Regional, Ethnic, European?
Complex Identity Construction of Silesians in the Context of Cultural Borderland

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Abstract
This article shows the transformation process of regional and national identities in Silesia in the context of changes induced by the processes of European integration and globalization. The author analyses the reconstruction of the identity of Silesians – a cultural borderland group – at different levels of identification. An important aspect of this analysis is an attempt to answer the question about the attitudes of Silesians, constructing and reconstructing their territorial identity, to various forms of further European integration.

Keywords
Introduction

Identity is a concept that allows the introduction of two distinctive characteristics of people or things: similarity and difference. This divide enables us to classify things and peoples as identical or as other (Jenkins 2005: 5). Similarity and difference are also a question of continuity and of distinguishing characteristics. One important element of identity conceived in terms of similarity with the other is territory. Perceived as their own, familiar, homely, and organized according to the rules accepted by the members of the group, territory becomes an important element of a group’s culture. This is the basis of identity and its relatively stable properties, characterized by the perceptions of “self” versus “others” (Bokszański 1989: 14). Territory in such a group is not only the physical part, the material conditions of functioning, but above all an important element of the symbolic culture. Territorial identity may relate to groups and communities on a different spatial scale, from local communities to global society. What is more, people usually belong to groups with a different spatial coverage: local communities, regional, national and transnational groups. They wander symbolically and physically as pre-modern nomads after a specified territory, which they consider their own (Tuan 1977). It is rare to have one integral identity, understood as a sense of belonging to a social group that is territorial in character. In this context, the question of the relationship between different territorial identities appears.

In my opinion, the various forms of territorial identity should not be ignored. They in fact represent different levels of identification, and thus determine the various bases of identification. For example, regional identity is based on the concept of the region in sociological terms, which means that it has a certain spatial scale and an implied inferiority to the more general ethnic or national identity (Rykiel 2010: 20-21). Ethnic or national identity may have a different spatial scale from the local (homeland) to the global (diaspora), which means that it is neither less nor more general than the supranational or transnational identity (such as European), but simply different from the latter.

Disclosure of the identity of a certain level of territorial identity (local, regional, ethnic, national or European) in human behaviour is the consequence of an interactive context rather than the absolute dominance in the process of self-identification. Identity is variable and fluent. The activation of levels and elements of the identity is generated by everyday circumstances of human activity, not by some permanent identification (Ardener 1991). The awareness of belonging to a group in a specific territorial context determines the dominance of a particular identity. There is no doubt that contemporary economic, political and socio-cultural processes influence the strengthening and weakening of the consciousness of belonging to specific territorial groups.

In this article I am interested in the transformation process of regional and national identity in Silesia in the context of changes brought about by the processes of European integration, transformation and globalization. An important aspect of this analysis is investigating the visions Silesians are developing with respect to further European integration (when constructing and reconstructing their territorial identity).
Silesia – history and identity

Silesia is a cultural borderland. This definition means that it belongs to an area of the country (in this case Poland) that is usually peripheral, with a strong awareness of separateness. In Silesia, this awareness is the effect of a long-term penetration of numerous cultures of various origins in the area (Szczepański 1998: 239). A borderland has not only a spatial aspect, but also historical, political, ethnic, social and cultural dimensions (Babiński 1997). These dimensions represent the effect of natural and spontaneous ranges of different cultures, ethnic groups, ideas and systems of values that permeate regardless of the artificially generated boundaries between social systems.

Upper Silesia has for many centuries been influenced by different cultures. The scope of this impact has historically depended on the political and territorial situation of belonging. In its long history Silesia belonged to the Czech Kingdom, Austria, Prussia, Germany and Poland. This situation determined to a great extent its unusual development in political, economic and socio-cultural aspects (Kurletko 2009; Szczepański 1998). In terms of ethnic cultures, it became a place of interaction of Polishness, Germanness and Czechness. The long-term effects of different ethnic cultures, which were linked with political and economic influences, led to the creation of the original Silesian culture with its strong territorial identity defined by Silesians with the words: “we are of here”. These words are a manifestation of a strong regional identity and of maintaining a distance from Czech, German and Polish culture. This dissociation arises from the fact that these national cultures in the past tried to assimilate Silesians through fear and enforcement. Silesians found themselves in the situation of being a minority group trying to respond to different cultural practices of domination, such as assimilation, incorporation and marginalization (Mucha 1999). As a result, the construction of Silesian identity was connected to the strategies of, on the one hand, compromise and loyalty, and on the other, dissociation from the external environment. In response to the cultural domination of the Germans and Poles, Silesians acted in two ways. Firstly, they carried out their own activities in minority areas which were not reached by the majority culture, such as the private sphere, family, and neighbourhood group. Secondly, while publicly, formally and in a ritualized way participating in some majority practices they implicitly participated in minority practices as well. Such a procedure allowed them to avoid conflicts with the dominant ethnic group and to maintain a low involvement and participation in the public sphere (Bartkowski 2003). It also contributed to developing a sense of their particular identity against the external environment.

This type of strategy is certainly one of the main reasons why Silesians stress regional self-identification while they are cautious in declaring state affiliation. The historical bonding with Germans and Poles caused a perception of national identity as a type of identification that is occasional, potential and situational (Szmeja 1997). Contrary to this identification, regional identity is conscious, real and relatively stable. It describes the Silesian characteristics as the following: territorial attachment, a separate language (the Silesian dialect) the cult of work, high religiosity, being consistent in activities, group solidarity and isolation from others. In the case of Silesians the sense of separateness was significantly influenced by three factors (Dolińska 2010: 340). The first one was the pacification of Silesian cultural differences and its instrumental approach in the political struggle between the dominant groups of Germans and Poles. Secondly, the development of regionalism was based on the historically
contingent strong ties with the values of local communities. Thirdly, the maintenance of a strong transnational (Polish-German) habitual relationship with a so-called “little homeland”.

The Silesian identity was established as a result of common experiences. Its present form is to a great extent conditioned by the collective memory of the group (Szmeja 2005). A sense of instrumental treatment and harm suffered at the hands of Germans and Poles played an important role here. On the one hand collective memory enables Silesians to emphasize their specificity and on the other hand they are able to set the boundaries between their group and others. Identity is also used as a tool in daily contact with others, one that is often instrumentally and situationally modified (Szmeja 2008).

The communist regime in post-war Poland had a tremendous influence on the shaping and modifying of the historical memory of Silesians. This period in Polish history was a time of political stigmatization and displacement of any cultural differences, ranging from local through regional to ethnic. Part of this post-war policy of homogenization comprised forced migrations, displacement and resettlement of “non-Poles” outside the country, or their territorial scattering, resulting in fusing in Polish society. This enforcement was supposed to enable the “external element” to blend into the Polish society. The cultural diversity of Poles was presented as an ethnographic relic, which was nothing more than a remnant of the past. For the government the goal was to build a new socialist society, axiomatically homogenized and shaped by a uniform cultural pattern. This task was particularly important in Silesia, which was the main stage for the communist industrialization in Poland. From the perspective of power, the region played a key role in the economy of the country and was responsible for the supply of coal and steel. Implementation of this objective required the introduction and adaptation of additional labour to Silesia from other regions of the country. As a result, many displaced persons came to Silesia shortly after World War II, including those arriving from the eastern Polish territories, which after the war were taken over by the Soviet Union.

Silesians received two contradictory messages from Poles and the Polish authorities during this period (Berlińska 1999). On the one hand there were declarations of the incorporation of indigenous peoples in the region to the Polish nation. This promise was accompanied with insurance that the process of incorporation would finally end the long-term misery of the population of Silesia. On the other hand, especially in their daily contact with the authorities and immigrant populations, Silesians were treated as a “suspicious element” in socialist society. They were regarded as camouflaged Germans, and at best as a Germanized population that needed to be “Polonized”. In this context the culture and identity of Silesians that was different from that represented by incoming settlers and authorities was moved from the public to the private sphere. Due to the massive influx of inhabitants from other regions, searching for work in the developed industrial sector, Silesian culture was no longer the basis of inter-group relations. These relations were now dominated by privileged newcomers and the planned policy of the authorities and the impingement was limited to intra-group contacts of indigenous residents.

The authorities not only forced the removal of the Silesian dialect in the private sphere, but they also did not accept its use in businesses and institutions. In schools teachers used and imposed a literary Polish language. Silesian dialect was tolerated at
the level of primary education and in vocational schools which were preparing their graduates for performing specific, low-skilled work. In these institutions teaching humanities had been completely marginalized since the domination of professional preparation for working in the mining and metallurgy industry that was dominant in Upper Silesia. Secondary schools preparing children for further education required from their students use of the literary Polish language. As a result, the majority of indigenous youth limited their educational aspirations. These factors, as well as the political circumstances mentioned above determined the external origin of political and administrative workers in Upper Silesia (Wódz and Wódz 1999).

The process of selecting members of economic and political local elites from outside the region was one of the manifestations of the “internal colonization” of Silesia by Poles, a fact frequently stressed by Silesians (Dziadul 1997). Another important sign of such “colonization” was the intervention and reconstruction of the traditionally organized space in the region. In Upper Silesia post-war industrialization and chaotic urbanization had led to the destruction of the original spatial order – enclosed settlements around the workplace – which was an important element of Silesian identity. Outsiders became a dominant group in this region, identifying the Silesian dialect, traditions, and patterns of behaviour as a variant of German culture that should be marginalized. The Silesian population was perceived by Poles as “other” and often as “worse”. As a result they were also considered to be non-Polish. Simultaneously, the same cultural traits of those Silesians who emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany were treated by Germans as an expression of Polish culture and identity.

One of the effects of the post-war experiences with Poles and Germans was a strengthening of the sense of Silesians’ national ambivalence and lack of belonging. Another effect of this situation was the sense of being maltreated and a widespread feeling of suffering from both Poles and the Polish state and Germans and the German state. These two factors became an important motif of the mobilization of the population of Silesia to strive towards empowerment and self-governance in the period after the collapse of the communist system in 1989. The transformation system allowed the public disclosure of the German minority in Silesia, ruthlessly suppressed during the communist period. The German minority had a “significant other” for constructing its Silesian identity. This development brought about the need to confront the identity of Silesia with not only the Polish, but also the German identity.

What started in the region at this point can be explained by the concept of building social subjectivity. This means the stimulation of activities which enable cooperation between residents, strengthening participation and involvement in tackling social problems and citizens’ participation in government (Alsop et al. 2006). The building of a powerful community also helps to liberate it from the cultural domination of the majority group. This construction involves the process of revitalization and strengthening Silesian identity, which results in identifying Silesianness as an alternative regional identity or as a national identity. The first variant characterizes the model of organization and functioning of the regional movement and the second the ethnic movement. Before we return to how this distinction became important in the region and how it became intertwined with the process of European integration we will need to introduce a theoretical model explaining these two types of movements.
Regional and ethnic movements differ from each other with five basic characteristics (Babiński 1995) and can result in contributing to building different types of identities. First, regionalism is a movement towards autonomy and distinctiveness, and therefore it points to going “away from the state”. It is focused on minimizing the impact of the central government on the functioning and development of a region. On the contrary, ethnic nationalism is separatist in its nature and is focused on the establishment of a group’s own state. Second, regionalism is primarily based on the ideology of “private homeland”, which refers to the symbolism and meaning of social space that are limited with clearly defined and stable boundaries. The ethnic movement creates an ideological homeland where territorial and symbolic boundaries are labile in character. Regionalism is furthermore traditionalist, referring to the folk culture and historically shaped values of the local communities. Ethnic nationalism is “modern” and refers to the instrumental understanding of ethnicity (Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Gellner 1983; Smith 2003). It processes the folk culture and traditions for the purpose of achieving political goals. Fourthly, a regional movement embraces trans-regional and transnational associations, and often perceives them as a chance to weaken the nation-state and to strengthen their own identity. Nationalism is often reluctant or suspicious towards supranational integration, unless it is part of the separatist strategy against the state of the majority society in which it functions as a minority movement. Lastly, regionalism is primarily defensive, aimed at preserving the traditions of and praising the past. An ethnic movement is sometimes xenophobic and conservative, but in most cases it is an expansive movement which assimilates minorities.

In the case of the Silesians the manifestation of those elements of their identity that are characteristic of the regional and ethnic movement is based on several factors. One of these is the thin the Silesian population those with a Polish national option, those with German national option and people who are nationally indifferent (Szczepanski 1998). The first two groups characterize their Silesianness in terms of regional diversity. The third group tends to define it as an ethnic and/or national identity. An important manifestation of this phenomenon took place during the National Census of Population and Housing in 2002, when more than 170,000 inhabitants of the Silesian region declared Silesian national identification.

Another factor influencing the eligibility of self-identification in terms of regional or ethnic minorities is cultural competencies. People with lower competencies rather refer to plebeian Silesian culture, tradition and history as the primary correlates of regional identity. Those who have higher cultural competence in the first place emphasize the otherness of Silesian identity from the national Polish and German identities, which leads them to perceive it as a separate national identity.

Finally, the way of perceiving Silesianness depends on belonging to the ideologically involved elite. Leaders of regional groups such as the Association of Upper Silesia, the Silesian Autonomy Movement or the Union of People of Silesian Nationality strongly differ in their views on Silesianness compared to ordinary citizens of the region (Kurcz 2008). In the case of the latter it often results in dilemmas associated with defining “ourselves” (Wódz 2001.) In fact they have a problem with matching the image of an ideological Silesian nation and the images produced for their own use. The representatives of the aforementioned organizations are participants in the social movement for Silesian nationality and are convinced that the Silesian community has national features. They rarely call for separatism, but are in favour of
the transformation of the political unitary system in such a way that Silesia will allow full regional autonomy in Poland (Bal dys and Geisler 2008).

Additionally, the perception of Silesianness by the inhabitants of the region in terms of regional, ethnic and national identity is further complicated by three additional factors. These are the formal similarity which exists between regionalism and nationalism, the symbolic resources constituting the basis of cultural identity, and finally the on-going processes of the systemic transformation, European integration and globalization.

Some similarity of regional and ethnic movements and the associated ideology causes these movements to have several features in common (Babiński 1995: 71-72). Both are based on internal integration and mobilization of their members and both are territorial. Their common characteristic is a historicity understood in terms of origins and consciousness. Similarly, in both types of movements and ideologies the processes of constructing auto stereotypes, stereotyping of others and building prejudices against them occur. Finally, in both movements a primordial bond exists, which manifests itself in the idea of symbolized kinship (Shils 1957; Smith 2003).

This convergence between regionalism and nationalism is also associated with the existence of the second factor that complicates the definition of Silesianness in terms of regional, ethnic and national identity. Regardless of the identification option in the axiomatic, cultural area, Silesianness is seen through the prism of four characteristics: family, religion, space/place and work. The primacy of these four characteristics leads to additional complications related to the symbolic borders of the Silesian group. As a result, a person who was born in a mixed marriage may become a member of the group, as may a child who was born in Silesia of immigrant parents. Within the framework of nationalist ideology this type of integration process is associated with “aggressiveness”, with searching for followers of “Silesian matter” even outside the native population. Within the framework of regional ideology it is a consequence of the evolution of movement in the direction of the so-called “new regionalism”. In this framework, the most important thing is the emphasis on regional differences in mentality, which means that as a consequence the region should be an essential element of economic policies shaped by local authorities (Webb and Collins 2000).

Finally, the perception of Silesian identity in terms of regional, ethnic and national identification is affected by contemporary social processes. Cultural globalization, democratization associated with system transformation and the permeable borders of national cultures within European integration make it more difficult to maintain existing cultural boundaries. It is even harder to construct new ones. The processes of cultural hybridization and penetration of different axiom-normative systems result in the formation of transnational (Faist 2002) trans-regional and trans-local spaces. In addition, the processes of European integration and Polish accession to the EU have resulted in the emergence of interest by Silesians in the concept of European identity and in the direction of the further development of Europe. In this respect the Silesian Autonomy Movement is in favour of organizing the future Europe in accordance with the concept of Breton national activist Yann Fouéré – “Europe of 100 Flags” (Bal dys and Geisler 2008). According to this idea the united Europe should be an order where the disappearing nation-states will transfer most of their competences to the autonomous historic regions.
The identity of Silesia: An empirical analysis of the local perspective

The main aim of the field study was to target a group of people with Silesian identity. As is stressed above – because of its historical position in between the German and Polish cultures and a constant pressure from these two ethnic groups – it seems interesting to analyse the process of “punching in the identification independence” of Silesians. On the one hand Silesians highlight their cultural diversity from Germans. On the other hand they stress their difference from Polish society and the 20th-century process of socio-cultural homogenization. In this context the main aim of the empirical research was to answer the question of how Silesians build their social identity in the context of four types of socio-cultural relations, such as those within the Silesian minority, between the Silesian minority and Poles, between the Silesian and the German minority in Poland, and last but not least Polish attitudes to the EU and European integration. Empirical studies were conducted in 2007 and 2009 in Nikiszowiec and Giszowiec, which are two communities in Katowice inhabited by numerous Silesians. We conducted a series of in-depth problematic interviews supplemented by documentation of social life.

The Silesian identity and relationships within the minority

In most of the interviews, the answer to the question of who Silesians are is related to the historical-romantic context. The respondents see themselves as belonging to a group separated on the basis of certain cultural traits which are endangered and elusive and which are at the same time specific to Silesians and cannot easily be distinguished from outside. In this perspective, Silesian identity has a primordial character and exists in the hearts of those who feel and belong to it. There are neither artificial, thoughtful elements nor shaped constructions with the form of cultural creativity, invented traditions.

The most common feature that distinguishes Silesians is their dialect – godanie in Silesian. The respondents stressed that speaking a dialect shows a certain social prestige of the people using it. “It’s an honour. I like dialect, I really do. My son often speaks Silesian, he even did so in school, and previously teachers were paying attention to it. And he godol [spoke in dialect] even when he was writing.” (S/N/04)

In many situations linguistic discrimination of Silesians is accompanied by a feature of territoriality. “To be a Silesian means to live in Silesia and to speak Silesian and that is all.” (S/G/01) This characterization is very important, since for many respondents, Silesians who leave the region have lost their identity. Regardless of the place where they migrate, in the opinion of respondents, they cannot sustain the features which characterize Silesians.

The obvious conclusion is that according to the respondents it is possible to maintain Silesianness within their own group, where a daily affirmation of identity characteristics is possible. In case of language this condition is necessary because others do not understand the dialect, which means that even at home Silesians must modify the form of communication depending on the context of interaction. “When you really godo [speak in dialect] then the other person does not understand and you

1 The field research was carried out by Marcin Galent, Maria Molenda, Dariusz Niedźwiedzki and Karolina Rzepecka.
have to translate into Polish.” (S/N/02) According to respondents, not all words can easily be translated into Silesian. Dialect is used “but it depends who you talk to. For example, the lady who lives opposite me, she does not speak Silesian at all, even though she is a native Silesian. And when she comes to see me, she speaks Silesian but in the backyard she no longer does this.” (S/N/05) In the yard are people who settled in Silesia but originally come from other parts of the country. Only among their own people are “almost all conversations [...] in Silesian. When we meet up we speak to each other in Silesian.” (S/N/05)

A territorial reference is also noticed, because Silesians feel their linguistic dissimilarity when they are travelling in Poland. In some situations, this difference is a matter of pride. This pride is especially the case when people (specifically) ask Silesians to use dialect because they want to hear it. In other situations Silesians feel that their way of talking irritates others, and they therefore try to avoid dialect. “Even recently, when I was on holiday there was this woman from Ruda Śląska – it’s also in the Silesia region – she was also speaking Silesian. Apparently she could not speak any other way. I saw that sometimes some ladies were making fun of her. [...] And some other people were asking her to talk dialect. And yet other ladies were looking at her with a kind of... I don’t know... disregard.” (S/G/05)

Many respondents notice changes in the use of the Silesian dialect, and the assertion is clear here. Fewer and fewer people use the dialect, young people increasingly avoid it, and above all, they mostly limit themselves to the Polish language outside the family. “Our grandchildren, one is 21, the other one is 16 years old, they are able to speak Silesian. Of course. Well, we were not gagging ourselves to protect our kids from hearing it. But they can also speak very nice Polish. And they do so. We don’t know when. When at home they speak Silesian, and when it is... I mean when they talk to family. But now even my daughter and my son-in-law don’t use Silesian at home. Unless someone comes in, a friend, colleague who speaks dialect, and then they’ll still pogodoją se [speak in dialect].” (S/G/05) Some respondents claim that this process is partly justified by comfort. In their view, speaking Polish is easier. “I think it is easier. The language has a larger vocabulary. Silesian limits the speaker. Silesian dialect is limited. [...] There are only a few words and that’s all.” (S/G/05) Respondents perceive a threat in these linguistic changes with regard to the survival of the Silesian identity. It is furthermore endangered due to the influx of people from outside the region who do not speak the Silesian dialect. “It will happen because there are more and more outsiders. I think that if there were no more outsiders and those who are already here and have children will speak Silesian then Silesia will survive; but if they will speak standard Polish to their children instead of godać [speak in dialect], Silesia will disappear.” (S/N/02)

As mentioned earlier, the territorial aspect of Silesian identity involves the use of dialect, which can mainly be heard in the private sphere, at home, or in the territory shared with neighbours. This territoriality is also evident in other cultural characteristics. The interviews indicate that Silesians are characterized by a specific lifestyle which is territorially limited to the close neighbourhood to live and work. “People live in a district where they were born and they do not want to move out any further. So they live, work and that’s all. And they don’t even know where what is. They sit in their gardens, with their flowers, they have everything. Not long ago they were still planting everything. You know, all those vegetables and fruit. Not anymore. Now, only flowers and grass.” (S/G/04) This nearest neighbourhood is a subject of
Concern for individuals and the group. Generally, the idea is to make it neat and tidy. “Silesians are very good people. Thrifty and clean. It’s something you know. If you go for a walk in Giszowiec, or anywhere else, they will always tell you that a Silesian house could be not clean, but the window always had to be clean and the curtains had to be fresh. It had to be like that. It was like a business card. And that’s what I was taught.” (S/G/03)

Attention to order is one of the dimensions of Silesians’ diligence. It is another cultural trait that is commonly emphasized in interviews. Silesians “are friendlier and more hardworking. And this can be said because in Silesia there are only miners, at least it was like this, because now there are fewer and fewer. But these are people who are not afraid; they are tough, they are not afraid, maybe of some risks but they are not afraid of work. This seems to me to be their most important characteristic, diligence and conscientiousness above all.” (S/G/01) To a large extent, this diligence is associated with traditional Silesian professions, working in the mining and metallurgy industries. “Each Silesian is usually a miner, it’s this trait that makes him go to mining work, and in Poland they look more at education, they study more. Well, here too, because Silesians learn, but foremost you can say about them that they work hard.” (S/N/03) Simultaneously, after the war the development of these industries in Silesia led to threats to traditional Silesianess by foreigners who were engaged to work in the mines and by large companies in heavy industry. In addition to hard work, the family is of particular concern to Silesians. “The most important thing in a family was always the family ties. That’s how it was in my house. If somebody was missing, nobody was sitting at the table; everybody was waiting until it was complete. If it was for Christmas Eve dinner or anything else.” (S/G/03) On the one hand hard work was very important, but on the other “family was always in first place” (S/G/02). Virtually in all the interviews, to the question of the most important thing in life the answer was family. And in many cases this importance does not change throughout life. Many respondents talk about their family, even distant, with a characteristic note of affection and sympathy. They proudly point out that most of the family lives in Silesia, and if someone from the family has migrated beyond the region they often look troubled and hope for the return of relatives in the future. Silesians “keep the family, well in general they take care of family. I don’t know, maybe everybody does, but they really are fond of the family” (S/G/04). This attachment to the family is also associated with certain family traditions, among which the respondents emphasize the different holidays as well as the typical Sunday dinner. This ceremony brings together the whole family including the distant family. A common feature of this dinner is a pre-defined menu. “Once in Silesia, and even now people respect it, it was only on Sunday that there had to be chicken noodle soup, red cabbage – that is blue – and rolls. How many times I had to prepare it! And you didn’t use to be able to buy noodles, so I had to make them myself. Do you have any idea how much work there was on Sunday? Every woman each Sunday had a ton of work. Because tomato soup, no, it couldn’t be, with beetroot, not something like that. It had to be a typical Silesian dinner. Every week the same thing.” (S/G/04)

Silesians are trying to maintain a sense of community, a group based on emotional components. One can even see that the close family relationships mentioned are often transferred to the whole community. An example is the following excerpt from one of the interviews, where the respondent emphasizes that “Silesians have this thing where they are very friendly to one another and it can be seen here. We see it at every step, someone [saying] ‘hello’, and he doesn’t walk like he is resented or something.
Oh, there is my boss walking over here.” A woman who appeared during the interview asked the respondent: “Aśku, do you want apples for compote?” The respondent turned to the researcher, making the comment: “Well now you see, this is Silesianness. This is how Silesians are [...] they love one another” (S/G/01). This strong, emotionally grounded bond between Silesians creates a model of family solidarity, and consequently it helps in situations when it is needed. One believed that “this is the bond between Silesians, such a strong bond. This is how they go along together [...] this is how Silesians help one another. If something happens they always come to help” (S/N/03). The metaphor of the family also appears in the context of the location of the Silesians among other social groups. “We are family in Poland, and although it is only a particle, we do not perceive ourselves as something else.” (S/G/01)

Some respondents talking about Silesianness refer to the National Census, in which they declared Silesian nationality. One of them believes that he is “well, above all, a native Silesian. And when there was that census two or three years ago I said the same thing” (S/N/01). Another pointed out some problems associated with it. “Of course when we were writing these interviews we were indicating Silesian nationality. I talked to the neighbours, not every interviewer wanted to write it down, because they had their own priorities coming from the top, right. But for me they wrote it down, under pressure, but they did. Anyway it is good to be a Silesian, and it is good to be a Pole, a cool nation, hard to deny.” (S/G/02)

These declarations of Silesian nationality in the census do not mean that the respondents believe in Silesia as a separate nation. On the contrary, the vast majority of them believe that, despite many differences, Silesians do not deserve such a title. “No, it seems to me that we are all Poles. I don’t know what the opinion of others is, but it seems to me that we are Poles, after all this is Poland.” (S/N/05) One of the reasons is a belief that the sense of Silesianness does not contradict identification with the Polish nation. “I’m proud that I am Silesian. I am proud, because I say that I was born here and I live here. If for example I was born in Warsaw, I would be proud that I am a Varsovian, a Pole. And here I am a Pole but of Silesian origin.” (S/G/03)

This not fully conscious awareness of multilevel identification sometimes leads to emphasizing the relativity of axiom-normative social identity. It was faith that made a man be born in Silesia, in the Silesian family, but that does not mean that he is better than people with other cultural roots. In this context, the true Silesian with his culture places himself somewhere between a Pole and a German: “It’s hard to say if [a Silesian] is Pole or German. Mutants, as they say” (S/N/05). In this approach Silesianness is an important basis for cultural continuity, which is independent from the political changes taking place in these areas. As recalled by one of the respondents: “I don’t know... if not for those twists of history then maybe we would’ve been Germans. Because it was like this [...] My mother was German, my grandparents were Germans. How to say this, half of the family was Polish, half was German. No matter which side you turned, it would have matched. Before I turned six years old I spoke better German than Polish. But all the floors were full of old German women who were speaking German among themselves. When I was supposed to go to the kindergarten, they taught me Polish.” (S/N/01) One of the respondents said she felt Silesian, but immediately added: “For me it is irrelevant. If man could choose, he would be born in the royal family, but I was born in the Silesian family, my father was a miner, my grandfather was a miner. That’s the family I come
from, actually it was a poor family and we never had welfare.” (S/N/05) Such an opinion clearly highlights a nod in the direction of accomplishing a social system in which elements that are beyond someone’s reach should not be the subject of special praise. For some of the respondents, “there are good and bad people. Silesians are good and Poles too [...]. And when somebody is bad then he is bad.” (S/G/04).

This humanism, which refers to man as a value independently of his particular culture, is definitely related to the historical experiences of Silesians and to the attempts of dominating their separateness by the German and Polish elements. According to some respondents Silesians are not a separate nation, and should not be. Territorial independence and economic self-sufficiency, which are associated with national separation, would be difficult to maintain. “Constructing these small enclaves doesn’t make sense, it’s not an option. It is important to live in harmony, and it doesn’t matter whether it is Silesian or [a person] from the seaside or from Mazowsze, or from Warsaw or Krakow, it’s important to live in harmony. Separately? I think that if such a small state was created it would not survive.” (S/G/02) As one of the respondents said: “If somebody was to disconnect Silesia from the Polish centre, we would not manage.” (S/N/04). In some isolated opinions, which point to the existence of an independent Silesian nation, the respondents emphasize its similarity to the German nation. In this context, it appears clearly different from the Polish one. In such a view Silesians are a separate nation, linked with Germans: “It’s just that he was born in Silesia. My husband would emphasize this fact a lot. I’d even say if Germans returned they would have joined them and in the case of all those who are not native, I think they would have betrayed them all.” (S/G/04)

The problem of the Silesian identity involves the question of understanding and attitude towards the homeland. Generally, a stronger emphasis is placed on a small homeland, a patrimony, which is understandable in the context of the aforementioned territorial dimension of Silesianness. “This is my house, that’s all.” (S/G/02) Homeland is strongly associated with some familiarity of the place of residence. It is close to man, because of the homeland: “Here this place [...] in general, in general... here, this circle. Others call it a small homeland, no? But it is irrelevant whether it is small or slightly larger, but it is a place where I live. Because if I go to Ireland, my homeland is not there anymore. Even though I spend time there, I live there, it’s not the same.” (S/N/01) And I feel best here, and I feel how this place is calling me no matter where I am. For some of the respondents homeland is indeed “only Silesia. I live in Silesia” (S/N/02). For others, it is not even all of Silesia or a specific city, but only a part of it or a specific residential district. One respondent said “Lately, when there were those hailstorms, my relatives called me to ask if my car was okay, because there was hail falling in Katowice. And I told them that I don’t live in Katowice, I live in Giszowiec. I’m glad that I can live here. It’s something separate. It’s more like a city, Giszowiec, than just a district of Katowice.” (S/G/02)

Some of our respondents, when defining their homeland, indicate its importance and their responsibilities towards it. According to our respondents, homeland “is my home, my life, because I was born here, I live here, I will be buried here. I just wish that it is good; it seems to me that the good upbringing of children brings profit to the country. Because I have a son in the army, he is a corporal and my children are well educated, they work, I have no complaints, they work with people and for me it’s a satisfaction because it seems to me that this is my contribution to the homeland.” (S/G/01) For some homeland is understood as an ideology of duties, similar to the
pattern outlined by John F. Kennedy: “ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country”. One respondent said: “I understand it – country, patriotism, that it doesn’t mean to plunder everything but to give to the people, but here everything is the opposite” (S/N/04).

The homeland is also a value system that shapes its inhabitants, enabling them to achieve their goals in life, to pursue their own aspirations. Homeland means “that I was born here; it has to be respected, because the homeland raised us and educated my children. It made it possible for me to educate them. And well, just the fact that we are here, we live here, we enjoy good health and everything.” (S/N/03) In our research there was one case where the concepts of small and big homeland were bound together. Homeland “is a country where I was born and I would not change it, you know, I would not change it. Even if I changed, I definitely wouldn’t change identity [...] In Poland, but here. Here - in Silesia. Because these are the roots, you know, these are the roots.” (S/G/03) In rare cases, appeal to the homeland in terms of symbolism, the respondents pointed to the dominance of Polishness (understood holistically) above regional divisions. “Well, homeland is Poland. Well, I cannot isolate here Kaszuby, Masuria or so. That’s all Poland.” (S/G/04) “Home for me, well, that’s all Poland. In this case I don’t isolate Silesia. It seems to me that homeland, well, it is Poland. It’s not Silesia, it’s Poland. Those who staunchly say Silesia, well, I don’t understand them. But let them say that.” (S/G/05)

The identity of the indigenous Silesians has changed over time, but in this case it is difficult to speak of a debate, of internal discourse on the problems of identification. This difficulty is partly because of problems with the identification of community leaders. The respondents are unable to identify the leaders of indigenous Silesians. They often declare a lack of knowledge in this field, or lack of interest in such matters. Nevertheless, some of our respondents are convinced that these community leaders do exist, since the effect of their activities can be observed. One of the respondents did not know who leads the Silesians, but “for sure there is somebody who does it. Because nowadays there is a new Silesian television channel on Polsat, and that’s where all those godki [programmes spoken in dialect] and music playlists are. Everything is in Silesian, all the TV programme is in Silesian. So that’s something that’s been created.” (S/G/01) Likewise, most respondents were not able to point to organizations which are working for the Silesians. Only two people confirmed that they had heard of the Silesian Autonomy Movement, but they could not give any concrete information on the structure, process and objectives of the Movement’s activities.

Those who tried to name Silesian leaders or organizations can be divided equally into three groups. The first group points to the genesis of such leaders and organizations in the movements of the German minority in Poland. “There is something... this minority of Silesia, or not minority, but this Silesian Autonomy, who are fighting, this German minority.” (S/N/01) The place of birth of such leaders and organizations is either the Opole region or Germany, from where German Silesians are coming back to Poland. “I mean there is something somewhere in Katowice. Association [...] I don’t know. What do they call it? Silesians... Brehmer, Brehmer² – he, he is German, he’s

² Dietmar Brehmer is a German regional activist associated with the Upper Silesia, a longtime chairman of the German Working Community “Reconciliation and Future”. In 2004 he was among the founders of
there somewhere in Katowice. Well, I really can’t tell you the exact name, because I am not interested.” Unfortunately, since the respondent is not interested in such people and organizations she is unable to say anything more: “I don’t need this Brehmer guy. I feel Silesian. And he came somewhere from Germany. So there are still many of those Silesians in Germany.” (S/G/03) The second group points to the independence of such leaders and organizations from Poland and Germany and to their willingness to act in favour of the autonomy of Silesia. “There’s an organization, it’s... it was trying, it wants this autonomy, but I’m not interested in such organizations.” (S/G/02) When asked about the Silesian Autonomy Movement one of the respondents replied that “there is something in Katowice. But it’s just I’ve heard, there is this young man and he was talking about something, but what they do, I have no idea.” (S/G/08) Another respondent had heard the slogan that Silesia should be only for Silesians: “yes, sometimes you can hear from people that Silesia should only be for Silesians. I don’t care. What makes the difference is who lives close to me. It’s important that nobody does any harm to me.” (S/N/05) On the Silesian Autonomy Movement: “There was something like that. Even someone from a distant family, someone was working there. But I don’t know if they achieved anything. They were trying to change their nationality and so forth.” (S/G/05)

The idea of the autonomy of Silesia is not very popular among the people surveyed. There are those who “want, just like those from Opole, they want this Germanness or something. It’s them who wish to register Silesia. But it is impossible to divide it from Poland.” (S/G/04) One of the respondents believes that those who want to separate Silesia from Poland “don’t think with their heads” (S/N/05). And finally a third group provides general information about the existence of some leaders and organizations, but due to lack of interest in such matters they are not able to give any further details. Such organizations “certainly exist. On television you hear that a man may not need this in order to benefit from something, to belong to something. That was enough for me; I’m okay so I don’t need to know much.” (S/G/10)

Respondents more often referred to local and regional leaders than those who can be determined in ethnical and cultural terms. For many respondents the territorial aspect of Silesian identity makes it important to indicate who works to improve the situation in their city and region, no matter whether he or she is an indigenous Silesian or a migrant. Of course, if this activity is associated with multigenerational living in Silesia, then pride appears. Some respondents therefore praised the district councillors of Nikiszowiec and Giszowiec, who come from these settlements. Most of the respondents expressed a very positive opinion about the president of Katowice (who is of Silesian origin), primarily for his efforts to develop the technical and social infrastructure, as well as to improve the aesthetic aspect of the city. The president is in their view very good, although he does not take action to consolidate and develop indigenous Silesianness. Such a role is attributed to a greater extent to representatives of the region on the central political stage. It is from these representatives (many respondents named Kazimierz Kutz and Dorota Simonides in the interviews) that people expect not only representation of the economic and social needs of the region, but also to draw attention to the cultural diversity of Silesia.

Upper Silesia Unity, organization including among others Association of Upper Silesia and Silesian Autonomy Movement.

3 Members of the Polish Parliament. Kazimierz Kutz is also a film director who has made many films about Silesia and the Silesians.
The mayor of the city and local councillors are the institutions to which people can turn if they want to solve local problems. “Our councillors have meeting opportunities, and we can come to them twice a week, I think on Tuesdays and Thursdays. They sit there, and this woman in Mysłowice too. And if someone has a problem they can go there.” (S/G/03) Some opportunities in this field are also offered by the local parish. “There is also something at our church parish where you can go with some problems that people from Nikiszowiec have, you can come and talk about it” (S/N/03). In general, the respondents hardly knew any local non-governmental organizations. When asked, they only indicated housing associations, community centres and trade unions. Nevertheless, many of them declared an interest in local affairs and in attending meetings aimed at solving residents’ problems. Respondents noticed the possible participation in the exercise of power and felt a certain influence on the shaping of social reality. “The residents of Giszowiec yes, because they are constantly organizing meetings. And there also many people from the housing association.” (S/G/04) Usually, this influence is in the form of non-institutionalized actions. People just “work together, yes, yes. They try more and more to keep order, so it’s no longer like before, when it was nobody’s... and if it belonged to nobody, nobody did anything about it, it was getting destroyed. So it’s no longer like this, now people take more care of these things.” (S/G/02) Sometimes organized meetings take place, where residents meet and discuss the problems of the community. “We have a restaurant here where meetings on Nikiszowiec are held [...] it was not long ago, because it’s Gazeta Wyborcza that organizes such meetings with inhabitants, where you can talk about all the problems that the residents of Nikiszowiec have and about what can be done. And we said that there should be CCTV on the market square to make this area safer [...] last time the Mayor of Katowice, Mr Uszok, was participating.” (S/N/09)

Unfortunately, most of our interviewees regret the inability to solve the basic problem of the Nikiszowiec and Giszowiec communities, which is hooliganism. Almost all of them agreed that this violence is the most burning issue. However, they differ as to what has caused this unsolved phenomenon. Some point to a decline in morals and morality in modern times and changes that have taken place in the relations between people. Others add to this a lack of sanctioning of inappropriate behaviour by both adults and institutions. Some problems are a result of the social changes associated with the arrival of outsiders in the area. As a consequence the number of native Silesians is becoming less and less “[...] and this is it. Because Silesians watched their children, and others don’t.” (S/N/03). The problem of hooliganism lies in the fact that it cannot be solved from the outside; there is a need for action on the part of the parents of young hooligans. In studies on the causes of hooliganism, some opinions also point to the responsibility of adults for the growth in this phenomenon. Partially, the problem arises from the absence of social infrastructure: “Things were quiet before. First of all, children had the playing field, now in this particular place they’ve built a hotel, and there’s nowhere for kids to go. I don’t blame them, because there is nothing here. There is no cinema, no sports team or events, nothing to have some entertainment. And before there was a playground and kids were going there and played. Now, they’ve just renovated the ice rink.” (S/N/09) One respondent speaks even more clearly in this spirit: “Here in Giszowiec it’s dangerous. It is, it is. There’s a lot of those. Well, what can they do here? If even old people get bored then what do these young people have? There is no money. There is nothing for young people here. Only aggro [aggression]. There are only pubs, and they go there, some swallow a pill and sing all night. And scream in Giszowiec. And either kick or set fire to rubbish
Changes to the infrastructure that decrease the leisure opportunities for young people are by some of our respondents considered to be extremely important.

According to most of the respondents, indigenous Silesians consider themselves to be hosts in this region, even if the numbers show that they are already a minority population. They see a lot of shortcomings in the environment, and try to supplement them. They do not eschew involvement in social work. “If something has to be done, they will work on it. It doesn’t have to be a company or something... they will come and help. So this is not a problem.” (S/G/02) The problem is that according to the respondents not all people behave in this way. Interviewees are noticing increasing individualism and isolationism. “To be honest, it is fairly simple to call upon only one person, but to bring together more people is really difficult. Not so long ago we bought an apartment from the Community, and it will be difficult to reach some common agreement on a common plan. Everyone has a different opinion, you know that if there are two then [...], so it’s not easy.” (S/G/02) In this context, some respondents deplore the state of the community and regret that they do not have a greater impact on the situation. “Sure, I'd love to have [a greater impact] but you know it’s like throwing peas against the wall. Simply no and no. I’ve already said that I won’t speak any more during the meetings. Because it is like, you know, fighting windmills. Now when I go to a meeting I sit still. I go, I listen, and I join in the discussion when it comes to the police or security. And that’s all.” (S/G/09) In addition, some respondents are irritated by the local community’s inability to fix problems on the spot due to its institutional organization. However, the responsibility for this state of affairs is rather placed at a higher level of authority. There is a problem with the local “host”, “because the host should actually govern from below, because this top part is focused too much on collecting taxes and everything goes to Warsaw.” (S/N/04) In short, the local authorities tend to try hard, but they are often powerless against the limitations of formal, institutional and financial arrangements.

According to the interviewees there are no significant social conflicts in the surveyed communities (apart from the one between hooligans and the rest of the population). In their view, it is the effect of living long-term among the same neighbours. In the case of disagreement conflicts take place between individuals, rather than between groups of people. Most of the respondents point out that they trust their neighbours, and many would have no problem with leaving their flat in their care while travelling. Of course, not all residents of the area deserve such confidence; however, in general it can be assumed that this type of feature of a normative aspect of civil society is presented in the surveyed communities.

Many respondents faced difficulties with the concept of democracy. Some explicitly stated that they do not understand this word and its meaning in the context of their life experiences. Others use this concept as a criterion for assessing the power system in Poland, without defining the phenomenon. In particular, their responses suggest that such a state of democracy in Poland has not yet been reached. One of our interviewees said that in Poland, “this democracy is still at arm’s length. There are still too many better and best. People said that communism was stealing, but at that time there was only one secretary, and now instead of one secretary they established twelve governors and they all steal. Simple.” (S/N/01) Part of the answer brought the concept of democracy down to the freedom of expression and characteristics of the socio-economic system, and the opportunity to assess the state of democracy in
Poland. “Democracy. You know what, well democracy – freedom of speech above all. But also limited, because you can’t say anything. What else does democracy mean? Well – free market. What else? And if it’s fully democratic – I don’t believe it. I don’t believe, because it seems to me corruption is everywhere. This is legal corruption. So for me this is not democracy, just in my opinion.” (S/G/05)

Pluralism and tolerance are values important to many of our respondents. Despite the apparent closeness, the indigenous Silesians often emphasize that the human being has a value and a right to a dignified life, regardless of his cultural traits. Some of them have noticed substantial changes in the pluralism and tolerance which took place in the post-war period. Among the indigenous Silesians “many have changed their mentality to one that is more tolerant, like mine. Because when I was young it was still: hit the ‘Gorol’ [non-Silesian in dialect]. There were fights with Germans. Today that’s not the case anymore.” (S/N/10) To some respondents long-term contacts with German and Polish culture have contributed to the awareness of cultural diversity as a natural social condition. It is important that this difference cannot be the reason for anyone to be treated in an unfair way. Moreover, years of contacts with Poles who came to Silesia in the post-war period led to a process of cultural diffusion. An important role is played here by relationships and mixed marriages between indigenous Silesians and migrants. Once avoided, after some years this is becoming more common. “In my family, for instance we are all Silesians, but my granddaughter has a boyfriend from outside of Silesia. At first my son was somewhat opposed: ‘Ola, you know that we are all Silesians,’ she said, ‘Dad, what do I care, I like him.’ And so we welcome him to the family and it turned out that he is a good guy. His parents died young. My son came to us and said that Ola was dating some guy that is not one of ours and she told him to stay out of it. And I told him that he must be prepared for it and that he must accept anyone who his daughter likes.” (S/N/08)

A sense of pluralism and tolerance is also associated with freedom, at least in recent years with the use of the Silesian dialect. “For instance I don’t care if I’m in Katowice in a shop or in Nikiszowiec, I never speak, I always godać [speak in dialect]. In the office or not, I don’t care. We are in Silesia and we godomy [speak in dialect] in Silesian. Just like in Kashubian, it was fun to godalo [speak in dialect] Silesian with Kashubian. My woman has family there. He understood me better than I could understand him because with Kashubian it’s just impossible. In the Poznań language, for example, there are many words like ours. These are German loan words.” (S/N/01)

Silesians’ relations with Poles and Germans

For autochthons, Poland and Poles (including alluvial Silesians) are an important reference point because of their impact on the functioning of the whole of Silesia and its inhabitants. The post-war history of mutual contacts began with a strong hostility and open conflicts. For Poles the territory of Silesia was the subject of expansion, so they were trying to dominate the indigenous population. “Everybody knows how it went with Silesia, these lands were recovered, and how Poland treated us. For Poles, Silesia was not Silesia, it was Germany. So in my view, looking from Warsaw’s perspective for example, we are always worse than them. They think that Silesia is not Silesia, that it’s just a piece of Germany. Anyway, it was like that.” (S/G/05)
Regardless of the assumptions, the policy of the Polish state towards Silesians had elements of two models - partial exclusion and homogeneity in integrating the minority into the majority society. The model of partial exclusion is based on the assumption that members of minorities are only entitled to some of the rights of the dominant group (Bryant 1997). In effect such a policy leads to the ghettoization of the group, to closing them up in their own social circles, to a limitation of their life aspirations and to a single engagement in the structures and institutions of the dominant community. The homogeneity model assumes the full integration of minority groups into the majority society through cultural assimilation (Bryant 1997). It requires that members of the subordinate group converse with the main culture, which means rejection of the minority culture. Refusal results in a closure of the subordinated group towards its own social circle, which is functioning on the border of the majority society. This is the case of the partial model of exclusion.

The respondents recall that one of the results of this Polish policy towards the indigenous Silesians was limiting their social and career options. Since senior positions in government and in the economic sector were reserved for people from outside and Silesians began to limit their ambitions in this regard. “Silesians never fought for, you know, authority. Never, for example, were they the directors of mines, that’s what I remember also from the stories of my grandparents or whatever… never… almost never was it a Silesian. Silesians were the managers, the foremen, but not more. It’s always been people that studied at AGH [University of Science and Technology in Krakow], all the mining technical schools or something. These were always people from outside.” (S/G/09) Among the respondents, there were voices saying that this state of affairs continues to this day. According to one opinion Silesians still have a small share of power: “If you have a close look at the Province Council and Municipal Council, you will see there are almost no Silesians. Just have a look… in all these boards how many Silesians are there. Silesians were discriminated against starting in the ‘50s.” (S/N/11)

Discrimination against indigenous people in the Silesia region also involved discrimination against their culture, which was often identified with the German. The object of the attack was the Silesian dialect. An important source of conflict was educational institutions and school that applied linguistic pressure. Children speaking dialect met with the sanctions and disapproval of their form tutors and teachers. “The teacher, for example, my granddaughter’s teacher, my granddaughter is 18 years old now, but when she was at kindergarten she had a teacher who was always yelling at her because she was speaking Silesian. And this teacher said: ‘I don’t like you because you just fułosz, fułosz [speak Silesian dialect], and I don’t understand anything.’ [...] My son, he also godol [speak in dialect] Silesian all the time, and we were constantly being called by the school; they said my son would have his mark reduced for Polish language and behaviour, because he doesn’t speak in standard Polish and I should have corrected him to pay attention. And I said I would try my best, but how can I do this if everybody at home and in the playground speaks Silesian? And he still had the courage to tell her that ‘ję byda po śląsku godol bo jo je Ślónzk! [Silesian dialect]’ Then she lowered his mark for behaviour.” (S/N/03) This situation has changed only in recent years. The use of dialect did (and according to some respondents still does) lead to tensions and conflicts with others. Among Poles there are those who do not like Silesians because of the way they talk, and those who are clamouring to hear Silesian dialect. In the opinion of one of the women in Wroclaw, “just where I go, they like Silesians. There they don’t want me to speak
[standard Polish], but they want me to godaća [speak in dialect]. They love it. There I feel good and comfortable. But not in Ostrów. In Ostrów you have to be careful and you have to speak [standard Polish], because they hate Silesians.” (S/N/02)

Another of the respondents had bad memories from a visit to Krakow: “Once we went with my wife on a pilgrimage to Nowa Huta [the communist-era new town attached to Krakow], it was back in the time of martial law; in Krakow we entered a restaurant. There was a priest with us who said he would make an order. And there was one woman who said, ‘dejcie’ [Silesian dialect] to me too’, and we didn’t get sugar with the coffee or anything else [...] in some places they like Silesians and in other they don’t.” (S/N/04) In terms of attitudes towards indigenous Silesians, Poles are on the whole varied. “Well, you know it depends. But in general, I think that we are not liked. Or should I better say: not everywhere. Because, for example, there in the Opole region, these were areas of Silesia – Germany, there it’s still okay, but if you go further there I believe we are treated with neglect.” (S/G/09) However, a dominant opinion is that the situation has changed for the better: “Before Poles didn’t like us, they were not very fond of our speech, but I think that now it’s better, there is no longer segregation that you are a Silesian, you are a Pole.” (S/N/03)

Secondly, the question of sympathy and antipathy towards Silesians is individualized. “I travel a lot in Poland, for example, four years ago I visited the whole of eastern Poland, I was speaking in Silesian, they knew that I was from Silesia, and there were no problems. On the contrary, they even bought me a beer. So the image of the Silesian is positive in Poland. I think that... of course, you will always find somebody, but you should not look at the individual, it’s important that it’s the total that counts. Nowadays everything has blurred, these animosities, and I hope it will stay like this.” (S/G/02)

Thirdly, in modern times none of this animosity should take place because of racist and xenophobic reasons. “I went to the seaside several times, it was when I was still healthy, and I know that they did not like us [...] they were poking us, and they were shouting after us hangasy [Silesian dialect], but I don’t give a damn, I don’t care. What bothers me for example is when I watch this Anna Maria Wesolowska⁴ and when I see this racism; when they beat up a black person, it annoys me terribly! Just because he is also a human being, and he is black, so what? [...] And in Bulgaria or Russia, they don’t know whether you’re Silesian or not Silesian, only Polish.” (S/N/12)

According to some respondents, in the post-war period elements of the material culture of indigenous Silesians were also subject to devastation. It was in this way that they perceived the demolition of traditional Silesian neighbourhoods and replacing them with blocks of flats. “This was all destroyed by Grudzień, who was the governor of Katowice, and who would have loved to have deported all the Silesians. Grudzień was Grudzień [...] he was the one who wanted to destroy Giszowiec, and all those little houses. Fortunately, he didn’t succeed because he died. If he’d lived longer Giszowiec probably would have looked very different today. It would be concrete... concrete, concrete and nothing else. Grudzień was really... You can say he was a bad man.” (S/G/02) The demolition of ‘familok’ [Silesian dialect] allowed the acquisition of land for the construction of huge blocks of flats. As a result, this led to the breakdown of dense indigenous Silesian communities due to incoming people. “

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⁴ A popular Polish television programme.
was their field of specialization, to mix – Pole here, Silesian there, so there was not such a multitude to order, so they divided everything. It happened when there was the previous government, under communism. They were taking miners to put them in Będzin and they were taking steelworkers to settle them in Giszowiec.” (S/N/04)

The time of construction of large “hotels for workers” resulted in numerous conflicts between Silesians and Poles. Since most of the residents of these hotels were spending their free time drinking and making noise, they had a very bad reputation. That period is remembered by the inhabitants of Nikiszowiec as a time of huge conflicts. “Silesians were Hanysy and they still are, and outsiders were Gorole... differently at times.” (S/N/04) In effect, back then, indigenous Silesians were trying to isolate themselves from the immigrant population. Rejecting the manners and lifestyle of alluvial people, they were not able to change the unwelcome customs and habits. The situation was tense because in the post-war years the population of immigrants was mostly in the position of representative of the majority group. This resulted in the Silesians withdrawing to the areas which were not reached by the expansion of immigrant culture (perceived as a threat to the existing law and social order). The strategy consisted of closing themselves in a small circle and taking care of family and neighbours. “And those gorole were coming to this Wieczorek [name of the mine], and they were watching over their daughters. If one went against it she’d become, you know, pregnant, so they would organize a wedding, but it was all in shame. And now, it’s not like this anymore.” (S/G/04)

The interviewees also mentioned another thread of origins of the conflict between Poles and Silesians. The reason was envy and resentment by Poles caused by the high material status of not only indigenous Silesians, but in general the inhabitants of the Silesia region. In this case, the otherness of Silesians had not a cultural but a territorial dimension. In the communist era Silesia was an area of rapidly growing heavy industry, which according to the Soviet model of industrialization was the basis for the development of economy and society. Workers employed in this field had relatively high salaries. In addition, the authorities in the system of central distribution of goods sought to give the people of Silesia access to goods and services that were difficult to reach in other parts of the country. As a result, according to the Silesians questioned, Poles “don’t like us, mainly because they believe that we are rich” (S/G/03). In this context, we talk about a sense of envy, which according to one of the respondents was not justified. “Since you had a ‘G’ book [a document which enables one to purchase in selected, by the standards of those times well-equipped shops] you can buy everything.” But it’s not that I could buy everything just like that, my husband had to earn it. He had to go to work on Saturdays and Sundays to earn the ‘G’ book to make it possible to buy something. A rug, blanket, a food processor, anything. So yes, we could buy everything in these shops, but we had to work for it.” (S/G/13)

Our respondents’ reflections on the relationship between the Silesians and the German minority in Poland are much poorer. The opinions on this subject can be arranged in three basic scenarios. Most respondents had nothing to say on this subject, arguing that they have no contact with Germans. Their opinions were limited to brief statements about some things they had heard (“My sister’s son said that he was treated there as if he was German. That means well. These contacts are good.” (S/N/09)), indicating differences between Silesians and Germans (“Maybe not really? Because between Poles and Germans there is a difference, but pure Silesians claim to
belong to the Germans.” (S/N/04); “I don’t know, the Germans are stingy like the
Scots, they take toilet paper with them [laughs], Silesians are sincere but not all of
them, it depends on the family.” (S/N/05), sometimes stating that everything
depends on the specific person (“Oh, I’m afraid I can’t answer this question. I guess it
depends. It depends on the man, who you get.” (S/N/12)).

The second group suggests that it is difficult to speak about relations between
Silesians and the German minority in Poland, due to the problems of identification of
these two groups. Some respondents point out that those Germans who live here, “are
not Germans. These are actually people who were born here, went to Germany and
came back. They are not Germans, they are Silesians – krzyżaki [Silesian dialect], as
they call them.” (S/N/05) Others suggest that Silesians – or at least some of them –
aspire to be Germans. “Maybe some people are really like that.” (S/G/05) What is
more, as a consequence of such self-identification, some have lost part of their family
(those family members who decided to migrate to Germany). “You know, part of my
family from my father’s side went to Germany. And they felt as if they were
Germans. They live in Chorzów. They believed that Silesia is part of Germany. They
didn’t stay in touch. It’s already been thirty years. They never even sent a postcard. I
don’t know if they are still there.” (S/G/05) In both cases, the unification of these
groups’ relations has the nature of social relations, but they are not conditioned by
ethnic or ethno-regional culture.

The third group tries to determine the way in which the German minority in Poland
treats Silesians. After taking into account the circumstances they believe that the
attitude of the German minority is rather positive because “they do count, it’s as
though they are like Silesians descended from Germans, from Germany. That’s not
Polish, only German.” (S/G/09) Another respondent suggests that the matter is more
complicated because, “Well, Germans are also Germans. Don’t attach the Silesians.
Maybe a little bit friendlier than the Poles, but also what you think [...] that is the
Silesian, but Polish.” (S/G/04)

Silesians on Europe and the European integration process

The vast majority of respondents feel European. First of all, a reference to a sense of
Europeanness can be perceived as a result of participation in a primary group
independently of the act of will. Belonging does not necessarily have to be
determined by the “right of blood” (jus sanguinis). One of the respondents feels
European and argues: “I was born in Europe. That’s all. Not abroad, but in Europe”
(S/N/05), while another respondent claims to have a European identity as a result of
living in Europe (“since I live in Europe, that’s for sure” (S/G/03)). In this case, the
building of European identity, Europeanization is determined by the “law of the
land” (jus soli). The second type indicates Europeanness through the prism of
possession of certain rights associated with being European. Above all this means the
right to move freely within the European Union. I am a European, because “I can go
without any obstacles, well” (S/G/02), “I think so because I live in Europe, even
though I don’t use this Charter of the European Union since I don’t move anywhere.”
(S/N/11) The third type of reasoning points to Europeanness as one of the levels of
territorial and cultural identity that is linked with others. Our respondent feels
“European in general since we live in Europe, this is our continent – Europe. But as I
said, I feel Silesian. Nobody will break me or change me. I will not change this. I’ve
never been ashamed that I’m Silesian.” (S/G/03)
Among the respondents there were also those who declared no sense of being European. In this case, there is one type of justification of such a feeling. Lack of European identity is associated with a sense of lack of influence on European reality, lack of subjectivity and social perpetration. Do I feel European? “I don’t think so. You can count only on yourself.” (S/N/03) “I don’t care what’s happening here or there, I’m too old for this. I am Silesian and do whatever you want when I’m no longer here.” (S/N/13)

Most of our respondents have a positive attitude towards the process of European integration. Most of them support Polish accession to the EU, recognizing it as chance for civil development. In many opinions this concerns Poland as whole and Silesia as a region, includes inhabitants of both urban and rural areas, and concerns the economic dimension and social functioning of the system. As one of the interviewees states, since the Polish accession to the EU “a lot has changed [...] for Giszowiec and for Poland. It seems to me that it was a good manoeuvre to join the EU, in general, that they wanted us. No, no, it was good. The markets are open, the borders are open, that’s all that matters [...] and also all those building investments in the region, it’s all the EU, and it comes from these funds. I think that without it there wouldn’t be so many buildings, so it helped a lot. Anyway, I think it’s good for the whole of Poland, after all, also for farmers; Lepper was saying not to join, not to join, and now I don’t know whether any farmer would say that he doesn’t want the European Union. It seems to me that everyone is somehow helped, technically, and the expansion, all these roads, everything is going on.” (S/G/02) Changes related to the integration process also include the transformation in the sphere of material culture, and aesthetics of space and landscape. After the accession, there was a vital change in the “Polish image. After Poland joined the EU, well, here or there is a monument but they start to take care of it now. And it is like that for this last three, four years, they do gutters, roofs and things like that, and before it was... even my predecessor said that there is a water leak and nobody did anything about it... they just brought some piece of paper, and they glued it.” (S/N/01)

Some respondents admit that even though they had some doubts before the Polish accession to the European Union, they were in favour, bearing in mind the future of young people, their children and grandchildren. “For me it didn’t matter. But I was pro, so that my grandson would have a better future, or my daughter, maybe my children also. To make it all better. Well, and it is better indeed.” (S/G/14) Some of them still do not see personal benefits, but their opinion on the opportunities for children does not change. European integration is about the future for young people: “Yes, they have a future. For example, another thing... every young person can learn a foreign language, whichever they want, and before it was only Russian. When I was a kid I knew German but then they made me forget it to prevent me from saying something in German at school.” (S/N/09) The integration process is beneficial “for young people because they can leave. Before it was much more difficult, you had to have a passport, and now all you need is your ID.” (S/N/02)

Some people pay attention to the need for mobilization related to participation in EU structures. In the EU you must have the ability to make good use of the existing opportunities. “I’m a little conscious, and not because anything is wrong, it’s just fine.

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Andrzej Lepper was the leader of Self Defence, the largest Polish populist political party, and was vice-prime minister in 2006-2007. He died in 2011.
It’s important to be able to use that money [...] here again the role of the host is important. It must be a good host to do it all the way it should be done, to use this well, because then afterwards we will have to help the Union because new states are joining.” (S/N/04) Some interviewees expressed the fear that the Polish political class (because of its characteristics) would not be able to face the challenges. They are worried, “if only our leaders, those who decide about the money, are not washed away somewhere, left behind and no money.” (S/G/02) Other respondents showed irritation, stating that the whole process of allocation and receipt of EU funds is complicated, and may cause under spending and waste. “You know what, I’m sure they could get more for Silesia. Because there is still a lot to do here. A lot. Those houses for instance, you know. There is one committee after another because they got a subsidy from the EU and now they have to fix roofs and all the rest. You know they come, watch and write. And that’s all. And I’ll tell you I would be very happy, not for myself, if they gave me one hundred zloty more for my pension, because I have as much as I have, but I want them to take care of it, if they want to keep it as a monument and they received grants for Silesia, then they should look first to the oldest ones.” (S/G/03)

Among the respondents, there are people who do not see positive changes resulting from Polish accession to the EU. Partly, this is a consequence of unmet expectations. “I did have [expectations]; I thought that after we entered the Union and euro zone, then it was going to be different, cheaper or something. But nothing has changed.” (S/N/05) One of the respondents had hopes related to the accession, but “nothing came true. Poverty and poverty.” (S/N/03) Another interviewee expressed hopes that “when we have the euro, then I will know we are in the EU.” (S/G/03)

Some respondents, when discussing the effects of Polish accession to the EU, point to the increase in the sense of security of Poland and Polish people. This happened because “states become linked with one another and they help each other.” (S/N/09) Whether we have some material benefits or not “at least we know that we have some protection. If someone wants to attack us, we are not alone any more; someone will come to help us.” (S/N/04) This sense of security associated with the Polish accession to the EU corresponds with a general conviction that Poland should rather cooperate with the EU structures than with the United States. None of our interviewees, when asked about Polish foreign affairs, perceived the priority of cooperation with the US above the EU. Also “we are Europeans. I don’t know Americans but when I watch on TV their mentality is completely different. It is as if... maybe for us it’s like life from a different planet. Well, I don’t know, but I would prefer to cooperate more with the EU. However, they do cooperate with Americans too. And they should work together with both, but it can’t be only the US, the US, and the US. Europe is closer to us.” (S/G/02)

Most of our interviewees had a problem with describing the future development of the European integration process. They could not define how it should proceed or determine its final goal. In this case most of the respondents preferred to submit to those who are more competent, to social and political leaders. Those who tried to answer this question can be divided into three equal groups. The first one consists of people who are not sure whether the European Union should be one country or a union of member states. The second group shows the benefits coming from the integration process in the form of a single political body. “I think it should be one country, and one, for example, as they want, a single foreign minister, and then there
would be order. He would be responsible for these 27 countries. And then they would speak one language, and now you see how it is... when Russia attacked Georgia if there had been one minister, he would have decided, and you know how it was, they came together and what? Just eat, drink and nothing more.” (S/N/04) A third group of respondents underlines the value of preserving the sovereignty of the member states. “Each state should be separate. Yes. Each responsible for itself, and from the EU the only thing should be money for those countries that are in need. That would suit me too.” (S/G/08) Such a statement was often followed by the fear of creating a big state. “Cooperation between states is better than one state. Well, after all, it would be, it would be the second Russia, in terms of population, or China. No.” (S/G/05)

In the context of the future of European integration our respondents are divided into three groups (also because of their attitude towards Turkey’s accession to the EU). The largest group consist of those who do not have a clear opinion on this matter and who prefer to leave such decisions to political leaders. “I'm not someone who can give an answer to this question, because I really don’t care who they accept. Let them worry about whether they want to or not.” (S/G/03) The opponents of Turkey’s accession most often use the argument of general cultural differences, saying that Turkey should “rather not” be included into the EU. Supporters talk about human solidarity and humanism, which should not exclude any country from participation in the process of European integration. “There are no objections with regard to Turkey; after all they are also people. When I was in Bulgaria I talked to Turks and it seems to me that these are also normal people. Maybe they have some deviation, I do not know, in the end we all have something. But I wouldn’t mind.” (S/N/05)

Conclusions

This study confirms the existence of numerous specific features of the identity constructed by groups living in a cultural borderland. Among Silesians, the characteristic ambivalence of national identity is also present. Some of them consider themselves Poles, others associate Silesians with the German national identity and others still see Silesians in terms of a specific national group. Regardless of the provenance of national identity, virtually all respondents stress the territorial aspect of Silesian identification. It is constructed, maintained and developed within a specific socio-cultural space which is strictly related to the physical space. The basis of Silesian identity is the culture, with its traditional elements such as family, industriousness, religiosity, and a specific code of communication. According to the respondents, Silesians attach great importance to primordial ties. This attachment includes not only close and distant family, but also neighbours and even the entire regional group. Silesian primordialism, which is a sense of “identity in heart” and emotional closeness with their own people, contributes to a sense of otherness and distinctiveness from Poles and Germans. Even those of our respondents who declared the Polish or German national identity option emphasized that this is an identity with Silesian roots.

It is difficult to conclude that Silesians have constructed a nation in the truest sense. It seems to be more accurate to state that they are in the process of nation-building. In this course of action the main role is played by leaders of the Silesian movement rather than the so-called ordinary citizens of the region. For the latter, leaders and the ideas promoted by them, are frequently unknown or incomprehensible. Therefore,
the Silesian nation is constructed “from above” thanks to the occurrence of favourable circumstances such as the democratization of social life, the emergence of nationalist leaders and the affirmation of multiculturalism in the modern world of Western civilization (Kurcz 2008). Silesians are a recruitment base for this process. However, in studies, many of them reject the possibility of the existence of a Silesian nation and openly go against this kind of idea.

There is no doubt that Silesians have a European identity, and they justify it in a cultural, territorial, historical and socio-political way. A sense of European identity is self-evident. On the other hand this self-evidence is the reason why Silesians do not reflect either on the further Europeanization process or on the progress of European integration. Some of them support the preservation of the status quo, while some opt for changes. The former are in favour of a “Europe of Homelands”, what means a model of the EU’s continuing dominant role of nation-states in the functioning of the community. In the second larger group, there are supporters of all possible alternatives, ranging from the creation of a super-state to a full regionalization of Europe. Among them are those who are convinced of the need to transform the EU into a state, while of course maintaining a certain independence of the regions.

The lack of a deeper reflection on the political and institutional organization of the future Europe means that many respondents are in favour of different varieties of integration. The interpretation of their words, at different times of the interview, leads to the conclusion that they do not have a final judgment in this matter. Their support for any option will depend on the type of message and source of information prior to taking a decision.

For Silesians, characteristic is openness to others who are willing to participate in the process of European integration. The experience and strong memory of the harm suffered under the dominant culture of Poland and Germany make them tolerant towards others. In general, they support the accession of Turkey and Eastern European countries (including those of the former Soviet Union) to the EU. In this context Silesians do understand and support the rights of minorities. This aspiration is crucial since any nation aspiring to EU membership finds itself in a position of a minority group against the populations of the EU member states.
Complex identity construction of Silesians in the context of cultural borderland

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