The European Union and Turkey
Democracy, Multiculturalism and European Identity

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Abstract

In international relations the European Union has emerged as a new form of polity increasingly characterized by a unique mix of state-like attributes and intergovernmental organization traits. At the same time, it seems to be increasingly characterized by multiculturalism, which in its essence is a highly contested term. It is here proposed that the question of how to define ‘Europe’ has emerged as a critical point of scientific inquiry in an analysis of Turkey’s accession to the European Union, playing an equal role to the Turkish ability to meet the EU’s accession criteria.

This paper analyzes how Turkish accession to the EU could help the EU to tackle the challenges of multiculturalism and democracy. It analyzes the influence of multiculturalism on Turkey’s accession and addresses the challenges arising from multiculturalism. Because the Turkish accession to the EU goes beyond a relatively simple analysis of the Turkish ability to meet the accession criteria, the EU’s uniqueness and the emerging European identity need to be taken into account when assessing this process. The paper rests largely on a normative argumentation and addresses the twin challenges of democracy and multiculturalism to the EU through the prism of the Turkish accession process.

Keywords

Democracy — Enlargement — European Identity — European Union — Multiculturalism — Turkish Accession
Introduction

What is Europe? Is there a common European identity? What kind of an entity is the European Union (EU)? Does it rest on a collective identity? If so, how does Turkey fit into that common identity? These questions emerge as critical points of scientific inquiry in an analysis of Turkey’s accession to the European Union playing as equal a role as the Turkish ability to meet the EU’s accession criteria. The European Union has emerged as a new form of polity in international relations which is increasingly characterized by a unique mix of state-like attributes and intergovernmental organization traits. At the same time, it seems to be increasingly characterized by multiculturalism which in its essence is a highly contested term. The EU has become a novel experiment in pooling sovereignty, as well as in the creation of a supranational entity bringing multiple cultures and identities together. The EU’s cultural diversity and pluralism are important ingredients in the integration process as shown by the adoption of the official motto of ‘unity in diversity’ in 2000.

A critical component of the identity question in Europe is connected to the discussions on multiculturalism in the European Union. When the German Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed that ‘Multiculturalism has failed’, this was an important testimony to the current crisis on multiculturalism in Europe with serious repercussions on the Turkish accession to the EU. Similarly, when the French President Nicolas Sarkozy stated: ‘A Europe without borders will become a subset of the United Nations and we have to say emphatically who is a European and who is not,’ he pointed to the role that ‘Europeanness’ would play in accession talks. Sarkozy’s claim that ‘Turkey is part of Asia, not Europe, and should never become a member’, implies that even if and when Turkey meets all the accession criteria, its accession to the EU would still be determined by the EU specific factors that are beyond the Turkish control. The above declarations make us wonder as to what kind of factors set Turkey apart from other European states. After all, there are wide differences between the EU members, themselves, in terms of culture. Is the fact that Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country the determining factor in setting Turkey apart from the rest of Europe? If so, what kind of implications does this bring in for the construction of a European identity?

The European Union is a unique experiment of sharing and pooling sovereignty. It is to this sui generis entity that Turkey is trying to accede and for which the negotiations began on 3 October 2005. The EU has concrete criteria for an aspirant country to join the EU, ranging from political stability, economic competitiveness to the ability to adopt the EU’s acquis communautaire. Turkey, therefore, has to fulfill the accession criteria and successfully adopt the EU acquis in order to become a member. However, the Turkish ability to fulfil the EU accession criteria is only one aspect of the picture and unless the EU members are willing to accept Turkey, it will not be sufficient. This is why, the EU publics’ and government leaders’ positions on the Turkish accession

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from a culture-driven angle matter. This paper proposes that the future of the European Union’s governance and the main dynamics in the integration process will determine the conditions under which accession negotiations with Turkey will unfold. This is an important and novel proposition because the main explanatory variable for Turkey’s accession to the EU rests with the EU’s dynamics, specifically its cultural dimension. It is highly likely that Turkey’s accession could not materialize even when Turkey fulfils its obligations unless the EU is ready for Turkey’s accession. This then means that the Turkish accession process to the EU can not be evaluated solely with respect to the Turkish ability for fulfilling the EU’s accession criteria. This is an important difference from, for example, the previous enlargements of the EU – most notably in Central and Eastern Europe – where the completions of the accession negotiations were largely determined by the candidate country’s adoption of the EU’s acquis communautaire. It is, of course, largely unfair that Turkey finds itself confronted with a new set of factors for accession.

This is why this paper explores the ongoing identity struggles within both the EU and Turkey, and assesses their interactions with each other. An important question tackled in the paper is with regards to the debates in multiculturalism and the European identity in the EU, which carry significant consequences of Turkey’s accession to the EU beyond the Turkish adjustment to the EU norms and its ability to absorb the EU accession criteria.

**Multiculturalism and European identity**

Turkey has since the 19th century sought to be included in the European order as a European state on its own right. It is, however, very hard to pin down what constitutes European identity, which is a highly elusive term itself, or if, indeed, there is such a thing as ‘European’ identity at all. Similarly, Turkish identity formation is partly tied to its internal struggles and partly to its relations with Europe. An important dynamic in shaping Turkish identity has been the struggle between two political groups, the Islamists and the secularists, ever since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. When the new Turkish Republic was created in 1923, one of the stated goals of the founders was to get Turkey accepted in the European civilization. Directly connected to that goal was the objective of decreasing all forms of influence of Islam in Turkish politics, as Islam and Islamic way of life were seen as forces that diverted Turkey from its European path. It is for this reason that the process of modernization was seen also as a process of Europeanization in Turkey. This dynamic in Turkish politics reached a major turning point when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was elected to power with 36 percent of the national vote in 2002. Even though AKP leaders immediately stated that they are not going to interfere in anybody’s lifestyles, Turkish politics after 2002 entered a new stage with the AKP in power. The AKP also turned out to be a very ardent political reformer in its early years from 2002 to 2005, but after 2005 its political reformist position began to waver. It is within this background that Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU were opened.

Turkey’s accession negotiations with the European Union constitute an important turning point for the Turkish goal of gaining acceptance as a European country. For pundits, Turkey as part of the EU would be included into the larger European system and be accepted as part of the European identity. As a result, the opening of
negotiations for accession in October 2005 is seen as the final culmination of this process of Europeanization. The negotiations were opened when Turkey was able to meet the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria, and this was possible through the democratization process which began in 1999, accelerated in 2002 and continued with full speed until 2005. The democratization process and the political reforms adopted to fulfill the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria also unexpectedly enhanced the visibility of the struggle between the Islamists and the secularists.

A turning point for the EU and Turkey was reached when the European Commission recommended in its 2004 Progress Report that ‘Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria’, upon which the European Council opened accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. The EU’s decision was deemed as proof that Turkish democracy has finally reached the EU standards. This, of course, does not mean that there were not any internal political dynamics that led to such political clashes and changes. One could conceptualize the role of the EU’s political conditionality4 as a catalyst that induced change in Turkey. An important component of that political change is the internalization of norms by the Turkish society. One should note that the adaptation to EU rules is a costly process that the governments that engage in significant political reforms have to incur,5 and that the reception of European norms by various segments in the Turkish society during the negotiations process is a particularly problematic process. Particularly important and problematic here are the norms on individual rights and liberties and their diffusion into the Turkish society. This problem stems from the inherent authoritarian tendencies in the Turkish political culture. There is a marked difference between the European and Turkish norms and values, and this marked difference forms the basis of the opposition and resistance to the EU in various segments of the Turkish society. One must, however, note that the very notion of European norms is elusive and there are wide differences among the EU members over these political and social norms.

For example, the privatization of religion as a norm has turned out to be the most explosive political problem in Turkey and came to the forefront in Turkish politics from 2007 onwards. This, in turn, begs the question: Does democratization in Turkey in line with the EU norms lead to the emergence of an authoritarian regime? This would be a paradoxical outcome for the EU as well, but not highly unlikely. The greatest battle on this matter is fought on the secularization axis in Turkey. A main characteristic of the European societies is ‘the liberal secular norm of privatization of religion’,6 and this norm is not yet diffused into Turkish politics and society. The privatization of religion as a norm is particularly challenging for Turkey. The Turkish accession process to the EU highlighted the divides in the Turkish society between different socio-political groups, especially with regards to religious freedoms.

Turkey’s EU accession process created a paradoxical situation where the proponents of democracy in Turkey today are the Islamists; and the defenders of the status quo,

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turned out to be the secularists who were the reformers in the first 60 years of the Republic. The unexpected consequence of this process was that the religious conservatives and Islamists became the force behind political reforms, democratization and Turkey’s EU membership whereas the secularists became the defenders of the status quo and the main opposition to Turkey’s EU membership. This consequence might be because even though the Turkish state is ‘laic’, i.e. there is a separation of state and religious affairs, the Turkish society is not yet fully secular and as Turkey becomes more democratic, the Islamists that were formerly excluded from government gain power. This is an interesting development as the EU itself is trying to confront its own multiculturalism fears, and the possible impact that Turkey’s accession might bring to those challenges posed by multiculturalism. It seems that through the accession process, Turkey also is confronting its own demons. Democratization as motivated by the adoption of EU norms and criteria enables the strengthening of the Islamists in Turkey and this would mean that Turkey would move even further away from the EU as it democratizes. This is because increased democratization in Turkey increases the visibility of Islamic symbols and since the EU is struggling with multiculturalism and the fear of other cultures, a more visibly Islamic Turkey would be seen as even a further challenge to the European identity.

The struggle between the Islamists and secularists in Turkey is important for shaping Turkey’s place in Europe. Since both the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel stress the ‘identity’ factor in Turkey’s accession, it is highly likely that the European debates on multiculturalism will impact Turkey’s accession to the EU. In order to do so, one needs to analyze the influence of multiculturalism on Turkey’s accession and address the challenges arising from multiculturalism. This is because the Turkish accession to the EU goes beyond a relatively simple analysis of the Turkish ability to meet the accession criteria. Most of the scholarly debate on Turkey’s accession leaves out a very important determinant of Turkey’s accession: the shape of European integration both institutionally and culturally. This is largely because the debate focuses on the question of Turkey’s ability to meet the EU’s accession criteria, the Copenhagen criteria, and the adoption of the acquis communautaire. However, the EU’s uniqueness and the emerging European identity need to be taken into account in assessing this process.

The process of European integration which was launched in the 1950s culminated in a sui generis polity by the end of the 20th century. The EU has, on the one hand, acquired a new sense of political mission and on the other hand, it has expanded to include most of the European countries. It is now commonplace to talk about a post-enlargement EU, which has reached a historical junction with the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. Consequently, the future of Europe is shaped by institutional deepening and by expansion of its membership: the twin processes of deepening and widening. However, the dual pressures of deepening/institutional reform and widening/enlargement brought the European Union to the brink of a crisis where the key concern turned out to be the future of integration, most importantly as to whether

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a ‘finalité politique’ has been reached. Specifically, the 2004 Constitutional Treaty and its subsequent rejection in 2005 with the French and the Dutch referendums were critical in illustrating the limits of integration. The constitutional crisis was to a large extent a crisis of governance that the 2007 Lisbon Treaty aimed to address. The European Union was further affected by the 2008 economic crisis which led to deterioration on the European economy. The economic crisis that erupted in Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain affected the whole of the European economy, with dire consequences for the euro zone as well as the EU. It seems like by 2011, the limits of integration have been reached with the diverging preferences of the member states on material interests clearly visible.

The integration process, however, also correlates with the emergence of a collective European identity and the creation of a European demos. This would be especially important for holding the EU together even in crisis times when the material interests seem to diverge. Seen in this light, the EU is a political project which brings together different nationalities, languages, ethnic identities, cultures and religions around a common political destiny. This, in turn, makes the EU an experiment of multiculturalism that entails the emergence of a collective European identity. Directly tied to the issue of multiculturalism is the question as to what Europe actually stands for. This is precisely why within this framework, a number of questions arise as to what kind of a place Turkey, which has a predominantly Muslim population, would have in Europe.

Multiculturalism as a term could be used to refer to the emergence of a unified polity which involves the management of multiple linguistic, ethnic and cultural identities. The European Union’s unique mix of multiple cultures, nationalities and ethnicities makes it an important experiment of multiculturalism. The challenge lies in the creation of a new European identity that would cement these multiple identities together for a common political destiny, or, in other words, the EU’s motto of ‘unity within diversity’. This motto forms the basis of the European Union’s cultural policy, and ‘the EU policy has sought to build legitimacy through an emphasis on the compatibility of contrasting identities’. This would be how the integration process and multiculturalism are tied to one another in a mutually reinforcing fashion. The multicultural European identity is impacted by the two major processes of European integration; first, the pace of integration, its institutions and the decision-making procedures, and second, the process of enlargement. In both of these processes, Turkey’s accession would play a critical role in shaping the EU and its multicultural identity.

As a result, precisely because of the historical junction that the EU finds itself at in 2011, Turkish accession could no longer be solely determined by the Turkish adoption of the EU acquis. Equally important, the EU’s treatment of the Turkish accession process

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9 Kalpyso Nicolaidis, ‘We: The Peoples of Europe…’, Foreign Affairs, 83(6), 2004, 97-110.
becomes a litmus test case for the EU’s multicultural identity. The future of the European integration process is affected from the debates on multiculturalism with one of the most important tests coming from the Turkish accession. As long as the EU remains an economic integration project, it would not need to be complemented with a common identity. However, it is now possible to conceptualize the EU as a supranational polity with cosmopolitan values that would then need to be based on common values, culture and a common destiny. Multiculturalism in the EU today is tied to the idea of Europe and its relationship to national identities because ‘for the first time in history a European identity through European integration and the EU has become a distinct possibility’. This also constitutes one of the main challenges for the European Union. The EU integration process is affected from the relative lack of a European cultural identity that would act as a cement to hold European peoples together. The challenges to the EU’s cosmopolitan, multicultural identity also impact the integration process as witnessed since 2008. In the absence of a common identity, when the EU members are confronted with a crisis that threaten their national material interests such as the 2008 financial crisis, the tendency is to rely on national measures rather than a collective identity. This is why a European identity based on multiculturalism seems to be critical for the EU integration to flourish, which is addressed in the next section.

**Multiculturalism and the finalité politique for Europe**

In recent years, multiculturalism has become a catch-word generating research on European societies, especially in the post-nationalist era. It is, however, a very elusive concept. Different scholars from different fields tend to approach the concept of multiculturalism in various ways. However, one needs to note that it poses particular challenges in the European context partly because of the pattern of development for the European state. This is because the evolution of the European state did not involve cultural diversity, but rather rested upon a close relationship between identity and territory. This particular pattern of development in Europe lies at the core of the difficulties in the creation of a European cultural identity today.

The European identity is linked to the project of EU integration, thus completing the circle. At a time when political and economic rules of the game are being changed through and in support of the process of EU integration and expansion, the references to culture lend the project a mantle of stability and continuity. This construction of a ‘multicultural Europe’ has thus become an ideological cornerstone of European integration. It lends the project its aura of teleological fulfilment, its universal pretensions, and its moral veneer. It sets the ideological framework for inclusion and, significantly, for exclusion.

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If the future of European integration is tied to the emergence of multicultural Europe, then the EU enlargement process becomes one of the key tools in its realization. This is why the debate on the borders of Europe, whether physical or symbolic, is essential for the European cultural identity and the strengthening of multiculturalism. When the EU enlarged to include almost all the Central and Eastern European countries in 2004, this radically altered the physical borders of the EU, but equally important the enlargement brought into the surface new questions of European identity.

Consequently, debates on a common European identity, as centred on the EU, shapes the future of the EU as well as the EU governance. The future of Europe debate is now centred on what, if any, the borders of Europe are, who the Europeans are and, related to that, who the others for Europe would be. This debate involves the key questions of multiculturalism and as a result contributes to the process of European integration. The critical question here is whether the European identity is multicultural or not.

There are two different ways of approaching this question: from a cultural determinist perspective or from a political perspective. Collective identity formation in Europe stresses common ties such as culture, religion, and race, a common intellectual heritage with roots in Greek antiquity, the Renaissance and the age of Enlightenment.\(^\text{16}\) According to the European Commission, there is a ‘European identity’ founded on a common heritage. In the course of centuries, differing contributions, individuals, ideas, styles and values have created a common civilization.\(^\text{17}\) This definition views the EU as a civilization project that has a centuries-long common history. However, the EU is too culturally diverse to base the essence of European identity on a common cultural denominator.

The paradox is in the simultaneous demand that Europe acknowledge its common cultural heritage and core values, and thus exclude all those who do not share it (like Turkey, for example), and at the same time the view that European culture is too diverse to build its common identity, and should therefore give up the idea of becoming anything more than just an organisation of sovereign states.\(^\text{18}\)

This paradox is also reflected in the discourse on European identity, which stresses the idea of a ‘community of values’ as argued by the sociological institutionalists.\(^\text{19}\) Accordingly, the constructed European identity emphasizes adherence to democratic principles, respect for rule of law and human rights, tolerance for diversity and the basic underpinnings of a liberal democracy as the collective identity for the EU members. This, in turn, means that ‘[t]he Union’s citizens are bound together by common values such as freedom, tolerance, equality, solidarity and cultural diversity’.\(^\text{20}\) Thus, aspiring EU members must be perceived as European either in


\(^{17}\) Pietro Adonnino, ‘A People’s Europe: Reports from the ad hoc Committee on a People’s Europe’ (‘The Adonnino Reports’), EC Bulletin Supplement 7/85, 1985, at p. 3.


terms of the common civilization project, as discussed above, or in terms of a newly constructed Europeanness based on democratic principles. The perception of the EU as an embodiment of a liberal democratic order implies that its expansion would be justified to the extent to which new entrants satisfy the basic criteria of being stable democracies. A common European identity from this angle de-emphasizes the different ethnic origins and increases the role of adherence to democratic principles as the key gauge of Europeanness. The following table from the Eurobarometer 72 survey in 2009 shows that most of the respondents perceive the role of culture and values as essential ingredients of the European identity. It also shows how the European publics see the issue of cultural diversity and openness to others as one of the challenges facing the EU.

**Table 1:** QC3. From the following items, which two should our society emphasize in order to face major global challenges?\(^{21}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural diversity and openness</th>
<th>Common religious heritage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>13 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>8 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>10 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>14 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>25 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>16 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>20 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>16 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>12 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>10 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>17 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>14 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>11 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>13 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>8 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>10 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>23 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>11 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>9 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>9 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>13 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{21}\) Standard Eurobarometer, EB 72, field work completed in October-November 2009, results published in February 2010.
Spain 14 %  4 %
Sweden 19 %  4 %
United Kingdom 17 %  8 %

An integral part of cultural diversity, i.e. the question of multiculturalism, is the implication that a multicultural society that includes ‘non-Europeans’ is a threat to the values, norms and culture of the European society. This possible threat comes from immigration and/or expansion of the EU. Specifically, the immigration pressures on the EU with a flow of ‘non-European’ peoples into the EU territories and the absence of an EU level policy on immigration exacerbate these challenges. The former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s position on the immigration process is telling in that aspect: ‘People are really rather afraid that this country might be swamped by people with a different culture. […] people are going to react and be hostile to those coming in’.²²

Immigration plays a critical role in shaping the EU’s position and the European public’s perceptions of different cultures. Thus, as seen in Table I, the countries where there is significant immigration to, such as the Netherlands, France, Denmark, UK, see cultural diversity as a challenge for the future. Recent research on the European Union has shown that there are a total of 18.5 million legal migrants, non-EU nationals and around eight million illegal immigrants in the EU territory.²³ A substantial portion of these immigrants are Muslim.

Muslims in Europe constitute one of the key issues for the future of the EU in its multicultural political destiny. ‘Europe finds itself in a contest with Islam for the allegiance of its newcomers. For now, Islam is the stronger party in that contest, in an obvious demographic way and in less obvious philosophical way.’²⁴ The Brookings Institute has estimated that eight percent of the population in France, six percent of the population in the Netherlands, four percent of the population in Germany and around three percent of the population in UK are Muslim, and in some EU cities Muslims constitute around 20 percent of the population.²⁵ These are significant statistics. The integration of these Muslim populations into the European identity has been a major challenge for the EU. This issue is compounded by the fact that the EU lacks a supranational immigration policy. What is particularly important here is that the Muslim populations in the EU territory and the subsequent multiculturalism seem to have created many tensions at the national levels. Multiculturalism would imply the co-existence of multiple cultures, a plurality in the society of different religious, ethnic, linguistic groups who would not only occupy the same space but respect each other’s space and right to exist. However, there are significant problems with the

Muslims that emerged in Europe’s multicultural experiment. One could list the 2005-2006 caricature crisis in Denmark, where a Danish caricaturist drew caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad, and the 2004 murder of the Dutch film director Theo Van Gogh for his film 'Submission' on Muslim women’s rights, as critical turning points for the future of multiculturalism in Europe.

The most critical question in that realm is the presence of Muslim immigrants in Europe compared to other minorities in the EU. There seems to be a set of assumptions in the public’s and the policy makers’ perceptions that Islam constitutes a challenge far greater than, say, the Roma. This, in turn, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Islam is now part of Europe but whether it is a threat to multiculturalism, and therefore, to the process of European integration remains to be seen. Particularly important in this aspect is the French experience with the Muslim immigrants. The 2005 and 2007 riots in Paris by the Muslim minorities in France were partly fuelled by the lack of social and economic opportunities as well as democratic channels of communications. The problem of integrating the culturally different segments of the population became a problem of democracy at large, posing a threat to the social fabric of the French society. This, however, is then reflected onto the French position on multiculturalism, and it even works in shaping the French position towards the EU’s expansion, most notably towards Turkey.

In order to deal with these new challenges, various EU governments are changing their laws to facilitate integration of different cultural groups into the dominant culture. For example, the UK gives tests on the British history and constitution, certain German Länder ask culturally challenging questions and the Dutch government gives training on the Dutch history to aspirant citizens. Germany passed a new law in 2007, whereby all non-EU citizens are required to pass language tests in order to facilitate integration. The Netherlands deserves particular attention here as the Dutch society was previously seen as a model of multiculturalism. However, the Dutch government has now adopted more assimilationist policies, as illustrated by the Law of New Arrivals in March 2006, which contains a Civic Integration Examination which required them [immigrants] to take courses in the Dutch language and social orientation, on Dutch liberal values. The Netherlands has a multicultural model based on the recognition of different religious identities, since it was declared as a multicultural society in 1983. However, the applicability of the Dutch model to different ethnic groups has proven to be limited.

Multiculturalism is an essential ingredient of the European Union and as such forms the basis of the European future. However, the coexistence of multiple ethnic and/or religious identities does not automatically translate into integration, what is more, the tendency is to put the responsibility of integration on the ‘minorities’, the ‘newcomers’, or ‘the culturally different’. Thus, the picture presented is as follows: If the Muslim minorities are not integrated, it is largely their own fault and not the result of host countries’ policies. Charles Taylor succinctly pointed out this position, as ‘our identity is molded in part by recognition or non-recognition of, or often by

misunderstanding by others’. This view is captured by the Eurobarometer results from 2009, where one of the questions is ‘Do you think that in 2030, in the EU, people will live in a society that will be more or less tolerant to ethnic and religious minorities?’. 31 percent of the EU public said less and 43 percent of the EU public said more. This result shows that in the next decades, the EU’s multiculturalism will most likely change.

The measures taken in EU member states are important in terms of the larger democratization process in the EU and the multicultural society that the EU is based upon. This is how multiculturalism is tied to the larger problem of democratization. Most European societies are multicultural. However, this is mostly in the private lives of these social groups and a connection between the multiple social groups with the political rights, i.e., their inclusion into the public sphere still is problematic. According to Joseph Weiler, ‘the normative, or in that sense, constitutive aspect of European citizenship dissolves interdependence between citizenship and nationality within the supranational constitutional sphere, which leads to establishment of The Union as composed by citizens, who by definition do not share the same nationality’. This is also how multiculturalism and European citizenship are tied together. One of the key propositions that one could develop for increased democracy in the EU with respect to strengthening multicultural, transnational society would be to grant voting rights to all the legal residents in the EU territories. This would be a welcomed step in the integration of citizens of non-member states who are legal residents in the EU and enable their inclusion into a public sphere from which they have been previously excluded. In order to realize these goals, the EU needs to make certain institutional changes, such as mobility rights to the migrant populations, political and cultural rights to the residents, and increased democratic participation not only for migrants but all minority groups, including the Roma populations. This seemed to be the direction the EU has taken, when in 2000 the legal residents in EU countries were allowed the same citizenship rights that EU citizens have under the Maastricht Treaty, which is the right to vote in the local elections and European level elections. However, the EU countries have different practices on this issue; 16 EU members, such as Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, allow residents from non-EU countries to vote in the municipal and European elections whereas France and Germany do not. Accordingly, in the June 2009 local elections in Germany, ‘3.6 million voting age non-EU residents could not vote’. The problem in this case is that Germany does not allow dual citizenship, so, for example, many residents of Turkish origin who did not give up their Turkish citizenships are excluded from elections. The immigrants’ challenge to democracy in Europe is elaborately summarized by Jürgen Habermas as:

A democratic, constitutional state must preserve the identity of the political community, which nothing, including immigration, can be permitted to encroach upon, since that identity is founded on the principle of constitutional

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principles anchored in the political culture, and not on the basic ethnical orientations of the cultural form of life predominant in that country.31

This then means that in order to achieve democracy in a multicultural society, such as the EU aspires to be, mere recognition of multiple cultures is not sufficient. New tools of empowerment, such as welfare provision, education and training possibilities as well as inclusion into the public sphere need to be developed. This is where the main challenges lie. The co-existence of multiple identities in Europe currently is just that: co-habitation. But, the emergence of a democratic, multicultural society needs to go beyond those exploring new patterns of integration. Consequently, integration of multiple cultures in the EU would enable strengthening democracy at the supranational level as well. It really does not matter any more if the European leaders claim that multiculturalism has failed, as long as different nationalities and cultures co-exist together in Europe, there is a multicultural society in Europe whose challenges need to be met by the EU and national governments.

This is why it is possible to argue that the Turkish accession to the EU becomes essential in making that transformation possible and in enabling the EU to deal with the dual challenges of multiculturalism and democracy. The intense feelings surrounding Turkey’s accession could be explored through the lenses of multiculturalism. On the other hand, with Turkey as a member, the EU would have credibility as a multicultural polity. The next section addresses the Turkish accession process, and the challenges and opportunities the Turkish accession would bring to the EU. Equally important, the Turkish accession process directly impacted the Turkish political dynamics and brought out to the forefront the struggles between the Islamists and the secularists.

Turkey, European identity and multiculturalism

The concerns of the European publics and governments over Turkey’s accession seem to mostly revolve around the issue of multiculturalism. Ola Tunander argues that ‘[t]he replacement of the ideological East-West conflict with ethnic, religious and historical conflicts presented Turkey to the rest of Europe as a non-European – i.e. non-Christian- state’,32 this is reflected onto the debate on Turkey’s membership in the EU.

The view on Turkey’s place in the European identity is summarized in September 2004 by Frits Bolkestein, then the EU Commissioner responsible for the Internal Market, who declared: ‘If Turkey accedes to the EU, then this would mean that the efforts of the German, Austrian and Polish troops that resisted the Ottoman Turks’ siege of Vienna in 1683 would be in vain’.33 This position is strengthened when ‘Pope Benedict XVI, German Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger expressed concerns over the prospect (Turkey’s accession), suggesting that historically, Turkey has never been part of Europe’.34 The

difficulty in assessing Turkey’s place in Europe to a large extent is tied to the
difficulty of defining what Europe is. Directly related to Turkey’s place in Europe is
the attempt by the Pope and Europe’s Catholics to get a reference to the Christian
values of the European civilization in the now failed attempt at building a EU
Constitution. Reference to Christianity would give ‘concrete expression to what many
recognize as the source of the values on which the European project is founded’.35
This is also why the Poles during the Constitutional Treaty negotiations insisted on
that the EU has a Christian heritage. Even though this was ultimately rejected, the fact
that it was discussed was meaningful enough. According to Heinz Kramer, ‘[i]t is the
bicephalous character of the notion of the EU, as a “union of values or a union of
identity” that has accompanied the discussions about Turkey’s eventual
membership’.36

The EU member states’ preferences with regard to this ‘bicephalous character’ of the
EU shape their views and positions on the Turkey’s accession, which, in turn, act as a
critical variable in shaping the pace and nature of accession negotiations. This is why
it is essential to assess the EU members and their preferences towards Turkey.
Accordingly, if the relatively more powerful players in the EU, such as Germany and
France, have serious reservations on Turkey, Turkey’s accession would become
harder. In that realm, the French and German governments’ opposition becomes
highly important. Interestingly, both France and Germany approach the question of
Turkey’s accession from a multiculturalist point of view which, in return, have
an impact on the functioning of the EU. This view is illustrated by Nicolas Sarkozy as:
‘Europe must give itself borders, that not all countries have a vocation to become
members of Europe, beginning with Turkey which has no place inside the European
Union.’37 According to Helmut Schmidt, former German Chancellor, ‘[w]e cannot
manage Turkish membership since it would fatally dilute the EU’.38 Thus, the EU
leaders seem to assess the Turkish challenge on the functioning of the EU as well as
the European identity.

The European People’s Party, the coalition of Christian Democratic parties, argues
that Turkey’s accession to the EU is directly related to the European culture and the
Turkish misfit into the EU as such, as it ‘believes that Europe has managed to
preserve a shared cultural heritage. The sense of belonging together can only be based
on common cultural values and convictions. On this basis, it is high time to define EU
borders.’39

36 Heinz Kramer, ‘Turkey’s Accession Process to the EU: The Agenda behind the Agenda’, SWP
38 Frits Bolkestein, ‘Turkish Entry Would Fatally Dilute the Union’, Financial Times, 10 November 2006.
Available at: <http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?sortBy=gadatearticle&queryText=Turkish+membership+to+the+EU&aj
e=true&id=061110000730&page=11>.
39 Euractiv.com, ‘European Values and Identity’, 9 May 2006. Available at:
The new EU president, Herman Van Rompuy’s position on the EU borders and Turkey is telling in that aspect. Van Rompuy stated that:

Turkey is not a part of Europe and will never be part of Europe. An expansion of the EU to include Turkey cannot be considered as just another expansion as in the past. The universal values which are in force in Europe, and which are fundamental values of Christianity, will lose vigor with the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey.40

The above declarations show that the EU member states and officials seem to stress a possible material cost of Turkey’s accession on the cultural and value driven perspective. The governments’ preferences are to a certain extent shaped by the public’s views on Turkey. This is relatively recent in the EU’s enlargement process and is tied to the particular juncture that the EU finds itself at.41

The European integration process has evolved largely as an elite project since its start in 1957. However, the constitutional crisis that the EU passed through in 2004 and 2005 and the increased public debate on the integration process demonstrates that this is no longer the case. According to Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum, the EU decision-making process ‘has been dominated by executive officials, who have conducted their affairs behind closed doors and in relative secrecy. […] the public has had no direct input into these processes’.42 The limits of European integration where traditionally the public plays almost no role and provides no input have been reached. This is reflected in the words of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, former French Socialist finance minister, who stated:

Its project has broken down: to the questions of knowing why Europe and where Europe is going, nobody today can give a satisfactory reply. Its territory is uncertain: for the first time, the Union really poses the question of its ultimate frontiers. The uncertainties surrounding the European project result in a legitimacy crisis and lack of popular identification.43

This meant that from 2005 onwards, the EU governments had to respond to the public’s preferences on integration and the EU related questions more. Michel Barnier succinctly summarized this as: ‘If we want Europe to count in the world, we need to address the question of Europe’s geographical and political identity and that’s one lesson of the referendum’.44 According to Erik Jones, ‘the real lesson of the crisis is that the politicians need to respect public opinion’.45 It is also important to note that

43 Supra note 39.
this is a new development in the EU. The increased role of the public is highly important for Turkey’s accession because of the perceived challenge Turkey poses to the cultural unity of the EU. According to José I. Torreblanca and Antonia M. Ruiz-Jiménez, ‘support for or opposition to Turkish membership among European citizens is both highly consistent and, at the same time, deeply connected with preferences concerning the European integration process’.46

How the public’s position on Turkey in return is reflected at the governmental policies could be explained by looking at Christopher Anderson’s analysis that ‘[t]he structure of domestic opinion among the publics of the member states is likely to be a crucial ingredient that determines the types of bargains struck at the supranational level because it can impose different constraints on decision makers at the European level’.47 This is why, the European Commission President José Manuel Barroso declared: ‘Turkey must win the hearts and minds of European citizens; they are the ones who at the end of the day will decide about Turkey’s membership’.48 This concern was also reflected in 2005 by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ursula Plassnik, who argued that ‘most EU citizens do not want Turkey to join the EU, so it should be offered an “alternative partnership” of a sort’.49 Thus, a central concern is what shapes the European public’s position on Turkey’s accession.

According to Olli Rehn, the former EU Commissioner for Enlargement and the current Commissioner for the Internal Market, the main obstacle to Turkish accession lies in the mental image of the EU. According to Rehn:

Much of the debate on Turkey is in fact about our internal debate about migration. People fear that Turkey joining the EU will mean unwelcome further immigration. In practice, this is unlikely to be a major policy problem by the time Turkey joins – because the EU labour market and demographic profile will have changed so much by then. In any case, the EU has policy tools to address any potential problems.50

In terms of Turkey’s accession, the immigration issues are tied to the dual problems of both labour market shortages and a fear of foreigners. Consequently, largely due to the public resistance along immigration concerns, the European Commission in its Negotiations Framework decided to have ‘long transitional periods, derogation, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures’51 for Turkey’s accession. It is most likely that part of the resistance to Turkey is tied to the perceptions of group conflict over

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resources, but also to the concerns about a possible cultural degeneration for Europe as well as cultural animosity toward Turkey.

France is a good example here. Even though only about 400,000 Muslims in France are Turks, the problems of integration in the French society, as discussed in the section on multiculturalism, are reflected onto the Turkish accession process. In other words, the French perceive Turks as part and parcel of the larger Islamic community and even as part of the Arab world. Since the French are already facing domestic upheaval with the Muslim minorities, they tend to project their irritation with the whole foreigner issue to the Turkish accession process. This is why, according to Dominique Moisi, ‘[f]or the average Frenchman, a Turk is an Arab, while every new riot in the suburbs involving Arabs nurtures the “no” camp’.

Thus, when the French voters rejected the Constitutional Treaty in a referendum in May 2005, some analysts claimed that this was also partly related to the French public’s opposition to the Turkish accession. According to Philippe Moreau de Farge, ‘the “no” votes can be explained by many, many different motives, and certainly Turkey is one of them. Some French seem to be convinced that with the constitution, Turkey could join the European Union without any kind of [proper membership preparation] proceedings’. This seemed to be verified by the Eurobarometer 63, where the European Commission reported that 20 percent of the French respondents claimed to have said no to the Constitution because of Turkey’s accession. Even though, it is highly likely that the French ‘no’ to the Constitution was not solely due to Turkish accession to the EU, it is without doubt that reservations towards Turkey play a role in shaping the French public’s attitudes towards the EU.

As analyzed in the previous sections, the increased visibility of immigrants in Europe is largely due to the Islamic symbols they tend to carry as well as the security implications. Thus, in certain European countries such as France, it is possible to witness outlawing of religious symbols in public life. The growing Islamophobia, ever since the September 11 attacks and the 2003 London and 2004 Madrid terrorist attacks, presents another aspect in the Europeans’ attitudes towards the foreigners. For example, ‘one orientation that may potentially influence attitudes towards European integration is the way individuals view foreigners in their society’. More importantly, the EU citizens seem to be unwilling to incorporate people from different cultures into their spheres based on the fear of different cultures. This is interesting given the public’s perceptions on cultural diversity as a challenge for the EU. The ongoing problems with multiculturalism in Europe in different member states then tend to influence the governments’ positions towards Turkey’s accession irrespective of the Turkish ability to adopt and implement the EU’s accession criteria. However, since the EU needs to resolve the twin challenges of multiculturalism and democracy at home, it might be presented with a golden opportunity to do so with the Turkish accession. This might be a unique chance to build a ‘cosmopolitan Europe’.

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Conclusion

This paper argued that Turkey’s accession to the EU is impacted by a definition of what constitutes the European society, culture and the European collective identity and the evolution of the EU into a new form of polity. As such, its accession is directly tied to the larger debate on what multiculturalism in Europe stands for. The inherent difficulties in the definition of what Europe is and how the EU represents this identity plays into the multicultural dimension of Turkey’s accession.

Today, the EU remains the only organization that has gone beyond an intergovernmental organization and acquired state-like attributes in the process. The EU governance could be analyzed through its institutional balances and dynamics, and any candidate country’s accession is likely to influence and be influenced by the EU governance. This is why, ultimately, Turkey’s accession to the EU is tied to the larger debates on the process of European integration, rather than solely Turkey’s conforming to the EU acquis and criteria. Turkey’s accession provides the EU with a rare opportunity to deal with the challenges of cultural diversity and multiculturalism. Its accession would enable increased dialogue between different cultures in Europe, and its possible voting weight would enable the adoption of supranational policies to address this challenge. In addition to the symbolic value of Turkey’s accession on transforming the EU into a ‘cosmopolitan’ union, there are significant utility-based gains, such as those in security and economic advances. Similarly, the challenges posed by the Turkish accession to the EU were increasingly felt in terms of identity concerns. It is possible to argue that both Turkey’s accession to the EU and the European integration process are shaped by the identity formation in the EU. The European identity is, in turn, influenced by the future polity that the EU is moving towards.

This brings us into the question as to what kind of an impact Turkey’s accession to the EU would have on European identity and multiculturalism. What would be the possible costs and benefits of Turkey’s accession on multiculturalism in the EU? Alternatively, would having Turkey as a member help the EU to deal with the challenge of diversity as some EU publics perceive as a key challenge? These questions are important in shaping and determining the future of European identity and Turkey’s place in Europe. The future of European integration and the Turkish accession to the EU depend upon the emergence of a multicultural Europe and a resolution of the ongoing identity struggles in the European Union. It is not far fetched to claim that Turkey has a potential role to play in both of these processes. However, it should be noted that the Turkish ability to contribute to the multiculturalism and democracy debate in Turkey is greatly tied to the resolution of the ongoing identity struggles in Turkey.
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RECON is an Integrated Project financed by the European Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme for Research, Priority 7 – Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-based Society. Project No.: CIT4-CT-2006-028698.

Coordinator: ARENA – Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo.

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