

Altiero Spinelli

From Ventotene to the European Constitution

*Edited by
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ARENA Report No 1/07
RECON Report No 1

Altiero Spinelli:
From Ventotene to
the European Constitution

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ISSN 0807-3139

Printed at ARENA
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Oslo, January 2007

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Preface

RECON – Reconstituting Democracy in Europe – is an Integrated Project supported by the European Commission's Sixth Framework Programme for Research, Priority 7 'Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-based Society'. The five year project has 18 partners in 12 European countries, and is coordinated by ARENA, Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo.

RECON addresses the problem of democracy in Europe in light of challenges posed by globalization. It seeks to clarify whether democracy is possible under conditions of pluralism and multilevel governance. In order to make visible the democratic imprint on the European integration process, Agustín J. Menéndez has collected some of the key political writings of Altiero Spinelli – including the famous *Manifesto di Ventotene*. They demonstrate that the discussion about democracy on the European level was vivid even before the inception of the European Community.

Altiero Spinelli (29 August 1907 – 23 May 1986) was an enthusiastic European federalist who happened to be Italian. Among the generation of founding fathers of Europe, he stands out as one of the most active and influential in shaping not only European institutions, but also European politics and publics. By the time of his death, he had been a committed resistant to fascism, a top advisor to De Gasperi during the founding years of the Communities, an outspoken Commissioner, and, perhaps above all; a key Member of the European Parliament for ten years. He very much helped shape the self-conception of the European Parliament.

Spinelli was born in Rome. Soon he was to be witness to one of the most turbulent periods in modern Italian history. He became political conscious at a very early age, heavily influenced by the socialism milieu of his father. His youth was marked by the rise of fascism, and he joined the ranks of the Italian Communist Party as a teenager. Following his entry into radical journalism and the rise of Benito Mussolini's National Fascist Party, he was arrested in 1927 and spent ten years in prison and a further six in confinement. However, he did not lose much time, as he

turned his prison and confinement into a long decade of hard study. He became an ardent critic of Stalinism and a passionate advocate of supranational integration. His time at the small island of Ventotene (in the Gaeta Gulf south of Naples) proved decisive. Some of the key figures of the post-war period were confined there. Spinelli, together with Ernesto Rossi (key actor of the resistance movement) – and supported by a circle of fellow prisoners – completed a Manifesto in support of a new European federalist movement. That became what is known as the Manifesto di Ventotene. As was the case with other texts of the resistance, the publication of the Manifesto was a rather convoluted process. The text itself was written on cigarette papers, and sneaked out of the island in the false bottom of a tin box. Thanks to the efforts of Eugenio Colomi and Ursula Hirschmann, it was published and circulated widely among the resistance movements. Later it was adopted as the programme of the European Federalist Movement, which Spinelli was instrumental in founding in 1943. This movement proved to be very influential all across Europe. The Manifesto has since then been translated into a number of languages, and has reached an iconic status in Italy. Indeed, the first trip of the current President of the Italian Republic was to Ventotene, now transformed into the homeland of European federalists.

The Manifesto puts forward proposals for creating a European federation of states, the primary aim of which was to tie European countries so close together that they would no longer be able to go to war with one another. As in many European left-wing political circles, this sort of move towards federalist ideas was a reaction to the excesses of nationalism. The ideological underpinnings for a united Europe can thus be traced back to the fight against nationalism.

In 1993, one of the buildings of the European Parliament in Brussels was named the Altiero Spinelli Building to render public homage to his lifelong efforts to build Europe.

Erik Oddvar Eriksen
Scientific Coordinator of RECON

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Introduction

Spinelli, the Democrat Who Became European

Agustín José Menéndez

A life devoted to Europe

This year marks the centenary of the birth of Altiero Spinelli. Though a familiar character among the most committed pro-Europeans, he largely remains an unknown figure for the general public. This is unfortunate because any serious intellectual history of Europe in the XXth century would benefit from paying attention to his deeds and actions.

Spinelli lived a long and intense life, which summarises a good deal of the turbulent history of the continent. Indeed, were we asked to pick up one single person to illustrate to a neophyte in European history the unfolding of the history of the continent in the past century, he would be a safe choice. Spinelli was sentenced to prison and confinement as a young leader of the Communist Party in Mussolini's Italy. He became one of the founding forces behind the European Federalist Movement in the forties and he was a key political advisor to Alcide di Gasperi in the early stages of European integration (and very significantly, during the negotiation of the failed Defence Treaty of 1954). Moreover, Spinelli was also a lecturer at the John Hopkins University in Bologna and at the Sapienza in Rome in the sixties. In the seventies he was back in European politics through his position as a European Commissioner (during which he played an important role in the development of the Airbus consortium), and he was one of the leading European parliamentarians in the early years of the "reconstituted Parliament", immediately after its first election by universal suffrage in 1979. If that was not enough to qualify him as an outstanding figure in Europe's

XXth century, he was a gifted writer (as Italians would say, *aveva una penna*). Spinelli produced a huge number of political essays and articles (a fraction of which occupies the first volumes of his complete works being published by the Italian publisher Il Mulino), some articles on political theory, and a remarkable volume of memories (*How I tried to become wise*). His life-long companion was Ursula Hirschmann, herself a leading pro-European, author of a moving autobiography (*Those of us who do not have a fatherland*), and indeed sister of Albert Hirschmann, the well-known author of the academic classic *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*.

But perhaps the most important reason why we should keep on reading Spinelli is none of those; many other Europeans reached old age, were prolific (and elegant) writers in trying times and were part of a rich intellectual milieu (and even families). But Spinelli was close to unique in remaining a staunch defender of democracy and freedom all through his life. That is indeed a rare achievement over such a long career; in the thirties and forties, the authoritarian malaise infected most European intellectuals (from Carl Schmitt to Jules Benda); in the fifties and sixties, most were prey to conservatism, whatever ideological side they happened to align themselves with. For Spinelli, liberty was paramount all through. It was out of his commitment to human freedom and democracy that Spinelli became an active member of the Communist Party in the twenties and consequently a conspirator against the Italian Fascist regime (indeed, the Communists were *the* party for resisters). But it was for the same democratic commitment he abjured his party affiliation during the years he spent in confinement. In his long hours of study, Spinelli convinced himself that what was going on in Stalin's Soviet Union was simply unacceptable. Such a conscious and remarkable self-critical break was (and still is) indeed rare; it suffices, as was hinted some sentences ago, to check the biographies of most of his contemporaries. Moreover, Spinelli's political passion exited intact, as he put his enthusiasm and commitment at the service of the federal idea and, more specifically, of European integration.

Still in confinement, Spinelli subjected himself to a diet of federalist literature which included not only the classics of federalism, from the American trio of Hamilton, Madison and Jay to one of the founding fathers of modern anarchism, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, but also the contemporary advocates of supranational integration, from Luigi Einaudi to the leading group of British authors who advocated some form of world government as a remedy to cyclical wars and the ensuing misery. Spinelli read and carefully studied Lionel Robbins, Barbara Wootton and Lord Lothian, among others. From such materials, he developed a diagnosis and a prognosis: the nation-state as

they existed was the problem, Europe was the solution. The cure was to partially overcome or neutralise the traditional cleavage between left and right through the new cleavage between pro-European and anti-European political forces. This is indeed the core content of the *Manifesto di Ventotene*, the text which opens this short compilation.

In addition, and rather similarly to Jean Monnet, Spinelli was convinced that the most committed pro-Europeans in the inter-war period had been wrong in their excessive preoccupation with the lofty questions of European identity and culture, and in their lack of concern with the socio-economic problems of Europeans. European integration was clearly a normative ideal, a project with utopian underpinnings. But it will never be brought to life if its partisans were equally utopian, or limited themselves to explore some alleged common European cultural traits. To bring about concrete results, one should think strategically, and offer concrete solutions to concrete socio-economic problems (that was indeed the Machiavellian side of Spinelli). In 1941, with his co-author Rossi, he thought that the end of the war would give rise to the conditions under which the establishment of a federal Europe would be feasible. This conviction was perhaps induced by the experience of resistance to fascism in Italy, and not least the “European character” it attained once Hitler came to power in Germany.¹

All through continental Europe, war would contribute to persuade many that the most important loyalty is not a *national ethno-cultural* one, but a *political* one, capable of reaching beyond the national identity of each and every one of us. Not only resistance movements against Nazism and Fascism were multinational in their composition, but the war actually rendered painfully clear that one could be placed in harm’s way not only (and perhaps not mainly) by foreign governments, but by one’s own. As mentioned, Spinelli and Rossi were also fully persuaded that European integration could only be a success if it was based on a clear socio-economic programme, which would create the necessary conditions to avoid economic crisis such as the one experienced in the thirties.

The invasion of the Southern parts of Italy by the allies in 1943 led to the release of the political prisoners confined in Ventotene. Once liberated, Spinelli became one of the promoters of the foundation of the European Federalist Movement. As the second document of this anthology renders

¹ Before 1933, the scattered groups of opponents to the regime defined their problem as an Italian one. With the access of Hitler to the chancellorship, they came to regard their fight as one which transcended national borders, and which could only be successful if the nation-state was transcended as a political form.

clear, this movement was closely connected to the partisan organisations that had spread around Europe. But the failure of partisans to become a more organised force within the European political landscape damaged the prospects of the constitution of a European federation in the immediate aftermath of the war.

Thus, by early 1946 Spinelli had come to the conclusion that the nation-states were reconstructing themselves, and that different strategies to achieve supra-national integration were needed. He resigned from his leading position in European Federalist Movement and focused his energies in influencing the Italian Socialist Party and the Partito d'Azione (a small party which was indeed the intellectual heir of the most sophisticated progressive opponents to Fascism) in a federal direction. With the launch of the Marshall Plan the circumstances changed, and with them the strategy to be followed: in 1947 he came back to the European Federalist Movement as secretary general. In the coming years, Spinelli was simultaneously critical of those initiatives which he regarded as bound to lead nowhere (such as the Council of Europe) and eager to influence those projects which could create new chances for a European federation. He proved right most of the time in his assessments, although he did not allow the pessimism of his reason paralyse the optimism of his will. This was reflected in his role as advisor of De Gasperi during the negotiations of the Treaty establishing the Defence Community in the early 1950s. Spinelli was instrumental in the Italian proposal to annex a Political Community to the organisation of military cooperation, which was accepted by the other five members of the original Communities, and indeed resulted in the drafting of the first project of a European Constitution in 1954. These plans were, however, abandoned after the French Parliament refused to ratify the Treaty (due to the common negative front of Gaullists and Communists), and Spinelli looked once again for new means to realise his end. He finally thought he found them in the ideological transformation of the Communist Parties all across Western Europe. Once the Italian Communist Party overcame the last remnants of Stalinism after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops in 1968, Spinelli was in a position to be influential and persuade the new leadership to change their traditional opposition to European integration (on account of it being the Trojan horse of the United States) into their enthusiastic support. It was not so much that he had returned to the Communist Party, as that the Party had come closer to what were his political ideas all through these years.

It was also thanks to the support of the Communist Party that Spinelli became a member of the Commission in July 1970, and a member of the European Parliament in 1976. In both cases, Spinelli's aim was to place

himself in a position that would allow him to push integration further. He became Commissioner because he thought that the College of Commissioners could transform the European Communities in a federal direction. But when it was finally decided that the European Parliament was to be directly elected by citizens, Spinelli came to the conclusion that the institution through which federalist thinking could be more influential was precisely the Parliament. That in itself reflects his commitment to democracy.

By becoming a parliamentarian in 1976 (before the first election by universal suffrage), the old European seized the day and prepared his initiative of launching a constitutional moment in 1979. Spinelli succeeded in convincing his co-parliamentarians to dare writing a new Treaty, everything but in the name a European Constitution. That was needed precisely in order to realise freedom and democracy in Europe. The virtue of Monnet's Europe was that it had actually come into being, but its paralysing flaw was that it was an organisation that had only taken the first steps towards becoming a polity in its own right. The main problem was that the citizens lacked the right to express their political will in favour or against a fundamental European law. In other words, democratic reforms loomed large if the political will of citizens were to become the steering force of integration. Spinelli proved again his capability of combining passionate commitment and strategic action, by persuading many who were not born believers in the creation of a European Union with explicit federal traits (but found easier to share his passion for democratising Europe). However, Spinelli failed to convince national parliaments to endorse the project (yes, parliaments; he was clear-headed enough as to foresee that national governments would never endorse such a daring move, even if they would come to regret it in the years to come). His life was coming to an end, and he knew it: his last intervention before the European Parliament, which closes the compilation, was a testament but in name.

One hundred years after his birth, twenty after his death, we Europeans find ourselves at the crossroads that Spinelli predicted. He was laughed out when he characterised the Single European Act as a dead mouse. But was he wrong? The push towards the single market, the usual narrative goes, allowed Europe to overcome its paralysis and reach for new competences and attract new members. Perhaps. But it is not less true that the decision to move forward with the realisation of the single market without simultaneously taking long enough steps towards the creation of a political process capable to take not only market-making, but also market-redressing decisions, is indeed among the sources of (growing) discontent with European policies. Delors thought he could have the cake and eat it too. If the market was built, the

need for regulatory and redistributive policies would become so great that European governments would end up implementing them at the European level. In his recent memories, he concedes he was wrong about that. Indeed, the French 'non' and the Dutch 'nee' to the Constitutional Treaty have much to do with the very foreseeable, but still largely unforeseen consequences of the Single European Act.

Moreover, Spinelli was fully convinced that no serious constitutional reform could be successful if it was left in the hands of national governments. It is hard to contest this claim after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. But before that, it was widely claimed that the Laeken Convention could only be successful if it negotiated the Constitution as if it was an Intergovernmental Conference. However, this view missed the central point: namely, that if it was a democratic constitution they were writing, this would require a more inclusive process enabling the *pouvoir constituant* to authorize it. And, as we know, to French and Dutch citizens, the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty did not live up to this standard. Spinelli would probably have argued that only the European Parliament, acting as a constituent assembly, can write a constitution that stands a chance of being endorsed by citizens. The underlying arguments are far from being nuclear-edge political theory: while European Parliamentarians could be elected on the basis of their constitutional platform, governmental negotiators tend to think their principal is not citizens, but their governments, who in turn are often acting as if European questions were after all not so central in national electoral politics. At any rate, the beauty of Spinelli's idea is that it seeks to restore on the European level the cherished institutions of freedom of democracy usually attached to and often believed by Euro sceptics to be inescapably linked to the nation-state. Even if such Euro-sceptics might deeply dislike Europe as it stands, they would probably at least respect a Europe which will come close to Spinelli's dreams.

Actions and deeds of lasting value

Spinelli left a lasting imprint on European integration and on the current European Union. I would dare to add that reading Spinelli's work and reflecting on his deeds could be a major source of inspiration for all Europeans, whatever their political affiliation, general attitude or position towards Europe. Indeed, it is important to highlight that Spinelli was not only a man dear to those who were like-minded. He was a true democrat, and as such, capable of building bridges with those who had very different, even opposite ideas to his. None other than another genuine democrat of a very different persuasion, Jens-Peter Bonde, could have said the following:

“It was he [Spinelli] and Emanuele Gazzo, the founder of the Agence Europe, who taught me that federalism is not centralism, but the idea of democracy on a higher level than the nation state (...)I have great respect for his consistent federal way of thinking”

If I am asked to pick two themes on which Spinelli’s writings are bound to be reread thousands of times, those are the very definition of Europe vis-à-vis the world, and the scope of democracy in the Union.

First, Spinelli was a European in the true meaning of the term. He sided with the United States in the cold war international setting, not only because the US promoted supranational integration in the aftermath of the war, but also because freedom was a mirage in the Soviet Union and its satellites. At the same time, Spinelli defended the vision of transforming Europe into a “third power”, capable of reintroducing a modicum of balance in world affairs. Throughout his career, and especially as a Commissioner and Member of Parliament, Spinelli stressed that Europe should aspire to reunite. However, neither Franco’s Spain (as he stressed in his polemical exchanges with Koestler already in the late forties) nor Soviet Eastern Europe could fit in the common house. This combination of aspirations to a larger Europe and clear normative standards upon which the condition of European depended should be helpful for the reader when reflecting on an enlarged Europe.

Second, the relevance of Spinelli’s thoughts is connected to the fact that democracy has become the central, critical factor for European integration process as such. We see a development from a situation in which democracy served as a guiding norm for national systems only, to one where democracy has become an increasingly relevant standard also for evaluating the EU. The debate on the content and direction of the integration process has now found its way into a wider public. The leaders, on their part, have been slow to recognise that the strong opposition and the many vociferous criticisms of the technocratic state of affairs were threatening the viability and stability of the integration process and therefore that remedial action was required. In the reform process that was initiated by the hard won referenda over the Maastricht treaty in the early 90’s, democratic values figured high on the agenda. Maastricht helped generate a framework of norms wherein democracy has increasingly come to figure as the overarching norm that both proponents and opponents refer to. Even though the European polity has not become a federation, as it is based on a dual principle of legitimation and as the states control the most powerful body of the Union – the Council, it is nevertheless a supranational entity in its own right. Under such circumstances, the staunch defence of Europe in the name of democracy and

the drive to redeem such claim through the political mobilisation of Europeans are to be regarded as an enduring legacy of Spinelli.

For people that want to understand the normative foundation of the European project, Spinelli is a good read. He was a committed European, but not out of any culturalist pre-political kind; on the contrary, his commitment was to the very principles which the European Union, its member states and its citizens can claim to be theirs. Thus, we may agree or disagree with him, but his thoughts are bound to improve us.



Ventotene and Resistance

Chapter I

The Ventotene Manifesto, 1941

The Crisis of Modern Civilisation

Modern civilisation has based its specific foundation on the principle of liberty which states that man is not a mere instrument to be used by others but rather a main autonomous living being. Looking back at this definition all those aspects of social life that were not respectful of this principle have been placed on trial, in a great historical process.

1) All nations have been recognised the equal right to organise themselves into independent States. All peoples, defined by ethnic, geographic, linguistic and historical characteristics, were to find, within the State organisation created according to their own particular concept of political life that instrument best suited to their own needs, without any outside intervention. The ideology of national independence was a powerful stimulus to progress. It helped overcome narrow-minded parochialism and generated a deeper sense of solidarity against foreign oppression. It eliminated many of the obstacles that hindered the circulation of people and merchandise and, within the territory of each new State, it extended the institutions and systems of more advanced societies to less developed populations. Unluckily, however, the seeds of capitalist imperialism have expanded to the point of forming totalitarian States and to the unleashing of world wars and our generation has been witness.

Now the nation is no longer regarded as the historical product of communities of men that, as the result of a lengthy process, have increased similarities of customs and aspirations and consider their State as the most effective organisation of collective life within the framework of the whole

human society. It has, on the contrary, become a divine entity, an organism that has to consider only its own existence, its own development, without the least regard for the damage this might cause to others.

The absolute sovereignty of national States has given each of them the desire to dominate, since each one feels threatened by the strength of the others, and considers, as its living space, an increasingly vast territory wherein it will have the right to free movement and can rely on itself without any other help. This desire to dominate cannot be placated except by the predominance of the strongest State over all the others.

As a consequence of all this, the State is no longer the guardian of civil liberty but it has been transformed into the master of vassals bound to servitude, and it holds within its power all the faculties needed to achieve the maximum war-efficiency. Even during peacetime, considered to be a pause during which to prepare for subsequent, inevitable wars, by now the military class predominates over civilian society in many countries, by making more and more difficult the good working of free political systems. Expressions of civil policy, therefore, such as schools, research, productivity administrations, act with difficulty and are mainly directed towards increasing military strength. Women are considered merely as producers of soldiers and are awarded prizes in much the same way as prolific cattle. Since the very earliest age, children have been taught to handle weapons and to hate foreigners. Individual liberty is almost annihilated since everyone is part of the military establishment and constantly subject to be called in on the armed forces. Repeated wars force men to abandon families, jobs, property, often demanding the ultimate sacrifice for reasons of which no one can really understand the value. It takes just a few days to destroy the results of decades of common effort made in order to increase the general well being.

Totalitarian States are those that have most coherently achieved the unification of all forces, by effecting the greatest concentration and the highest degree of autarky. These organisations have proved to be the ones most suited to the current international environment. Should one nation move a step towards more accentuated totalitarianism, it would immediately be followed by the others, drawn through the very same furrow by their will to survive.

2) The equal right of all citizens to participate in the process of establishing the State's will has been recognised. This should have been the synthesis of the freely expressed, changeable economic and ideological needs of all the social groups. Such a political organisation has allowed the correction or at

least the minimising of many of the most jarring injustices inherited from previous regime. But freedom of the press, of assembly, and the increasing extension of suffrage, made the defence of old privileges more and more difficult, while maintaining a representative system of government.

The poor slowly learned how to use these instruments to fight for the rights acquired by the privileged classes. Taxes on unearned income and inheritances, increasing duties to be paid on larger incomes, tax exemptions for low incomes and indispensable goods; free public schooling; increased social security spending; land reforms; control of factories and manufacturing plants – all of them were now threatening the privileged classes in their well-fortified citadels.

Even the privileged classes, who had consented to the equality of political rights, could not accept the fact that the under-privileged took advantage of it in order to achieve a concrete economic and social equality that would have given meaningful significance to the real liberty. At the end of the First World War, the threat became too serious; it was only natural that these classes warmly welcomed and supported the birth of dictatorships that took legal instruments away from their adversaries.

On other hand, the birth of immense industrial and banking groups, and of trade unions including whole armies of workers, groups and unions pressing the government in order to obtain policies clearly favourable to their particular interests, threatened to dissolve the State into so many economic baronies, bitterly fighting against each other: Liberal, democratic systems became the tools these groups used to exploit all of society even more, and consequently lost their prestige. In this way they were more and more convinced that only a totalitarian State, in which individual liberties were also abolished, could somehow resolve the conflicts of interest that existing political institutions were unable to control.

As a matter of fact, the totalitarian regimes consolidated, generally speaking, the various social categories at those levels they had gradually reached by using police control of every aspect of citizen's life, and by violently getting rid of all dissenting voices, these regimes have barred every legal possibility of further correction of the present situation. This ensured, then, the existence of a thoroughly parasitic class of absentee land owners and enjoyers of an income who contributed to social productivity only by cutting the coupons off their stocks; the monopoly holders and the chain stores that exploit the consumers and make the sums set apart by small investors to vanish; the plutocrats hidden behind the scenes, pulling the politicians' strings and

running the State machinery for their own exclusive advantage, pretending to be interested in higher national interests. The colossal fortunes of a very few have been preserved, and the misery of the masses as well, excluded from enjoyment of the fruits of modern culture. They have substantially preserved an economic regime in which material resources and labour, which ought to be applied to the satisfaction of fundamental needs for the development of vital human energies, are instead addressed to the satisfaction of the most futile wishes of those capable of paying the highest prices; an economic regime in which, through the right of inheritance, the power of money is perpetuated in the same class, and is transformed into a privilege without any correspondence to the social value of the services rendered. The field of proletarian possibilities is so small that in order to make a living, workers are often forced to accept exploitation by anyone who offers a job.

In order to keep the working classes immobilised and subjugated, the trade unions have been transformed, from the free organisations of struggle they were, directed by individuals who enjoyed the trust of their associates, into organs for police surveillance run by employees chosen by the ruling class and responsible only to them. If improvements are made in this economic regime, they are simply and only dictated by the military needs that together with the reactionary ambitions of privileged classes have given rise to and strengthen totalitarian States.

3) The permanent value of the spirit of criticism has been asserted against authoritarian dogmatism. Everything that was affirmed had to be truthful and verifiable, or disappear. The greatest achievements of our society in every field are due to the methodicalness of this open-minded attitude. But this spiritual liberty did not survive the crises created by the totalitarian States. New dogmas to be accepted like articles of faith, or hypocritically, are taking over all fields of knowledge.

Though no one knows what a race is, and the most elementary notions of history emphasise the absurdity of the statement, physiologists are required to believe, demonstrate and convince that people belong to a chosen race, simply because this myth is needed by imperialism to excite the masses to hate and pride. The most evident concepts of economic science must be considered as anathema if the autarchic policy, trade balances and other old chestnuts of mercantilism can be presented as extraordinary discoveries of our times. Because of the economic interdependence of all parts of the world, the vital space needed by many population that wants to maintain a living standard consonant with modern civilisation, can only be the entire globe. But the pseudo-science of geopolitics has been created, and its aim is to

demonstrate the validity of the theory of living spaces, in order to legitimate theoretical cover to the imperialist desire to overpower.

History is falsified in its essential data, in the interests of the ruling classes. Libraries and bookshops are cleared away of all works that are not considered to be orthodox. The shadows of obscurantism over again threaten to suffocate the human spirit. The social ethic of liberty and equality is undermined. Men are no longer considered free citizens who can use the State in order to reach collective purposes. They are, instead, servants of the State, which decides their goals and the will of those who hold the power is masked behind the will of the State. Men are no longer subjects of law; they are arranged hierarchically and expected to obey all their superiors, whose leaders is a suitable deified Leader, without discussion. The regime, built on castes, springs up again irresistible, out of its own ashes.

This reactionary, totalitarian civilisation, after triumphing in a series of countries, finally found, in Nazi Germany, the power that was thought to be capable of drawing the final consequences. After meticulous preparation, boldly and unscrupulously taking advantage from the rivalries, egoism, stupidity of others, carrying other European vassal States – among which primarily Italy and becoming allied with Japan that is aiming at the very same goals in Asia, Germany has launched itself in a campaign of overpowering. Its victory would mean the final consolidation of totalitarianism in the world. All its characteristics would be exasperated to the greatest degree, and progressive forces would be condemned for many years to the role of simple negative opposition.

The traditional arrogance and intolerance of the German military classes can give us an idea of what their dominance would have been like, after a victorious war. In order to command, the victorious Germans might even concede five years of generosity towards other European peoples, formally respecting their territories and their political institutions, satisfying at the same time the false sentiment of patriotism of those who consider the colours of the boundary fence, and the nationality of the prominent politicians as being more important than the ratio of power and the effective content of the State institutions. However camouflaged, the reality is always the same: a new division of humanity into Spartans and Helots.

Even a compromise solution between the two struggling sides would be one more step ahead for totalitarianism; in fact all together countries which were able to elude Germany's grasp would be forced to adopt the same forms of political organisation, in order to be adequately prepared for the war to come.

But if Hitler's Germany did succeed in felling the minor States one by one, this action has forced increasingly powerful forces to join battle. The courageous fighting spirit of Great Britain, even in that most critical moment when it was the only one to face the enemy caused the Germans to collide against the valiant resistance of the Russian Army, and gave America the time it needed to mobilise its infinite productive resources. And this struggle against German imperialism is closely linked to the Chinese people against Japanese imperialism.

Large masses of men and wealth are already drawn up against totalitarian powers whose strength has already reached its peak and can only gradually consume itself. The opposing forces, on the contrary, have already overcome their worst moment and are now on the way up.

Day after day the war of the Allies awakens the desire for liberation more forcefully, even in those countries which had submitted to violence and had lost their way owing to the blow they received. And it has even re-awakened this desire in the very Axis populations who realise they have been dragged into a desperate situation, simply to satisfy their rulers' lust for power.

The slow process, due to which infinite masses of men passively let themselves be shaped by the new regime, adjusted to it and even contributed to its consolidation, has come to a halt. And the opposite process has begun. Within this huge wave, slowly gathering momentum there are included all the progressive forces, the most enlightened groups of the working classes that have not let themselves be swayed, either by the terror or by flattery, from their ambition to achieve a better quality of living; the most conscious elements of the intellectual classes, offended by the forced degradation of human intelligence; businessmen and investors who, being able to undertake new initiatives, want to free themselves of the trappings of bureaucracy and national autarchy, that encumber all their movements; and all the others who, thanks to an innate sense of dignity, will not be bent by the humiliation of servitude.

Today, the salvation of our civilisation is entrusted to these forces.

Post-War Duties: European Unity

Germany's defeat would not automatically lead to the reformation of Europe according to our ideal of civilisation. In the brief, intense period of general crises (during which the States will lie broken, during which the popular

masses are anxiously awaiting for a new message and will, meanwhile, like molten matter, burn, being easily poured into new moulds, capable of welcoming the guidance of serious internationalists) the classes which were the most privileged under the old national systems will attempt, underhanded or violently, to moderate the feelings, the internationalist passions and they will ostentatiously begin the reconstruct the old, State institutions. And the English leaders, perhaps in agreement with the Americans, may try to push things in this direction, in order to restore the policy of the balance of power, in the apparent and immediate interests of their empires.

The conservative forces, that is: the directors of the basic institutions of the national States; the top-ranking officers in the armed forces up to, where possible, monarchies; the groups of monopolistic capitalism that have bound their profits to the fortunes of the States; the big landowners and the ecclesiastical hierarchy, who can expect their parasitical income only in a stable, conservative society; and following these, the interminable band of people who depend on them or who are simply misled by their traditional power. All these reactionary forces already feel the structure is creaking, and are trying to save their skins. A collapse would deprive them all of a sudden of all the guarantees they have enjoyed up to now, and would expose them to the attack of the progressive forces.

The revolutionary situation: old and new trends

The fall of the totalitarian regimes will have the sentimental meaning, for entire populations, as the coming of "freedom"; all restrictions will disappear and, automatically, complete freedom of speech and of assembly will reign supreme. It will be the triumph of democratic tendencies. These tendencies have countless shades and nuances, stretching from very conservative liberalism to socialism and anarchy. They believe in the "spontaneous generation" of events and institutions and in the absolute goodness of impulses from the lower classes. They do not want to force the hand of "history", or "the people", or "the proletariat", or what ever other name they give their God. They hope for the end of dictatorships, imagining this as the restoration to the people of their inalienable rights to self-determination. Their crowing dream is a constitutional assembly, elected by the broadest suffrage and with the most scrupulous respect of the rights of the electors, who must decide upon the constitution they want. If the population is immature, the constitution will not be a good one; but it can be corrected only through constant efforts of persuasion.

The democratic factions do not deny violence on principle, but they wish to use it only when the majority is convinced it is indispensable, that is, when it

is little more than an almost superfluous "dot" over an "i". They are, then, useful leaders only in times of ordinary administration, during which almost all population is (generally) convinced of the validity of the basic institutions that they are to be modified, only in relatively secondary aspects. During revolutionary times, when the institutions must not simply be administered, but rather created, democratic procedures fail clamorously. The pitiful impotence of democratic faction during the Russian, German, Spanish revolutions are the three most recent examples. In these situations, once the old state apparatus had fallen, along with its laws and its administration, there is an immediate flourishing of assemblies and popular delegations in which all the progressive socialist forces converge and agitate, either pretending to be respectful of former legality, or scorning it. The population does have some fundamental needs to satisfy, but it does not know exactly what it wants or how to act. A thousand bells ring in its ears. With its millions of minds, it cannot orientate itself, and it breaks up in a number of tendencies, currents and factions, struggling with one other.

In the very moment in which the greatest decisiveness and boldness is needed, the democrats lose their way, not having the backing of spontaneous popular approval, but rather a gloomy tumult of passions. They think it is their duty to realise a consensus and they present themselves as exhortatory preachers, where instead there is a need for leaders able to know what they want they are going. They miss chances that would be favourable to consolidating a new regime and even try to make certain bodies that need a longer preparation and they would in any case be more suitable of relative tranquillity to work immediately. They give their adversaries arms which are use then to overthrow them. They represent, in their thousand tendencies, not only the will for renewal, but the confused whims and desires found in every mind that, becoming paralysed, they actually prepare the terrain for the growth of the reaction. Democratic political methods are a dead weight during revolutionary crises.

As the democrats wear down their initial popularity as assertors of liberty by their endless polemics, and in the absence of any serious political and social revolution, the pre-totalitarian political institutions will inevitably be reconstituted, and the struggle would again develop following along the lines of the old class opposition.

The principle according to which the class struggle is the condition to which all political problems are reconducted, has become the fundamental line especially among factory workers, and has given consistency to their politics as long as fundamental institutions were not questioned. But it becomes an

instrument to isolate the proletariat, when the need to transform the entire social organisation is imposed. The workers, educated in the class system, cannot see beyond the claims of their particular class, or even category, without worrying about how to connect these with the interests of other social strata. Or they aspire to a unilateral dictatorship of the proletariat in order to achieve the utopian collectivisation of all the material means of production, indicated by centuries of propaganda as the panacea for all evils. This policy attracts no other strata, but the workers, who thus deprive the other progressive forces of their support, or it leaves them at the mercy of the cleverly organised reaction so as to break up the worker's movement.

Among the various proletarian tendencies, followers of the classist politics and collectivist ideal, the communists early recognized the difficulty of obtaining a sufficient following to assure victory. They therefore organized themselves, – differently from the other popular parties – into a rigidly disciplined movement. It has exploited the Russian myth in order to organise the workers, but it does not accept their word as law and it does use the workers in the most disparate manoeuvres.

This attitude makes the Communists, during revolutionary crises, more efficient than the democrats. But their maintaining the workers separate as much as they can from the other revolutionary forces – by preaching to them that their "real" revolution is yet to come – turns them into a sectarian element which, in decisive moments, weakens the sum of the progressive forces. Besides this, their absolute dependence upon the Russian State, which has repeatedly used them in pursuing its national policies, prevents this Party from undertaking political activity with continuity. They always need to hide behind a Karoly, a Blum, a Negrin, and then to go along towards ruination with the democratic puppets that had been used. Power is attained and is maintained, not simply through cunning, but with the capacity of responding to the needs of modern society in an organic and vital manner.

Should the struggle remain limited within the traditional national boundaries, it would be very difficult to avoid the old uncertainties. The national States, in fact, have so deeply planned their respective economies, that the main question would soon be which economic group, that is, which class, should to handle the controls of the plan. The progressive front would be quickly shattered in the brawl between economic classes and categories. The most probable result is that the reactionaries would benefit more than anyone else.

A real revolutionary movement must rise from among those who were able to criticise the old, political statements; it must know how to collaborate with

democratic and with communist forces as well as with all those who work for the break-up of totalitarianism, without becoming ensnared by the political practices of any of these.

The reactionary forces have capable men and officers who have been trained to command and who will fight ruthlessly to preserve their supremacy. When circumstances are very hard, deceitfully they will show themselves as the lovers of liberty, of peace, of general well-being, of the poorer classes. Already in the past we have seen how they made use of popular movements, and they paralysed, deflected and transformed them into exactly the opposite of what they were. No doubt they will be the most dangerous forced to be faced.

The point they will seek to exploit is the restoration of the national State. Thus they will be able to grasp the most widespread of popular feelings, most deeply offended by recent events, most easily handled to reactionary purposes: the patriotic sentiment. In this way they can also hope to confuse their adversaries' ideas more easily, since for the popular masses, the only political experience acquired up to this time has been within the national context, it is therefore fairly easy to direct them and their more short-sighted leaders towards the reconstruction of the States "felled" by the tempest.

If this purpose were to be reached, the reaction would have won. In appearance, these States might well be broadly democratic and socialist; it would only be a question of time before power returned into the hands of the reactionaries. National jealousies would again develop, and each State would again express its satisfaction only in its armed strength. In a more or less brief space of time their most important duty would be to convert populations into armies. Generals would again command, the monopoly holders would again draw profits from autarkies, the bureaucracy would continue to swell, the priests would keep the masses docile. All the initial conquests would shrivel into nothing, in comparison to the necessity of preparing for war once more.

The question which must be resolved first failing which progress is but mere appearance, is definitive abolition of division of Europe into national, sovereign States. The collapse of the majority of the States on the continent under German steam-roller has already placed the destinies of the European populations on common ground: either all together they will submit to Hitler's dominion, or after his fall, all together they will enter a revolutionary crisis, and they will not find themselves adamantly distinct in solid, States structures. The general spirit today is already far more disposed than it was in

the past towards a federal reorganisation of Europe. The hard experience of the last decades has opened the eyes even of those who refused to see, and has matured many circumstances favourable to our ideal.

All reasonable men recognise that is impossible to maintain a balance of power among European States with militarist Germany enjoying equal conditions, nor can Germany be broken up into pieces or once it is conquered. We have seen a demonstration that no country within Europe can stay on the sidelines while the others battle: Declaration of neutrality and non-aggression pacts come to nought. The uselessness, even harmfulness, of organisations like the League of Nations has been demonstrated: they pretended to guarantee an international law without a military force capable of imposing its decision, by respecting the absolute sovereignty of the member States. The principle of non-intervention turned out to be absurd. According to it each population should be left free to choose the despotic government it thought best, as if the constitution of each of the single States were not a question of vital interest for all the other European nations. The multiple problems which poison international life on the continent have proved to be insoluble: tracing boundaries through areas inhabited by mixed populations, defence of alien minorities, seaports for landlocked countries, the Balkan Question, the Irish problem, and so on. All these matters would find easy solutions in the European Federation, just as corresponding problems, suffered by the small States which became part of a vaster national unity, lost their harshness as they were transformed into problems regarding relationship between various provinces.

On the other hand, the end of the sense of security, inspired by an unassailable Great Britain which advised "splendid isolation" to the British; the French dissolution army and the disintegration of the Republic at the first serious collision with the Germany forces (a result which, and we hope so, might have lessened the chauvinistic attitude of absolute Gallic superiority); and particularly the risk of total enslavement are all circumstances that are favouring the constitution of a federal regime, which will place an end to the current anarchy. And the fact that England has accepted the principle of Indian Independence; and that France has potentially lost its entire empire in recognising its defeat, make it easier to find a basis of agreement for a European arrangement of colonial possessions.

To all of this must be added the disappearance of some of the most important dynasties, and the fragility of the bases which sustain the ones that survive. It must be taken into account that these dynasties, by considering the various countries as their own traditional perquisites, together with the powerful

interests backing them, represented a serious obstacle to the rational organisation of the United States of Europe, which can only be based on the republican constitution of the federates countries. And, once the horizon of the Old Continent is passed beyond, and all the people who make up humanity join together for a common plane, it will have to be recognised that the European Federation is the only conceivable guarantee that relationships with American and Asiatic peoples can exist on the basis of peaceful co-operation, while awaiting a more distant future, when the political unity of the entire globe becomes a possibility.

The dividing line between progressive and reactionary parties no longer follows the formal line of greater or lesser democracy, or of more or less socialism to be instituted; rather the division falls along the line, very new and substantial, that separates the party members into two groups. The first is made up of those who conceive the essential purpose and goal of struggle as the ancient one, that is, the conquest of national political power – and who, although involuntarily, play into the hands of reactionary forces, letting the incandescent lava of popular passions set in the old moulds, and thus allowing old absurdities to arise once again. The second are those who see the creation of a solid international State as the main purpose; they will direct popular forces toward this goal, and, having won national power, will use it first and foremost as an instrument for achieving international unity.

Through propaganda and action, seeking to establish in every possible way agreements and links among the single movements which are certainly being formed in the various countries, the foundation must be built now for a movement that knows how to mobilise all forces for the birth of the new organism which will be the grandest creation, and the newest, that has occurred in Europe for centuries; and the constitution of a steady federal State, that will have an European armed service instead of national armies at its disposal; that will break decisively economic autarchies, the backbone of totalitarian regimes; that will have sufficient means to see that its deliberations for the maintenance of common order are executed in the single federal States, while each State will retain the autonomy it needs for a plastic articulation and development of a political life according to the particular characteristics of the various people.

If a sufficient number of men in the most important European countries understands this, then the victory will shortly be at hand, as both the situation and the spirit will be favourable to their project. They will have before them parties and factions that have already been disqualified by the disastrous experience of the last twenty years. It will be the moment of new action and

it will also be the moment for new men: the MOMENT FOR A FREE AND UNITED EUROPE.

Post-War Duties: The Reform of Society

A free and united Europe is the necessary premise to the strengthening of modern civilisation that has been temporarily halted the totalitarian era. By the end of this era immediately the historical process of the struggle against social inequalities and privileges will revive in full. All the old conservative structures which have hindered this process will either have collapsed or will be in a state of collapse. This crisis must be exploited, with decision and courage.

In order to respond to our needs, the European revolution must be socialist, that is its goal must be the emancipation of the working classes and the realisation of more humane living conditions for them. The orientation to be chosen for the steps to take can not, however, depend solely on the purely doctrinaire principle which states that private ownership of the material means of production must, as a general rule, be abolished, and only temporarily tolerated when there is no other choice to be made. The general state control of the economy was the first, utopian, form in which the working classes imagined their liberation from the yoke of capitalism. Once it is achieved, however, it does not produce the hoped results: on the contrary, a regime comes into existence in which the entire population is subject to a restricted class of bureaucrats who run the economy.

The truly fundamental principle of socialism, in which the general collectivisation was nothing more than a hurried and erroneous deduction, is the principle which states that the economic forces must not dominate man, but rather – like the forces of Nature – they must be subject to man, guided and controlled by him in the most rational way, so that the broadest strata of the population will not become their victims.

The gigantic forces of progress that spring from individual interests, must not be slaked by the grey dullness of routine. Otherwise, the same insoluble problem will arise: how to stimulate the spirit of initiative using salary levels and other provision of the same kind. The forces of progress must be extolled and extended, and find increasing ranges for development and utilisation; at the same time, the barriers guiding these forces towards objectives of the greatest advantage for all society, must be strengthened and perfected.

Private property must be abolished, limited, corrected, and extended: according to the different situations and not according to principle. This guideline is easily inserted into the process of forming a European economic life freed from nightmares of militarism or national bureaucratism. The rational solution must replace the irrational one even in the consciousness of the working class. In order to describe the content of this guideline, in greater detail, while pointing out that the convenience of each point in the program, and the way it is to be effected, must always be judged in relation to the indispensable premise: European unity, we would like to emphasise the following aspects:

- a) Those enterprises which conduct a necessarily monopolistic activity, and that can therefore exploit the mass of consumers, must no longer be left in the hands of private ownership; electricity industries, for example, or those ones which must survive for the common good but that need customs protection, subsidies, preferential orders, etc. (the most visible example of this kind up to now in Italy is the steel industry); those enterprises which owing to the size of the capital investment and the number of workers employed, or the importance of the sector involved, can blackmail various State organs, imposing upon them their policies that would be advantageous to themselves (for example, mining industries, banking institutes, arms manufacturers). In this field, nationalisation must undoubtedly take place on a vast scale, bearing in no regard acquired rights.
- b) The characteristics private property and the right of succession had in the past permitted the accumulation in the rich hands of a few, privileged members of society. In a revolutionary crisis it would be properly distributed in an egalitarian manner, in order to eliminate the parasitic classes and to give the workers the means of production that they need, so as to improve their economic conditions and let them reach greater independence. We can this way think of an agrarian reform by distributing the lands directly to farmers, the number of land-owners is going to increase enormously and an industrial reform which would extend workers' ownership in non-nationalised sectors, through co-operative management, employee profit-sharing etc.
- c) Young people are to be assisted with all the necessary provisions in order to reduce the gap between the starting positions in the long struggle ahead of them. In particular, State schools ought to offer the effective possibility of continuing their studies up to the highest level to the best students not only to the wealthy ones; and in each branch of study, trade schools, semi-professional schools as well as in the liberal arts and sciences, it should prepare a number of students corresponding to the market demand, so that the

average salaries are about the same for all the professional categories, even though within each category there may be differences, depending upon individual capacities.

d) The almost unlimited potentiality of mass production of essential goods thanks to modern technology, will allow everyone to be guaranteed, at relatively low social cost, food, lodging, clothing and that minimum of comfort needed to preserve a sense of human dignity. Human solidarity towards those who succumb in the economic battle ought not, therefore, be shown with the same humiliating forms of charity that produce the very same evils they vainly attempt to remedy: rather it ought to take a series of measures which unconditionally guarantee a decent standard of living for everyone, without lessening the stimulus to work and to save. In this situation, no one would any longer be forced by misery to accept unfair work contracts.

e) Working-class liberty can only be conquered after the conditions described have been fulfilled. These classes must not be left to the mercy of the economic policies of monopolistic trade unions that simply translate the same overpowering methods of big capital into the working world. The workers must once again be free to choose their own emissaries where, in collective bargaining sessions, are defining the conditions under which they will agree to work, and the State must give them the legal means to guarantee the observation of the terms agreed to. All monopolistic tendencies can be efficaciously faced once these social transformations have been achieved.

These are the changes needed to create a broad group of citizens interested in the new order and willing to struggle for its preservation, and to give the political life the solid stamp of liberty based on a strong sense of social solidarity. Based on these principles political liberties can truly have not only a formal meaning, but a real meaning for everybody, since that mass of citizens will be independent, and will be sufficiently informed as to be able to exert continuous and efficacious control over the governing class.

It would be superfluous to dwell at length on the constitutional institutions; in fact not being able to foresee the conditions in which they will be drawn up and will have to regulate, we could do more than repeat what has already been said – the need for representative bodies, the formation of the law, the independence of the magistracy that will be substitute the present one in order to apply impartially the laws handed down by higher authorities and the freedom of the press and of assembly so that public opinion can be enlightened and all citizens can effectively participate in the life of the State.

Only two questions demand further and deeper definition because of their particular importance for our country in this moment: the relationship between Church and State; the quality of political representation.

a) The Treaty which concluded the Vatican's alliance with the Fascism in Italy must absolutely be abolished in order to assert the purely lay character of the State and determine the unequivocal supremacy of the State in civil matters. All religious faiths are to be equally respected, but the State must no longer strike the balance of religions.

b) The house of cards that Fascism built with its corporativism will collapse together with the other aspects of the totalitarian State. There are those who hold that material for the new constitutional order can be salvaged from this wreck. We do not agree this. In totalitarian States, the corporative chambers are the crowning hoax of police control over the workers. Even if the corporative chambers were a sincere expression of the will of the various categories of producers, the representative bodies of the various professional categories could never be qualified to handle questions of general policy. In more specifically economic matters, they would become organs for the accumulation of power and privilege among the categories having stronger union representation. The unions will have broad collaboration functions with State organs which are appointed to resolve those problems directly related to these categories, but it is absolutely excluded that they will be given any legislative power, since this would create a kind of feudal anarchy in the economic life of the country, leading to a renewed political despotism. Many of those who ingenuously were attracted by the myth of corporativism, can and must be attracted by the task of renewing structures. But they must realise the absurdity of the solution they might vaguely desire. Corporativism can only be concretely expressed in the form given by totalitarian States: that is to regiment the workers beneath leaders who might controlled every movement in the interests of the ruling class.

The revolutionary party cannot be amateurishly organised at the fixed moment. It must form at least its central political philosophy since now, its leaders and directors, the primary actions it will undergo. It must not represent a heterogeneous mass of tendencies, united merely negatively and temporarily, that is, united by their anti-Fascist past and the active expectation of the fall of the totalitarian regime, regime all ready to go their separate ways once this goal has been reached. The revolutionary party knows that only at this point its real work will begin. It must therefore be made up of men who are in agreement on the basic future problems. Its methodical propaganda must penetrate everywhere there are people

oppressed by the present regime; it must use as its starting point the problem which is the source of greatest suffering to individuals and classes and show how it is related to and connected with other problems, and what the real solution might be. But from this gradually increasing circle of sympathisers, only those who have identified and accepted the European revolution as the principle purpose in their lives are to be recruited into the movement. Day by day, with discipline, the work must go on; its continuous and efficacious safety must be provided secretly, even in those most dangerously illegal situations. Thus the more solid network of workers will be set up to give consistency to the more fragile sphere of sympathisers.

While overlooking no occasion any sector in which to spread its cause, it must turn first and foremost to those environments which are the most important ones as centres for the circulation of ideas and the recruiting of unbending determined men; primarily towards the two social groups which are the most sensitive to the current situation and decisive for tomorrow's circumstances, that is, the working class the intellectuals. The former is the one that least submitted to the totalitarian rod and that will most readily reorganise its ranks. The intellectuals, particularly the younger among them, are those who feel most spiritually suffocated and repulsed with the current despotism. Other classes will gradually be drawn into the movement.

Any movement which fails its duty to ally these forces, is condemned to sterility. In fact a movement made up only of intellectuals will not have the strength it needs to overwhelm reactionary resistance, it will distrust and be distrusted by the working class; and even though it is animated by democratic sentiments, it will be prone to losing its hold while facing the difficulties, in the mobilisation of all other classes against the workers, and the result will be the threatened restoration of Fascism. If, instead, the movement is backed only by the proletariat, it will be deprived of the clarity of thought which only the intellectual can give, and which is needed in order to define new paths and new duties; it will remain a prisoner of the former classism, it will consider everyone as a potential enemy, and will slither towards the doctrinaire Communist solution.

During the revolutionary crisis, it is up to this movement to organise and guide progressive forces using all the popular organs which grow spontaneously, ardent crucibles in which the revolutionary masses are melted, not for the drawing up of plebiscites, but rather waiting to be guided. It derives the vision and security of what must be done not from a previous consecration of what is not yet be the popular will, but from the consciousness of representing the deepest necessities of modern society. In

this way it issues the initial regulations of the new order, the first social discipline directed to the unformed masses. This dictatorship by the revolutionary party will form the new State, and new genuine democracy will grow around this State.

There are no grounds for fearing that a similar revolutionary regime will develop into renewed despotism. This may develop if a servile society has been forming. But if the revolutionary party continues with determination from its very first action to create the conditions necessary for individual freedom, conditions under which all citizens can really participate in the life of the State, it will evolve towards increasing comprehension of the new order, even though moving through possible secondary political crises, and acceptance of it by all the population. It will be growing, therefore, towards an increasing possibility of functioning, and of free political institutions.

The moment has arrived to know how to discard old onerous burdens, how to be ready for the new changes that is coming and that will be so different from what we expected; to put aside the inept among the old, and create new energies among the young. Today those who have perceived the reasons for the present crisis in European civilisation are seeking each other, and are trying to plan future. In fact they are gathering the inheritance left by all those movements which worked to raise and enlighten humanity, and which failed because of their incapability to understand the purpose to be achieved or the ways how to achieve it.

The road to follow is neither easy nor safe. But it must be pursued and it will be.

Chapter 2

Manifesto of European Resistance Movements, 1944

Draft declaration of the European resistance movements (20 May 1944), in Europe speaks: issues on behalf of the ISK, Internationaler Sozialistischer Kampfbund (Militant Socialist International), 11.10.1944, pp. 1-4. On 31 March, 29 April, 20 May and on 6 and 7 July 1944, militants from the resistance movements of several European countries met in secret in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to discuss the problems posed by the post-war reconstruction of a democratic Europe following a federal model. Here is the manifesto that was agreed.

Manifesto

I.

“The peoples of Europe are united in their resistance to Nazi oppression. This common struggle has created amongst them a solidarity and unity of interests and aims which demonstrate their significance and value by the fact that the representatives of European resistance movements have come together to draft this declaration expressing their hopes and aspirations regarding the future of peace and civilization.

The members of the resistance movements are well aware that their relentless struggle on the home front against the enemy's war machine is an important positive contribution towards the war effort of the United Nations; it gives their countries the right to participate in the reconstruction of Europe side by side with the other victorious powers.

They accept the essential principles of the Atlantic Charter and maintain that the life of their peoples must be based upon respect for the individual personality, security, the planned exploitation of economic resources for the benefit of the whole community and the autonomous development of national life.

II.

These aims cannot be achieved unless the different countries are willing to give up the dogma of the absolute sovereignty of the State and unite in a single federal organisation.

The lack of unity and cohesion between the different parts of the world make it impossible to tackle immediately the task of creating a federal world organisation. At the end of this war we shall have to limit ourselves to the building up of a less ambitious world organisation — which should however permit of development in a federal direction — in the framework of which the great powers will have the task of guaranteeing collective security. It will not be, however, an effective instrument of peace unless the great powers are organised in such a way that the spirit of peace and understanding can prevail.

It is for this reason that, within the framework of this world organisation, a more radical and direct solution must be found for the European problem.

III.

European peace is the keystone in the arch of world peace. During the life time of one generation Europe has been twice the centre of a world conflict whose chief cause was the existence of thirty sovereign States in Europe. It is a most urgent task to end this international anarchy by creating a European Federal Union.

Only a Federal Union will enable the German people to join the European community without becoming a danger to other peoples.

Only a Federal Union will make it possible to solve the problem of drawing frontiers in districts with a mixed population. The minorities will thus cease to be the object of nationalistic jealousies and frontiers will be nothing but demarcation lines between administrative districts.

Only a Federal Union will be in a position to protect democratic institutions and so to prevent politically less developed countries becoming a danger to the international order.

Only a Federal Union will make possible the economic reconstruction of the Continent and the liquidation of monopolies and national self-sufficiency.

Only a Federal Union will allow a logical and natural solution of the problems of the access to the sea of those countries which are situated in the interior of the Continent, of a rational use of those rivers which flow through several States, of the control of the straits, and, generally, of most of the problems which during recent years have disturbed international relations.

IV.

It is not possible at present to determine the geographical frontiers of a Federal Union which would guarantee peace in Europe. We must, however, state that from the outset such a Union must be strong enough to avoid the risk of either being used as a mere sphere of influence by a foreign State or of becoming the instrument of the political ambitions of one of its member States. Furthermore it must from the beginning be open to all countries which entirely or partly belong to Europe and which wish to join it and are qualified to do so.

The Federal Union must be based upon a declaration of civil, political and economic rights which would guarantee democratic institutions and the free development of the human personality, and upon a declaration of the rights of minorities to have as much autonomy as is compatible with the integrity of the national States to which they belong.

The Federal Union must not interfere with the right of each of its member States to solve its special problems in conformity with its ethnical and cultural pattern. But in view of the failure of the League of Nations, the States must irrevocably surrender to the Federation their sovereign rights in the sphere of defence, relations with powers outside the Union, international exchange and communications.

The Federal Union must possess the following essential features:

- (1) A government responsible not to the governments of the various member States but to the peoples, who must be under its direct jurisdiction in the spheres to which its powers extend.
- (2) An army at the disposal of this government, no national armies being permitted.
- (3) A Supreme Court acting as authority in interpreting the Constitution deciding cases of conflict between the member States or between the member States and the Union.

The peace which will follow this war must be based upon justice and progress and not upon vengeance and reaction. It should, however, treat the war criminals with ruthless severity; to let them escape their punishment would be an insult to all who have fallen in this war and especially to the unknown heroes of the resistance movements throughout Europe. Germany and her satellites must take part in the economic reconstruction of the regions they have devastated. But Germany must be helped and if necessary, compelled to change her political and economic structure with a view to qualifying for membership of the Federal Union. For that purpose she must be completely disarmed and temporarily subjected to a Federal control, which will have in the main the following tasks:

- To entrust power to those truly democratic elements which have consistently fought against Nazism.
- To build up a decentralised democratic State free from the last trace of Prussian militarism and bureaucracy.
- To secure the liquidation of feudalism in the agricultural and industrial life of Germany.
- To integrate German chemical and heavy industries into the European industrial organisation so as to prevent their use for German nationalistic ends.
- To prevent the education of German youth in accordance with Nazi, militaristic and totalitarian doctrines.

V.

The signatory resistance movements recognise that the active participation of the United Nations is essential for the resolution of the European problem, but they demand that all measures taken between the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of peace shall be in conformity with the requirements of a Federal organisation.

They appeal to all the spiritual and political forces of the world and in particular to those of the United Nations to help them to attain the objectives indicated in this Manifesto.

They undertake to consider their respective national problems only as particular aspects of the general European problem and they intend immediately to establish a permanent bureau with the function of co-ordinating their efforts on behalf of the liberation of their countries, the organisation of a Federal Union of European peoples and the establishment of peace and justice throughout the world.”



Commissioner

Chapter 3

What the Commission Should Do, 1974

Considérations d'Altiero Spinelli sur les tâches de la Commission après le Sommet des 9 et 10 décembre 1974, Archives historiques des Communautés européennes, Florence, Villa Il Poggiolo. Dépôts, DEP. Emanuele Gazzo, EG. Les institutions et les organes communautaires, EG.B.A. Commission, EG.B.A-04. Commission des Communautés européennes: présidences Ortolí, Jenkins et Thorn, EG-95.

Lettre d'Altiero Spinelli, membre de la Commission des Communautés européennes, à ses collègues les commissaires

Bruxelles, le 16 décembre 1974

Chers Collègues,

Je sou mets à votre attention bienveillante l'ensemble des idées que je me propose de défendre en Commission au cours des prochaines réunions que le Président nous a conviés à consacrer à la définition de notre stratégie politique après la récente Conférence des Chefs de gouvernement.

Je ne serais pas complètement loyal envers vous si je vous cachais que je ferai dépendre de la conclusion de ces débats ma décision si rester encore dans la Commission étant convaincu qu'elle assume pleinement la tâche ardue d'animatrice politique de la construction européenne, ou bien en démissionner ayant constaté qu'elle y renonce.

Bien amicalement à vous,

[Signature: Altiero Spinelli]

Considérations d'Altiero Spinelli sur les tâches de la Commission après le Sommet des 9 et 10 décembre 1974

L'Union européenne comme confédération

La Conférence des Chefs de gouvernement des 9 et 10 décembre a déclaré que, grâce aux mesures institutionnelles qu'elle a prises, "le processus de transformation de l'ensemble des relations entre les Etats membres", c'est-à-dire la construction de l'Union européenne, "est commencé" (v. § 13 du Communiqué).

En effet la Conférence des Chefs de gouvernement est devenue, sous le nom de Conseil européen, l'organe politique suprême, chargé "d'arrêter progressivement des positions communes et de mettre en oeuvre une diplomatie concertée dans tous les domaines de la politique internationale qui affectent les intérêts de la Communauté européenne" (§ 4). Le Conseil des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères s'est vu reconnaître "un rôle d'impulsion et de coordination des activités communautaires" (§ 13). La tâche de gérer le pouvoir de décision dans les problèmes politiques moins importants a été transférée aux Représentants Permanents (§ 7). Les gouvernements décideront eux-mêmes les cas où leurs décisions seront ou non prises à l'unanimité (§ 6). Ils se proposent d'étendre "à de nouveaux domaines" "les réunions de représentants des gouvernements" (§ 9).

Par volonté des Chefs de gouvernement, assistés par leurs conseillers diplomatiques, à l'insu de leurs peuples et de leurs Parlements, l'Union politique débute ainsi comme confédération, comme ligue d'Etats souverains qui s'efforceront de faire avancer leur union par des procédures de concertation intergouvernementale.

Les Chefs de gouvernement n'ont pu ignorer complètement que la logique de l'Union européenne va bien au delà du confédéralisme, mais dans ces cas chaque affirmation est entourée de réserves mentales. Ils n'ont qu'un "intérêt" à faire usage du transfert à la Commission de certaines compétences de gestion et d'exécution (§ 8). L'élection directe du Parlement Européen "devrait" être réalisée dans quatre ans, mais deux Etats n'ont pu accepter pas même ce conditionnel (§ 12). Ils ne manqueront pas de "prendre en considération les vues du P.E. sur la participation de celui-ci à la construction européenne" (§ 12). Ils ont chargé M. Tindemans de leur faire un rapport sur l'Union européenne, et ce faisant ils ont dégradé les rapports des institutions communautaires au niveau d'expertises de deuxième ordre destinées à être complétées par d'autres consultations, semble-t-il, plus valables. En tous cas ces Chefs se sont réservé le droit, après avoir médité sur le rapport

Tindemans, d'octroyer aux Parlements, aux peuples, à tout le monde, leur "conception d'ensemble de l'Union européenne" (§ 13). Ces promesses, si elles sont maintenues, contribueront, certes, à dépasser la phase confédérale, mais elles ne pourront l'être que dans la mesure où entretemps les relations entre Etats membres et la situation de la Communauté dans le monde ne se détériorent pas jusqu'au point de rendre irréalisables ces engagements.

Or c'est l'évidence même que si le dessin confédéral a été adopté par les Chefs de gouvernement, c'est parce qu'ils ont senti très fortement les dangers qui menacent l'Europe dans son ensemble et la nécessité d'affronter en commun certaines affaires très importantes de leurs pays. Mais la réponse confédérale qu'ils ont donnée montre la pauvreté de leur inspiration politique, la mesure où ils sont intellectuellement asservis aux formes mentales de leurs diplomaties.

Vingt-deux ans d'existence des Communautés – qui étaient nées pour dépasser la coopération intergouvernementale – ont montré ad abundantiam que leur paralysie croissante est due à l'incapacité du Conseil – organe typiquement confédéral – de former et consolider une volonté politique européenne. La doctrine juridique et l'histoire politique sont là pour enseigner que les confédérations – à moins qu'elles aient dans leur sein un patron – peuvent bien engendrer quelques décisions ponctuelles de portée limitée, mais que par leur nature même elles sont incapables d'assurer à l'action politique commune la continuité, la cohérence, la vigueur dont elles ont besoin. Et cependant c'est dans un tel système que les Chefs de gouvernement décident de s'installer pour affronter la crise la plus grave qui frappe l'Europe depuis une vingtaine d'années.

Le Conseil européen à l'oeuvre

L'impuissance de la méthode confédérale est apparue au moment même où elle était proclamée.

Le Conseil européen a en effet bien réussi à débloquer la question ponctuelle du Fonds régional, après en avoir par ailleurs encore réduit la taille.

Par contre, après avoir débattu le grand sujet de la lutte contre l'inflation, le chômage et la récession, c'est-à-dire contre la crise économique qui menace l'avenir de l'Europe, et après avoir dressé une liste des politiques nationales que chaque Etat devrait suivre, ils sont arrivés à la découverte mirobolante que ces politiques pour être convergentes devraient s'appuyer "sur des mécanismes permanents et efficaces (!) de consultation (§ 19), et sur des

action coordonnées (§ 25), c'est-à-dire exactement sur des méthodes qui ont fait faillite jusqu'à maintenant.

Placés devant la crise de l'énergie, qui par la globalité de ses aspects économiques et diplomatiques était la raison principale de la convocation de ce Sommet, ils se sont bornés à prendre acte des contacts intergouvernementaux, intra et extra-communautaires, passés et futurs, sans être capables ni de près ni de loin d'exprimer aucune position commune, aucune impulsion.

A cette impuissance d'engendrer une véritable volonté d'union, correspond l'impuissance d'engendrer une véritable volonté d'indépendance et de dignité européenne dans les relations internationales. Le Conseil européen a pratiquement accepté comme une chose allant de soi cette consultation préliminaire et postliminaire du gouvernement américain (§ 20, 31, 32), réclamée naguère avec tant d'arrogance par le Secrétaire d'Etat. Il a ainsi tacitement intérimé la situation de dépendance et non de partnership de l'Europe à l'égard des Etats-Unis.

La Commission face à son destin

A) - L'Union Economique et Monétaire

Après cette Conférence la Commission, seul centre politique supranational doté d'une existence continue, ne peut se borner à faire ce qui se peut, dans le cadre confédéral adopté à Paris dans l'espoir de sauver ce qui peut être sauvé de l'ancienne méthode communautaire.

La Commission devrait constater que la Conférence a donnée une réponse fausse et stérile au problème de l'unification européenne, et que sur ce chemin l'Europe va vers sa déchéance économique, politique et diplomatique.

Elle devrait s'engager à utiliser tous les moyens à sa disposition pour amener les peuples, les forces politiques et sociales, les gouvernements de la Communauté, à comprendre que l'unité, l'indépendance, la dignité, le progrès dans la liberté et la justice ne peuvent être atteints par l'Europe que si l'on se décide à transférer progressivement la conduite des affaires d'intérêt commun à un véritable gouvernement européen, séparé des gouvernements nationaux, contrôlé par un véritable Parlement outre que par un Conseil de représentants des Etats membres.

A cette fin, sans négliger la bonne conduite des politiques partielles en cours – agricole, sociale, régionale, vers les PVD, etc. – la Commission devrait donner une priorité aux deux thèmes dont le Conseil européen a confirmé qu'ils restent les grands buts à atteindre : l'Union économique et monétaire et l'Union politique.

Les Chefs de gouvernements ayant affirmé que "leur volonté n'a pas fléchi" en matière d'U.E.M., malgré l'insuccès de ce qui avait été entrepris, et que "leur objectif demeure celui qu'ils s'étaient fixé lors de la Conférence de Paris" (§ 14), la Commission devrait décider d'affronter ce sujet avec une approche nouvelle qui tienne compte de l'insuccès de la méthode des étapes successives chacune remplie de contenus détaillés. La nouvelle approche devrait être fondée sur la création successive d'instruments communautaires d'action ayant le but de faire converger les politiques nationales, sans préétablir nécessairement les étapes d'un développement qui est en soi imprévisible.

La lutte contre le chômage, la récession et l'inflation restera en effet à moyen terme une responsabilité propre des Etats membres, qui seront nécessairement amenés à intensifier leurs interventions dans leurs économies nationales. Puisque ce fait implique un danger croissant de rupture de l'intégration communautaire et de l'interdépendance internationale, le rôle propre de la Communauté sera d'exercer par des instruments d'action appropriés une influence réelle sur ces interventions, tout en respectant leur caractère de politiques nationales, pour les rendre compatibles et convergentes. Les instruments principaux à mettre sur pied sembleraient être :

- a) création auprès de la Commission d'un Institut d'orientation et programmation européennes (en reprenant le projet de R. Barre et en l'adaptant aux tâches nouvelles), afin de définir les grands objectifs que la Communauté doit se donner, ainsi que le grade de compatibilité et de convergence qui en dérive pour les politiques et les programmes nationaux;
- b) mise en commun progressive des réserves nationales dans un Fonds de coopération monétaire ayant les caractéristiques d'une véritable banque d'émission; émission d'une monnaie européenne qui serait employée comme moyen de paiement dans certaines opérations à définir;
- c) mise en commun d'une partie des moyens financiers aujourd'hui employés par les Etats pour les politiques industrielles, régionales, sociales, de la R.D., et possibilité d'alimenter ultérieurement ces fonds par les ressources propres de la Communauté, de manière que surtout les grandes interventions

structurelles ne puissent se faire sans l'apport d'argent et par conséquence de conditions communautaires;

d) possibilité de créer des instituts de crédits européens appropriés pour mobiliser des capitaux en faveur de grandes initiatives d'intérêt commun, intracommunautaires ou avec des pays tiers, surtout dans la perspective de promouvoir les formes triangulaires d'investissements des pétrodollars dans les PVD;

e) transfert de la coopération économique internationale à la compétence communautaire et création d'une Eximbank européenne pour promouvoir les plans de coopération;

f) élargissement des possibilités de taxation communautaire et d'émission d'emprunts, afin de donner à la Communauté la possibilité de réaliser les actions susindiquées et de donner ainsi à son budget la dignité d'instrument de politique économique.

L'augmentation du budget de la Communauté devrait être accompagnée de diminutions corrélatives des budgets nationaux, et n'impliquerait par conséquence pas nécessairement une expansion de la dépense publique globale.

La manière dont la Commission a essayé jusqu'à présent de gérer, par ailleurs sans grand succès, certaines politiques et notamment la politique de l'union économique, la politique industrielle et le contrôle des aides, devrait par conséquent être modifiée assez profondément pour l'adapter à cette nouvelle approche. Les services de la Commission qui s'occupent de la politique économique générale (Directions A et B de la D.G. II), de la politique d'investissements industriels (D.G. XVIII), de la politique industrielle (D.G. III) et du contrôle des aides (Direction D de la D.G. IV), devraient être unifiées, rationalisées et simplifiées en vue de devenir un instrument efficace de programmation et de gestion des instruments financiers dont la Communauté disposerait:

La Commission face à son destin

B) L'Union Européenne

La mise en oeuvre des instruments communautaires nécessaires pour faire avancer l'U.E.M. peut et doit être amorcée en partant des structures actuelles de la Communauté, mais seulement à la condition qu'il s'agisse d'une période de transition relativement brève, au cours de laquelle des institutions

gouvernementales, législatives et de participation démocratique soient mises en place. Ces institutions s'imposent aussi pour assurer le développement harmonieux des autres politiques (régionale, agricole, énergétique, de R.D.) et surtout pour assurer l'identité, l'indépendance et la dignité européennes dans les relations internationales.

La Commission devrait par conséquent :


- 1 - accélérer la conclusion de son rapport sur l'Union politique expliquant avec réalisme et fermeté les raisons pour lesquelles la méthode communautaire traditionnelle n'est plus suffisante et la nouvelle méthode confédérale est stérile;
- 2 - demander d'être associée, et en tout cas suivre de près l'élaboration du rapport du M. Tindemans, en vue de contribuer à son succès;
- 3 - contester aux neuf Chefs de gouvernement la compétence qu'ils voudraient s'arroger d'établir eux-mêmes "la conception d'ensemble de l'U.E."; demander que le rapport Tindemans soit remis au Parlement européen, comme important document de travail, pour que celui-ci rédige et vote le projet (ou les projets) de lois constitutionnelles de l'U.E., à soumettre aux ratifications nationales. Pour que cette procédure, qui seule ferait participer avec pleine responsabilité toutes les forces politiques d'Europe à la construction européenne, ait le maximum de légitimation démocratique, et compte tenu de l'impossibilité pratique d'avoir des élections européennes en 1975 ou 1976, les Parlements nationaux devraient être invités, au moment de la remise du rapport Tindemans, à rénover leurs représentants au Parlement européen en vue de lui reconnaître un mandat constituant.

Conclusion

La Commission devrait annoncer avec solennité, à la fin de ses débats, au début même du second mandat de son Président, son programme d'action en matière d'U.E.M. et d'U.E. Elle devrait affirmer que chacune des politiques partielles qu'elle sera amenée à prendre, y compris ses propositions éventuelles concernant la renégociation britannique, ainsi que ses relations avec le Conseil, le Parlement et l'opinion publique, seront conçues dans le cadre et dans la perspective de ce programme d'action. En agissant ainsi elle pourra assumer dans le redressement et la relance de la construction européenne ce rôle de guide qui n'est plus tenu aujourd'hui par personne et qui est nécessaire pour maintenir ouvertes les perspectives de dépassement de la phase confédérale actuelle. Si elle y renonce, elle est condamnée à disparaître

définitivement comme centre d'initiative politique et à devenir de plus en plus un humble organe technique au service du Conseil européen et de ses structures intergouvernementales prétentieuses mais impuissantes.

Le moment du choix pour la Commission – et pour ses membres – est venu et ne peut plus être renvoyé.



The European Constitution

Chapter 4

The Dead Mouse of Intergovernmentalism, 1981

Statement by Altiero Spinelli to the European Parliament, 19 November 1981

Madame President, once again, I should like to use one of the common working languages of the Community.

If I were religious, I would begin my speech with the words 'Gott helf mir! — God help me!', for I am certainly in need of some occult assistance to put across what I need to say in the paltry five minutes I am allotted by the Rules of Procedure. For my intention, Mr Genscher and Mr Colombo, is to urge you to rise above yourselves in order to fulfil the mission which you have been assigned.

We appreciate the fact that you, the German and Italian Ministers, have taken this initiative, for, in proposing this European Act, you have broken a taboo — that of looking beyond the Community's economic tasks — which has hampered the building of Europe for far too long. You have the merit of having said that the time is ripe for initiating moves to gradually create a European Union, a political union undertaken not only to strengthen common economic policies, — although this is, of course, part of it — but also to promote a common policy towards the outside world and a common security policy. This would entail the making of diplomatic and strategic moves in common to make a positive contribution to achieving world peace.

We thank you, therefore, for obliging our governments, our Community and our populations to consider that these new common policies call for common instruments for decision-taking and action. I am sorry to say, however, that your initiative reveals that you have scant faith and only very limited vision! Six or seven years ago, Mr Genscher, you persuaded your party to commit itself to a European constituent assembly. I have not forgotten this, but maybe you have. More recently, on 26 November 1980, when you began to talk about this relaunching of the European political union, you addressed the Bundestag as follows: 'I do not believe that the impulse to undertake the drafting of a European constitution can come from national governments. It can only emanate from the directly elected European Parliament.' When you said that, you knew that the idea of the Crocodile was gaining ground in this Parliament. I am the first to admit that Parliament is at fault for having dragged its feet over this affair, but it has finally shouldered its burden and in a short while it will have its nose to the grindstone. But you couldn't bear to wait, Mr Genscher. You wasted no time in shedding faith in this Parliament. You couldn't wait to give your diplomats the task of drawing up this Act. And they gave you just what you expected: the umpteenth variation on the inter-governmental collaboration theme, which you swallowed without protest.

(Applause from certain quarters)

You must have heard the proverb which says that even the most beautiful girl in the world can only give what she has got. Your diplomatic manoeuvres cannot offer any more. I admit that, for the time being, this intergovernmental cooperation is all that you have and that you must make use of it to tackle the most pressing international problems. But we want you to recognize that such an arrangement has no durability or substance to it. Do not come here and tell us that, in five years — at the outset you said three years, but already it has turned into five years — in the light of experience, the Council will, if necessary, propose a treaty to consolidate the Union. It would be much better if you said that we don't need any more experience, and that we know all we need to know, if we were only willing to admit it. You ought to say that you will do your utmost to maintain this halting and precarious cooperation to give Parliament the two, or two and a half years it needs to draft the basic legislation for the European Union and to submit it to the Member States for ratification. If you were to do this, the European Parliament, on behalf of the people of Europe who have elected it, would wholeheartedly applaud your initiative, and would feel prompted to speed up its work as a constituent body in order to help you as quickly as possible out

of a position which, ultimately, is not yours to hold. In this way, you would have served Europe well.

I also have something to say to Mr Colombo — even though he is not here — since he regards himself as the heir to de Gasperi's European spirit; I should like to ask him to show something of the tenacity which de Gasperi had in order to make similar proposals to his colleagues.

I tell you, Minister, that Europe's future depends not on your inter-ministerial proposals but on this Parliament, the only institution with the right to speak out and to put forward suggestions on behalf of the people of Europe who have elected it!

I told you that I thought you lacked vision. I will admit that you have come to realize that our governments must learn to cooperate as quickly as possible in order to have a minimum number of common policies in all sorts of spheres, particularly — I may as well say it — to have a common security policy. You have also come to realize that it is no good just hailing it as a necessity; you must do as little as you can to achieve it. So, in your 'Act', you call for the setting-up of an army of councils, committees, and sub-committees as part of a preposterous secretariat whose structure and location will not be fixed. In other words, you want to create a leviathan of a bureaucracy, but manned only by inter-governmental agents. And when this monster of committees and boards has chewed everything over and disgorged it, you believe that each Member State is going to tot up the political experience acquired!

But gentlemen, haven't you ever heard how, during the first and second world wars, the Allies — finding themselves in an emergency which obliged them to have a common military policy on their warfronts, a common provisions policy and common control of their currencies — decided, through acts similar to yours, but without any formal legal procedures, without setting up institutions, and with little regard for the future, to appoint Messrs Foch, Eisenhower and Monnet to act as plenipotentiaries on their behalf? You should make the same suggestion in order to promote your initiative in the present situation as a provisional measure in the form of collaboration between governments.

(Applause)

Chapter 5

Only a Constitution Will Do, 1982

Statement by Altiero Spinelli to the European Parliament, 14 October 1982

Mr President, ten years ago the first summit of the enlarged Community of Nine solemnly declared that economic and monetary union and political union would be a fact of life by 1980 and it instigated procedures that any simpleton could have predicted would lead to neither monetary nor political union.

Today, ten years later, the Community with neither monetary nor political unity faces challenges and responsibilities which make this unity even more necessary and at the same time it is in a state of impotence and increasing collapse.

Mr Colombo and Mr Genscher came here a year ago to say they were going to make realistic, pragmatic proposals to restart the building of Europe and to do so they would use the same procedures of ten years previously, in other words brief and superficial consultations with the genuine European authorities, namely the European Parliament, and secret negotiations in national diplomatic circles.

I understand your embarrassment, Mr Genscher and Mr Colombo, for you are forced to speak to us today with an eloquence which glosses over but does not manage to hide the truth, which is that you have almost reached

agreement in numerous points of detail, form, European rhetoric, but that you are far from agreeing on matters of substance. I wish you good luck, Ministers, for if you succeed the Community will have at least taken a tiny step forward and that would be better than nothing; but I shall not hide my deep belief that you are in a dilemma, not because of your aims but because of the means you have proposed to achieve them.

I asked for the floor, not to give voice to my hopes and fears, but to draw your attention to a new fact which you have not exactly overlooked but the importance of which you have underestimated.

The Chairman of the Committee on Institutional Affairs, Mauro Ferri, has just reported on the institutional work for the European Parliament. In July, Parliament voted basic guidelines for this work by an overwhelming majority of its members. At the beginning of 1984 it will not submit this draft to Council but will transmit it to each government with the request for ratification by the relevant national authorities, by Parliament or by referendum, as the case may be. Now I'm not asking for many promises here this evening, but I do ask you to debate this in your own governments so that you can return here soon and tell us that if European Parliament, sole legitimate representative of the European electorate as a whole, approves a draft constitution for European Union by a very large consensus of its Members, then your own governments – and I say your own governments and not the Council – promise to propose ratification by your countries.

Mr Genscher, Mr Colombo, try to think with the political courage which led Robert Schuman in 1950 to put resolutely aside a method which had become sterile and to undertake something new and fruitful. Today this new and fruitful work is represented by the constitutional enterprise of the European Parliament. Try to understand it, try to adopt it, and try to invite those who would follow you to do so.

Chapter 6

Towards the European Union, 1983

Sixth Jean Monnet Lecture, European University Institute, 13 June 1983, delivered by Mr Altiero Spinelli, entitled 'Towards the European Union'

Firstly, I want to thank President Maihofer and this Institute, not only for having given me the honour to speak in this Sixth Jean Monnet Lecture, but also for their contribution to the work of the Institutional Committee.

This June the European Parliament enters the final year of its mandate during which it will have to complete the task it undertook of proposing reform of the Community, transforming it into a genuine political and economic Union endowed with the authority and institutions which would enable it "to respond effectively through democratic procedures to the serious and growing problems common to all our peoples".

To understand the significance of this undertaking, we have to answer three questions:

1. Why has the European Parliament taken this constituent task upon itself?
2. What is the substance of the proposal that Parliament is getting ready to make?
3. What must the Parliament do to ensure that its draft will be adopted by the Member States and enter into force?

Let us begin with the first:

I. Why the reform?

When the directly elected European Parliament began its work four years ago, the Community and its associated structures had already been in a state of profound crisis for some time. Initially Parliament had not been driven by any grand incentive for reform. It was scarcely a hot-bed of revolutionaries and dogmatists. Most of its members were proudly aware of having been entrusted with the highest conceivable form of political legitimacy in democracies, that of election by the people, and hence of their considerable political authority, but on European questions they were all moderates, with a few rare exceptions, from the extreme right to the extreme left.

While aware of the crisis within the Community, they were prepared to fulfil their mandates with caution, abiding by the responsibilities conferred upon them by the Treaties in the hope of contributing thereby to reviving the process of building Europe. Since the European Parliament is an observatory where all the issues of European responsibility and construction are reviewed and discussed, the European MPs had the opportunity of gaining many varied and impromptu experiences.

First experience

The Parliament had certain limited budgetary powers and when it came to consider its first budget it put forward various amendments which, while not significantly altering the structure, laid emphasis on Parliament's desire to put an end to the budgetary procedure as a mere exercise in calculating the costs of decisions already taken and instead of making the budget a binding indicator of policies to be implemented or expanded. Since the Council obstinately refused to accept this approach, Parliament rejected the budget by an overwhelming majority in December 1979, which was in its competences. It seemed like a major victory at the time, the dawn of a new life in the Community. However, Parliament was soon forced to recognize that the rejection of the budget was a blunt weapon since the Treaties allowed the Commission to go on spending on a provisional monthly basis for an indefinite length of time. The Commission and the Council merely needed to let six months elapse before presenting a new budget and by the half-way mark there was not much left to forecast for the current year. It meant letting through a virtually identical budget to the previous one.

Each year, in a different guise, a new conflict broke out over the budget and each year the Council ended up having the final say, always with the same

tight-fisted attitude and the Commission, unaccountably, always gave in to the Council.

Second experience

As prescribed by the Treaties, Parliament began regularly to express its opinions on the proposals for regulations and directives which the Commission presented to the Council. It noted that the Commission exercising its unquestionable authority took the occasional suggestion of Parliament into consideration and introduced it into its proposal to the Council, while the latter always totally and arrogantly ignored Parliament's proposals and took decisions only on the basis of agreements reached or not reached in the inter-governmental negotiations between the Member States.

Third experience

In an effort to encourage the Commission to initiate and the Council to legislate from an overall viewpoint and to take account of the prevailing problems and circumstances, Parliament addressed itself on its own initiative to a series of major themes of Community policy and put forward various initiatives concerning the new resources required by the Community, progress on monetary union, the reforms of the agricultural policy, the implementation of a transport policy, a new policy on research and so on. The Committee on Institutional Affairs assembled in a single publication all the proposals for Community policies to be implemented, developed or modified which Parliament has so far adopted by large majorities and others which it will do so before the end of its mandate. Thus, Parliament has not only demonstrated its clear awareness of what needs to be done in the interest of the peoples of the Community but also that it is possible to rally broad political support for these proposals from the left to the right.

Parliament has also had to acknowledge however that the Commission is almost completely deaf to these requests and takes initiatives only insofar as the Council allows — by this I do not mean adopting them but taking them into consideration. The Council, with its hints and enigmatic pronouncements, is the real initiator of policies in the "Community and takes not the slightest notice of Parliament's proposals.

Fourth experience

Aware that Europe has political, economic and moral responsibilities in the world that go well beyond the limited economic competence of the Community and the issues dealt with in political cooperation, Parliament has begun to voice opinions and challenges on questions of international policy concerning security, human rights, the maintenance or restoration of peace

and so on. Parliament can of course frequently be accused of over-emotional attitudes in adopting these positions, but through these debates it has emphasized the need for a foreign policy and for joint security. It has had to acknowledge that its discussions in this field have had no effect whatsoever because it lacks the natural and necessary interlocutor, in other words an executive responsible for common foreign policy which through concrete action could establish firm points of reference for the parliamentary debates.

Fifth experience

Finally, by recognizing that the institutions function badly, but in the hope that by means of alterations and adjustments to be made within the framework of the existing Treaties, the method of operation can be substantially improved, Parliament has put forward a series of proposals to the Council and the Commission. It has been forced to note that beyond a few fine words neither the Council nor the Commission has acted on its requests because the Commission does not dare to claim powers usurped by the Council and the Council is too occupied with its inability to respond to similar proposals for institutional changes within its own structure such as the plan of the Three Wise Men and the Genscher plan, to take any notice of Parliament's proposals.

Sixth experience

Every six months the incoming President of the Council is called upon to set forth what the Council proposes to do. This should be Parliament's most important meeting because the entire construction of Europe is based on the principle that whatever is to be done jointly is delegated to the Commission, that Parliament exercises control over the workings of the Commission while the Court ensures respect for the law within the Community, but the power of deciding whether and which regulations and directives are to be introduced, how to implement them, which policies should be followed, which decisions and reforms to propose is virtually all in the hands of the Council.

Every six months the Parliament listens gloomily as the outgoing President of the Council relates how little the Council has been able to achieve. Then there is the President of the European Council who regularly comes to address Parliament on the serious nature of Europe's foreign policy problems and how sketchy and disappointing, without any guarantee of continuity, have been, and are only likely to be, the results of political cooperation.

If there were only a few, minor, slowly dwindling issues of a political, internal economic and international order to be dealt with by the

Community on a joint basis, the current inefficient system could be tolerated and indeed simplified. The Parliament with its laborious periodic elections and its claims to participate in decision-making could be done away with. The Commission and its administration could be pared down to a secretariat of the Council. The rare Community operations would involve only those who were interested and could be assigned to specialized agencies controlled by inter-governmental committees. It would be a return to the good old days of casual intermittent cooperation of a limited duration. I here are those who actually envisage such a future for the Community and who believe that these ideas are original and quite adequate. People used to talk about Europe *a la carte*, then it was: Europe and variable geometry, now they talk of a Europe made up of agencies.

But virtually day after day, and from one year to the next, Parliament has seen and heard the Commission, Council and even statesmen from third countries talk about the many increasingly serious economic and political problems which can be tackled more effectively on a joint basis or can only be tackled jointly.

Ladies and gentlemen, I shall spare you a list of these problems because any speaker on Europe could give one. Parliament's awareness of them has been demonstrated by the relative ease with which the Committee on Institutional Affairs has been able to outline the major themes of the Union in the course of its work.

If they have not been confronted with the proper persistence, with the right sense of perspective and solidarity, this is due essentially to the way in which decisions are taken in the Community. In every politically organized entity, decisions are forged following two different policies, which finally coagulate: the political policy in itself and the administrative policy.

Decisions of a European dimension should be prepared politically through debates, electoral campaigns and compromises which demonstrate the degree of consensus called for among European citizens. Hence, we have elections for the European Parliament. And for years now Parliament has demonstrated its ability to work out genuinely European positions. All this has no influence however on the formation of the decisions which have been taken by six, then nine, then 10, and tomorrow 12 ministers whose political roots are in the soil of their national political life and not in that of the European political scene.

Decisions of a European dimension should be prepared from the bureaucratic point of view by planning offices in the European administration to guarantee continuity with what is already in place at Community level. It is for this reason that the Commission has the right of initiative on Community laws. But all this has no bearing on the bureaucratic drafting of Council decisions. These are taken on the basis of six, 10 and then, shortly, 12 dossiers prepared by the same number of national planning offices, each of which has cut down the proposal of the Commission to a simpler working document and in preparing the dossier for its minister has had to take account of the national viewpoint and assert the national interest.

In other words, in the Community there is a sense of the existence of common problems; there is a sense of the need to react to these problems with common responses; there is the capacity to formulate these responses. But Community procedure means that drafting a European viewpoint and getting a European consensus in a European political and administrative Background to hold together is difficult and often impossible, while it facilitates even encourages the formation of a consensus on individual national drafts.

Entrusting decisions to such a procedure prevents the orderly expansion of the Community since the decision can only be the final equation of prior national drafting and decision-making for which there is no pre-ordained unity and indeed a far greater likelihood of divergence on account of the differing practices, political balances and so on. Decisions between governments are usually well nigh irreconcilable and when this is not the case there are delays, imperfections and incoherencies and a lack of any assurance of continuity. It should be added that the Council is not only structurally ill-equipped to carry out a policy for the gradual construction of a united Europe. As a body it is overbearingly arrogant and in spite of all evidence to the contrary considers itself capable of coping with and carrying forward any common policy needed by Europe. Once the problems began to multiply it then multiplied itself into a series of specialized Councils. When it was necessary to provide some form of unity for this increasingly disjointed conglomeration of Councils it first hit on the idea of the so-called summits, and then the European Council of Heads of State and Government.

Although it has continued to be just as ineffective, when Ministers Genscher and Colombo felt the rising unease that was seeping through the European construction and realized that Europe would jointly have to face other issues such as security, all they could come up with were proposals to extend the method of inter-governmental cooperation, already proved to be so

ineffective, to new domains To further restrict the Commission's autonomy and to continue to deprive Parliament of any genuine powers.

The obvious impossibility of overcoming the glaring contradiction between the needs of Europe and the ability of Europe run by the Council to respond to these needs was the bitter experience which led the European Parliament, composed as it was of moderates, to take up the proposal put forward by the nine members of different political parties and different nationalities who met in July 1980 as the now famous Crocodile Club and To assume on behalf of the citizens which had elected it, the task of preparing and proposing a wide-ranging reform of the Communities and the other Community-related structures.

We will now pass to the second question:

2. What is the substance of the reform?

In July 1982, having forwarded a number of general guidelines to the Committee on Institutional Affairs as to the direction it should adopt, Parliament began to discuss in particular a long resolution drawn up by the Committee on Institutional Affairs which set out in some detail the substance of the future Treaty. Once Parliament has adopted this resolution next September it is to be transformed by the committee into an actual draft treaty establishing the European Union. Parliament will then have to consider and vote on this draft at a final reading during the first few months of 1984, rounding off its mandate which expires in June 1984 with this proposal for institutional reform. Let us take a brief look at the substance of the draft already drawn up by the Committee on Institutional Affairs, although it has yet to reach its final version.

The first problem it had to resolve was the safeguarding of Community achievements, known as Community patrimony, while re-defining the competence of the institutions and the decision-making procedures. The drafting required scrapping a section which contained a list of amendments to the existing Treaties to avoid producing a document which by making continual references to other texts would have been incomprehensible to most people. A procedure for amending the existing Treaties is provided for by the Treaties themselves under which an initiative is required of the Commission (which has Invariably refused to make such proposals), which assigns to Parliament only its habitually subordinate consultative role, confers the authority to make draft amendments on the Council (which has repeatedly demonstrated its inability to carry out this task as it is doing even

now in its treatment of the Genschel-Colombo plan), and then leaves the Member States to organize a diplomatic conference between themselves and to have a text of any possible amendments prepared by the diplomatic services.

The impracticability of the method of amendments has led the committee to draft a treaty formally instituting the Union *ex novo*, in order to establish in a coherent manner its structure and competences, and the phases and procedures for its achievement. This has enabled a comprehensible text to be put forward while by-passing the absurd decision-making procedure established for amendments to the Community Treaties.

The new political body will be called the Union since this is the term which has been used since 1952 as a landmark for the construction of Europe. In order to preserve the Community patrimony the treaty will establish that the institutions, the aims and the competences of the Union will completely replace the institutions, aims and competences of the Community, of political cooperation and the EMS, while any element of a legislative nature contained in the Treaties establishing the Communities such as all the regulations, directives and decisions of the Community, or involving political cooperation and the EMS will remain in force until they are amended by the Union under its own procedures.

Having thus ensured legal and political continuity between the original Communities and the Union, our resolution puts an end to the plurality of Community cooperation system, placing the entire construction of Europe under the mantle of the Union and establishing that henceforth any step towards unification will be made within its scope under the forms and procedures laid down by the treaty establishing the Union.

One of the major features of the draft is that while it describes in detail the institutions of the Union and their competences, it also lays down the gradual stages of integration. Intergovernmental cooperation is seen as the basic and hazardous area of integration. Beyond that there is a sphere which will ultimately become one of common actions which will be decided and put into effect by the institutions of the Union but will continue to be carried out by the Member States until they are superseded by the decisions of the Union. Lastly, there is a sphere in which the Union will have sole power to act by its own decisions. The transition from one sphere to the other is subject to the principle of subsidiarity in cases where an objective can be achieved more effectively in common than separately, when achievement can

only be reached jointly. I shall not dwell here on the special procedures and guarantees provided for to ensure the transition to a higher level of unity.

In this way we have avoided the error of trying to pre-ordain in a rigid and definitive manner what should fall to joint competence and what to national competences. In the present circumstances, it would probably have meant an excessive diffidence against every decision and the easy predominance of restrictive interpretation and wrong allocation. Faster procedures than those for the revision of the Treaties have also been introduced to promote the working out of common policies and legislation.

The resolution by the Committee on Institutional Affairs proposes that the institutions of the Union should as far as possible be the same as those of the present Community although with some important changes. The European Council becomes an institution of the Union, but is quite distinct from the Council of the Union. The European Council is to consist of the Heads of State and Government and is the body responsible for cooperation. It can decide to transform certain forms of cooperation into common actions by delegating their administration to the legislative and executive organs of the Union. It has been calculated that by force of circumstance the Heads of Government will frequently recognize the need for common actions in which case, instead of instructing their own ministers or national officials to carry out their ideas, which would result in a rapid return to the traditional national frameworks, they will assign them to the Union's own organs.

The European Council thus takes on a similar role to that of the Heads of State when they appoint the President of the Commission and instruct him to form the Commission. The Council of the Union as distinct from the European Council is made up of representatives of the governments who will vote by a more or less qualified weighted majority although never by unanimity. The Council of the Union will share legislative power, adoption of the budget and the investiture of the Commission with Parliament. Parliament will finally cease to be a merely consultative body and will become a branch of the legislative authority and the budgetary authority. The Commission becomes a genuine centre of government with a political function and responsibilities. The European Council appoints the President who then appoints the Commission.

The Commission takes up its functions only once it has presented its programme to Parliament and the Council, and obtained approval for taking office. Its term of office is the same as that of Parliament which has the power however to adopt a motion of censure by a qualified majority requiring the

Commission to resign. By preserving the current formula the Committee on Institutional Affairs aimed to reconcile the practice of a vote of no-confidence which exists in all our countries with the idea of a collegiate government like the one in Switzerland. There cannot be a vote of no-confidence at every hand's turn, only in cases of marked opposition between Parliament and Commission.

The Commission becomes the only executive body of the Union. In particular it has the power to issue implementing regulations, putting an end to the current obligation to submit virtually all its implementing regulations to parliamentary opinions and Council decisions, and to the Council's habit of withdrawing regulations from the executive through its consultative committees and commandeering them. The Court of Justice has its powers strengthened on the basis of priority of Union law over national law.

The fields in which the Union expands its competences whether potential, concurrent or exclusive and acts through its institutions are economic policy, social policy, foreign policy and security. In addition to these areas there is the commitment, lacking in the present Communities, to respect and ensure respect by all the Member States for civil and political rights as well as social and economic rights. The financial autonomy of the Union is guaranteed but by means of regular consultations and the drafting of multi-annual financial programmes, there is a permanent link between the European and national fiscal requirements.

These are the broad outlines of the committee's draft. It undoubtedly proposes a qualitative leap in the structure of the institutions because while it recognizes the importance of the representation of the governments of the Member States and leaves them complete independence in the field of cooperation, it removes the current monopoly of the legislative power in the field of joint actions and-withdraws the vote by unanimity. The concept of the competences in the draft also constitutes a qualitative advance by setting out broad limits since it is impossible to establish in advance and in abstract to what extent it is advisable to act but it demands strong proof of consensus both within Parliament and in the Council any time a forward leap is envisaged.

The project is realistically based on the idea that the practical construction of a European economy and a European society, of a foreign policy and a European security apparatus must necessarily be gradual. Thus it provides for phases of transition, stages and demonstrations of consensus. But at the same time it will prevent the present distortions in building political will which

sacrifice the European sense of purpose to the national will. They will now at least be on an equal footing and the proof of this will be in letting one or the other come to the fore as the occasion demands rather than automatically assuming, as is now the case, that the national political will is far stronger.

The draft probably contains many flaws but it has to be admitted that the balance it strikes between boldness and caution is better than any of the previous attempts. It, as I hope, the European Parliament adopts this draft it will be satisfied with the work that has been done.

Now let us pass to the third and last question:

3. What to do about the draft treaty?

Parliament's greatest mistake would be to think that its political battle was over with the vote on the draft. The text would then be included in a resolution ending in the ritual phrase of all resolutions: The Parliament charges its President to transmit this resolution to the Commission, the Council, and the Member States.

You can be quite sure that the Commission would shrug its shoulders; the Council would probably assert that the text was unacceptable because it was not in accordance with Rule 236 and at best would assign it to one of its committees where it would meet the same fate as the draft of the ad hoc Assembly, the Tindemans plan, the Genscher-Colombo plan; the text would never reach the individual governments supposed to receive it according to the resolution because in a sense, it would already be considered as addressed to them from the moment it was given to the individual members of the Council, and it would go no further. Parliament will have to realize after its final vote on the draft treaty that its battle for European Union will have not ended but is just beginning and it must form its own political strategy perhaps along the following lines.

From the point of view of substance the text that the European Parliament will have voted is a genuine constitution because it defines institutions, competences and aims of a political body as distinct from its Member States although it is linked to them in the ways indicated in the actual wording. From the formal point of view the text is in fact a treaty because it can only enter into force and bring about the effects it envisages if it is ratified by the States destined to become members.

This dual legal nature of the Parliament's draft requires that as a constitution it should be drawn up and voted by the Assembly which legitimately represents all the citizens who are to become part of the union. As a rule, constitutions are voted by parliamentary assemblies because it is there that the various political groupings to which the citizens belong can freely confront each other and freely establish the points of convergence around which the greatest possible consensus can be welded. There is no reason why the constitution or the European Union should not be born in the same way through a similar pattern of confrontation and search for points of convergence and consensus. Especially since the Union is the natural fulfilment and metamorphosis of the Community, in other words a political body, already separate from the Member States, which has been in existence for more than 30 years and already has a directly elected Parliament.

This unwritten although exclusive political right of the European Parliament based on a sound democratic custom must be forcefully invoked by Parliament against any attempt to transfer the drafting to wise men, diplomats, ministers or others. If the European Parliament gives way on this point, if it admits that its work has been merely preparatory and is destined to be overhauled by others, it reduces itself to little more than a planning office and spontaneously admits that it lacks the virtue to represent the citizens of the Community thereby denying the very aim for holding the elections. We can be sure that many voices will be raised in opposition to this attitude of the European Parliament but let it be aware that if we abandon this trench the entire battlefield for the Union will collapse.

As a treaty, the European Parliament's draft can only enter into force if it is ratified by the States who are to be a party to it according to the proper constitutional procedures. None of our countries' constitutions, whether written or unwritten, lays down the procedures for drafting treaties. Thus there is no legal obstacle to the draft treaty's being drawn up, not as usually happens by an inter-governmental diplomatic conference, but by a parliamentary assembly in which the Citizens of the State which will be called upon to ratify it are adequately represented. Indeed, in one way or another, all the constitutions of our States lay down that only governments are authorized to ask the parliaments (or, in the case of France, with the option of a referendum) to approve treaties. Once it has voted on the draft treaty-constitution, the European Parliament should then send its delegations to each of the governments of the Member States of the Community and ask them to present it for ratification by their parliaments (or by a referendum).

It is unlikely that the various governments will rush to ask for ratification. Some will be more willing, others less so, but all will hesitate since quite naturally they will want to assess the political importance of the European Parliament's request before deciding what to do about it. It is important that the final provisions of the draft include one that provides for the entry into force of the treaty-constitution and the birth of the Union once a decisive block of support has been reached – let us say a group of States whose combined population is equal to two-thirds of the entire population of the Community. This would prevent any one government holding up the creation of the Union by its decision not to act on Parliament's request.

There will however be a period of uncertainty and indecision during which the European Parliament and its Members and political groups who have voted on the draft will have to work to overcome the hesitation, uncertainty and opposition in each individual country. The first and major opportunity for such action will be provided by the second European elections in June next year. During a couple of months throughout all the countries of the Community simultaneously, the citizens will be urged by candidates and parties to take stock of the fundamental problems of the Community and to elect MPs who will go to Strasbourg for the fight to solve them.

Members and parliamentary groups who will have voted on the draft treaty should thus feel committed initially to convincing their parties who will conduct the electoral campaign that the issue of the reform of the Community will be the central question on which the voters will be asked to express their opinion and which will give a political significance to the Europe-wide vote. They will then have to call for the support of the popular vote so that on the one hand in the new European parliament there is a, solid majority determined to ensure that the proposal made by the previous Parliament is accepted, and on the other, that the parties represented in ' the European campaign and afterwards in the European Parliament – but also in the national parliaments and governments – put pressure on their governments through parliamentary motions to present the draft treaty-constitution of the Union for ratification by the parliaments (or through referenda), which has been submitted to them by the European Parliament.

It is so important that the current European Parliament should vote the draft treaty and deliver it to the individual governments before the European elections because this is the only way to make uniformly clear to one and all within the next year, both at the European and the national level, the issue on which citizens, parties, parliaments and governments must decide in favour or otherwise. Were the current European Parliament to conclude its

mandate without having fulfilled this task, the next election campaign would be a cacophony of disjointed and feeble slogans, varying from country to country, from party to party and from candidate to candidate. The opportunity for a major uniform mobilization of the people, with a clearly-stated purpose would be wasted. It is more than likely that the election campaign will not be sufficient to sway the resistance and that the battle for ratification will continue after the elections. But while it is highly probable that much of the resistance will have started to waver and that the favourable mood will have increased the Parliament which will emerge from the 1984 elections will be a strong political centre which will feel committed to pursuing the task.

Today no one can know how long the battle for ratification will last or what will be the outcome. But if the Parliament and its new pro-European members and groups are capable of acting within the time limits for the objectives I have just mentioned the battle will certainly be on, and the chances of wearing down the resistance, winning over the faint-hearted and carrying the day are considerable.

Let it not be said that not a single government would accept our draft today. My reply would be that all our governments are convinced of the need for progress on Europe but they are incapable of putting together a few ideas as a start on real progress because they draw all their ideas from the intellectual arsenal of their diplomacies, in other words from a source that produces only futile proposals for inter-governmental action. We must work on their deep-seated feelings of guilt at their own impotence in European affairs – by demonstrating that Parliament's proposal is the response to the need for greater European unity which they too recognize.

Let it not be said that the parties are not aware of European problems and do nothing about them. Why should they when they are never confronted with them? But they will be confronted with them at the next elections and we can then seriously set about opening their eyes and ears.

And finally let it not be said that all this is too risky, that we must keep our feet on the ground and take small steps forward. You can all see to what a disastrous state this so-called policy of feet on the ground and small steps has led us – a policy called 'pragmatism', while it really is a policy based on a lack of ideas and vision or to put it bluntly, based on intellectual subservience or worn-out and hopelessly inadequate ideas.

We must make everyone aware in the next election campaign that Europe ought to carry great weight in the world and carries no weight at all; that it should be doing much for its citizens and is capable of doing so little; and that for these reasons it is vital to establish a real European Union and to establish it soon.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have come to an end, but allow me to conclude with a brief personal reflection. It is highly probable that my advanced age will not permit me to be part of this action for much longer. But when I reflect that today the first elected European Parliament would be very different from what it is had it not assumed the constituent role I have talked about, and when I think that all my long years as an advocate of Europe have culminated in this operation I cannot help repeating to myself with some pride the words of St. Paul: *bonum certamen certavi, cursum consummavi* (I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course).

Chapter 7

The Hemingway Allegory, 1983

14 September 1983: Before voting on the measure confirming the whole Parliament's position on European Union, the Assembly hears Spinelli's – unrehearsed – reference to the difficulties of the action undertaken and the obstacles to be encountered on the path ahead. The Hemingway Allegory marks one of the most intense moments, from the human and political point of view, of the relationship between Spinelli and the European Parliament.

I shall try very briefly to explain, by a parable, the significance of my vote in favour. You must all know the short story by Hemingway, about an old fisherman who, after catching the biggest fish of his life, tries to get it back to shore. But bit by bit the sharks eat it, so that when the old man returns to shore, all that remains is a fishbone.

Mr. President, with the vote it will take in a few minutes, Parliament will have caught the biggest fish of its life. But it must bring it back into port. So let us be careful, because the sharks will always be there waiting to devour it. Let us try not to return into port with a fishbone.

Chapter 8

The Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, 1984

14 February 1984: In this debate and the vote following it the European Parliament performs the most important act of its short history as a European democratic Assembly, bringing to a conclusion the action initiated by Spinelli on 25 June 1980 and continued by the foundation – on 9 July – of the Crocodile Club.

Following up the resolution approved on 14 September 1983, the Committee on Institutional Affairs transformed the content of the resolution into the articles of a Treaty. A committee of 4 jurists, Francesco Capotorti, Meinhard Hilf, Francis Jacobs and Jean Paul Jacqué, ensured that the treaty was legally sound. The legal accuracy of the language in the Dutch, Danish and Greek versions was also ensured by Hans Nord (Liberal Member), Peters Vesterdorf (Danish lawyer) and Dimitris Evrigenis (Greek lawyer and Member of the European Parliament since June 1984). On 13 December 1983 the Committee on Institutional Affairs approves the draft Treaty by 31 votes in favour and 2 against.

Mr President, honourable colleagues, the Committee on Institutions has completed the task which this Parliament entrusted to it. Today I have the honour of asking you on its behalf to approve the resolution containing the draft treaty establishing the European Union.

Before I proceed, let me draw your attention to the fact that one line has been removed from the explanatory statement. It referred to the very first text in which the subject of institutional reform was raised, the Van Aerssen motion a resolution of September 1979. The missing line will be restored. I

should just like to make a preliminary comment on the amendments you are being asked to vote on. One group of amendments are stylistic corrections which the committee do not have time to incorporate into the text and which it asks you to approve. A second group are amendments which put to the House substitute formulae already considered and rejected by the committee. We must ask you to reject these, for they seek to modify texts which are the result of often complex and delicate compromises which it would be unwise to tamper with. Since we should all be aware that to produce this draft meant marrying ideas of different parentage, I shall ask the authors of the amendments to withdraw them.

The last category is amendments containing some new ideas or nuances. The committee proposes that the House adopt these or, if not, an acceptable compromise amendment which does not alter the meaning of the article. These amendments include some relating to Article 82 of the treaty and paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution, the acceptance or rejection of which will affect the whole political significance of the draft treaty. I shall be speaking of these shortly.

I come to the central theme of our debate, which, since it is the fourth to be devoted here to this subject, will no doubt concentrate on the essential aspect which I wish to define in the following way: today, in this House, the European Parliament must explain firmly and clearly the political reasons for our proposal. It must explain them to itself, to the governments and parliaments of the Member States, to the parties, to the social groupings and, above all, to our citizens in whose hands in four months time we shall be placing the mandate for which we canvassed five years ago. It is to the clarity and firmness of that explanation that I want to contribute with this introduction to the debate.

Our proposal for institutional reform and the Genscher-Colombo Plan came into being at almost the same time a little over two years ago and have a great deal in common. Both stem from recognition of the contradiction between the growing need for European unity and the obvious danger that it might not merely fail to develop, but actually regress. Both projects express the view that the fundamental reason for this crisis is that the objectives to be achieved are too narrowly defined and the way in which the Community operates is inefficient. Both projects, therefore, focus on institutional reform. They are alike, too, in reflecting their authors' acute awareness that results can be achieved only by a compromise between those engaged in the search for a solution.

However, the methods used in the two approaches to the problem have been very different. The negotiators of the Genscher-Colombo Plan, ministers and diplomats, derived their legitimacy from their capacity as State representatives as such. Although they were aware that they were dealing with problems of Community significance and dimension, they were all bound by the nature of their institutional position to see things primarily from the national point of view. In the case of our project we derived our legitimacy from our role as the elected representatives of the Community's citizens, as the most authentic trustees of nascent European democracy. Coming as we do from the political and social life of our countries, we are all conscious of the need to take the problems of our respective countries into account. But our institutional task is to see things first and foremost from the European standpoint. We now know the results of these two different approaches. During the Genscher-Colombo Plan negotiations the national perspective inevitably prevailed. European considerations gradually faded and the final declaration proposes in effect that inter-governmental action should be strengthened to the detriment of supranational action. In the course of the work on the draft on which we shall be voting this evening, far from becoming weaker the European aspect actually became clearer, surer, as the work progressed.

Our text makes the Commission into a genuine political executive and preserves a legislative and budgetary role for the Council of the Union. It recognizes that there are fields in which problems should be dealt with by the European Council by the method of cooperation. But it prohibits the inter-governmental method from encroaching on the sphere of common action and, at the same time, leaves a way open for certain matters to be transferred from the sphere of cooperation to that of common action. In one sense it has been providential that the Athens Council came between Stuttgart, where the Genscher-Colombo Plan was voted on, and Strasbourg, where we are voting today on the draft treaty. For the Genscher-Colombo Plan Athens was a real *hie Rhodus, hie salta* and it failed to make the crucial leap. It had proposed strengthening the inter-governmental method and Athens demonstrated the logical, never mind political impossibility of conceiving and carrying through by that method large-scale policies which need to be pursued over a long period, to be based on broad consent and to overcome certain rigid national attitudes. But the disaster in Athens also showed unexpectedly what the previous Councils, despite their creeping paralysis, had managed to shield from public gaze. For the first time, the Athens Council revealed that there was a real possibility that the union achieved in the Community could collapse and sacrosanct national egotism could return. Everyone feared the effects of such a collapse and began to look for a means of refloating the ship of Europe.

Our draft treaty could not have appeared on the political scene at a more opportune moment, for it is the only politically and intellectually valid reply to the failure in Athens. Our reply, like all true and genuine things, is both easy and hard to digest. It can be summed up in very few words: matters of common interest can be administered only by a genuinely common authority. Anyone who seriously desires to escape from the Athens impasse must support our project, but what a mass of taboos to overcome before people will see the truths staring them in the face!

Once approved, our draft treaty will not go to the Council, which would hand it over to the diplomatic representatives, who would dissect it and bury it. We shall deliver it to the national governments and parliaments, asking them to set in motion the ratification procedures.

The Committee on Institutional Affairs is recommending that Parliament follows this path principally for two complementary reasons. In the first place, this elected Parliament must be clearly and specifically conscious – and proud – of being the only European body in which the citizens of Europe as such are represented, in political groupings which are the same as those that exist in the national contexts. It follows that it is the only European body capable of drawing up a constitutional proposal without losing sight of the European perspective and with the participation of the political forces of all the Member States. In the second place, the national governments and parliaments are clearly aware of the need to push ahead with European integration and therefore to say yes or no to a scheme for Europe. But, if they sit down round a table in the persons of national ministers of parliamentary delegations to draft a text, the national reflexes of the individual minister or parliamentary delegation are inevitably triggered so that they automatically begin again to discuss things from the point of view of necessarily divergent national demands. Diplomatic negotiation would quickly predominate once more for reasons of national interest and the European Parliament's text would soon be reduced to a working document and eventually laid aside.

Of course we cannot rule out the possibility that our draft treaty will encounter such obstacles, that Parliament will have to take it back, put it on the last again, so to speak, and reshape it. But let us wait and see before deciding to do that. Let us be careful not to demote our proposal now from the level of an official project from the only political assembly qualified to propose a text on European institutional reform to the level of a working document humbly submitted by a Parliament unsure of its right to draft it.

I have dwelt on this aspect of our proposal which is referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution and in the compromise amendment which our committee is recommending for approval because the effect of the Haagerup-Nord amendment would be illogical in precisely the way I have been trying to indicate. If this amendment were approved, we would ourselves have declared that we are incapable of presenting a viable project. Probably some of us, I for one, would feel rather ashamed to set foot again in a Parliament capable of such an act of self-mutilation and self-ridicule. We shall, therefore, I hope, decide to address ourselves to the governments and parliaments of the Member States to ask them to take over and approve the project. That is when the real battle for the Union will begin and the European Parliament's role will continue to be vital, for it will have to direct and inspire a difficult and exacting operation which cannot succeed unless we learn to be single-minded.

Our political groups will be asked to exert all the influence they can on their parties and thereby on their related political groups in the national parliaments. We shall explain and publicize our draft treaty during the next election campaign. We ask here and now that the next Parliament take all the necessary measures to overcome the obstacles and secure ratification.

I should like to draw your attention, too, to Article 82 and to the compromise amendment which refers to it and which the committee asks you to approve. The article says that unanimous ratification by the present Member States is not required for the Treaty to enter into force between those that do ratify it. It will then be for the latter to decide on the date and procedure for the entry into force of the Treaty and to negotiate new relations with the States which have not acceded. I draw your attention to the fact that such a quorum means that at least six States must have ratified the Treaty and seven in a Europe of Twelve; so the smaller States will have a decisive say in the matter.

If we left any doubt as to whether a start could be made without the full number ratifying the Treaty, we should be putting the success of the enterprise into the hands not of those who are most decided, but of those States which are most hesitant, even potential opponents, condemning the entire undertaking to virtually certain failure. Among the hesitant countries I am thinking – and I am not the only one to do so – of France, watching her with particular attention, anguish and apprehension because of the probably decisive impact which her response will have on all the other countries of the Community. The hesitation of many of our French colleagues in this House

is a clear indication of serious hesitation among the leaders of their country. Once again, it is almost providential that France holds the Presidency of the Council in this first half of 1984, which starts with today's vote on the draft treaty of the Union and will end with the European elections. Of course no one can expect all the accumulated damage of the Athens fiasco and long before to be made good during these months, but we are entitled to expect that the way in which they can be redressed might be discovered and mapped out.

The French Presidency is, therefore, under an obligation during these six months to ponder the crisis in Europe and ways of dealing with it with greater intensity and more imagination than in past years. We should, I believe, advise it not to expect much from the bilateral meetings it is so keen on. To be sure, it is possible, even likely, that a series of compromises of a short-term nature will be found during these meetings, but one can bet on it that they will be bad compromises, because they will put off the institutional crisis for a year or two, when it will explode all the more dangerously for having been deferred. Useful though they may be for specific limited agreements inter-governmental negotiations are bound to produce bad compromises, when what is needed is a large-scale, lasting policy.

Our Parliament must, with this evening's vote, say to all the people of France, but above all to the President of the Republic, who recently appealed for a return to the spirit of the Congress of The Hague and spoke of the need to achieve political unity that we took to the French. Presidency of the Council to do more than come and speak to us in ritual fashion, at the end of its half-year, of the Council's trifling achievements during that period; instead we expect it to recognize that our proposal is the reply, the only viable reply to the life-and-death challenge facing Europe and, with it, France, and we look to the French Government – I really do mean the French Government, not the European Council – to adopt the draft treaty and to announce that it is prepared to begin the ratification procedure as soon as the minimum number of countries required by the Treaty for its entry into force have similarly committed themselves. In that case, these six months of the French Presidency would go down in history.

In conclusion, on behalf of the Committee on Institutional Affairs, I ask the House to vote massively for the Committee's resolution and the amendments which it is recommending.

Chapter 9

Spinelli and Socrates, 1984

14 February 1984: Before the Assembly takes the final vote on the draft Treaty, Spinelli recalls the commitment undertaken vis-à-vis "his" electors and his role in Parliament.

The draft Treaty establishing the European Union is approved by the European Parliament by 237 votes in favour, 31 against and 43 abstentions.

Mr President, during the election campaign five years ago, I promised my constituents who were not on the centre-right but on the left that I would pursue this matter. I have kept that promise. Today, having reached this point, the end of one chapter and the beginning of another which others, perhaps, will complete, and as I look back on the task that I have tried to accomplish here, I have to tell you that it is my view that if the ideas contained in this draft and the resolution had not been in the minds of the great majority of this Parliament, it would have been quite impossible for me to put them there. I have merely practised the art of maieutics, after the manner of Socrates. I am the midwife who has delivered Parliament of this infant. Now we must nurture it.

Thank you.



The Legacy

Chapter 10

Aide Memoire on the Procedure to be Followed, 1985

On 5 March 1985, Altiero Spinelli, Italian Chairman of the European Parliament's Institutional Affairs Committee, writes an aide-memoire on the procedure to be followed so that the Intergovernmental Conference, responsible for drawing up the Treaty on European Union, may reach a successful conclusion.

Source: Archives historiques des Communautés européennes, Florence, Villa Il Poggiolo. Dépôts, DEP. Emanuele Gazzo, EG. EG 64.

Aide-mémoire sur la procédure à suivre pour la convocation de la Conférence Intergouvernementale chargée de rédiger le Traité d'Union européenne

1. Le Conseil européen des 28 et 29 juin 1985 à Milan décidera de l'opportunité de convoquer la Conférence Intergouvernementale souhaitée par le Président de la République Française et recommandée par le "Comité ad hoc sur les questions institutionnelles".

La situation politique et notamment électorale dans plusieurs Etats membres est telle qu'une décision doit absolument être prise en juin; tout retard mettrait gravement en péril cette initiative.

2. Pour que la Conférence ait quelque chance d'aboutir, il est indispensable qu'elle reçoive un mandat précis, qui peut être ainsi formulé:

- a) se saisir du projet de Traité du Parlement européen et proposer d'éventuelles modifications tout en respectant son esprit et sa méthode ;
- b) chercher, suivant une procédure appropriée, un accord entre la Conférence et le Parlement européen en vue de parvenir à un texte approuvé par les deux instances ;
- c) soumettre le projet final aux signatures des gouvernements en vue des ratifications nationales.

A l'appui de cette proposition, je mentionnerai les arguments suivants:

- le projet du Parlement européen est le fruit de trois ans de travail et de compromis entre les grands courants politiques de la Communauté, légitimement présents dans le Parlement européen ;
- le projet du Parlement européen englobe (en l'adaptant à la situation nouvelle) tout l'acquis communautaire, y compris la coopération politique ainsi que les aménagements à celle-ci par la Déclaration de Stuttgart ;
- le rapport Dooge reprend, dans des termes plus généraux, la plupart des idées formulées, dans un langage juridique précis, dans le projet du Parlement européen, et suggère à la Conférence des modifications qui n'en changent ni l'esprit ni la méthode ;
- si la Conférence ne basait pas ses travaux sur un projet précis et articulé comme celui du Parlement européen, elle risquerait fort de recommencer à zéro et de ne pas aboutir dans un délai raisonnable, voire de ne pas aboutir du tout ;
- la participation de plein droit du Parlement européen à l'adoption du projet définitif est une nécessité politique car la Conférence intergouvernementale verra surtout s'affronter en son sein les points de vue nationaux, alors que le Parlement européen pourra présenter un point de vue authentiquement européen ; il est indispensable de parvenir à un équilibre entre ces deux exigences ;
- cette participation est exigée aussi par la logique juridique: en effet, le projet définitif aura un double caractère de Traité international et de Constitution

de l'Union: en tant que Traité, il doit être négocié par une conférence intergouvernementale - en tant que Constitution, il doit être préparé par le Parlement européen qui représente l'ensemble des citoyens de la Communauté; en cas de divergences entre les positions de la Conférence et celles du Parlement européen, il faut donc prévoir des méthodes appropriées de conciliation qui permettront d'arriver à un texte définitif approuvé par les deux instances.

3. Bien qu'il soit hautement souhaitable que tous les gouvernements des pays membres de la Communauté participent à la Conférence, il est possible que certains s'y refusent ou n'acceptent d'y participer qu'à condition que le mandat soit anodin et ne les engage préalablement à rien. Dans cette hypothèse, il est clair que la convocation de la Conférence ne pourra pas être le fait du Conseil européen lui-même. Elle devrait alors naître de l'initiative d'un Chef d'Etat ou de gouvernement: dans le contexte politique actuel, ce Chef d'Etat ne pourrait être que le Président de la République française qui inviterait tous les gouvernements qui le souhaitent à y participer sur la base d'un mandat tel que suggéré ci-dessus.

4. Il faut être conscient que le projet du Parlement européen aussi bien que le rapport Dooge - le premier explicitement, le deuxième implicitement, mais dans les deux cas inéluctablement - prévoient que toutes les compétences des Communautés soient exercées par les institutions de l'Union et selon ses méthodes. Cela signifie que les Communautés seront absorbées par l'Union qui fera sien tout l'acquis communautaire et le développera ultérieurement avec plus d'efficacité et de démocratie.

Si tous les pays membres de la Communauté deviennent membres de l'Union, la succession de l'Union à la Communauté ne pose que des problèmes techniques.

Si l'Union n'est composée que d'une partie des membres de la Communauté (au moins la majorité des Etats membres comprenant les 2/3 de la population globale de la Communauté), elle assumera, pour ce qui est de ces Etats, l'acquis communautaire ; des négociations avec les autres Etats devront être entreprises en vue de sauvegarder le plus possible l'interdépendance et l'ouverture réciproque de leurs économies réalisées par la Communauté, sans laisser survivre des structures qui ne seraient pas compatibles avec la nouvelle réalité.

Altiero Spinelli

Président de la Commission Institutionnelle du Parlement européen

Chapter II

The Strategy for Achieving European Union, 1986

Speech by Altiero Spinelli to the Committee on institutional affairs, 4 February 1986

After inviting his colleagues to 'venture again' at the sitting of 16 January 1986, Mr Spinelli outline for the Committee on Institutional Affairs the new strategy the European Parliament should follow in the 1989 European elections in order to take on the role of constitution-maker for the European Union.

This in substance represented the 'political testament' Mr Spinelli has left the European Parliament and the Committee on Institutional Affairs. As he was aware however that the European Parliament could not win its battle without the support of the public, Mr Spinelli proposed that referenda be held in all Community countries on European Union and democratic means of attaining it and invited a group of European opinion leaders to consider the way and rate at which political unity could be achieved in Europe.

Following Spinelli's death, this initiative gave rise to an "Altiero Spinelli action Committee for European Union" at the initiation of Carlo Ripa di Meana, Emanuele Gazzo, Werner Maihofer, Jean Paul Jacque and Jean Victor Louis and in the European Parliament, on a proposal from Hansch Herman, Ippolito, Newton Dunn and Romeo, a Federalist Intergroup for European Union intended to take the place and continue the work started in July 1980 by the Crocodile Club.

The Strategy for Achieving European Union

All the European Parliament's new initiatives (contacts with national parliaments, social interest groups, the general public, etc.) must be grouped together to form one strategy, the basic steps of which have been laid down by the European Parliament on a proposal from the Committee on Institutional Affairs.

The facts of the matter are that:

- 1) Contact with national parliaments will only bear fruit if the European Parliament actually has something to say. If we look to them to provide ideas we will be met with vague suggestions only, as national parliaments are not cut out for drawing up projects on a European scale;
- 2) It is only when the Committee on Institutional Affairs has formulated a new strategy that it will be possible to convince the political groups and encourage them to take action with the national political parties;
- 3) It is only if we actually have a strategy that social interest groups will be drawn to and support it; without it, these groups will fail to come up with any European-wide political project;
- 4) It is only if we have a strategy that the general public will take an interest and it will be given attention by the press, the mass media, universities, etc. The work of our information services only acts as a catalyst and can never be a substitute for ideas which only the Parliament as such can express;
- 5) Only when we have this strategy will we be able to influence the Commission, which will otherwise continue to pursue its path of indecisiveness (let us remember what happened in the past: the working party chaired by Vedel, the Paris Summit in October 1972, powers for the Monetary Union and the 1975 Commission report were all in vain and these documents now form part of the Community's archives);
- 6) Only if we have a specific strategy in the next few months will we be able to request that certain appropriations be included in Parliament's budget.

The debates held in this Committee so far have shown — apart from some minor details — that there are two possible strategies and that it is essential to establish at the outset what path we are to pursue.

The first strategy can be formulated as follows:

The Single European Act contains some minor innovations. We must monitor the implementation of the Act and if, in two years' time (in 1988, i.e. one year before the European elections), as seems more than likely, the Act has proved to be ineffective, we will present the minimum number of proposals for reform needed in order to make the Community function properly, i.e. a specific, concise draft Treaty (some members of the Committee on Institutional Affairs consider that this draft could be prepared very quickly in collaboration with the national parliaments).

It is clear that this draft – a minimal, specific and concise one – will be a retrograde step compared with Parliament's draft Treaty on European Union, as experience has shown that our draft could not be accepted by an Intergovernmental Conference (in other words, by the governments of our countries). Parliament must launch an appeal to voters in the 1989 elections to support this minimum draft and, consequently, the list of major policies to be implemented which require such reforms. This support by the electorate will be deemed to confer a mandate on the new European Parliament to push for acceptance of this draft.

As we will not have challenged governments' European powers, but instead will have wisely remained silent on this issue, there seems every reason to suppose that some governments – at best – will listen to us and propose – naturally – a new intergovernmental conference, since none of them will have said in advance that this is unacceptable. And this conference will once again require the agreement of all parties, as no one will have proposed a procedure keeping out those who do not wish to move forward and providing for special agreements in this respect. It is possible that this strategy may lead to some slight progress. It is certain that, in any case, it will bring about insufficient progress and, since technological, social, ecological, foreign policy and security problems will have evolved in the meantime, the Community will in fact have regressed further.

The second strategy takes the following lines:

a) we must fight to ensure that the mandate to be proposed to national parliaments and, in the case of France, to the electorate by means of a referendum on reform of the Community and political cooperation, is recognized as being conferred on the new European Parliament which will be elected in 1989, by means of a majority of the Community Member States amounting to 2/3 of the Community's total population; this would get round

the problem of Europe being 'put together' by national bureaucracies, i.e. by an intergovernmental conference;

b) This mandate will not involve a new, specific, short Treaty but instead will involve a definition of the features of the Union's Constitution (subsidiarity, effectiveness and democracy) and a definition of the consequences in the event of several countries failing to join the Union; It will be the task of the new elected Parliament to bring this mandate to a conclusion, knowing that its draft will be subject to ratification instead of being 'demolished' by an Intergovernmental Conference of senior bureaucrats;

c) In order that a number of governments should agree to recognize this mandate, it is advisable that it should be given public support in their respective countries. A consultative or 'policy' referendum is the best formula (as proposed by De Gaulle, Giscard and Andreotti and implemented by Wilson and the Norwegian, Danish, Irish and Spanish Governments). I do not think that it is possible to visualize decision-making referenda, since this would involve constitutional reforms, but the constitutions of various countries do not prohibit consultative referenda. However, it would be advisable – and moreover not very difficult – to carry out a study on this subject. If insurmountable difficulties were to arise in some countries, it would be possible simply to hold a formal vote in the national parliaments;

d) The task of this new European Parliament would be to draw up the text of the mandate and try to persuade national parliaments, governments, parties, social interest groups, the general public, the Commission, etc.;

e) In order to have chance of success, Parliament must state its intentions clearly and firmly. If instead it makes veiled, ambiguous pronouncements, leaving it until the very end to reveal the crucial choices to be made, it will lose the fight and the action needed will not even get under way.

Thirty years ago these obstacles could be largely ignored and it was perhaps wisest not to discuss them and instead to tackle the problems of the resistance put up by national bureaucratic structures only when the 'battle' was over. Today these well-known obstacles face us and cannot be ignored. Failure to denounce them for what they are will be tantamount to capitulation.

This is why, in a nutshell, the second strategy must be not to declare that we want nothing to do with national governments, but rather to declare that we want nothing to do with reforms drawn up by bureaucrats and experts and we want nothing to do with the need for unanimous ratification in order to

implement reforms. Europe must be built by means of European democracy which already exists as a result of the European Parliament.

The first strategy would result in Parliament being kept in the background for the next two years. The second strategy would enable it to be at the centre of things in the campaign for Europe, starting with the major debate which must be held on the constituent mandate.

My working proposal is this: we must appoint a 'draftsman' to prepare a detailed analysis of the two strategies and their implications so that the Committee on Institutional Affairs can hold debates during their forthcoming meetings in February, March and April. Between April and July we must give the political groups the opportunity to discuss these matters so that our strategy can then be presented to the House in the autumn. I would like to propose Mr Fernand Herman as 'draftsman', since he took part in our work during the last assembly and was a member of the Dooge Committee for the Belgian Government. In the course of these activities he demonstrated a great capacity for independent thought and judgment, also vis-à-vis his political group.

When considering these issues and work of the Committee which will give them concrete form, I would urge you to bear in mind also that I am prepared to discuss many of the details of the second strategy, but if you choose the first strategy you will also have to choose another chairman.

Thank you!

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The life and political actions of Altiero Spinelli (1907–1986) reflect the eventful transformations that Europe underwent in the last century. A political opponent of Fascism since his early youth, Spinelli spent more than a decade in prison and confinement. During those difficult years, he synthesised classical federalist thinking into a theory and a blueprint for a federation of Europe. Spinelli was a close advisor to Alcide de Gasperi in the 1950s, a part-time scholar in the 1960s, a Commissioner in the early 1970s, a paramount figure of the European Parliament from 1976 to 1986, and an unrelenting critic of all orthodoxies.

In this volume the reader will find some of Spinelli's key political texts, from the Manifesto of Ventotene to the farewell speech given to the European Parliament. This is RECON's way of celebrating Spinelli in the year that marks both the centenary of his birth and the launch of the research project.

RECON – Reconstituting Democracy in Europe – is an Integrated Project supported by the European Commission's Sixth Framework Programme for Research. The project has 18 partners in 12 countries across Europe and is coordinated by ARENA – Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo. RECON runs for five year (2007–2011) and focuses on the conditions for democracy in the multilevel constellation that makes up the EU.

