Is there a Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy?
An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates

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Abstract

When Turkey began its accession negotiations with the European Union on 3 October 2005, this constituted an important turning point for Turkey’s relations with the EU and for Turkish socio-political transformation. This paper poses the following questions; is there a Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy as a result of Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU? If so, then what are the main areas and limits in which Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy has occurred? This paper answers these questions by providing a background on Europeanisation, firstly by differentiating between the member states and the candidate countries, and secondly by analysing the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy through an investigation of the changes in Turkish foreign policy since 1999 with regards to the CFSP, NATO-EU cooperation and Middle Eastern neighbors.

Keywords
Common Foreign and Security Policy – Enlargement – Europeanization – Turkey
Introduction

Since the end of the 1990s, the European Union is increasingly emphasized as an instrument stimulating a process of Europeanisation among its member states. Europeanisation, traditionally, has referred to changes in the member states pertaining specifically to the EU’s first pillar where a set of procedures, norms and practices emerged that influenced member states’ adoption of the EU’s acquis communautaire (Ladrech 1994; Olsen 2002). The concept of Europeanisation as an analytical tool was applied to the changes in the EU members in the second pillar, an intergovernmental pillar in its essence (Sjursen 2001; Rieker 2006). Since the 2004 enlargement of the EU, Europeanisation is increasingly used to assess the impact of the EU on the socio-political and economic transformation in the candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). Even though most of this analysis is limited to political conditionality and transformation in the first pillar, there have been some attempts to use Europeanisation as a conceptual tool to assess changes in foreign policy making among the candidate countries.

This paper attempts to assess the Europeanisation of foreign policy in acceding countries by examining the Turkish case. When Turkey began its accession negotiations with the European Union 3 October 2005, it constituted an important turning point for Turkey’s relations with the EU and for Turkish socio-political transformation. Various studies have analyzed the Turkish political changes in response to the EU conditionality (Heper 2005; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 2004; Müftüler-Baç 2005; Öniş 2009). The question to be answered is whether the Turkish accession process also constituted an important step in Turkish foreign policy making. A number of scholars has argued that since the 1999 Helsinki Council when Turkey became a candidate for EU accession, the EU has influenced Turkish foreign policy (Müftüler-Baç 2008; Öniş and Yılmaz 2009; Özcan 2002). For example, one could witness some changes in the Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq as well as its position on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the NATO-EU cooperation (Kirişçi 2004a; Çelik et al. 2006; Müftüler-Baç 2008). There seems to be some transformation in the foreign policy making procedures, mostly due to the changes in the civil-military balances in Turkey. In addition, it is possible to trace a change in Turkey’s foreign policy towards its Middle Eastern neighbours from a hard power approach to one that also utilises soft power instruments. We propose that these changes resulted from Turkey’s accession process and that they could be interpreted as a Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy. This is, of course, not to deny the role of internal changes such as the 2002 and 2007 elections, which resulted in the electoral victories of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). However, for the purpose of this paper, we are looking at changes in the Turkish foreign policy contours in response to European norms and the impact of the EU’s political conditionality on Turkish foreign policy.

This paper poses the following two questions: Is there a Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy as a result of Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU? If so, then what are the main areas and limits in which Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy has occurred? Three steps will be taken to answer these questions. Firstly, a background on Europeanisation is provided, which differentiates between the member states and the candidate
countries. Secondly, the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy will be analysed and finally, the changes in Turkish foreign policy since 1999 with regards to the CFSP, NATO-EU cooperation and Middle Eastern neighbors will be investigated.

**Europeanisation of national foreign policy**

Ladrech (1994: 69) defines Europeanisation simply as ‘an incremental process of re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the extent that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making’. The Europeanisation process has traditionally evolved as a framework for analyzing the changes that occur in the EU member states, specifically with respect to the first pillar issues and the adaptation that the member states go through regarding various aspects of the EU’s *acquis communautaire*. As noted above, Europeanisation as a concept emerged initially as a tool to analyze changes in the EU member states in the first pillar (Olsen 2002), and has since been extended to the analysis of political processes in Central and Eastern Europe in the most recent wave of enlargement. (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2006; Schimmelfenning 2007). Risse et al. (2001) defines Europeanisation as the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is of political, legal and social institutions associated with the problem solving that formalise interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules.

(Risse et al. 2001: 3)

Europeanisation can occur in two distinctly different manners. The first is through formal policy decisions of the EU and its adaptation by national polities (Risse et al. 2001; Knill 2001; Olsen 2002), and the second through increased social interactions between European actors and national actors (Schimmelfenning et al. 2003; Sjursen 2001). In the first explanation, it is possible to assess Europeanisation as the emergence of a common foreign policy behaviour among the member states. The second path is a more constructivist way of treating the process of Europeanisation. This does not mean that the process of Europeanisation and the EU-isation are the same thing, but that the EU is the only institution that can offer rewards and/or inflict punishments for Europeanisation or lack of it. The European collective identity and its norms and rules transcend the European Union without any question (Manners 2002). However, because the EU is the only institution with enforcement mechanisms, it becomes the most visible manifestation of the Europeanisation process. This is due to the EU’s impact on domestic politics in shaping the member states’ policies and institutions. There are two important questions here that need to be addressed: To what extent is it possible to apply the logic of Europeanisation to the area of common foreign policy making where national interests still play an important role? This is mostly due to the fact that foreign policy coordination is still intergovernmental (Soetendorp 1999; Jorgensen 2002). A further complication in this question is whether it is possible to infer some conclusions for the acceding countries from the experiences of the member states.
The concept of Europeanisation has limits when it comes to explaining the changes in foreign policy making among the EU member states, let alone in candidate countries. This is largely because of the intergovernmental character of the CFSP and second pillar integration (Smith 2004; Hill 2004; Müftüler-Baç 2007). In order to assess the mechanisms for Europeanisation of national foreign policy, either through the norm adaptation on foreign policy making or through the commonness of foreign policy behaviour, one needs to look at the special character of the CFSP and its impact in creating a common foreign policy behaviour among the EU member states (Hill 1996). The interaction of national foreign policy decision makers at the EU level, and especially in the second pillar institutions, create a process whereby European level norms on foreign policy making emerge and are adopted by the member states (Sjursen 2001).

The increased foreign policy coordination among the EU members first emerged within the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) (De Schoutheete 1980), and later on through the CFSP. It is through these institutionalised settings that a set of common rules has emerged and stimulated a process of Europeanisation in foreign policy (Holland 1993). We also expect the impact of Europeanisation to be different in candidate countries than in member states. This is largely due to the fact that the EU institutions have provided a framework within which member states were able to take joint decisions and/or communicate over their foreign policy choices. In other words, member states are bound to a common institutional setting, albeit an intergovernmental one, when they formulate their foreign policy decisions. This, in turn, provides us with the opportunity that some common norms and rules of behaviour emerge for EU members in the area of foreign policy as well.

However, one still needs to acknowledge that these common institutional norms and rules apply even less to the candidate countries and that there is a difference between the member states and the candidate countries with respect to Europeanisation of foreign policy. There are two main issues here: first, Europeanisation is much harder to assess among the candidate countries who are yet to become EU members. Second, Europeanisation of foreign policy – an intergovernmental area where national interests still matter and where there is no acquis communautaire which could be presented to the candidate as in the first pillar harmonization – for candidate countries differs considerably from the experience of the member states. These issues come on top of the fact that Europeanisation as a process is less likely to occur in the intergovernmental pillar. In other words, because there are legally binding rules and regulations on foreign policy that the candidate country is expected to adopt, Europeanisation of foreign policy is essentially different than Europeanisation processes in the first pillar (Olsen 2002; Hill 1996).

Nonetheless, even when one consider these limits on Europeanisation, it still is possible to analyse the impact of the EU on foreign policy changes in the candidate countries. There are a number of key concerns here. Firstly, Europeanisation of foreign policy making for candidate countries might be concerned with changes in decision making procedures. This is probably less of a concern for the member states, and brings into mind that in candidate countries, if there are some actors in foreign policy decision making other than the democratically elected officials (for example the military) the Europeanisation of foreign policy making would essentially lessen the role of these
actors. This would be a basic difference between the member states and candidate countries with respect to Europeanisation. Second, it would also be possible to argue that a set of norms acting as a constraint mechanism on the member states emerge within the institutional setting of the CFSP (Manners 2002; Sjursen 2001), and it would be expected to see them also adopted by the candidate countries, despite the fact that they are not yet members.

This brings forth the question as to whether there are European norms on foreign policy and/or common rules of behaviour (Zielonka 1998). Some European norms include the acceptance of CFSP, identifying with a larger European collectivity, collaboration with other European states in formulating policy, seeking multilateral rather than unilateral solutions to international problems, and the use of diplomatic and economic means rather than military instruments when solving disputes. Once such norms are adopted, they act as boundaries that shape and constrain member state preferences. They guide states when they formulate their own national foreign policy and become especially critical when the EU prepares its common foreign policy goals (Hill 2004). It is also important to note here that the common institutional setting that the second pillar provides for EU members is crucial in the creation of common rules of behavior (Sjursen 2001; Smith 2004). A challenge is to assess to what extent Europeanisation could apply to second pillar integration both for the member states and for candidate countries who do not yet participate in the common institutions of the CFSP. Europeanisation is not a straightforward process, but could either be interpreted as an adaptation to EU norms or as a commonness in foreign policy behaviour, i.e. an actual change in foreign policy behaviour. This does not mean that in all foreign policy issues, the EU members act as a unified front, but that there has been some coordination in foreign policy making within the premises of the CFSP.

With respect to the first aspect of Europeanisation, which involves changes in foreign policy behaviour, institutional changes in decision making procedures are also expected to occur. This is related to the liberal democracy norm that the EU diffuses in the international sphere. According to the liberal democratic model, no unelected group (such as the military, monarchy, judiciary, or bureaucracy) can hold reserve or tutelary powers that can obstruct policy making capabilities of the elected officials (Linz 1975: 182-3; Linz et al. 1995: 78). Indeed, highly autonomous military institutions that have the power to shape, determine and veto foreign and domestic policies, are against what the EU considers as the ‘normal way’ that a democratic regime functions. As a result, foreign policy cannot be determined exclusively by an institution – military or bureaucratic – that is not accountable to the voters in regular national elections. In European democracies, foreign policy is usually determined by the government with the involvement of civil society groups and after consultation and discussion in the parliament. This is why this paper argues that the changes in Turkish civil-military relations (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 2004; Jenkins 2007) in line with the EU political conditionality, have been important in the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy. As the military has been a critical actor in Turkish foreign policy decision making (Heper 2005), a relative decline in the role of the military in this area would be a significant indicator of institutional changes in line with the adoption of foreign policy procedures and therefore could be seen as an indicator of Europeanisation. The Europeanisation of national foreign policy in candidate countries such as Turkey could then be assessed with respect to the formal institutional changes in
the foreign policy actors. This, of course, is not a concern for the member states. It is also important to note that the democratically elected officials could still decide on the use of force as the foreign policy tool. But what matters here is the decision making process where appointed officials such as the military do not act as one of the primary decision makers. Even though this paper does not analyze the civil-military changes in Turkey in line with the EU political conditionality, it is important to note that the Turkish adaptation to the EU accession criteria, namely the political aspects of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, has led to a procedural change in foreign policy making in Turkey.

The second norm diffused by the EU is the use of economic and diplomatic instruments to achieve foreign policy goals. These civilian tools involve seeking international legitimacy, collaborating with others in the region, and looking for solutions in multilateral settings and international or regional institutions (Zielonka 1998). Europeanisation of foreign policy entails minimal use of military instruments and force in solving disagreements – even in ones that are perceived as high politics, such as border disputes. According to EU norms, employment of diplomatic and economic ‘carrots and sticks’ are a better and more legitimate way to deal with conflictual situations. In other words, ‘hard power’ should be replaced with ‘soft power’.

This is not to say that the EU members do not use force to achieve foreign policy objectives, but that it is generally seen as a last resort (Holland 1993). Indeed, one could ask to what extent European norms in foreign policy have been adapted by the candidate countries. This seems to be problematic even for the member states where serious disputes within the EU emerged, for example over the 2003 Iraqi intervention (Hill 2004). In other words, even among the EU members, norm diffusion with respect to the CFSP is still far from being non-problematic (Tonra 2001). If this is so, one could also ask whether a ‘European’ way of making decisions, i.e. through consent and coordination of policies, emerges for the candidate countries as well. Whether these norms would be absorbed and adapted by the candidate countries is another question.

According to Rieker, ‘national approaches tend to adapt to norms defined by an international community or institution to which they are closely linked; that this adaptation takes place over time, through a socialization process; and that it may also, in the end, lead to changes in national identity’ (Rieker 2006). It is through this perspective that the EU’s impact on national foreign policy is important, in terms of its ability to shape and influence the emergence of a European identity and the adaptation of national identities as a result. Even though the final outcome could be assessed as a collective identity formation through foreign policy, there would still be a difference as to what motivates the national centers to this adaptation. Are the EU member states willing to adapt their foreign policy making to ‘a European way’ because it is the appropriate thing to do, and in the longer run internalise these norms? Or are the EU member states maximising their utility in achieving their foreign policy goals by a Europeanisation of their foreign policy? These are two different motivations for the adaptation process. However, if the utility maximization is the main motivation, one would expect to see a reversal of the adaptation process when key material interests, such as survival, are at stake. It is within the premises of these questions that apply to the member states, that one could develop similar questions for the candidate countries. However, the candidate countries differ from the member states in the fact that they do not necessarily participate
in the CFSP institutional setting and are therefore not bound by the EU’s institutional rules and common patterns of behaviour. In addition, the candidate countries differ from member states in terms of the procedural changes that they might go through in foreign policy decision making. An important aspect of the EU’s impact on expanding its norms to the countries in its periphery, external salience of norms, is the respect to the changing procedures of decision making in foreign policy. Institutionally, Europeanisation of foreign policy in candidate countries such as Turkey would result in the increased role of democratic procedures in foreign policy making. This is not a major concern in the EU member states where the procedures of foreign policy are relatively more democratic. Similarly, for the candidate countries, the EU expects that foreign policy decisions are taken by elected officials.

In terms of the normative aspect, European values aim to protect and uphold the promotion of democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights and minorities (Manners 2002; Sjursen 2001; Zielonka 1998). This is furthered by the predominant view in the EU that there should be limited use of military tools and increased application of diplomatic instruments and economic sanctions to promote foreign policy objectives.

The process of Europeanisation of foreign policy in Turkey would be measured by the extended role of the elected officials and civil society groups in foreign policy decisions, and the increased use of economic and diplomatic instruments in solving disputes, rather than the possible use of force. These are different expectations for Europeanisation of foreign policy in Turkey compared to the EU member states’ experiences. In the next section, the changing parameters of foreign policy making in Turkey will be analyzed within this framework of Europeanisation.

**Turkey and the CFSP**

Turkey officially became a candidate country for EU membership in the European Council’s Helsinki Summit in 1999. This constituted the main turning point in enhancing the EU’s power over Turkey in inducing political change. Six years later, when the accession negotiations began with Turkey in October 2005, the EU’s impact on the Turkish political structures and norms was enhanced by EU conditionality. It is through the perspective of EU membership that Turkey approved a series of political reforms since 1999. The EU’s political conditionality and the Turkish desire to fulfill these political criteria in order for accession negotiations to begin, became critical in triggering a vast political transformation in Turkey which has had an impact on collective identity formation in the country. This is not to say that the EU had no influence over Turkey prior to 1999. On the contrary, Turkey and the EU have a long relationship since the signing of the Association Agreement in 1963 and the establishment of a customs union in 1995 (Müftüler-Baç 1997). However, it was not until the 1999 Summit and the promise of full membership that the EU became an anchor for Turkey’s political liberalisation and reform process (Hale 2000; Önüş 2000, 2001; Müftüler-Baç and McLaren 2003).

The political reforms that were adopted in Turkey increasingly alter civil-military relations in Turkey and enabled a process of political change. The impact of
these reforms, then, was also felt in the field of foreign policy, especially with regard to the procedural changes and adaptation to the EU level norms. In the analysis of the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy, the procedural changes with regard to foreign policy making come to the forefront, with the civil-military relationship sitting at the core. The positions of the Turkish military and government toward the EU’s CFSP and the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) has been mostly determined by the changing dynamics of European security in the post-Cold War era, specifically with respect to the transformations of NATO and the EU (Sayar and Makovsky 2000). The Turkish Armed Forces have traditionally advocated the use of military instruments, especially when the strategic interests of the Turkish state were threatened. Because of this inclination, the Turkish military has been lukewarm towards the EU as well as the CFSP (Bilgin 2004). The implications of such a move could potentially isolate Turkey and damage its strategic interests. From the perception of the military, Turkish interests could be safeguarded better if European states continued to cooperate under the umbrella of NATO. The military is specifically sensitive about the involvement of Cyprus, as a member of the EU, in common foreign and security policy. These concerns became critical in shaping Turkey’s foreign policy with respect to the deepening of EU’s second pillar.

When the EU decided to create the Rapid Reaction Force in its Helsinki summit in 1999, the non-EU European members of NATO, most importantly Turkey, insisted on the application of the Berlin-plus arrangement and the 1999 NATO summit decisions toward NATO-EU cooperation (Müftüler-Baç 2000, 2008; Bilgin 2004). The Turkish military and foreign ministry argued that NATO assets could be used in EU operations only when all NATO members approve it, as decided in NATO’s Washington summit of 1999. In December 2002, during the Copenhagen summit of the European Council, the EU agreed that ‘the Berlin-plus arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU member states which are also either NATO members or parties to the “Partnerships for Peace” and which have consequently concluded bilateral security arrangements with NATO’ (Presidency Conclusions 2002a). This decision effectively operationalised EU’s CESDP, enabled the first operation to be realized in Macedonia, and also addressed Turkey’s key concerns. As long as the EU made use of NATO assets in its operations under the CESDP, Turkey would be able to participate in EU-led operations. As a result, Turkey has contributed and participated in the EU-led operations that made use of NATO assets since 2003. In addition, Turkey has pledged to contribute to the EU’s Headline Goal for 2010 with 6000 troops, aircraft and ships. This contribution made Turkey the fifth-largest contributor to the EU force of 60 000. As a NATO member since 1952, Turkey has been an important security provider for Europe and has also been socialised into a common identity that revolved around NATO. Turkey’s willingness to contribute to European security after 2003 shows that the Turkish military and government still support taking joint decisions with other European countries, at least for operations that draw upon NATO assets and providing for the security of the continent. The Turkish active participation in NATO missions in Afghanistan and its participation in the UNIFIL in Lebanon in 2006 as well as numerous EU-led operations in the Balkans, Caucasus and North Africa, all indicate a Europeanisation of foreign policy where Turkey has demonstrated its ability as a team player for the EU.
Even though Turkish participation in EU-led operations is an important indicator of diffusion of European norms among decision makers, it is clear that Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy is also conditioned by strategic interests. When the government and especially the military believe that Turkish strategic interests are jeopardised and Turkey is not recognized as an equal partner, there is a tendency to detach from common decisions.

This inclination was exemplified in 2007 when the EU began to plan its operation in Kosovo. From the Turkish point of view, the main problem was that the EU decided to use NATO facilities and at the same time allow for arrangements that would include Cyprus in this operation. Since Cyprus must be kept out of the EU-led operations using NATO assets according to the 2002 Copenhagen decision, the Turkish military and government saw this as a violation of the Berlin-plus arrangements and a threat to the country’s strategic interests. The EU defined the mission as a civilian operative EULEX, and therefore, did not see a problem in the inclusion of Cyprus. The Turkish argument was that it would not matter if the operation was civilian or military as long as it used NATO assets. General Yılmaz Oguz, Turkey’s Representative to NATO’s Military Command, communicated Turkey’s position to the Council of the EU in May 2007 and argued that ‘Turkey’s expectations are not fulfilled and its concerns are not addressed’ (‘NATO does not give support to PKK’).1 The Turkish foreign ministry seemed to agree with the military’s concerns. The Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Abdullah Gul, declared that parameters were already set in 2002. You shouldn't expect further flexibility from Turkey, a country that has introduced major contributions to NATO as an ally, on this issue. It shouldn't solely be Turkey that is expected to be flexible. Like NATO does in these kinds of situations, the EU should find a solution to this issue itself, without using its form of a decision mechanism as an excuse.

(Şimşek 2007)

This impasse was highly significant for the future of European common foreign policy. The EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn claimed that ‘this is a problem for Europe and it hurts the EU, and its troops’2

Despite calls for cooperation, the Turkish government and military objected to the use of NATO assets in the operation. In March 2008, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer made an attempt to override the Turkish veto by holding an unofficial meeting between the EU and NATO. The Turkish side fiercely reacted to that meeting arguing that this went against the general rules and practices of NATO ‘since NATO functions on a consensus basis’ (İnanç 2008).3 Turkey believed that such a meeting cannot take place

1 CNNTURK, 12 June 2007.
without the consent of all members. Even though the meeting was cancelled, the immediate impact of the crisis was felt between the Turkish government and the military.

The military believed that unless the dispute was settled, Turkey should not contribute to the EU mission. However, the government opposed the military’s position. The civilian cabinet was concerned about the possibility that ‘Turkey might be excluded from the international body which will for some time have a say in the administration of Kosovo’ (İnanç 2008). As a result, the government decided to contribute to the EU’s Kosovo mission. However, the cabinet still agreed with the military on the use of NATO assets. In summer 2008, Turkey effectively said no to the EULEX’s access to NATO and vetoed the modalities which would have enabled the EULEX to take over from UN forces.4

Despite the agreement between the military and cabinet on the use of NATO assets, the government still wanted to be part of the EU mission. This was an interesting turn of events reminding one of the row between President Turgut Özal and the Turkish Chief of Staff Torumtay5 over Turkey’s participation in the UN multilateral force in 1990-1991 Gulf War. This is important to note because it reflects on the emerging dynamics of foreign policy decision making in Turkey. It also demonstrates the limits of norm diffusion among Turkish state actors. Even though the government is more willing than the armed forces to cooperate with the EU members, the fact is both the civilian cabinet and the military still have concerns when the strategic interests of Turkey are threatened. When there are no such concerns, both actors support Turkish participation in European common security and foreign policy. The Turkish government’s position differed from the military’s position in Kosovo and this was an important revelation with respect to Europeanisation of foreign policy. In the European Union or for that matter in any democracy, the military implements the decisions taken by the democratically elected policy-makers rather than act as the decision-makers as well. The dispute between the government and the armed forces in Turkey over the Kosovo operation, indicated that this norm is now also considered in Turkey, most probably as a result of the Europeanisation process. This could be seen as an illustration of the institutional changes in Turkish foreign policy where the government took the leadership role on a foreign policy issue. This is also indicative of the possible normative impact of the EU. Equally important, there has been a change in Turkish foreign policy not only in terms of procedures but in its basic formulations which are addressed in the next section.

**Contours of new Turkish foreign policy**

Until relatively recently, Turkish foreign policy was based on a ‘coercive regional’ (Öniş 2003: 84-5) approach and a ‘national security-centered understanding’(Kirişçi 2006: 12). In the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy was mostly formulated to deal with the perceived threats from neighboring countries. For example, in 1995, the Turkish parliament threatened Greece with war if it increased its national waters in the Aegean from six to

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5 We thank the referee for bringing this point to our attention.
twelve miles, and in 1996, the two countries came to the brink of war over islets in the Aegean Sea. As for its southern neighbors, Turkey also had hostile relations with Syria and to a certain extent with Iraq. Turkey and Syria clashed over the distribution of the Euphrates and Tigris waters and Turkey accused Syria of harboring Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdish terrorist organization, PKK (Çarkoğlu and Eder 2001). In 1998, Turkey came close to declaring war against Syria in order to pressure its neighbor to depose Öcalan. The Kurdish separatist activities also marked conflictual relations with Iraq. The de facto autonomy of northern Iraq after the Gulf War in 1991 had created a safe haven for the PKK to launch attacks against Turkey. The Turkish military, in turn, carried out its own operations to wipe out terrorist cells across the border.

In what was perceived as a highly insecure environment in the 1990s, Turkey sought alliances with Israel against its Middle Eastern neighbors and emphasized the use of military force. This type of foreign policy put the military at the center stage as a key decision maker (Özcan 2002). Except for brief interludes (such as President Turgut Özal’s almost unilateral decision to participate in the Gulf War), elected officials and civil society seldom held the upper hand in foreign policy decisions.

However, These characteristics of Turkish foreign policy started to change after 1999 (Öniş and Yılmaz 2009). Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and former advisor to the Prime Minister, states that ‘since 2002, Turkey has pursued a zero problem policy toward [its] neighbors’, which is based on trust and cooperation in economic and political spheres (Davutoğlu 2008: 80). This type of friendly relations has also been translated into an active role in neighboring regions. Turkey has played mediation and peace-maker roles in the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East. Davutoğlu emphasizes ‘rhythmic diplomacy’ as a key component of this new foreign policy. Turkey has participated in and hosted several international meetings, with an attempt to ‘gain […] more influence in international organizations’ (Davutoğlu 2008: 82). These changes have also increased the influence of the government, parliament, and civil society organizations in decision making (Kirişçi 2006). Even though the military and the ministry of foreign affairs still play critical roles, a new modus vivendi has been reached between the armed forces and the civilian government (Zucconi 2009).

Compared with Turkish foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War period, the new stance of Turkey in the international arena fits better with EU norms (Aydın and Açıkmeşe 2007). In the past, the Turkish military enjoyed greater leverage in determining foreign policy and had more say than its counterparts in Europe in decisions pertaining to the deployment of armed forces. This, however, gradually changed after 1999, when the European Union accession process started to affect the powers of the military in Turkish democracy and hence its involvement in foreign policy decision making. The primary way the EU influenced Turkish politics was through the prospect of EU membership and enlargement negotiations – what Ian Manners calls the ‘procedural diffusion’ of EU norms (Manners 2002: 244). The reform packages that were adopted in order to meet the EU conditionality in accordance with the EU accession criteria, also affected the role of the military in foreign and domestic policy. Especially critical were the changes in the powers of the National Security Council (NSC). The members of the NSC include military commanders and members of the civilian government. The NSC is responsible for ‘the formulation, establishment and implementation of the national
security policy of the state’. It prepares the national security policy document, which determines the necessary actions that must be taken against main security threats (Robins 2003: 76-7).

The 2001 amendment package changed the role of the cabinet vis-à-vis the NSC. While in the past the cabinet was required to ‘give priority consideration’ to the decisions of the NSC, now it is obligated only to ‘evaluate’ the ‘advice’ of the Council (Özbudun 2007: 193-4, 2002: 27-8). Further changes in the Constitution in July 2003 increased the powers of the civilians relative to the military representatives in the NSC. The secretary general of the NSC, who had previously been a military officer, was replaced by a civilian and his powers were reduced. The number of civilians working in the under-secretariat was increased relative to the military officers and finally the regular meetings of the NSC were reduced from once a month to once every two months (Heper 2005: 37; Jenkins 2007: 346-7; Turan 2007: 331-2; Özbudun 2007: 193-5). Arguably, these reforms did not radically change the role of the military in Turkish politics and the armed forces reacquired their previous dominance in a relatively short period of time (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 2008; Michaud-Emin 2007). Yet, in foreign policy decision making, these reforms coincided with the increasing role of civilian groups and the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy.

Since the Cold War, as Pinar Bilgin (2004: 38) argues ‘EU security culture has put emphasis on soft governance, common security practices and the need for non-military responses’. Turkish security culture, on the other hand, had been realist and based on perceptions of threat from domestic and international actors (Bilgin 2004: 43). This ‘military-focused and state-centric’ approach necessitated the use of more coercive, hard-line tools to solve conflicts. These perceptions and use of means, however, began to alter after 1999. This transformation was visible in the way Turkey dealt with its Middle Eastern neighbors, the Cyprus dispute, and Greek-Turkish relations.

The Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy from this angle could be explored by looking at the changes in Turkish foreign policy with regards to its Middle East neighbors, as these changes seem to illustrate the increased use of diplomatic/economic instruments versus military means. Turkey’s relations with especially Iraq and Syria have been seen as high politics, involving major threats to national interests, specifically with respect to the Kurdish terrorism. This issue involves Turkish national unity and a complicated combination of domestic, identity, and foreign politics. This is why we would expect to see the least changes in Turkish foreign policy towards especially Iraq, since threat perceptions against national interests would be particularly high in this case. Accordingly, any change from military to diplomatic/economic instruments in the way Turkey deals with Iraq, would provide strong evidence of Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy.

**Foreign policy toward Iraq and Syria**

It is possible to argue that Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq until 1999 revolved around PKK terrorism and the military aspect of this question. Turkey’s problems with the PKK were aggravated by the creation of the northern no-flight zone in Iraq after the
Gulf War. This strengthened the PKK and allowed it to establish bases across the border. The security approach believed that, for any viable solution in southeast Turkey, the armed forces must first defeat the PKK. After terrorism is eliminated, ‘economic and social programs [...] would resolve the problems of the region’ (Kirişçi 2004b: 283). Thus, diplomatic and economic instruments could not produce a solution until the PKK and its bases in Northern Iraq were eliminated.

This is why it is possible to claim that specifically with respect to PKK terrorism, there has been a Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy in the late 1990s. An important precipitator of EU influence was the success of military instruments in decreasing the power of the PKK. In 1998, Syria had to deport Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, after the Turkish state coerced and threatened war against its neighbor. Öcalan fled to Italy, which led Turkey to exert considerable pressure on its NATO ally. The leader of the PKK was finally deported from Italy too and captured in the Greek embassy in Kenya. After his arrest, Öcalan called a cease-fire, which effectively ended PKK terrorism for three years.

By 1999, military tactics and coercive approach seemed to have paid off and the prospects for Turkish membership in the EU had increased. Consequently, several important reforms were carried out giving more domestic rights to the Kurdish minority. In August 2002, broadcasting and private education became possible in Kurdish. Also in the same year, death penalty in Turkey was abolished. Even though rejecting death penalty was a significant application of an EU norm in itself, it was also a major development because it resolved the question of whether or not the captured leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, was going to be executed. After the November 2002 elections, the newly elected Justice and Development Party (AKP) accelerated the reform process and strengthened the economic and diplomatic approach further by enacting six additional constitutional packages and revising the penal code. These amendments, among others, put into operation the previously ratified reforms. As a result, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) started to show some Kurdish programs, and in 2009 a new Kurdish TV channel was launched. Several local TV and radio stations also began broadcasting. In addition, in several primary schools, children were given the opportunity to learn Kurdish (Grigoriadis 2006: 449). Even though these changes were mostly in domestic politics, it became possible to see their application in foreign policy objectives as well.

It is possible to claim that from 1999 until 2004, the European norms on minority and human rights seemed to have gradually diffused into Turkey. The process had a setback in 2004, however, when the PKK resumed its activities and carried out several destructive attacks against the Turkish armed forces and the civilian population in the southeast. The most violent attacks against the security forces occurred in October 2007, in Hakkari and Dağlıkçın in SouthEast Anatolia, and in May 2008 in Aktütün. The biggest assault against civilians (killing two high school students and several other civilians) took place 3 January 2008 in Diyarbakır (Çocukları da vurdular 2008). With the American intervention in Iraq in 2003, the prospects for an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq seems to have increased. In addition, the power vacuum in the region allowed PKK fighters to cross the border to Turkey more frequently. Turkey grew increasingly anxious that an autonomous Kurdish entity would be established in northern Iraq and also control the oil rich Kerkük. There was already an authorisation made by the Turkish Parliament in October 2003 allowing the military to carry out operations in the region. Consequently,
since fall 2007 the Turkish military has crossed the border and attacked PKK bases several times, marking the continued influence of military instruments.

However, despite these military operations, Turkish foreign policy toward northern Iraq has changed in important ways. In fact, according to Davutoğlu (2008), one of the main principles of the new Turkish foreign policy is to find ‘a balance between security and democracy’. Seen from this perspective, it is significant that ‘the Turkish military pursued […] military operation[s] against terrorist formations in Iraq for several weeks, with no negative impact on liberties in Istanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakir, or Van’ (Davutoğlu 2008: 80). Indeed, after 2004, important diplomatic and economic instruments were introduced into Turkish foreign policy. Turkey gradually came to accept the federal structure in Iraq and the Turkish government started to engage in dialogue with the Kurdish administration in Erbil and the government in Baghdad. In July 2008, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited his Iraqi counterpart and met with Jalal Talabani, the President of Iraq, who is also a Kurd. Erdoğan and Talabani signed a strategic partnership agreement, which envisioned the creation of a high council and regular meetings between presidents, prime ministers, and technical delegations (‘Irak’la Stratejik İşbirliği Asamasi’ 2008).6 The two countries also took important steps in dealing with terrorism. In his visit to Ankara, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri El-Maliki declared that Iraq is ready to cooperate with Turkey in its fight against PKK terrorism. Similarly, in March 2009, Talabani came to Turkey in an official visit and provided assurances that an independent Kurdish state would not be formed. The Turkish president Abdullah Gül returned Talabani’s visit and, in what would have been an unthinkable trip a decade earlier, he referred to northern Iraq as ‘Kurdistan’.7

This is also important as the contacts with the Kurdish administration in Erbil were initiated several years earlier. Indeed, since 2004 special representatives of Turkey have frequently traveled to the region and ‘the Chief of Turkish Intelligence [has] paid visits especially to Kurdish leaders’ (Kirişçi 2006: 69). One of the high profile visits was made in May 2008, when a delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs met with the Prime Minister of the Kurdish regional government, Nechirvan Barzani. Similarly, in October 2008, a Turkish delegation traveled to Baghdad to meet with the President of the Kurdish administration, Massoud Barzani and in these meetings the two sides explored the possibility of cooperating against the PKK (Barzani’yle temas tamam, 2008).8 Even though concrete results are not yet discernable on this issue, it is clear that such dialogue and diplomacy between Kurdish leaders and Turkey isolate and weaken PKK’s activities in the region. This also fits well with the Europeanisation of foreign policy as the diplomatic measures were now being increasingly used instead of military instruments.

Cooperation among Iraq’s neighbors, since it integrates the country with its region, indirectly serves the same purpose. In this realm, Turkey took the initiative and hosted the meeting of Extended Neighboring Countries of Iraq in November 2007. In this meeting, Turkey agreed to cooperate with Iraq’s Arab neighbors in a forum for the purposes of involving regional powers with the future of the country (Öniş and Yılmaz

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Such diplomatic contacts with the Kurdish administration, Iraqi government, and other regional neighbors are important indicators that Turkish foreign policy is changing and increasingly adapting to European norms.

The use of economic instruments in Iraq is another important indicator of Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy. Turkish companies have extensively invested in Iraq and engaged in important projects. In 2005, more than 80 Turkish companies invested in 1.5 billion dollars worth of initiatives in Iraq. Some of these undertakings include the American Embassy, the Suleimania University, the international airport in Erbil, and several highways (Kirisci 2006: 47). In only three years, from 2003 to 2006, Turkish exports to Iraq increased from 829 million to 2.6 billion dollars. Given that in 2002 there were no official records of trade with Iraq, this sudden increase in economic cooperation is quite significant for relations between the two countries and for Turkish economy. Indeed, exports to Iraq exceed imports by a wider margin than Turkey’s trade relations with other neighbors. The economic exchange with Iraq supports the revitalisation of Turkey’s southeast regions and helps combat terrorism in these Kurdish dominated areas. Business activities also facilitate indirect mechanisms of diplomatic exchange. A few Turkish entrepreneurs and especially some members of the Turkish Union of Chambers (TOBB) have developed close contacts with the Kurdish leadership. In 2005, businessmen played a critical role in reaching an agreement between the two entities on overflight rights to Kurdistan Airlines and direct flights between Turkey and northern Iraq (Kirisci 2006: 70).

This is why we claim that the new Turkish foreign policy toward Iraq can be characterised as a mix of continued use of military means and increasing use of diplomatic and economic instruments. Military operations still continue, but Turkey seeks more multilateral backing in its efforts against the PKK, including demands from the US against the PKK camps in the region (Larrabee 2007). It is significant that both before and after the military operations, Turkey has sought diplomatic solutions. Ankara tries to keep close relations with the government in Baghdad and the Kurdish administration in Erbil. Encouraging developments in the economic sphere and the involvement of civil society groups, such as businessmen, imply that both foreign policy goals and decision makers have changed significantly. In a nutshell, Turkish policy towards Iraq is based on political dialogue, economic interdependency, and cultural coexistence. All of these are important indicators that Turkish foreign policy has been increasingly Europeanized, even in a case where we would least expect to see these changes.

It is also significant that the Turkish Armed Forces seem to be on board with the new foreign policy outlook. Decisions of the National Security Council have promoted the further development of economic and trade ties with Turkey’s neighbors, including Iraq. Increasing commercial relations has been seen by the military as another way to enhance security and foreign policy goals. As Kemal Kirisci notes, ‘the fact that [trade with

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northern Iraq] benefited the local Kurdish population on both sides of the frontier and that there was a risk that the PKK might abuse the trade [has been] overlooked for reasons of pragmatism’ (Kirişçi 2006: 37).

Similarly, the military has conceded to the need to forge diplomatic ties with the northern Iraqi administration. In October 2005, then Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök recognized the authorities of Barzani and Talabani by saying that they were not tribal leaders anymore, but had become the Presidents of Iraq and northern Iraq, respectively. Özkök implied that, since Turkey officially recognizes Iraq, it also has to acknowledge the changing circumstances and the new Iraqi constitution, which strengthens a federal structure (Yetkin 2005). The Turkish military believes that effective dissolution of the PKK can be achieved if the administration in northern Iraq also shares the same goal. Since the role of the Kurdish administration is critical, cooperation with Erbil can also be acceptable and even desirable.

The support of the Turkish Armed Forces to the new foreign policy toward Iraq is complementary with the military’s endorsement for Turkish accession to the European Union. In the words of former Deputy Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt ‘the Turkish Armed Forces cannot be against the European Union because the European Union is the geopolitical and geostrategic ultimate condition for the realization of the target of modernization which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk chose for the Turkish nation’ (Kirişçi 2006: 36.) As frequently stated by the military hierarchy, the armed forces see the EU as an important means to Turkish modernization and Westernization. In this context, EU membership is an important goal and fundamental pillar of Turkish foreign policy. The military’s willingness to accommodate to changes in foreign policy and to adapt to EU norms and instruments should be seen within this EU membership perspective. These declarations and the military’s position seem to provide evidence for our Proposition II, with the utility dimension empirically supported.

While the military’s stance toward northern Iraq is remarkable, its changing attitudes toward Syria are also highly significant. In June 2002, during the visit of Syrian Chief of the General Staff to Turkey, the two sides signed a military training agreement, which consisted of ‘mutual exchange of military personnel, mutual invitations for monitoring war games, and military training’ (Altunışık and Tür 2006: 240). On 27 April 2009, Turkey and Syria started two-day military exercises. According to the official declaration of the Turkish Armed forces, the main purposes of the exercises were ‘to strengthen the friendship, cooperation, and trust between the two land forces and increase the level of education and collaboration between the border troops’, Ilker Başbuğ, Chief of Staff,

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affirmed his support for the exercises when Turkey’s long-term ally in the Middle East, Israel, criticized the maneuvers. In what can only be described as a historical statement, Başbuğ declared that ‘Israel’s reaction does not concern us’. In the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy was centered on the ‘Turkey-United States-Israel triangle’ (Öniş and Yılmaz 2009). This was partially a response to common perceptions of threat from rogue states in the region, including Syria. Currently, Ankara’s friendly relations with Damascus are a cause of concern in both Israel and the United States. Therefore, the new willingness of the military to work together with the Syrian land forces is an important indicator of how significantly Turkish foreign policy toward its neighbors has changed.

The military exercises are, in fact, just one example of cooperative relations between Syria and Turkey. After Syria deposed Öcalan, the two countries signed the Adana Accords in October 1998 to enhance security relations. Syria agreed to close down PKK training camps and to cease its logistical support to the organization. Following the signing of the Accords, representatives from the military and diplomatic corps of both sides visited each other in confidence-building meetings. In June 2000, the Turkish president went to Syria to attend the funeral of Hafiz al-Asad (Altunışık and Tür 2006). Similar high-level visits followed. In January 2004, Bashar al-Assad became the first president that visited Turkey since Syria’s independence from France (Larrabee 2007). His gesture was followed by Erdoğan’s trip to Damascus later that year. Such meetings between the heads of government scaled down the intensity of important conflicts of the past, namely the sharing of the Tigris and Euphrates waters and border disputes over the Turkish southern province of Hatay. Thus, there was a visible change in the increased use of diplomatic tools rather than the implicit threat of force in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Syria.

It is possible to argue that Turkey sees its relations with Syria as an opening to good relations with other Arab countries and an integral part of Turkish mediation in the Middle East. Turkey wants to use its ‘soft-power’ to enhance security in the region, which includes the construction of stability in Iraq and suspension of the Arab-Israel conflict. For this purpose, Turkey tries to mediate between Israel and Syria, and cooperates with Syria in the Iraqi neighborhood forum. Damascus and Ankara are both concerned with the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the possibility of an independent state in northern Iraq. Syria has a significant Kurdish population, which has a potential to engage in collection action against Damascus. As Bashar al-Assad emphasized during Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit in December 2006, ‘Turkey and Syria have common views on regional issues and […] [Syria] appreciates Turkey’s efforts to restore peace in the Middle East’ (quoted in Aras 2008: 4).

In economic relations, as well, Syria and Turkey have started to cooperate more. From 1995 to 2004, commercial exchange between the two countries increased 50 per cent (Kirişçi 2006: 76). The free trade agreement signed in 2004 and the gradual clearing of
mines across the border serve to improve trade relations. Consequently, in only one year, from 2006 to 2007, trade between Turkey and Syria increased from 797 million to 1.2 billion dollars (Aras 2008: 2). Turkey hopes that such business activities would boost the development of southeast provinces and help combat terrorism in the Kurdish populated regions.

In short, with respect to Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iraq and Syria, one would point to significant changes, mostly with respect to increased use of diplomatic and economic tools, rather than military instruments. In addition, there is a change even in the military’s position towards these countries which were only a decade ago classified as security threats to Turkey. The increased cooperation between the military and the government is also indicative of the changes that come with Europeanisation.

Conclusion

This paper argues that since 1999 there has been a gradual Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy, specifically with the procedural changes and increased use of diplomatic and economic instruments. First, the visible changes and reforms in the civil-military relations in domestic policy making were important in terms of their reflection onto the foreign policy making arena. Second, we are able to witness a change in Turkish foreign policy specifically with respect to the increased use of diplomatic and economic instruments, as opposed to the use of military instruments. These changes in Turkish foreign policy could also be seen in the unlikely case of Turkey’s stance towards the Middle Eastern neighbours.

Our paper has demonstrated that it is possible to use Europeanisation as an analytical tool in the foreign policy field even in an area where Europeanisation seems to be most problematic, for candidate states in the second pillar issues. Nonetheless, there have been several important steps on this issue that suggests the diffusion of EU norms to candidate countries. The increased emphasis on diplomatic measures, changes in the foreign policy decision-making mechanism with a lesser role for the military and participation in common foreign policy objectives could all be listed among such steps. For example, Turkey participated in the EU-led operations drawing upon NATO assets and initially contributed troops and material to the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force. However, Turkish elites have been skeptical of NATO-EU strategic cooperation. Problems arose when it became possible for Cyprus to access NATO assets in Kosovo. Turkey withdrew from the Headline Goal as a response. This demonstrates the fragility of the joint decision making norm and coordination reflex on foreign and security matters in Turkey. However, one should note that this is also the case for the EU members as some EU members might be sceptical on certain CFSP decisions in line with their perceived interests. This is also the case with Turkey. When Cyprus was not involved in EU-NATO operations, Turkey was a willing participant, adopting the EU norms on joint action. However, when the threat that Cyprus might gain access to NATO assets increased, Turkey raised its objections. We have demonstrated that Europeanisation is most likely to occur when it furthers the

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perceived material interests of the candidate country. This finding is in tandem with the Europeanisation literature for both candidate countries and member states, i.e., utilitarian concerns are the key to understanding candidate countries’ norm compliance and/or adaptation to EU standards.

This paper has demonstrated that Europeanisation of foreign policy is possible for acceding countries where the candidate countries adjust to the EU’s norms on foreign policy and common rules of behaviour. Specifically because Europeanisation in the second pillar, which is intergovernmental, is problematic even for member states, this paper has tried to uncover whether the EU seems to have an impact on foreign policy changes in Turkey, both procedurally and on a norm-based perspective. Our analysis is important in highlighting changes in Turkish foreign policy and its increased Europeanisation. This does not mean that there were no other factors that influenced these changes in Turkish foreign policy, but that we focused solely on the possible impact of the EU. This is why this paper constitutes an addendum to Europeanisation literature. The paper raises further questions to be explored, such as the linkages between domestic and foreign policy making, the role of norms in foreign policy in general as well as the ability of the EU to take on a global role for itself.
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