin/Handlin (1966: 341).
Last but not least, representatives can be selected and authorised by pointing to their epistemic superiority, i.e. their expertise. A legal expert, a physicist, a technician and so on can act as representatives in certain expert committees and feed their special knowledge into the decision-making process. The highly technical nature of some issues requires the inclusion of experts independent of their geographical origin, their social group or their political affiliation.\(^6\) Expertise can stand in contradiction to identity. It can happen that experts have a better knowledge about the demands of a social group than the representatives of the social group. One version of this approach can be found in Burke and the Federalist Papers (notwithstanding all their differences). It is the outstanding knowledge, an alleged moral superiority or integrity which legitimises representatives. Later this was discredited by introducing the assumption that expertise is the prerogative of only certain social classes: the educated people who ‘coincidentally’ happen to belong to the more prosperous upper class – a clear case of virtual representation.\(^7\) Until the masses reach the right education levels, state affairs have to be conducted exclusively by the enlightened elite.

However, we have to understand the three criteria for selection – identity, expertise, interests – as analytical categories whose balance is nevertheless recognizable in the political world. But it would be inappropriate to extend the analytical character into an empirical typology, since in reality these criteria are thoroughly intertwined with each other. In most cases our representatives are experts whose regional origin plays a role, but it may also be that the criterion of identity (political, territorial, or institutional) enjoys under specific conditions a certain preference.

Since a selection on grounds of shared identity, common interests or expertise might not be sufficient to answer the question why exactly this person and not somebody else (equally qualified) represents, a further specification is needed. This is either achieved by looking at the past performance of the candidate (retrospective voting) or electing the candidate whose manifesto comes closest to one’s preferences (prospective voting). Needless to say, that there are numerous problems involved ranging from Schumpeter’s claim (1942: 262) that ‘typical citizens become primitives again once they enter the field of politics’ to claims by Fiorina (1981: 5)\(^8\) that citizens

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\(^6\) This does not mean that ‘technical decisions’ do not have political implications. Quite contrary an increasing number of publications about the role of independent agencies and committees alludes to the fact that decisions are not always owed to objective criteria but are more often than not based on political determinants. See Yataganas (2001), Héritier and Thatcher (2002), Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002), Chiti (2004), Geradin and Petit (2004).

\(^7\) An excellent example for this is given by Boissy d’Anglas who composed the introductory words to into the new French constitution in 1795: ‘Absolute equality is a chimera. If it existed one would have to assume complete equality in intelligence, virtue, physical strength, education and fortune in all men […] We must be ruled by the best citizens. And the best are the most learned and the most concerned in the maintenance of law and order. Now, with very few exceptions, you will find such men only among those who own some property, and are thus attached to the land in which it lies, to the laws which protect it and to the public order which maintains it […] You must, therefore, guarantee the political rights of the well-to-do […] and [deny] unreserved political rights to men without property, for if such men ever find themselves seated among the legislators, then they will provoke agitations […] without fearing their consequences […] and in the end precipitate us into those violent convulsions from which we have scarcely yet emerged.’ (quoted in Hibbert 1980: 282).

\(^8\) For the assumption that citizens can arrive at rational decisions even under the condition of defective knowledge the ability to substitute through opinion leaders, parties etc. was introduced (Berelson et al. 1954; Downs 1957). See also Ferejohn/ Kuklinski (1990), Popkin (1991), Lodge/ McGraw (1995).
‘do not need to be experts but only need to have a general knowledge about politics’ and to Achen’s and Bartels’ (2000) scepticism about the rational voter.

Once the representatives are elected and properly authorised, their actions should be in the centre of our attention. If the mere presence of a representative with whom a principal shares ascriptive characteristics, i.e. a social, ethnic, religious etc. identity, is thought to be no proper measure of performance, we need to concentrate more on what a representative does and less on who she is (Pitkin 1967). Various typologies have been suggested to characterise the behaviour and the acting of representatives. Concerning behaviour, John Wahlke et al.’s (1962) representation types (or styles) of trustee, delegate, and politico very much set the pace but were later criticized as being too rigid (Müller 2001a: 12; Searing 1991, 1994). This typology relates rather to the question on how they represent and not so much on what they are doing. For the latter the concept of responsiveness becomes important. Representatives have to act in a way responsive to the demands and interests of the principal. If those demands and interests are fulfilled to a satisfying degree the standard model speaks about good representation.

In order to maintain good representation and to avoid the creation of a class of mandarins various measures of accountability are employed. James Madison (Federalist no. 52, 1788) thought frequent elections and the competition between delegates from various interests combined with a strong, directly elected president to be the best safeguard mechanism against such a development, whereas Edmund Burke (1774) placed his trust in the independent deliberation of representatives guided by their ‘unbiased opinion, their mature judgement, and their enlightened conscience’. Modern liberal democracies rely on a mixture between legal and political accountability, the former relying on the workings of an independent judiciary, the latter based on the rational voter or a sort of peer review. The accountability format also depends on the measure of discretion or the nature of the mandate a representative enjoys. From our point of view the idea of an imperative mandate of a representative does not make sense, since it renders the representative a mere delegate and thus blurs the distinction between the two. By definition, the difference between a delegate and a representative is the independence of the latter – it is not the degree of independence but the very existence of it which allows differentiating between a delegate and a representative. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the representative is free to do whatever she wants; rather, the independence of a representative is depending on various conditions such as for instance, the degree of party organisation, the electoral system, the duration of the mandate, the institutional arrangement in general, in short, the nature of the political system.

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9 Müller (2001: 13) points out that studies about the activities of deputies are very often based on ‘a more or less systematic evaluation of anecdotic material, e.g. round table talks with deputies and other information bits and pieces’ (author’s translation). A more methodical and systematic contribution was delivered by Searing (1994, 1995) who in an analysis of 521 British deputies differentiated between backbench and leadership role. Jogerts (1991, 1993) discriminated between ‘policy influencer, constituency representative, supporter of party policy, debater and generalist’.

10 Burke was taking up a thread of argument already to be found in John Toland’s ‘Art of Governing by Parties’ (1701) and Humphrey Mackworth’s ‘Vindication of the Rights of the Commons in England’ (1701).

11 In the following we concentrate on political accountability.
Thus far we have presented a simplified version of the standard model of political representation in modern liberal democracies. As pointed out, several inconsistencies and inaccuracies are obvious. However, they seem to have been brushed over for the sake of contingency reduction and a certain ‘typology fever’. In the following we will deal with the most important aberrations, such as the recurrent belief that representation was an ingenious invention and not an incremental development; that the absent which is represented is a unified people; that representation is based on direct social relationship between principal and representative; that the defining characteristic of representatives is their electoral mandate; and finally that good representation is the same as responsiveness.

**Myth No.1: Representation was invented to make democracy work in large scale political communities**

The standard account of representation assumes that representation is a technique invented to make the absent present. Like a *deus ex machina* the concept appears at the beginning of the 14th century when feudalism was approaching its end. Representation became a surrogate for direct democracy, a substitute for the *ekklēsia tou démou* and a concept which was totally alien to antiquity and the Middle Ages. Karl Loewenstein (1959: 37) compared the importance this invention held for the political development of the West with the invention of steam-power, combustion engines and nuclear power. In the middle of the 20th century he embodies an understanding whose history reaches far back. Indeed, the American creed developed during the constitutional debates of the 18th century that ‘representation was the only great discovery in theoretical politics made since antiquity’ (Pocock 1975: 521) was becoming part of the canon. Unfortunately, the conclusion James Madison (Federalist No. 63) drew from this – that democracies are different from republics because the latter employ the principle of representation – was soon forgotten. Democracy, representation and republic all blended into one thick theoretical soup. Hence emerges the idea of representation as a modern form of government, as a technique of rule whose invention was prompted by the development of large political communities and the need to organise them democratically.

However, as in-depth historical research has shown political representation has its roots in Roman law and the late Middle Ages (Hintze 1931; Larsen 1955; Hoffmann 1982; Podlech 1984), and especially in the debate on the Catholic Eucharist during the Roman Synod in 1059. Later on Bartolus a Saxoferrato and other post-glossatores then applied the formula *personam alicuius repraesentare* in the legal context. But it was in the early Middle Ages were the most important approaches were coined:

12 A fair number of references can be found in the works of 18th, early 19th century authors, e.g. Thomas Hare (quoted in Fairlie 1968: 47), Noah Webster (1787, see Bailyn 1993: 130), William Patterson (1787), James Mill (1828), Thomas Paine (1792) James Madison (e.g. Federalist No. 52). But not only Anglo-Saxon authors thought representation an entirely new idea, see e.g. Jean Jacques Rousseau (Social Contract, Bk. III), Montesquieu (Spirit of Laws, Bk. XI.), Abbé Sieyès (quoted in Schmitt 1969: 191). See Pollak (2007, 2007a) for an overview.

13 For the change of meaning of central concepts see Ball/Pocock (1988).

14 The central point concerned the question of Christ’s presence in the communion which was either understood as allegoric or real presence. Could a past act of sacrifice find expression in something which had neither a temporal nor material connection? Only convention allows the transfer of meaning from the past and invisible to the host (Hofmann 1974: 80).
descendence (or theocratic) theory and ascendance theory. In the former case, authority is granted by Christ (the Pope bases his claim to be the direct successor of St. Peter on whom according to the Gospel, the Church was founded by Christ); in the ascendance theory power stems from below and lies with the people and its representative assembly. The dominant position of the Catholic Church in medieval Europe guaranteed a salient place for the descendence theory. Only in the 13th century, after a new wave of interpretation of Aristotle’s writings set in, started the descendence theory to slowly lose ground (Ullmann 1975; Zimmermann 1971). The momentum was taken up in England first where between 1199 and 1327 the landed gentry succeeded to wrest substantial rights from the crown, dressed in the remarkable words ‘redress of grievances before supply’. Their demand for participation in the affairs of the state was based on a representative claim: representing subjects. Those subjects had no say in the selection and authorisation of the self-proclaimed representatives. The following centuries showed the protracted struggle to achieve their say in politics too, to achieve the transformation from subject to citizen. For several hundred years the concept of representation was used as a means to avoid direct participation as far as possible and to make democracy impossible. It was ‘conceived in explicit opposition to democracy’ (Manin 1997: 236), indeed ‘[t]he purpose of representative government was to prevent, rather than to implement, democracy which was largely identified with popular mobilization and mob rule, and was singularly unappealing to 18th-century constituents.’ (Urbinati 2004: 54; see also Roberts 1994: 170). If we accept the fact that representation has no intrinsic relation with democracy, and secondly, that representation emerged out of prolonged political struggle for participation, it becomes clear that the meaning of representation is contingent upon the socio-historical circumstances. We could even go further borrowing the concept of illocutionary force from Austin (1961, 1962) with an eye to Quentin Skinner’s interpretation and state that the meaning of representation depends on its functions which, in turn, are depending on the intention of those arguing for or against a specific system of representation. Thus, a standard account becomes a truism per se. Rather we have to ask what functions representation shall fulfil.

**Myth No.2: The absent is the people which acts via the representative body**

The idea of ‘making the absent present’ is a central claim of standard theories of representation. But what is ‘the absent’ or the object of representation? Obviously, the object has changed over the course of history. After the medieval debate about the question ‘who is representing?’ was decided in favour of the king the question of what she represents came to the fore. Until the middle of the 18th century it was clear

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15 In this crucial time not only this two highly important approaches were formulated but in their wake three priceless achievements for the development of the modern state took place: (a) human associations were conceptualised as legally acting corporations (universitas); (b) the legal consequences of the actions of one person were attributed to the corporation thus securing its ability to act and function; and (c) the perception of a political community comprised of a multitude of individuals but existing over extended periods (Podlech 1984: 511).

16 Compare ‘Americanus I’ aka John Stevens who revealed the source of invention: ‘It was the English who first discovered the secret, of which the ancients were totally ignorant, of Legislation by Representation.’ (Baylin 1993: 229).

17 Compare the French cahiers des doléance which were given to the delegates of the electoral districts as a kind of imperative mandate.

18 Federalist No. 10 is a perfect example of Madison’s scepticism about widespread direct participation.
that the function of the representative was taken to be the defence of the material interests of his clients, the landed gentry, merchants and traders, the clergy etc. But there were also those who, like Thomas Hobbes, focused on an ideal, in Hobbes’ case the unity of the realm, who saw the object of representation as something other than the mere aggregation of the majority will or the interests of a certain class. 19 This thread was taken up in the 20th century and re-branded as idealism. We will first describe the most important idealist conceptions and then move on to interests as the object of representation before we chart the potential problems involved with both.

A higher being?

For Thomas Hobbes the late medieval idea of the ruler legitimised by God was out of the question. He resorted to an early corporation theory which holds that the unity of a body is founded on representation:

A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representor, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it is the representor that beareth the person, and but one person.

([1651] 1968: 220)

Hobbes does not simply take over the medieval theory of corporation; he also modifies it, since he denies the people a unified character of action after the transfer of power onto the king takes place. Fraenkel (1964) termed this the ‘absorption theory’ whose ideal embodiment is Hobbes’ Leviathan. A the collective of individuals transfers powers to a person who, from then on, represents their unity as a people and the unity of the realm. Thus, the people gain a unity the moment they surrender all power to the sovereign monarch (at the same time they loose their right to independent action). It was in the course of the 18th century, when the gap between absolutist theory and practice began to widen, that absorption theory came under attack. Jean-Jacques Rousseau formulated a radical critique in Du contrat social in the year 1762. The sovereign which comes into being through the social contract is identical with the state and can only be represented by itself: ‘le souverain, qui n’est qu’un être collectif, ne peut être représenté que par lui-même.’ Today, this

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19 We can find the earliest reference to the idea that members of the parliament do not only represent their clients but the whole kingdom in an English Common’s bill from 1571 (Hallam 1865 quoted in Fairlie 1968: 32). The bill would have legalized the practice that constituencies can elect non-resident representatives. It failed since the argument was made that an intimate knowledge of a constituency is a necessary precondition for proper representation. It took more than 120 years to refute this opinion. In 1698 Algernon Sidney published his Discourses Concerning Government in which he argued – against the radical approach of the Levellers - that members of parliament are no delegates and thus they do not represent individual constituencies or cities but are entitled to act for the whole kingdom. ‘It is not therefore for Kent or Sussex, Lewis or Maidstone, but for the whole nation, that the members chosen in those places are sent to serve in parliament; and tho it be fit for them as friends and neighbours (so far as may be) to hearken to the opinions of the electors for the information of their judgments, and to the end that what they shall say may be of more weight, when everyone is known not to speak his own thoughts only, but those of a great number of men; yet they are not strictly and properly obliged to give account of their actions to any, unless the whole body of the nation for which they serve, and who are equally concerned in their resolutions, could be assembled. This being impracticable, the only punishment to which they are subject if they betray their trust, is scorn, infamy, hatred, and an assurance of being rejected, when they shall again seek the same honor.’ Sidney concludes that nothing speaks against instructions for the MPs ‘but the less we fetter them the more we manifest our own rights.’ (Section 44).
incompatibility of sovereignty and representation is an integral part of parliamentary-representative democracy and is never questioned (Landshut 1968: 468). Rousseau’s radical critique remained an exception at the time; the theories of Montesquieu, Denis Diderot, John Locke, John Priestly, Thomas Paine and Edmund Burke proved to be more influential by modifying contract theory. It was in those decades of the late 17th and the early 18th centuries that the parliament changed from being an independent mediator between king and people to being the representative of the people. During the French Revolution the absorptive representation by the king capsizes into the absorptive representation by the legislative assembly (Podlech 1984: 526).

In the time of industrial revolution the (idealized) nation as the object of representation gained prominence in the writings of William Blackstone, Edmund Burke and William Paley. Although Burke did not develop a coherent theory of representation – his remarks rather reveal an erratic character – his formulations continue to resonate today. In his famous Bristol address he set out to defend the free mandate which is needed to represent the higher good of one nation:

Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of a whole – where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed; but when you have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a Member of Parliament.

(Burke 1866: 95).20

Burke stands in the tradition of John Willis, Noel Somerset (Birch 1971: 38) and Algernon Sidney but the roots of this kind of virtual representation lie with the French Estates in 1798. Since the interest of the nation as a whole has to stand in the centre of all representative actions the geographical origin of the representatives becomes irrelevant. If the parliament21 represents the interests of the nation it is only decisive that the MPs were aware of specific demands and problems. A physical presence was not required.22

Some 20th century advocates of Idealism, such as Thomas H. Green (1968) or Francis H. Bradley (1969) view the general will (Rousseau’s volonté générale) as the proper object of representation. A political community is more than just the sum of its individuals; it is a community of human beings who share interests, values and objectives. There are no problems recognizing this common will since we are all members of the same political community.23 For Gerhard Leibholz (1966: 27) representation serves to make a being

20 Already in 1774 he wrote ‘The virtue, spirit, and essence of a House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the nation.’ (quoted in Fairlie 1968: 36).
21 If it is possible to speak about a French model of representation it consists in the emphasis of the parliament to be the representative of the nation and not so much – as we see it in the English case – the individual MP.
22 Much later Weber (1956: 173) called it ‘national representation’ in which he saw an opportunistic ‘phrase-like fiction’ because it denies the representative’s dependence on local and partisan interests.
23 An argument which can all too easily lead to the vague heights of nationalism or the abyss of tyranny. Individuals who do not recognize this common will are either not part of the community, ignorant or
present which lies beyond itself and Carl Schmitt (1957: 209) wants to make the invisible present – the invisible being something of higher importance and ontological status than mere interests. Leibholz (1966: 52) connects representation with the common welfare by insisting that the people can only be represented as an ideal unity. Thus the representatives can only represent the interests of the people and not the privileges or particular interests of the few (contrary to the old systems of representation based on classes). Eric Voegelin (1952) pushes this ideal representation in his differentiation between descriptive and existential types of representation even farther. Whereas the former comprises simple demographic data like age, gender etc. existential representation means the realisation of an idée directrice. Voegelin (1952) concludes that a government needs to be representative in the descriptive as well as in the existential sense. Thus such radically different authors like Schmitt and Voegelin suggest that representation is about the reproduction of a ‘higher being’ or as Siegfried Landshut (1968) argued, about the representation of an ideal unity.

Mere interests?

At roughly the same time when Burke developed his ideas about the representation of the nation in England, James Madison described the advantages and disadvantages on interest representation in the Federalist papers and developed a highly pragmatic approach:

> A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilised nations, and divide them into different classes, activated by different sentiments and views.

(Federalist No. 10)

Madison assumed that representatives inevitably act as delegates of such interests and thus refuted Burke’s idealistic claim of the all-transcending idea of the nation:

> It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest, which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.

(ibid.)

uneducated. Until the proper education levels are reached state affairs have to be conducted by enlightened elites.

24 Voegelin bases this claim on the theory of M. Hauriou (1929) according to whom rule is legitimate if it represents an idée directrice, especially the one of the state. The state is a national community in which the ruling power carries out the business of the res publica. The key task of rule is to create a politically unified nation by transforming the existing unorganized multitude into an organised body, which is capable of action. The state has its origin in such an idée directrice and has the task to realize it and enlarge it. The specific function of the ruler is to create and realize this very idea and it is reached if the ruler submits to the idea himself. Being a representative means to realize the idea in a position of authority via institutional embodiment.

25 F.A. Hayek (1991) expressed his scepticism in a similar way by stating his preference for a system which is not depending on the existence of morally good individuals but which draws advantage from the existence of a multitude of characters. A perspective which was also adopted by Karl Popper (1992) who asked how can we organise political institutions to make them independent of the quality of the rulers.
Representatives are either representing their own interests or the interests of their electorate. Thus, we have to make sure that the former – regarded as a fact of life by Madison – is kept at bay. Frequent elections are an excellent instrument to provide for that. ‘It is particularly essential that [the House] should have immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which the dependence and sympathy can be secured.’ (Federalist no. 52). Apart from elections, Madison argued in favour of a large government as an additional security against an overwhelming group interest. Indeed, the government itself should be a mirror of the different interests existing in society. Because individual groups always try to dominate the way a society develops, the multitude of factions is thought to balance partisan interests (Federalist No. 52-82) and, in addition, it provides a certain leeway for politicians. Together with a rigorous division of powers the existence of different interests and factions, which were hitherto regarded as the biggest disadvantages of democracy-like governments was suddenly turned into a necessity. Madison’s ‘delegated representation’ constitutes the archetype of the American representative model. Social groups are united by their interests and not necessarily by their ethnic roots. The role of government is to balance those interests in order to uphold democracy.

An extreme version of interest representation in the 20th century can be found in the advocates of estate representation. From their point of view

the present system (is) nonrepresentative and misrepresentative of the interests and views of the people. A territorial region, they hold, is never identified with a particular interest or opinion; each district is the habitation of groups of such various conflicting economic and social needs and views that no clear mandate for the supposed representative can be fused out of them, so that what is really represented is simply one or few of the stronger among the numerous minority groups.

(Coker 1915: 200)

This is supported by George Cole:

True representation, like true association, is always specific and partial, and never general and inclusive. What is represented is never man, the individual, but always certain purposes common to groups of individuals. The theory of representation which is based upon the idea that individuals can be represented as a whole is a false theory and destructive of personal rights and social well being.

(Cole 1920: 98)

However, the idea of professional representation proved largely unpopular in the U.S. Although William MacDonald (1921), Maurice Reckitt (1918), Mary Follet (1918), Arthur Holcombe (1935) und Ernest Griffith (1939) presented some suggestions, there was general scepticism because of the additional pressure the legislature would be exposed too – already the target of intense lobbying. Another argument was based on the increased intersectoral mobility of the US workforce which would not allow for a separation into professions in order to achieve an estate-like representation.
How to recognize the object?

Whether representatives represent interests, a nation or normative ideas there are some characteristics these approaches have in common. All of them assume that the object of representation can be discerned and then represented. But the recognition either requires simplification to an unacceptable degree (e.g. the people, a class) and/or a voluntary construction of the absent – a process we would like to call condensation. And since the basis of representation is not the unity of wills but its opposite, such constructions may well follow different interests than the ‘representation in the best interest’. Even if we could pinpoint an object of representation in all necessary clarity, the difference of wills would make the representative – to use the words of Alfred Schütz – ‘appresent’ something. That is, the representative adds something which might only be the expression of individual ideas, preferences, interests etc. but could also be the deliberate contortion of the object’s preferences. Unlike Hume ([1741] 1985: 42) we do not expect politicians, civil servants and experts ‘to be knaves, and to have no other purpose in all their action but self-interest’, but a constructive moment can hardly be denied in the process of representation. Frank Ankersmit (2002) and Michael Saward (2003) called the subjective element of representative behaviour the aesthetic moment of representation. Representatives have to form and design the represented. If the interests, opinions, and ideas were totally clear, the representative would only have to ‘read’ and reproduce them at a different political level. But what is represented (the image) is never the same as the represented (the principal). It is a picture, a detail, a portrait but never the thing as such, like a self-portrait of Rembrandt is not Rembrandt himself (Saward 2003: 3). The borders of this aesthetic moment are set by cultural codes and the nature of the mandate. If we authorise our political representatives e.g. on the base of their manifestos, these manifestos, together with political traditions, policy styles and profiles define a corridor of action. It is this corridor of action which renders an exact equivalence of interests, opinions, ideas etc. unnecessary.

In addition to this creative moment a representative necessarily needs to select specific aspects on which she concentrates in representative action. The attempt to represent everything would run counter to the wealth of individual interests, needs and preferences of the represented. Indeed, as Iris Marion Young (1986) has conclusively shown, every representation necessarily includes suppression of differences. Thus, on the one hand a representative needs to construct an object of representation and on the other, has to focus on certain aspects of this construction only. Representation is very much a simplification process.

**Myth No. 3: Representation is a direct social relationship between representative and represented**

Another assumption of standard theories of representation is that its actor-dimensions are relational: the principal authorizes the representative, the representative then represents the principal, and finally, the representative gives account to the represented. Whatever the precise arrangements of this relation are, represented and representative are bound together in a direct social relationship. If

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26 If there were a unity of wills representation would be a mere technical question. ‘Representation is an issue because politicians have goals, interests, and values of their own’ (Manin et al. 1999: 29).

27 Alfred Schütz took this concept took over from Edmund Husserl. See Weiss (2005).
what we said about the construction of the object of representation is correct, it becomes clear that the relationship between represented and representative is not a simple one. Let us assume the principal is defined by citizenship rights of a political community whose territorial borders are clearly demarcated. Those citizens cast their votes and authorize (territorially structured) representatives. Given the size of modern assemblies it is obvious that one representative has to represent quite a considerable number of citizens. For example, in the case of Germany a parliamentary representative is expected to (statistically) represent 134,533 citizens. It is obvious that this is unrealistic (even if we take another example: an Icelandic MP ‘only’ has to represent 4714 citizens); thus crude simplification, focus on specific topics and/or talking in different ways to different audiences becomes necessary to create the illusion of representation. The actual existence of different audiences is important in order to understand our first proposition of why representation is not a direct social relationship between two actors. Representation always involves a third part, i.e. the audience. The audience can either be a social actor who is different from those who have authorised the representative and/or the audience is the very actor who authorised. In both cases we have to include the audience as the third part in our equation. The first case is relatively simple, since a representative represents her principal towards a third party. In the second case the principal might be confronted with a picture of itself which is strikingly different from its self-perception, its wishes, demands and preferences. This is where the size and fragmentation of modern societies become undeniable advantages for the representative: the constructed image of the principal can be adapted to different audiences since the principal is not a unified actor. Neither our fictitious German MP nor even the Icelandic one, will ever meet their several thousand principals who authorised them to act on their behalf. At first glance this adaptation is not necessarily a bad thing since it allows for the presentation of the complex activities of a representative. There is no unified principal and it would be equally wrong to think that the representative has to address her principal as one unit with a single will and one set of preferences. The citizens might have voted for the representative not only out of different reasons but they could have done so with a different set of preferences too. But representation also includes decision-making, in whose interest will the decision be made? In the interest of the constructed principal? In the interest of the active part of the principal which interacts with the representative? Or in the interest of the greatest number?

What about the claim that there is a direct relation between representatives and represented? In order to grasp this question better, it helps to differentiate the principal into three parts: the passive principal who probably does not even bother to cast a vote, the standing principal whose role is limited to listening, evaluating and assessing and finally, the active principal, namely, citizens who are politically active without running for office. Only the latter may have frequent encounters with their representative on various occasions beyond the opening of the Oktoberfest, for example discussions in citizen fora. Otherwise, the electoral act has to serve as a proxy for a social relationship. However, in most cases the relationship between citizens and their representatives is mediated by a series of institutions. In modern democratic systems political parties are playing a fundamental role, but also other groups such as

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28 This in turn might be due to the potential representative presenting different representative claims to different audiences.

29 This differentiation is owed to a wonderful book about The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes by M.H. Hansen (1993).
corporate bodies, interest groups and NGOs have become increasingly important. These intermediate groups do have a tremendous role in answering the question to what extent a principal can shape the object of representation, i.e. they define the limits of creativity. Political parties are bound together by a certain understanding of the principal as are other social groups trying to influence policy-making.

Thus, contrary to standard approaches we hold that representation is a tripartite indirect social relationship. What follows is that we should focus our attention on what representatives have ‘to offer’, i.e. what social construction of the principal they purport, what limits this construction faces, and how this construction is justified.

**Myth No. 4: Representatives have to be elected**

In modern societies the authorisation of representatives is usually done via elections. Suffice to say that this was not always the case (see Manin 1997) and that there are good reasons not to outright ban other mechanisms like selection by lot. However, after acrimonious conflicts in the 19th and 20th centuries the universal, equal, personal and secret ballot has become the method of choice in liberal democracies. This is not the place to go into detail about the different effects of proportional or majoritarian electoral systems, we rather want to introduce a differentiation between formal and informal representatives which seems to be much more relevant to analyse modern representative systems. To think that citizens can only represented by an elected legislative assembly belongs mainly to pre-modern times of democratic theory. Today, liberal democracies are characterized by a coexistence of formal and non-formal representatives, the difference referring mainly to who is entitled to authorize the respective representatives and the reach of the decisions made.

By formal representation we understand the policy processes and actions of political representatives within the respective legal and institutional framework designed to reach collective decisions on behalf of the political community. Formal representatives act on the basis of the stringent criteria stipulated in the constitutional framework, and, most importantly, formal representation is based on equal representation. The assumption here is that policies which affect all citizens should only be sanctioned by formally authorised actors who derive their legitimacy from democratic structures based on equal representation. What makes representatives (really) representative is that they are elected by – or accountable to – a body of equally entitled citizens, not that they represent this or that substantive interest. Once election by citizens with equal votes is seen to constitute representation, it is up to representatives, subject to electoral accountability, to decide how to balance different substantive interests: economic, social, religious, and ethnic. No substantive interest has any a priori claim on the representative process (see Lord/Pollak 2009). Formal actors are regarded to pursue the interests of a majority who either elected them in a democratic procedure, as is the case with parliamentary representatives, or who are accountable towards an elected body.

Another important feature of formal representation is the temporary authority of all formal actors. Citizens accept that formal actors handle political processes and make binding decisions under the condition of legal and political accountability, i.e. formal

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30 Burnheim (1985), Callenbach/ Phillips (1985) and Goodwin (1992) found the selection by a lot a serious alternative to elections.
representatives have to give account of their actions and can be voted out of office. Under the constraints of (re-)elections and accountability inclusive representation of citizens can be assumed to be a rational behaviour of formally elected representatives. Additionally, citizens have the opportunity to elect representatives they can more or less identify with, who represent their interests and are regarded to have the necessary expertise to get involved in political processes.

But does this account of representation adequately describe existing systems? It seems that amongst others the decreasing importance of the parliamentary arena, the general scepticism towards professional politicians, and the increasing importance of executive politics have led to the emergence of another mode of representation which is not part of the formal realm. To be sure, formal representation comes in various forms – parliamentary, executive, administrative representation (see Pollak 2007) – but, in modern policy-making we increasingly find the participation of actors who are not elected by the citizenry as such. Due to the particular selection and authorisation mechanisms as well as their membership base, informal representatives cannot, and do not want to, claim to act on behalf of the whole citizenry (Warleigh 2001). Their participation in political decision-making is not depending on elections, their programs need not appeal to an audience as extensive as possible and their authority in selecting objectives is limited. Informal actors are representatives of certain groups of citizens or stakeholders lacking the chance, resources, need and will to be democratically elected by a majority of citizens. Thus, they can only provide voice for their specific audience.

Informal representation denotes the feeding of information, demands and interests into the political process by civil society associations with the aim to influence the policy-making process. Civil society associations are all types of organisations, including interest groups, NGOs and other types of networks that in general do not possess a formal mandate to participate in policy-making (see European Commission 2001) but that represent a more or less clearly defined membership base which is not congruent with the population of a territory under a common regulatory regime. Associations such as consumer or environmental groups understand themselves as representatives of their sometimes very broad membership structure and, therefore, as legitimate members of authoritative action and binding decision-making even though they have not been selected via elections by the majority of the citizens (Kritzinger/Michalowitz/Pollak 2006). Informal representative modes can be structured along the characteristics or objectives of associations vying for attention.

Today’s political systems are inhabited by various kinds of actors, formal and informal ones. Thus, elections as the differentia specifica are not a defining criterion for political representation.

**Myth No. 5: Good representation is equal to responsiveness**

For a long time, political objectives wore out in the demand for presence which was taken as the yardstick and guarantee for successful or good representation. Be it the barons, the landed gentry, the middle class or the working class, partaking in power was thought to be a panacea to the injustices of a political order. Very soon it turned out that mere presence is no guarantee for representation at all, the reason being the inherent differences of individual interests, needs and preferences or the alienation of the political elite. Different safeguard mechanisms ranging from legal and political
accountability to forms of peer control shall assure that representatives are responsive to the principal’s demands unless there are good reasons to the contrary. As long as there is an issue specific accordance between representative and represented with respect to the making of public policy, good representation can be achieved. Eulau and Karps (1978: 62) called this policy responsiveness. But, as indicated above already, even if the dubious assumption that such accordance exists is correct, there still remains the possibility of conflict over objectives, dissent over means. Eulau and Karps defined three other form of responsiveness too: Service responsiveness alludes to the advantages and benefits which the representative is able to obtain for particular constituents. In this case the representative largely acts as a delegate of her constituency towards the legislature and the administration. Allocation responsiveness means the ability of the representative to obtain advantages and benefits for the district as a whole. Symbolic responsiveness is a relationship built on trust and confidence expressed in the support that the principal gives to the representative and to which she responds by symbolic, significant gestures, in order to, in turn, generate and maintain continuing support. Some authors, like Riker (1982) called a dominance of symbolic responsiveness populism which is either normatively non-desirable or incoherent and, as such, not able to serve as a criterion for the assessment of the democratic quality of a political community. The line between symbolic responsiveness and populism is indeed a thin one. A prime minister or chancellor wearing wellingtons at the occasion of flooding can easily be dismissed as utterly ridiculous or it can be seen as a serious act of solidarity with the persons concerned.

The underlying assumption of the following four forms is threefold: (a) depending on the conditions a representative applies differently weighted sets of responsive modes. There may be times when symbolic representation is the only option, or situations in which everything else apart from pork barrel politics may be regarded as treason by a constituency. (b) The representative is in the position to adapt different modes of responsiveness. Being tightly bound to a party list certainly limits the room of manoeuvre, as do limited resources. (c) Responsiveness has to include efficiency because the representative must deliver. It is not sufficient for the representative to appear responsive; she must also be able to implement policies.

Furthermore, responsiveness under the condition of limited resources and fuzzy principals is a discriminatory process, that is, a representative can only be responsive to parts of the citizenry. Responsive politics thus creates winners and losers. This is no problem as long as there is no persistent discrimination. Equating good representation with responsiveness seems to be an exaggeration (then). All the more so if we take into account that good representation may mean to turn a blind eye to citizens’ demands. Interestingly enough, representation can sometimes imply that it is in the best interest of the people to act against their perceived best interest. Let us give an example: The financial and economic crisis at the beginning of 2009 has triggered protectionist calls from ‘Buy American’ in the United States to ‘Restrict immigration’ in Europe. Those calls can be understood as expressions of fear which, however, are entirely counter-productive. Representatives adopting policies to address protectionist calls would be showing indeed high rates of responsiveness, but they would be acting against the best interest of the principal. Further difficulties emerge if we consider the problems of attributing effects to causes and policies to results. In a complex environment where most policy-making involves coordination between several organizations straight-line attribution of results to policies is increasingly difficult.
How, then, can we ever identify what good representation is? A first tentative answer might be that it depends on what we understand by representation. If representation is understood as a close resemblance of ascriptive characteristics between represented and representative, the accordance of interests or experiences, then the accuracy of the resemblance serves as a criterion for assessment. Jane Mansbridge’s (1999: 628) sophisticated analysis of descriptive representation recommends that under certain conditions such a resemblance might provide a good criterion. Alas, her conclusion is that standards for evaluating representatives are fluid and flexible. If we are focusing on the actions of the representative, the criterion has to be the extent to which policy outcomes advanced by a representative serve the ‘best interests’ of their constituents. Again, we are running into all too familiar problems. Our conclusion is that in the context of the standard model of representation it is not possible to unequivocally identify what good representation is. To do so would require us to introduce a striking temporal distance including all relevant variables which might have influenced the political, economic and social development of a community. Assessment of representative performance would therefore become a historical undertaking and be prone to interpretation and the changing meaning of facts (comp. e.g. White 1986).

**Why the Standard Account Endured for so long**

Before we go on to chart the challenges existing systems of representation face, let us briefly ponder about the reasons why the standard model of representation persevered for so long despite its obvious inconsistencies. We identify four reasons why a conceptual debate hardly took place: (a) In the 18th and 19th centuries ideas about representation were mainly interventions into the political realm made by politicians (e.g. Sieyès, Burke, Madison) in order to challenge or protect existing systems. In the 20th century theories of representation became part of the academic discourse. This discourse, in the beginning, very much concentrated on finding the ‘one, true’ substance of representation and ignored its dazzling variety. (b) Modern mainstream political science has focused on comparative electoral studies rather than dealing with the conceptual and theoretical basis. Subsequently, accountability has moved into the centre of attention following simple logics: Since it is so difficult to theorize the input of the citizens in representative systems, at least an in-depth discussion about the appropriate control mechanisms is needed. (c) Although political philosophy was declared dead in the 1950s and analytical philosophy following Wittgenstein became dominant, it returned in the 1960s. One more recent peak was the so-called communitarian debate whose open end triggered a turn towards applied political philosophy. The cost of this turn was the abandonment of a discussion about the fundamental concepts of democracy.

**Ad (a) Essentialism**

Authors as diverse as Ernst Fraenkel (1964: 153), Gerhard Leibholz (1966: 27) and Carl Schmitt (1957: 209) have presented sophisticated definitions of representation. Though widely distinct in their theories, methods and normative beliefs what they have in common is a focus on the ‘true’ meaning of the concept, i.e. a phenomenological approach to the subject. Even Hanna Pitkin, in her seminal work ‘The Concept of Political Representation’ (1967), where she pins down the various meanings of the concept, reveals an essentialist understanding:
We may think of the concept as a rather complicated convoluted, three-dimensional structure in the middle of a dark enclosure. Political theorists give us, as it were, flash-bulb photographs of the structure taken from different angles. […] Yet there is something there, in the middle of the dark, which all of them are photographing; and the different photographs together can be used to reconstruct it in complete detail.

(1967: 11)

But do concepts carry their ‘true’ meaning within? Is something out there in the middle of the dark? If yes, one might ask why, after so many centuries of research this true meaning has not been discovered yet. What lies behind this approach is the understandable but fruitless attempt to discover the ‘truth’ behind concepts. Along with such attempts goes the understanding of language as a reproduction of the world itself as the sum of objectively identifiable facts. The manipulative character of language, its inherent element of power and its constructive potential are blanked out. But language, especially political language, is intentional. It aspires to an objective and this objective is always connected to a re-ordering of existing power relations. It may well be that the appeal to ‘truth’ serves as an additional tool in the struggle for power, but its scientific value remains in doubt.

Ad (b) Focus on Elections and Accountability

Between Hanna Pitkin’s seminal study (1967) and Bernard Manin’s book on ‘The Principles of Representative Government’ (1997) lie thirty more or less idle years which were dominated by a technical understanding of representation. Representation was perceived as the problem of how to translate votes into seats (Laycock 2004: xii). Within this understanding Bingham Powell (2001) distinguishes two lines of research focusing on procedural representation. In the first one, democratic representation means that votes for parties should correspond to the seats those parties win in the legislature. Much of this research has focused on the way different election laws shape such representation (Rae 1967; Gudgin/Taylor 1979; Groffman 1983; Lijphart 1985, 1986; Groffman/Lijphart 1986; Taagepera 1986; Cox 1991; Gallagher 1991, 1992). The second line of research begins with citizens’ preferences instead of their votes. Voter choices link citizens’ preferences to the preferences and behaviour of legislative representatives. Democratic representation means that citizens’ issue preferences should correspond to positions of their representatives. Other, less extensive research programmes centre on social or symbolic representation analysing demographic correspondences, such as gender, race and class, between citizens and their representatives (Norris/Lovenduski 1995; Vowles et al. 1998). A further research sub-strand is devoted to the role of campaign commitments, such as candidate promises and party manifestos, in government policymaking (Klingemann et al. 1994; Manin et al. 1999). Yet another one focuses on the analysis of ‘accountability’ and retrospective voting, emphasizing conditions under which voters penalize policymakers for poor performance in office (e.g. Powell and Whitten 1993; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999). It appears that representation is understood as a technical process, as the translation of votes into seats, as the aggregation of preferences (Downs 1957; Riker 1982; Elster 1983) and not as an action undertaken by the representative in the interest of the principal. A re-assessment of its normative connotations and implications has been of less interest.

Recently these different strands of research have been joined by ‘principal-agent’ theories Pratt/Zeckhauser 1984; Moe 1984, 1997; Furubotn/Richter 1997; Strom et al. 2003a). Democracy and the relation between representatives and principals is understood as ‘a process of delegation in which those authorised to make political decisions conditionally designate others to make such decisions in their name and place.’ (Strøm et al. 2003: 19). At the top of the delegation pyramid stand elections. Following that the legislative delegates authority to the executive, the executive to the administration and finally to the individual civil servant. This chain is complemented by the principle of accountability. What is astonishing is that ‘principal-agent’ approaches tend to blur the difference between delegation and representation so important for older theories. Delegation was seen as connected to the imperative mandate: the delegate or agent gets a detailed and limited instruction and fulfils it on behalf of the principal. There is virtually no room of discretion for the agent, whereas representation necessarily includes a leeway. Indeed, the voter delegates tasks to politicians, but these tasks are overwhelmingly unspecific. Questions like ‘who represents?’ do not figure prominently in ‘principal-agents’ approaches at all.32 However, the principal-agent approach has also contributed analytically to better grasp the relation between representatives and represented. According to some scholars this relationship has been hitherto phrased in ‘needlessly complex and diverse sets of terms’ (Strom et al. 2003: 5). Paradoxically, it is exactly the problems connected to the free mandate the principal-agent approach has helped to analyse.

The focus on elections and the request for a stronger control of representatives has given rise to the prominent position the concept of accountability occupies again today. The standard model of representation comprises two versions of the nexus between accountability and elections: retrospective and prospective voting. Several empirical studies show that the preconditions for both versions are rather precarious. Most voters do not have clear preferences (Sunstein 1993: 197; Goodin 1993: 234) or stable positions33, and only a minority is interested in a dialogue with their representatives (Wahlke 1971; Thomassen 1994). Furthermore, even in ‘first-order’ national elections the average knowledge about politics is modest (Converse 1964; Neumann 1986; Luskin 1987; Zaller 1992; Delle Carpini/Keeter 1996), and the possession of a general knowledge (Fiorina 1981) does not make a voting decision more rational (Achen/Bartels 2000). Thus, to substitute accountability for representation, i.e. to tighten the reins on the representatives (Mansbridge 2005) puts too much weight on an inherently weak electoral link between principal and representative.

Ad (c) Philosophical Turn

Another reason for the reservation political theory has treated representation with, lies in the transformation of political philosophy itself. In 1956 Peter Laslett (1956: vii) authoritatively declared ‘[f]or the moment anyway, political philosophy is dead.’ Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy took the lead in the 1950s and 1960s, linguistic analysis was deemed to be the only method for understanding society (Skinner 2002). However true this claim was, the works of political philosophers such as Eric Voegelin (1956) and Leo Strauss (1952) were published but flatly rejected by analytical

32 See e.g. Brennan/Hamlin (2000: 156): ‘Ideas of representation are notoriously diffuse and recalcitrant. We shall not here be concerned with the full array of these ideas. Our attention […] will be focused on the issue of political agency - on the simple fact of representation, rather than its detailed form.’

33 Not even with respect to economic voting. See Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000).
philosophy which denounced them as classicistic and anti-democratic. Politics was understood as a code which can easily be deciphered by the right technical means. And it seems that in the application of statistics sociologists were better trained than philosophers. Empiricism, especially Behaviouralism, set new standards in pragmaticism. This caused Laslett to say that ‘it may still be the case that we have no political philosophy because politics have become too serious to be left to the philosophers’ (1956). But already in 1968, in the third volume of the series ‘Philosophy, Politics and Society’, Laslett and Walter Runciman recognized a ‘renewal of political philosophy’. The publication of John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’ in 1971 marked the breakthrough return of political philosophy. This time the model of representative democracy was firmly established in most West-European countries. Since the end of the communitarian debate, itself a reaction to Rawls’ writings34, a new turn can be seen. It is a turn towards applied political philosophy, important authors being e.g. Kymlicka (1992, 1995) and Bauböck (1994). Since the debate between communitarians and liberals did not lead to any conclusions, it was attempted to operationalise existing theories and subject them to institutional analysis. Again, the normative foundations of representation were left untouched in the discussion, or they were absorbed into comparative political science. The new kids on the block are called associate and deliberative democracy, delegation35 and accountability. It seems appropriate to follow David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997) in their ironic assessment calling the resulting situation a ‘democracy of adjectives’.

**Challenges**

[T]he whole question of representation, one of the crucial and most troublesome issues of modern politics ever since the revolutions […] constitutes one of those dilemmas which permit of no solution.

*Hannah Arendt, 1965*

As a result of the social changes and the existing unsatisfying theoretical approaches, an increasing number of authors have rediscovered more ‘descriptive’ and de-territorialised forms of representation (Butler 1999), or suggested that electoral representation itself accounts for a narrower range of representative possibilities now than in the recent past (Bingham Powell 1982). Other authors have remarked how electoral representation itself increasingly functions outside the traditional model of trust/delegation, with greater roles played by deliberative and informal processes of representation (Mansbridge 1998, 2003, 2005). In their view, this may allow for greater freedom of action on the part of the representatives vis-à-vis the electorate, but also, in some cases, for a more direct participation and influence of ordinary citizens – thus breaking the traditional divide between representative and direct democracy. However, both descriptive and informal processes of representation present risks, and


35 It is more correct to speak about a renaissance of delegation since in 1979 Donald McCrone and James Kuklinski wrote: ‘Given its long tradition, the study of delegated representation is important. But it falls far short of leading to a total understanding of the phenomenon we call representation’ (229).
the debate over new and old models of representation and their relation is still very much open.

The standard model of political representation attempts to construct a theoretical frame for the description and explanation of representation. It does so by relying on some dubious assumptions, as explicated in the first section. Assumptions which can be better understood if we look at the general circumstances in which they were formulated. The overall framework for the formulation of those models was the nation-state. Today, we have to ask if this framework, which so much determines political science both in terms of vocabulary as well as theoretical perspectives, is still an adequate one. Warren and Castiglione (2004) have identified several challenges which have their roots in the general transformation of politics and society. Firstly, increasingly powerful transnational players and decision-making arenas tend to escape the reach of traditional institutions of democratic representation rooted in territorially defined political communities. An increasing number of collective decision-making areas and issues, at both the national and supranational level, are now largely shaped by specialized and expert bodies. This ‘agencification’ of politics can be understood as an attempt to carve up politics into neat isolated chunks which can be dealt with by experts who hardly have any democratic mandate or connection to the people. Secondly, a multiplication of informal structures and opportunities for political representation and influence has increased the importance of decision-making in couloirs which bypass formal (parliamentary) representative politics. Political power has thus been fragmented and responsibility and accountability dispersed. In short: politics has become governance (see Lord/Pollak 2009). These challenges may have a considerable impact on (a) how we think about representation and (b) on the existing representative systems. Let us first turn to the practical impact on existing systems of representation.

The emergence of transnational players and new global playing fields renders representation within the framework of the nation state ambiguous. The legitimate sphere of influence of the nationally mandated representatives is restricted to the borders of the nation state. Nevertheless, they are increasingly made responsible for developments they are hardly able to influence. Furthermore, the rising technicality of policy-making requires experts instead of generalists for decision-making. Delegating authority to special expert bodies is a perfectly rational decision, but leaves the question to who these experts are accountable to unanswered. Politicians have so far proved largely unwilling to take responsibility for decisions made by delegated experts, examples ranging from alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to the reform of social systems in European welfare states. Thus, the principal is deprived of the fundamental right of selection and authorisation of those who make decisions; politicians are shifting the burden of decision-making to experts and refuse to take over responsibility. One consequence is that people feel, correctly so, that ‘they have less control over the important decisions that affect their lives.’ (Mansbridge 2005: 234). Apart from the rally cry for a tightening of the reins, citizens react by forming various interest groups which seem to be in a better position to transport their demands, wishes and preferences into the decision-making arena. Consequently, the number of actors involved in decision-making rises because political representatives look out for interest groups to be seen responsive, i.e. politicians become mainly concerned with symbolic responsiveness. Administrations are in need of the additional expertise and they are aware they can lower the transaction costs if such
groups are allowed to participate., Citizens, on the other hand, can concentrate their political energy onto exactly those issues which rank high on their attention.

Two of the most challenging recent contributions to theory-building have dealt quite differently with the distance between representatives and represented, one by putting it into the very focus of analysis, the other by ignoring it instead of concentrating on the importance of the representative’s peer group or audience. (1) Michael Saward (2006) has offered a theory of representative claims, thereby conceptualizing representation as a constant social dialogue between represented and representative. Potential representatives make claims about themselves (that they possess certain characteristic which enable them to represent a constituency) and their constituency (they describe or understand the constituency in a specific way). The representatives constantly present a claim comprising an idea of the political community they want to represent and a specific course of action which allows for the realization of its principals’ best interest. Those claims are constantly re-negotiated, they are refuted, amended or rejected. By no means are those claims made by formal actors only. Rather, formal and informal potential representatives compete for the attention, the mandate, and authorisation of the principals.

This approach allows going beyond the sterile differentiation between participation and representation because the former is a pre-condition of the latter. Furthermore, the dynamic conception of Saward’s approach enables us to grasp the multiple relations between principals and representatives in complex systems by focusing on what representatives do. However, Saward does not seem to take into account the structural dimension to a sufficient degree, i.e. the framework in which representative claims are formulated and which potentially impacts on the frequency, clustering and commensurability or streamlining of representative claims. (2) Andrew Rehfeld (2006) in dealing with representation beyond the confines of the nation states argues that the audience which accepts a person as representative is decisive. According to Rehfeld, standard accounts of representation collapsed the formal and the substantive dimension of representation (a differentiation suggested by H. Pitkin) and do not allow for a general theory of representation apt for what Rehfeld calls ‘global institutions’ in which non-democratic representation occurs frequently. He offers an understanding which explains representation simply by reference to a relevant audience accepting a person as representative. The claim that his premise amounts to a general theory of representation may be bold, but his focus on the mode of recognition is nevertheless important since it puts the audience into the centre of attention. Those who recognize someone as a representative are the ultimate source of its legitimacy. It is not democratic procedures which create representativity; it is not the realisation of an idée directrice but its acceptance by an audience.

While Saward tends to underestimate the structural component, Rehfeld overemphasizes its role thereby blurring the borders between representation and representation.

36 Non-democratic representation is here understood as representation which is not based on democratic elections and in the fact that non-democratic representatives care for particular interests rather than the common good. Thereby we do not hold that democratically elected representatives all care for the common good but allure to the fact that they can ill afford to systematically exclude large parts of the population from their considerations.

37 His statement that ‘political representation, per se, is not a democratic phenomenon at all’ (2006: 1) because recognition can make use of democratic and non-democratic forms of recognition adds a further dimension to a historical view coming to the same conclusion.
delegation. Saward’s approach has the advantage of taking the decreasing importance of territorial representation into account, while Rehfeld’s approach also takes instances of non-democratic representation seriously. The latter is especially important for developing a theoretical account of political practice where multiple forms of non-democratic representative modes appear.

A note of caution needs to be sounded. The heterarchisation of decision-making as the most important challenge to political representation easily veils the fact that there are substantial resource asymmetries between different interest groups, and there is a danger of merely duplicating existing power structures. Secondly, a place on the table for interest groups raises the question who is allowed to select between the myriad of existing groups who all have a legitimate (if not necessarily democratic) claim to represent someone. Thirdly, the multiplication of actors – we can also call them informal representatives, i.e. representatives whose mandate is not based on a democratic selection and authorisation process38 and whose scope of decision-making is highly restricted – blurs transparency and masks who is responsible for what. As John Stuart Mill has phrased it, ‘It should be apparent to all the world who did everything and through whose default anything was left undone. Responsibility is null when nobody knows who is responsible’ (Mill [1861] 1964: 264). Thus, heterarchisation and informalisation re-create the problem which a new way of policy-making was supposed to prevent.39 Fourthly, the development of transnational decision-making arenas via the pooling of sovereignty adds an extra layer of complexity making it less clear who did what. Euphemistically described as systems of new governance, as socio-cybernetic systems, or as self-organizing networks, i.e. systems characterized by the inclusion of non-state actors in decision-making, the use of non-hierarchical steering instruments, and a focus on the output the new arenas pose a considerable challenge to traditional, nationally organised systems of representation. For example, as the success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines had demonstrated in the 1990s, involvement of non-state actors may in fact improve effectiveness of transnational negotiations and bring about profound results in a relatively short time (Axworthy 1998; Price 1998). Yet, as became painfully clear in the negotiations of the UN-sponsored World Conference against Racism in Durban, South Africa in 2001, involvement of civil society actors per

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38 It can well be that even interest groups decide about their leaders in democratic elections. Thus the main difference between formal and informal representatives is the scope of their deliberating and decision-making power (see Lord/Pollak 2009). Their participation in political decision-making is not depending on elections, their programs do not need to appeal to an audience as extensive as possible and their authority in selecting objectives is limited. Informal actors are representatives of certain groups of citizens or stakeholders lacking the chance, need and will to be democratically elected by a majority of citizens. Thus, they can only provide voice for their specific audience. The equality of all citizens can therefore not be guaranteed through the substitution of formal actors that have obtained their mandate in elections involving all citizens by informal representatives. Rather factors such as membership characteristics bring out the inequality that may increase through the powerful influence of informal actors on policy decisions. Informal actors push, and have to push, policy processes in a direction favourable to their members (some citizens). But these policy processes do also affect non-members (all citizens) (Kritzinger/Michalowitz/Pollak 2006).

39 Space does not permit us to deal with the question in how far this heterarchisation and informalisation are really new phenomena and if they differ from consociational and corporatist regimes. See Lord/Pollak (2009).
se is no guarantee of improved democratic quality of governance, as xenophobic and non-democratic views may in fact permeate some of these organizations (Cooper 2004:223-231). Heterarchisation of political representation in transnational governance calls for more elaborate rules and procedures for selection of legitimate representatives.

Together, the potential dangers of heterarchical representation can lead to the collision of representatives and, eventually, also to the collision of principals. They collide most obviously where one claim to representativeness undermines another; where, for example, two conflicting majorities have equal claim to regard themselves as democratically-elected representatives and equal claim to trump the other in deciding a law affecting the lives of the represented (Dehousse 1995; Follesdal 2003); or where a claim to represent some special need refuses to bow down to a claim to represent the public as a whole. Majorities at the European, national and regional levels – each with equal claim to being elected by the citizens – may all claim to be better placed than the others to represent citizens in the making of policies. Being closer to what happens on the ground, in a position to consider the larger picture, in touch with real political communities supported by real political parties and real media debates, are just some of the contrasting claims typically made by representatives at different levels. But it is not just elected representatives who dispute each other’s claims. Specific groups – fishermen, truck drivers, French plumbers, Volkswagen workers – whose livelihoods are intensely affected by regulations may not feel they can be adequately represented by any kind of elected representative whose main concern will often be with the diffuse interest of society in the regulations in question. Representative claims also collide in a second sense: namely, when citizens are confronted with a bewildering array of claims that only serves to obscure who is responsible for what within an institutional order, or, indeed, how citizens can engage with the political system, direct their expectations towards it with a view to securing policy outcomes, and claim ownership of it in the fundamental sense of being able to see themselves as authoring their own laws through representatives (see Lord/Pollak 2009).

While the competition between formal representatives, vying for support of their ideas within a clear constitutional framework belongs to the nuts and bolts of representative systems, the heterarchisation of representative politics may be to the detriment of the individual. Representation is not only a means to make democratic politics possible; it is also a means to free the citizen from a bios politikos. In heterarchical representative systems citizens have to be willing to follow politics very closely and engage into interest group formation. In other words, heterarchical systems favour active citizens or those with considerable resources. The question thus is, how we can combine the various horizontal and vertical systems of representation operating in multi-level polities and which specific organization of a polity abets which representative system.
Conclusions

In this paper we have charted a standard account of political representation, its elements coming from various approaches mainly developed in the last 100 years. Those elements are to a considerable degree part of a specific narrative about liberal democracy. We critically reviewed the five most important elements of the standard account of political representation. Namely, we argued against the popular notion that political representation developed as an answer to the emergence of large scale political communities. Similarly, we showed that the object of representation need not necessarily be the ‘people’, that there is not always a direct social relationship between the represented and the representative, that the representatives can be chosen by means other than elections and, finally, that good representations is not identical to responsiveness.

In spite of its weaknesses, the standard account of political representation proved remarkably resilient. It is no exaggeration to say that for the better part of the 20th century it overshadowed any alternative viewpoints and established itself as the orthodox and sole account in the theory of representation. This development, we argued, is largely due to three reasons. First, the concept of representation ceased to be the exclusive concern of politicians pragmatically interested in the allocation of power within a polity, and entered the realm of academic debate. As one result, establishing the ‘true nature’ of representation became a matter of scientific enquiry and an essentialist understanding of the concept prevailed. Second, the focus of mainstream political science on electoral politics and accountability inevitably neglected the nuances surrounding the meaning of representation. Third, the prevalence of analytical philosophy at the expense of political philosophy in the mid-20th century did not provide a suitable environment for the discussion of fundamental concepts of democracy.

In our opinion, it is no longer possible to understand political representation as the result of an electoral authorisation processes which ‘produces’ representatives with varying degrees of discretion and subject to different forms of accountability. Not only is the standard account of political representation undertheorized and full of contradictions, but it is inherently restrained to serve the analytical needs of a theoretical framework where the nation state is the sole reference point. The emergence of transnational actors and arenas, and the increasing heterarchisation and informalisation of politics robs the standard account of sufficient explanatory power. Moreover, the existence of multiple actors claiming to be legitimate representatives bears the danger of different representative modes colliding with each other thereby obstructing the decision-making process.

Instead of looking for one grand narrative or theoretical frame for political representation, we argue for the careful reconstruction of specific representative systems by analysing their functions. Every representative system fulfils a number of functions ranging from the organisation of rule to the introduction of a temporal space between decision-making and reflection used for identity-building. Systems might even be differentiated according to the weight they give to specific functions. For instance, the political system of the People’s Republic of China may be highly efficient when it comes to the functions of leadership, identity-building and system stability, but it shows considerable weaknesses with regard to responsiveness, executive control and accountability. The German political system, on the other hand,
shows high standards of control, accountability and responsiveness, but is rather weak when it comes to leadership and identity-building.40

The next step in theory-building should be an analysis of functions attributed to representation in the three RECON models. We will do so by looking first into existing typologies whose elements we will later link to the functional-regulatory model, the federal model and the post-national model. We expect each model to sponsor a specific representative system. Those theoretical systems and their dimensions will in the following be used to formulate hypotheses about the streamlining of representative claims in the forthcoming EP elections. But this is a matter for the next working paper.

40 We do not hold that strength or weaknesses of political system can be monocausally linked to the functions of representation. Rather the historical development, specific structural variables (e.g. federalism) and the general political climate have to be taken into account.
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