Identity and Democracy in the New Europe

The Next Generation Finds Its Way

Olga Brzezińska, Erika Kurucz, Ulrike Liebert and Rosemarie Sackmann (eds)

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Preface

Reconstituting Democracy in Europe (RECON) is an Integrated Project supported by the European Commission's Sixth Framework Programme for Research, Priority 7 'Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-based Society'. The five-year project has 21 partners in 13 European countries and New Zealand, and is coordinated by ARENA – Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo. RECON takes heed of the challenges to democracy in Europe. It seeks to clarify whether democracy is possible under conditions of pluralism, diversity and complex multilevel governance. See more on the project at www.reconproject.eu.

The present report is a joint cooperation between RECON's work package 5 'Civil Society and the Public Sphere' and work package 8 'Identity Formation and Enlargement'. WP 5 analyses how civil society and the public sphere shape the democratic reconstitution of Europe. Adopting a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparative perspective, it explores the conditions and dynamics of democratisation from below. WP 8 has two interrelated objectives: to clarify how much trust and commonality is needed to establish democracy, as a means of collective will formation at the various levels of governance of the compound EU polity; and to understand the formation of collective identities with regard to enlargement processes, with an emphasis on comparing the 'old' and the 'new' member states.

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Introduction

As a backdrop to contemporary crises and conflicts about the future of European integration, the "battlegrounds of European identity" (Kohli 2000) are back on the political as well as the scholarly agendas.[1] Research on European identity involves three key questions: First, the analytical issue as to whether a collective identity for the EU is necessary, and if so, what functions and consequences can be attributed to it. A second, empirical question is whether European identity is likely to emerge at all. And a third question refers to its normative implications, that is, whether a European

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[*]I want to thank the co-editors and authors of this report for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this introduction which has benefited in particular from the cooperation and exchanges with Rosemarie Sackmann, Magdalena Góra and David Skully.

[1] Over the past decades, research on "European identity" has triggered a continuing flow of scholarly publications; see Smith (1992); Stråth (2000; 2010); Herrmann, Risse and Brewer (2004); Bruter (2005); Cerutti (2005); Delanty (1995; 2005); Nida-Rümelin and Weidenfeld (2007); Meyer and Eisenberg (2008); Fligstein (2008; 2009); Checkel and Katzenstein (2009); Eder (2009); Risse (2010); Góra and Mach (2010).

identity is desirable and for what reasons (cf. Habermas 2006: 67ff). Yet, taking stock of what has been learned from a generation of identity scholarship, we are faced with two sets of problems (Abdelal et al. 2009): On the one hand, there is the problem of taking advantage of new theoretical approaches for conceptualising identity as a variable with an analytical value added. On the other hand, there is the coordination problem involved when drawing on new methodological options for measuring analytical conceptions of identity empirically in a consistent and clear way.

This research report presents an attempt to combine a theoretically informed conceptual framework with a novel methodological approach for empirically measuring subjective European identity constructions. This introductory chapter prepares the ground by pursuing three objectives.

First, by mapping the expanding research agenda about European identity, it shows which analytical added value this concept promises.

As a second step, by drawing on theoretical polity models of democracy in the EU, a yardstick is developed by which empirical patterns of identification can be measured. Toward this end, an analytical framework of three European identity constructions is elaborated, each of which is the correlate of a different model of the EU. Translated into discursive statements, these constructions – and their combinations – will help measure empirical patterns of subjective identification among Europeans.

The third part matches the above analytical framework with Q methodology for empirically measuring subjective patterns of identification in cross-national comparative analysis. Q methodology is a research method that has not only gained prominence in social psychology and psychological research, but offers as well an appropriate tool kit for the present purposes (for a detailed account, see chapter 2).[2] It is applied to selected case studies and a comparative analysis that has been conducted as a pilot study among

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[2] The notion 'Q methodology' is used in the literature to refer to specific procedures of data collection and interpretation, as well as to their underlying methodology.

younger scholars (students) from Germany, Hungary and Poland in 2008/9. Further empirical research is clearly needed for corroborating our findings and more fully understanding the benefits as well as the limits of this research methodology.

Research questions about European identity

Generally speaking, the academic research agenda on European identity focuses on three types of questions: analytical, empirical and normative. Regarding the analytical and empirical issues, Jürgen Habermas has asked "Is the development of a European identity necessary, and is it possible?" (2006: 67ff). In analytical terms, the role and functions of a European identity is at stake. For instance, in the context of an EU crisis, some would question whether the EU has the right to charge citizens with the costs of certain policies – for instance, rescuing the euro – without the existence of a collective European identity. Assuming that a European identity is necessary for advancing European positive integration, such policies might well fail as long as a European identity is missing. Yet, others doubt the necessity of a European identity, placing their trust instead in sources of norm compliance and motives for public support other than collective identity.

From an empirical perspective, there is widespread belief suggesting that a common European identity does not exist and that it is an illusion to expect an international organisation like the European Union (EU) to evolve one. Countering these assumptions, social scientific research provides empirical evidence suggesting that over four decades of European integration, common patterns of European identification have gradually emerged. Following the work pioneered by Stråth (2000; 2010), Herrmann, Risse and Brewer (2004), Bruter (2005) and Risse (2010), the emergence of European identity has been reconstructed as a dynamic interaction between external challenges, European constitutional norms, public contestations, and citizenship practices (Liebert 2012). For instance, addressing the external challenges of the Cold War, the EC's Foreign Ministers in the early 1970s as well as the Heads of States and Governments of the EU at their 2001 Laeken summit committed themselves to a European identity defined in democratic terms. Regarding the constitutive norms for a EU identity of the early 21st century, the Laeken declaration unequivocally committed EU leaders to engage citizens with a more democratic Union:

> The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient. It also has to […] bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design and the European institutions […].
>
> Laeken Declaration 2001

In the domain of social practices, empirical social scientists have confirmed the emergence of forms of mass European identity. To highlight just a few, Michael Bruter (2004, 2005) found evidence of civil and cultural norms that constitute two distinct varieties of mass European identity. Thomas Risse, in 'A community of Europeans?' (2010: 25ff), explored the Europeanization of national public spheres and the emergence of transnational public spheres as key mechanisms in the formation of novel identity patterns among European elites and citizens. These patterns can be considered new in so far as they indicate the existence of 'multiple identities where national (cultural) elements of identification are 'blended' or 'nested' with co-existing European (civic) norms around which identity is constructed. Here, the empirical problem is not any more whether citizens identify primarily with the EU or not, but rather around which EU norms their identifications will crystallize. In this perspective, the democratic question is centre stage: Are citizens predisposed towards identifying with an EU that – arguably – is neither configured as a political Union nor as a fully-fledged democratic state but rather as a contested would-be democratic polity?

Yet, from a normative angle, detecting the emergence of a European identity must not necessarily count as progress. Arguably, it is a matter of normative democratic standards whether its emergence is valued an asset and its lack a predicament. Must a European would-be democratic polity be modelled after the national democratic state on the presupposition of a pan-European identity? If European identity aspires at uniformity, will it threaten the legitimacy of how Europeans govern themselves through a diversity of autonomous national democratic state institutions? From this view, an evolving European identity would be detrimental to democratic legitimacy, as the latter remains attached to the nation state. In this vein, research on the transformation of national identities and the formation of a European identity in the context of Eastern enlargement and the Turkish accession has found indications of normative tensions if not

clashes. In some member states and candidate states European identifications arguably give rise to 'zero-sum' conflicts between the normative power of national identities and values identified as European.[3]

In responding to these criticisms, social theorists suggest that European identity should not be conceived in terms of a 500 million collective of members who are bound together by their sameness, rejection of differences and exclusion of others. Instead, European identity should be conceptualised in the framework of an association of democratic member states that is constituted by the EU. The idea of a community of Europeans who at the same time belong to culturally diverse, but mutually inclusive communities seems better suited. Captured by the term of a European demoi-cracy (Nicolaidis 2004), this conception of a common identity is framed by the principles of difference, mutual recognition and inclusion (Benhabib 2009), or by a European "constitutional patriotism" (Mueller 2007). Thomas Risse has convincingly argued this case:

> It is true that we do not observe the emergence of a uniform and shared European identity above and beyond the various national identities. Rather the available data show the Europeanization of collective local, national, gender, and other identities. Europe and the EU are integrated in people's sense of belonging.
>
> (Risse 2010: 5).

In other words, European identity can be conceived not as an exclusive but principally an inclusive construction, neither modelled on 'hierarchy' or 'layer cake' nor on 'bi-polar' or 'dualist' forms but rather on the template of 'multiple identities' or a 'marble cake'.

In sum, more than fifty years after the Treaties of Rome, the multiple empirical manifestations, as well as the available conceptual constructs of a complex and composite European identity demonstrate that the conventional wisdom according to which Europeans do not need, do lack or ought to reject any sense of allegiance to a supra- or transnational belongingness is to be revised.

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[3] See: Góra et al. (2009); Góra and Mach (2010); Góra et al. (forthcoming).

Yet, a number of questions are in need of further clarification: First, to what extent do such poly-form constructions of European identity resonate with empirical evidence about peoples' subjective identifications? Second, which patterns of European identification can be discerned from citizens' practices? Third, will citizens who subjectively identify with the EU in some form or another, and namely with a kind of democratic European polity, be more likely to support EU politics and policies compared to citizens who do not share any such allegiances?

Democracy and identity in the EU: the framework

If we assume that European identity is constructed on three basic elements – constitutive values or norms; social purpose; and external 'otherness' – the question of how these elements resonate with different models of democracy in the EU is centre stage. Arguably, depending on how democracy is configured in the EU, these configurations will provide different templates for framing European identity. In other words, variable assumptions about democracy will frame different forms of European identity. The democratic anchoring of this analytical framework departs from Risse's (2001) approach, which distinguishes four forms of pan-European identity: "Europe as a community of values;" European identity "as a third way between communism and capitalism;" "European identity as a part of Western identity;" and a "Christian European identity" (Risse 2001). The framework proposed here for conceptualising European identity also differs from other mappings of a great many European identity constructions (Meyer 2004). Instead, the present framework is premised on Erik O. Eriksen's and John E. Fossum's conceptualisation of three European democratic polity models (Eriksen and Fossum 2009; Fossum and Menéndez 2009, see also Annex 1). These EU polity models are specified as institutionally alternative configurations of democracy in the EU. Each of them responds in a different way to the question concerning how democracy is/can be/should be institutionalised within the EU. As a consequence, each advances different expectations about how the construction of European identity is framed substantively, and as a necessary, viable and desirable correlate of democracy in Europe (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1: Three institutional configurations of democracy in the EU and European identity constructions

	(1) EU = confederation of sovereign democratic states ('Audit democracy')	(2) EU = European multinational federal democratic state	(3) EU = regional democratic non-state with cosmopolitan imprints
European identity construct related to member state	Member-state identities: primary but 'Europeanised', depending on member states' autonomous provisions; no zero-sum conflict with EU norms	Member-state and EU identities equally important; provisions for citizens" retention of distinctive national identities; Conflict between national and EU norms (zero-sum) possible	Post-national member -state identities secondary, respect for diversity; supported by EU and cosmopolitan norms and values
European identity construct related to EU	EU-identity secondary, Union's scope of action legally constrained and bounded	EU-identity founded on value community or constitutional patriotism; principle of mutual recognition of European and national identities	Regional identification based on plurality of norms, fundamental rights and democratic procedures
European identity construct related to global norms	Global international human rights based cosmopolitan forms of identity: marginal	Global international human rights based or cosmopolitan forms of identification thin	Global international rights based individual and cosmopolitan identifications: stronger

Source: Cederman (2001); Eriksen and Fossum (2007); adapted by author.

The following describes this framework in more detail, depicting how each of these different European identity constructions is framed by, and in turn lends support to, the three democratic polity models.

(1) In the framework of a European confederal order of sovereign democratic nation states, European identity is framed as a plural construct of multiple, but mutually exclusive national identities. Here, EU identity clearly remains a secondary order compared to national identities. Within this configuration, the construction of a similarly important European identity appears unlikely, as its preconditions are lacking, namely a European wide public sphere, a

European nation state, a European citizenry or a European memory culture. Moreover, a European identity is also unnecessary for conferring legitimacy to a confederal configuration of the EU, since its authority is derived from the member states. In turn, plurality of mutually exclusive national identity constructions lends support to the intergovernmental paradigm of European integration where national governments are accountable to national parliaments and identity constructions will remain confined to the nation state. Tensions between national and European identities will be unlikely, as long as the latter are clearly second order. National identifications will remain the most important. Whoever questions their exclusive status – for instance in the name of transnational social or political groups – will be incorporated into or excluded from public identity discourse.

(2) The second polity model – the institutional configuration of a European multinational federal democratic state – frames a dual layered European identity construction. Composed of two kinds of similarly important identifications with a member state, on the one hand, and with the EU, on the other, the resulting European identity will be constructed in accordance with a nested or blended, marble-cake-like model of identity (Risse 2010: 25). While its national components will be protected by apposite provisions laid down in EU constitutional norms and practices, the EU component is founded on shared values or political principles, arguably framed by EU constitutional patriotism. The configuration of a multinational EU state not only suggests but requires identifications with the EU. Yet pessimists, even those acknowledging European identity as a necessary resource for a democratically legitimate EU, believe it is impossible (Graf Kielmansegg 1996). In fact, if democratic legitimacy rests on a European community of remembrance, a European public sphere and a European collective identity, and if a European people does not exist, then the crisis of legitimacy, motivation and rationale of the EU is inevitable.

By contrast, social constructivists analysing the Europeanisation of national identities have elaborated empirically grounded answers to the puzzle of how European identity emerges. They suggest more optimistic conclusions with regard to the viability of European identity, by pointing to cognitive, cultural and communicative processes driving the emergence of supranational identifications with

the EU. For instance, symbolic politics (declarations; EU state symbols, common currency etc.) can be read as commitments to promoting pan-European identities. Moreover, the forging of transparent processes of EU politics and policy making and participatory procedures, such as the European Citizens' Initiative, are likely "to lend systemic impetus to polity-wide politicisation", including the forging of a European public sphere (Fossum and Trenz 2007: 211). This will likely strengthen identifications with a democratically constituted EU. Also the 'euro' has been identified as an important catalyst of the transformation of nation state identities through public discourses and the construction of a public space (Risse et al. 1999; Risse 2001, 2003; Liebert 2001). This construction of a double layered federal EU identity does not merely duplicate the building of national identities in previous centuries. On the one hand, the mutual recognition and protection of national identities makes it different from earlier patterns, as it aims at trust and solidarity among Europeans without jeopardizing national and regional identities. Neither is this model premised on a fixed territory and clear borders within an enlarging EU where citizens' European identity constructions remain in flux. Therefore, 'the Other' and criteria of inclusion and exclusion will retain a certain fuzziness. As Gerard Delanty put it, a European people cannot be conceived as an ethnos: "At most, Europeans are united in recognition of their diversity and occasionally in response to an 'other'" (Delanty 2005: 133). Criticisms of multinational federal models framing European identity point to norm conflicts that lead to clashes between European and national identities. These clashes originate in cultural as well as political differences, questions of gender roles as much as different conceptions of democratic legitimacy, media pluralism etc. For reconciling these clashes, a European demos is re-constructed. If Delanty is right not doubting "that a European demos has come into existence" (Delanty 2005: 135), this birth does not come without conflicts.

(3) Finally, a third construction of European identity is framed by the EU's polity configuration as a regional democratic non state entity with markedly cosmopolitan elements. This configuration foregrounds the sovereign citizen, EU mover as well as third country resident, whose rights will be progressively de-coupled from their states of origin. Its reference points are, on the one hand, the international human rights that have evolved after the Second World

War and have been fuelled by the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, it is deeply anchored within the global dynamics of economic, communicative and institutional interactions and cooperation. In the global context, the EU is configured as the core of a regional European order that evolves towards a world-wide novel post-national and post-state form of polity. The construction of European identity in such a cosmopolitan polity will be characterised by 'post-conventional' forms of consciousness that are embedded in overlapping civil society and public spheres. As Eriksen and Fossum have put it:

> The model, thus, posits that the European Union's democratic legitimacy can be based on the credentials of crisscrossing public debate, multilevel democratic decision-making and enforcement procedures and the protection of fundamental rights to ensure an 'autonomous' civil (transnational) society. This is the clearest manifestation thus far of democracy as a principle based on a post-conventional form of consciousness, one seen to have been generated by the struggles and processes that produced modern constitutions.
>
> (Eriksen and Fossum 2009: 29)

Popular allegiance for such an order will rely on positive-sum relationships between nested identities (Góra at al. 2009: 285). This model of a European polity requires an "institutional guarantee that the particularity of collective identities is always counterbalanced by reflexivity, which is displayed in the discursive references to the 'unity in diversity' of the shared political space of Europe" (Góra at al. 2009: 285). The 'cosmopolitan imprints of this model regard the nature of relations between the different we-groups and the others: "The decisive feature of 'self/other' or 'in-group/out-group' boundary creation is *difference* rather than enmity" (Risse 2010: 27). In his framework, 'civic identity construction' means that "the 'others' are still different, but this difference is not regarded as inferior" (id: 28). This makes positive-sum relations between mutually inclusive identifications possible. The 'inclusive European' is located in the middle of a continuum of identifications, ranging from the 'exclusive nationalist' at one extreme who does not see Europe as an important part of identification to the exclusive European for whom national identifications do not form an important point of reference, at the other extreme (Risse 2010: 48–49). Inclusive Europeans are attached to

and worry at the same time about national and European as well as cosmopolitan values. They are characteristic for a distinctive European identity; as Delanty puts it:

> European identity […] expresses cosmopolitan currents in contemporary society, such as new repertoires of evaluation in loyalties, memories and dialogue. In other words, it is not a supranational identity, but *a cosmopolitan identity*.
>
> (Delanty 2005: 137)

How can we make use of these three theoretically derived European identity constructions for measuring subjective patterns of identification with Europe in social practices? The next section will match the analytical framework with an appropriate methodology.

Measuring European identity empirically[4]

To submit theoretically derived claims about European identity to empirical scrutiny in the enlarging EU, researchers are faced with considerable methodological challenges. For advancing research on these questions, empirical methods for measuring European identity are needed that match the theoretical level of sophistication and also cohere with research strategies that allow for systematic cross- and intranational comparisons. We suggest a novel methodological strategy for coping with these challenges. The research design described in the following applies Q methodology with the aim of making a novel contribution to the theoretically informed, empirical and comparative exploration of subjective patterns of European identification. The research has been designed as an explorative study with four features: (1) the operationalisation of the theoretical yardstick; (2) the social psychological conception of identity; (3) Q methodology as a qualitative-quantitative alternative to focus group as well as mass survey based research; and (4) a cross-national comparative research design.

(1) Regarding the theoretical yardstick for empirically measuring identity patterns – the three polity models – Magdalena Góra has suggested interpreting them as 'narrative templates"' that resonate

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[4] For a detailed account of how Q methodology was applied for empirical research and analysis in the present research project, see Chapter 2.

with different configurations of identities and democracy in Europe (Góra at al. 2009: 283). We develop her proposition further, by re-conceptualising the three institutional models in the language of public discourses, or, more specifically, by coaching each of them in terms of specific sets of discursive statements about the EU, democracy, relevant agents and power relations. This framework for researching European identity patterns is premised on two kinds of assumptions, theoretical and methodological ones: Theoretically and analytically, the three discourses are expected to frame the subjective identity constructions. Methodologically, in order to measure whether and to what extent these discourses are in agreement with the subjective patterns of identification, sets of discursive statements are submitted to selected interviewees who are asked to evaluate them. Thus, the theoretical framework helps generate statements that can be used as measures for empirical research and testing.

(2) What it means to 'be a European citizen' varies, depending not only on citizens' individual demographic characteristics[5] but on several dimensions of subjective constructions of meaning as well. Moreover, possibilities for feeling and acting as a European citizen also diverge considerably across the EU. This is due to different configurations of access to European citizenship in the member states, from the implementation of EU rights and the established norms of belonging to the institutional opportunities for political agency within and beyond the domestic realm.[6] In view of these complexities, we should expect not only divergent but also common patterns of citizens' European identifications, as well as how their allegiances are shaped by democratic norms and practices.

For the present purpose of measuring European identity patterns, the social psychological conception of identity as a social category appears useful. It is not defined in terms of a pre-existing collective or group, but as a social category of people with a variable degree of collectiveness. Thus, they will vary along two dimensions; on the one

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[5] Socio-economic analyses based on individual characteristics typically include income and education (Fligstein 2008), while gender and age are only occasionally covered.

[6] For a comparative analyses of citizenship that includes the subjective dimension of membership or belonging in 13 EU member states, see Bellamy et al. (2004).

hand, regarding the contents, that is the meanings this category entails, that is regarding questions such as "who are we", "what kind of group are we"; and on the other hand, as regards the extent to which they agree and disagree about these meanings (Abdelal et al. 2009). Thus defining collective identity as a social category comprises two dimensions of variation, 'content' and "collectiveness". The second dimension of social identity refers to the degree of agreement vs. disagreement within a population concerning the content of the shared category. Collective identities, in this conceptualization, vary in the degree of unity and diversity or the contentiousness of their meanings. There is always some level of diversity regarding the content of identity, "implying that social identities vary in agreement and disagreement about their norms, boundaries, worldviews, analytics, and meanings" (ibid.).

(3) Third, for empirically measuring subjective patterns of European identities, we take advantage of a methodological option which is quite well-known to social psychologists but has been much less explored by social and political scientists: Q methodology. Q methodology is chosen as an instrument for the qualitative as well as quantitative comparative measurement of subjective identity patterns within and across national contexts. This methodology goes beyond the European/national dichotomy on which Eurobarometer surveys traditionally rely. While qualitative approaches generally do not allow for systematic comparisons across diverse national contexts, mass surveys yield comparative quantitative data, yet without paying heed to subjective meanings. To assess how people's subjective identifications vary and how these resonate with different discursive representation of European integration and democracy, and whether or not they correspond to one of the competing models of democracy in Europe, Q methodology offers necessary fine grained qualitative-quantitative research instruments. Q methodology coherently coordinates with theoretically sophisticated empirical measures. It matches theoretically derived analytical frameworks of identity, on the one hand, as well as complex patterns of citizens' identifications in empirical practices, on the other. The Q approach systematically examines the responses of individual interviewees to sets of statements corresponding to the competing democratic European discourses outlined by the RECON models. Thus, the Q analysis serves three main purposes: First, to descriptively identify patterns of subjective identity constructions;

second, to test prominent claims and rivalling expectations; and third, to generate inductively new hypotheses for future research.

(4) Designed as a comparative analysis to establish cross- as well as intra-national differences and commonalities, one old and two new EU Member States have been selected for their diverse national discursive and linguistic contexts: Germany, Hungary and Poland. This requires translating the theoretically derived sets of discursive 'statements' into different national/cultural/language contexts in ways that ensure systematic comparisons of the empirical patterns of citizens' subjective attitudes across these diverse contexts. Moreover, for capturing emerging identity patterns, the research puts a distinctive focus on the 'next generation', that is young people aged 18–25 who were born shortly before or after the end of communist rule and who have thus been socialised in the context of the Eastern enlargement of the EU. University students have been selected as a kind of social constituency which can be expected to have over proportionately benefited from opportunities for European mobility, public information and communication and, eventually, political participation. For this purpose, from each of the three Member States two Universities were chosen (one urban, one provincial), and from them university students with different disciplinary backgrounds (Humanities and Sciences) were recruited. Accordingly, the research design focuses on three questions: First, in which ways and to what extent do subjective identity patterns cohere with the EU polity models? Second, to what extent do patterns diverge within each of the national contexts? Third, do citizens' subjective identities show idiosyncratic features or do they share cross-national commonalities? The question is, in sum, what do the modes in which groups of individuals, sort – or value - selected discursive statements tell us about their empirical 'identity patterns', about how these are framed by competing models of the EU, and about their commonalities and differences?

Summary and conclusions

This chapter has presented the research questions, the theoretical framework and the empirical methodology for exploring the nexus between identity and the EU polity. It has started specifying the analytical, empirical and normative research questions involved in European identity research. Then it has elaborated the theoretical framework from three competing institutional configurations of

democracy in Europe. Finally, research methodology has been introduced that transcends the limits of established methods of European identity research and, at the same time, coheres with a discourse theoretical conception of the EU as a contested "would-be" democratic polity. The remainder of this research report is structured in five parts:

The introduction is followed by a detailed account of the application of Q methodology (Chapter 2). Here David Skully lays out the research methodology that the present research report employs with the aim to identify and compare common identity patterns among students from Germany, Hungary and Poland.

Three empirical studies include Germany, Hungary and Poland. For the German case Rosemarie Sackmann (in Chapter 3) establishes cosmopolitan, nationalist, and individualist features as the prominent identity patterns of young Germans. In her case study on Hungary, Erika Kurucz gives an account of the liberal-democratic, nationalist and utilitarian patterns of identification she found among young Hungarians (in Chapter 4). Regarding Polish students Chapter 5 presents findings about universalist, traditionalist, pragmatic, and instrumental narratives of Europe among young Poles, in an analysis co-authored by Olga Brzezińska, Beata Czajkowska and David Skully.

The concluding comparative analysis (in Chapter 6) is jointly authored by David Skully, Olga Brzezińska and Beata Czajkowska. Here the authors return to the initial aim of this research project, which is to contribute to the emerging field of European identity research a better understanding of the following three questions: First, how does European Union membership affect the established and the new identity formations in the member states? Second, what is the nexus between changing identity patterns and the political order of Europe, more specifically European democracy? Finally, to what extent do identity patterns in the old and new member states differ and which common elements do they share? The research findings allow them to advance novel findings towards that aim.

First, in all three countries they identify similar, albeit not the same factors that show strong agreement with the cosmopolitan model of a democratic order (RECON model 3). These include, for instance, the

sharing of universal values, respect for diversity and pluralism, and the aiming at peaceful solutions of conflicts through deliberative processes.

A second commonality found among respondents from all three member states, is their strong resonance with a democratic order in the confines of the nation state, as depicted by the first RECON model.

From these findings they conclude that despite variations in subjective patterns of political identification, university students in Germany, Hungary and Poland represent a young generation of Europeans reflecting developments and changes of the modern world in their identity constructions. Their university affiliation; their access to unrestricted information via modern technology; and their desire to gain experience and explore the world via cross-border mobility and ever-increasing contacts with people from various cultures, nationalities and backgrounds provide for the recognition of the benefits of European integration and the creation of a broader and more inclusive sense of belonging.

Many still hold that there cannot be a common European identity and that it is an illusion to expect an international organisation like the EU to evolve one. The present research report provides selected evidence to demonstrate that over the past decade of European integration and enlargement, new patterns of European identity have emerged that reflect the contingent dynamics of the EU polity. Although its project of a federal European democratic constitution failed, it has nevertheless started experimenting with more active and social forms of European citizenship and civil society practice in a transnational political Community of and beyond nation states. More than fifty years after the Treaties of Rome, the manifestations of emerging forms of European identity demonstrate that the conventional wisdom according to which Europeans lack a sense of community has to be reconsidered. There exist forms of social and political identification with a regional multilayered political community, such as the EU, that can transcend the ethnic and cultural identifications based on national, religious, gender or class association. We have argued elsewhere that the emerging European identity is a result of dynamic interactions between European political ideas, EU constitutional norms, discursive constructions of Europe and

European citizens' social practices that unfold in national and transnational political spaces where the meanings of a common European identity are constructed and contested, deconstructed and reconstructed. Interestingly, the EU's Eastern enlargement of 2004 has not fundamentally altered these processes, but it has intensified and accelerated some of them. After all, the citizens of the new Eastern and Central Eastern EU member states may not think and feel that differently from people in the older EU member states. But, as Góra and Mach (2010) have argued, they are definitely more mobile across borders, more aware of Union citizenship rights and practices, and, thus more disposed to Europeanise their national identifications. If from the cacophony of the diverse constructions of European identity among German, Hungarian and Polish students, one underlying tune emerges, it is that of Europeanised national identities. As the present research has demonstrated empirically, there is unity amidst diversity – not a uniform model of European identity but rather a multiform one that makes young Germans, Hungarians and Poles feel European, but in quite different ways.

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Chapter 2

Q methodology, common identity patterns, and models of democracy in Europe

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Introduction

The objective of the present study is to identify the common identity patterns of individuals (university students) in Germany, Hungary, and Poland; to examine how closely these various identity patterns correspond to the three models of democracy elaborated by the RECON project; and to examine whether there are cross-border commonalities among identity patterns. This chapter explains the research methodology employed to identify and compare identity patterns.

Each individual has a unique constellation of subjective perceptions of and reactions to propositions about democratic processes and civil membership that constitutes his or her unique identity construction. The concept of 'a common identity pattern' refers to a set of subjective political attitudes that many individuals hold in common, but with varying degrees of agreement. Thus, someone revealing strong subjective agreement with a common set of attitudes called 'social democratic' also retains some eccentric individual attitudes: individual uniqueness persists. Analogous to a Weberian 'ideal type', one does not expect to find a perfect manifestation of a common

political subjectivity in any particular person; in fact, an observation of a perfect manifestation would likely be viewed as accidental.

The model and inspiration for the present cooperative research effort is the 1993 article by Dryzek and Berejikian, 'Reconstructive democratic theory'. Dryzek and Berejikian (1993: 49) express concern that democratic theory has become increasingly detached from the demos – from the citizens who would inhabit, staff, and govern the alternative democratic structures – as postulated by theorists: "Particular theoretical voices reach restricted audiences as the languages they speak become arcane and specialized. Think, for example, of the mathematical formalizations of public choice or the dense terminology of hermeneutics and critical theory." To provide an empirical anchor to theoretical enthusiasm, they employ qualitative-quantitative methods to examine the kinds of political discourse that resonate with actual citizens. They argue that their "approach is reconstructive in that it does its utmost to find its categories in how its subjects actually do apprehend the world, not in how the researcher expects them to do so." The starting point of the analysis is a set of observations of individuals' expression of their personal political subjectivities.

There are a variety of social scientific methods for eliciting subjective responses. Large-scale public opinion surveys, such as Almond and Verba's (1963) landmark study, *The Civic Culture*, can identify central tendencies and deviations with a high degree of confidence. Such large-N studies are costly and particularly sensitive to question construction and ordering. Intensive small-N ethnographic studies through contextual immersion and thick description, can overcome the arbitrary risks of large-N instruments; but they too are costly and limited in scope and generality. Dryzek and Berejikian (1983) employ 'Q methodology', a small-N approach that combines the complementary aspects of survey research and thick description in a relatively low-cost manner.

Q methodology was developed in the 1930s by William Stephenson, a psychologist and pioneer in the field of psychometrics. Q methodology is a variation on factor analysis, discussed later in this chapter. Q methodology became applied to the study of political subjectivity largely through the efforts of Steven Brown, whose 1980

book, *Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q Methodology in Political Science,* is the seminal work.[1]

Q methodology is a form of exploratory data analysis. Exploratory data analysis is inductive: it employs statistical methods to find patterns, similarities and dissimilarities within a data set. The objective is to let the data speak for itself: this means refraining from imposing theoretical assumptions or hypothetical constraints on the exploratory process. Exploratory data analysis is contrasted with confirmatory data analysis (Tukey 1962) which involves statistical hypothesis testing. Q methodology cannot support the statistical inferences necessary for hypothesis testing. Although it cannot test hypotheses, Q methodology – like other exploratory data methods – is used to generate hypotheses and raise questions about assumptions, particularly when the exploration uncovers theoretically anomalous patterns.

The balance of this chapter describes how Q methodology is applied in our research; it is discussed in four sections: (1) Eliciting identity patterns: statements, subjects, sorts and interviews; (2) Data analysis; (3) Interpretation of factors and construction of factor narratives; (4) Comparative analysis and agreement with models of democracy.

Eliciting identity patterns: statements, subjects, sorts and interviews

Statements

Q methodology starts with identifying a discourse or set of discourses from which a set of statements are drawn with the objective of stimulating a subjective response by study participants. As the focus of our study is identity patterns as they relate to models

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[1] *Political Subjectivity* is now out-of-print. Brown has posted the book online: http://reserves.library.kent.edu/eres/coursepage.aspx?cid=203&page=docs. The mathematical chapters of the book have been superseded by advances in computing and statistical software (see note 4) but the application of Q methodology to test Lipset's (1963) arguments about value patterns of democracy is an excellent example of the method in operation. Also useful is McKeown and Thomas (1988) as are the contributions of Costello and Osborne (2005) and Watts and Stenner (2005). Interesting and relevant applications of Q methodology include: Zechmeister (2006), Sullivan et al. (1992), Addams and Proops (2001).

of democracy and to European and national identities, our set of 70 statements included 46 statements constructed to represent aspects of the three models of democracy theorized by Eriksen and Fossum (2007; 2009) among others.[2] The other 24 statements were drawn from popular political discourse. As Dryzek and Berejikian (1983) demonstrate, few people (other than political theorists) think in terms of democratic models; it is necessary to include vernacular political sentiments to the statement set. The 70 statements were determined by the research teams from the three countries at a workshop in Krakow in April, 2009. The discussion and original statements were in English and subsequently translated by each country research team.

Subjects

Each case study involved 40 participants. All participants were full-time university students, no older than 25. Students were selected from a variety of disciplines from two universities in each country: one in a metropolitan centre and the other in a smaller regional town. An equal number of male and female respondents were drawn from each university.[3] It is important to emphasize that Q methodology does not require a random sample – it makes no pretence to be representative; it merely requires variation among participants.

Sorts

Each statement is printed on a card. Participants were asked to sort the 70 statements by arranging the cards in a format shown in Figure 2.1. The template was drawn on a sheet of poster board. The column on the far right labelled +5 allows two statements to be ranked as most important, the column on the far left labelled -5, allows two statements to be ranked as least important; the middle column marked zero indicates complete indifference. What importance means is determined by the individual respondent: it is subjective. In practice, cards placed in the left-most columns are usually statements to which respondents have a strong negative reaction; statements that

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[2] At the Bremen workshop in September 2009, several of these 46 democracy model-related statements were determined not to represent unambiguously a distinct model. Annex 7 provides a table of the final model-related statement sets.

[3] In the Hungarian study the distinction is between universities in Budapest and universities outside of Budapest.

elicit relative indifference are generally placed in the middle columns; and statements placed in the right-most columns usually indicate strong agreement. The triangular arrangement of cells in the template forces respondents to make assign values resembling a normal distribution. The larger central columns spare respondents the chore of making fine distinctions among statements of indifferent subjective value. A common complaint by respondents was that there were too few places in the extreme columns; this induced anxiety is deliberate: the template design forces distinctions among the strongest responses.

Figure 2.1: The Q-sort template.

Interviews

Respondents' subjective rankings of the statements provide a data set amendable to quantitative analysis. The objective of the quantitative side of the analysis is to identify distinct subsets of individual respondents based on their subjective rankings of statements. The qualitative side of the analysis is based on semi-structured interviews with respondents. Immediately following the sorting of statements, with the sorted statements in front of them, respondents are asked about their sorts. The interviews focus on the statements placed in the far left and far right columns (-5, -4, +4, +5); but discussion is not limited to these columns. Respondents explain why these statements are positively and negatively important to them. The interview elicits the subjective narrative behind the respondent's sorting. Information

from the interviews provides a check on whether the distinct subsets identified as sharing a common identity pattern in the quantitative analysis are internally consistent. Thus, Q methodology is an iterative interpretive processes combining both qualitative and quantitative information.

Data analysis

The empirical dataset of the Q method is the set of statement orderings, or sorts, made by study participants. Each individual sort is a row of 70 numbers, with integer values ranging from -5 to +5; these are the rank-values assigned to each statement by a participant in the sort process. Each case study engaged 40 participants. Thus the data set is a matrix of 40 rows and 70 columns.

The Q method statistical analysis of the data set is a variant of factor analysis.[4] Standard factor analysis identifies differences and similarities between the columns of the matrix. That is, it focuses on traits or scores, this is called R method. (R and Q come from the letters used to represent matrices in linear algebra). Q methodology, in contrast, identifies differences and similarities between the rows of the matrix – that is, differences and similarities between individual participants.

Q methodology was initiated in Stephenson's 1935 article titled 'Correlating Persons Instead of Tests'. Until this contribution psychometrics was primarily concerned with intelligence tests and whether there was one underlying measure of intelligence or if intelligence is composed of several distinct factors. The common distinction between mathematical and verbal ability stems from the factor analysis performed on the columns of a matrix composed of individuals' answers to test questions. Stephenson's innovation, to examine correlations among individuals, allowed for empirical methods to be employed in the identification of personality types.

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[4] The specialized statistical software used in this study is PQMethod; it is in the public domain and available from: http://www.lrz.de/~schmolck/qmethod/.

Factor Analysis [R]

Scores

Persons

Q - Method

Scores

Persons

Figure 2.2: Factor Analysis R- and Q- Method

The fundamental idea underlying factor analysis (whether of columns or rows – the discussion here is in terms of rows) is to identify factors common to subsets of individual responses: these common factors are represented by the ovals connected by arrows to the data matrixes in the two figures above. Factor analysis is a data-reduction method. The objective is to represent as much of the information contained in the data matrix by as few common factors as possible.

The specific mechanism employed to determine these common factors is Kaiser's (1958) varimax algorithm. This algorithm searches for the set of factors which best preserves the information content of

the data matrix. The result is a set of equations, one for each individual sort that relates the individual sorts to the factors. Specifically, the sort of respondent N can be expressed as follows.

Sort_N = B1*Factor_1 + B2*Factor_2 + B3*Factor_3 + B4*Factor_4 + e_N

Each factor is itself a set of 70 statement rankings: in essence, each factor is a synthetic sort that represents a distinct commonality identified in the data matrix. Each respondent's sort can be expressed as a linear function of all identified factors plus an individual error term. To understand the equation above, assume for the moment that Sort_N is identical to Factor_2. If this were the case then the coefficient for Factor_2 [B2] would equal 1.0; the coefficients for the other factors would equal zero; and the individual error term [e_N] would also equal zero. The result is the equation Sort_N = Factor_2. If Sort_N differed just slightly from Factor_2 the equation might read: Sort_N = .99*Factor_2 + e_N, where e_N is no longer zero. Similarly a sort that is exactly half Factor_1 and half Factor_2 can be written Sort_N = 0.5*Factor_1 + 0.5*Factor_2. The coefficients associated with the factors are a measure of closeness or similarity between an individual sort and a factor. Sorts with large positive coefficients on one factor are called defining sorts: these sorts are closely related to that factor.

There is an element of judgment in factor analysis about how many factors to include in the analysis. Factors are identified by statistical methods, the first factor identified has the greatest explanatory power, and each additional factor has less explanatory power. More factors provide more explanatory power, but at the cost of less data-reduction.[5]

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[5] The Kaiser criterion is to include only those factors for which the eigenvalue exceeds 1.0. Eigenvalues, in this context, are measures of explained variance and are generated by the PQMethod program. The cost of including a factor with an eigenvalue less than 1.0 exceeds its benefit, in terms of explanatory power and parsimony.

Interpretation of factors and the construction of factor narratives

The difference between R method and Q method lies in the interpretation of factors. In R method, with the focus on columns, there are no interviews to turn to for contextualization of the statistical results. In Q methodology, with the focus on the rows and the commonalities among persons, the interviews provide context. To construct a common identity pattern one attempts to reconstruct the common narrative that sustains a set of similar sorts. The statistical results indicate which sorts are similar and therefore likely to share a common narrative.

The statistical software, PQMethod, generates the following information: a table reporting the identified factors, specifically the ranking of statements for each factor; a table showing how the factors differ significantly – specifically, which statements the factors differ most in their rank-values; and a table showing how closely individual sorts are associated with each Factor – specifically, it reports the coefficients or factor loadings for each individual sort. In the terminology of Q methodology, those sorts which are closely related to a particular factor are called 'defining sorts' – that is, they serve to define the narrative.[6]

Most statistical methods are sensitive to 'outliers' – observations that stand outside the general distribution of the data set in one or more dimensions. An observation (a sort in our context) may be so unusual that the PQMethod algorithm identifies it as a unique factor; that is, the factor has only one defining sort. One-sort factors pose an interpretative problem: do they represent a distinct common identity pattern but by chance we only have one member participating in our study? Or are they simply eccentric? Or, perhaps they stand out because they have an unusual interpretation of a statement? The interviews can help solve this interpretive problem. For example, one participant in the Polish study assigned the value '+5' to the statement "Diversity causes problems." This response stands out because most Polish participants assigned negative values to the statement,

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[6] A defining sort in this context generally means at least a loading (coefficient) of at least 0.50.

indicating disagreement.[7] The interview provided the context: the participant explained that because diversity can cause problems it is imperative that we do everything we can to create an inclusive society; creating an inclusive society is so important to this participant that this statement was given the highest rank, +5. Except for this statement, this participant's sort was very similar to respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement. Of the 120 sorts in our three case studies we identified seven such significant outliers. These rows were deleted from the data matrices and the statistical analysis was performed anew. Although the sorts were removed from the statistical analysis, the interviews were used, when appropriate, in the interpretation and construction of the factor narratives.

Having excluded influential outliers, the analyses resulted in four viable factors in each country. The country chapters discuss the interpretive process undertaken in each case, but some summary statistics comparing the factors in the three cases are presented in Table 2.1. The table shows the proportion of variance explained by each factor and the number of defining sorts for each factor. The penultimate column provides summations; and the final column reports the number of sorts (that is, less excluded outliers) used in the analyses. The four factors account for between 42 per cent and 55 per cent of the variance; this is a significant reduction in data. The number of defining sorts ranges between 17 for Hungary and 32 for Germany. There is nothing unusual about having a large proportion of non-defining sorts. Non-defining sorts are simply not highly correlated with any single factor; rather they are weakly correlated with several factors.

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[7] The mean rank of the 40 Polish sorts for this question is -1.95; the standard deviation is 2.35, yielding a standardized score (z-value) for +5 of 2.98 – highly significant. Without the interviews one would need to employ robust methods to detect and diagnose significant outliers. See Hubert et al. (2008) for a recent review of robust methods as well as Chatterjee et al. (1999).

Table 2.1: Statistical Characteristics of the Country Factors

	G1	G2	G3	G4	SUM	N
Percent of variance explained	22%	11%	9%	10%	52%	
Number of defining sorts	18	5	5	4	32	38
	H1	**H4**	**H2**	**H3**	**SUM**	**N**
Percent of variance explained	16%	13%	7%	6%	42%	
Number of defining sorts	7	5	2	3	17	38
	P1	**P2**	**P3**	**P4**	**SUM**	**N**
Percent of variance explained	22%	10%	13%	10%	55%	
Number of defining sorts	12	4	6	5	27	37

Notes

G = Germany; H = Hungary; P = Poland

The objective of Q Methodology is to re-construct from statistical analyses and interviews, narratives representing the essential elements of common identity patterns. The convention in Q Methodology is to give these common factors descriptive names. This has heuristic value – naming forces one to identify what is distinctive about a factor. It also has convenience value, simplifying discussion. In preparing for the discussions in the country chapters and the comparative chapter, the first two data columns in Table 2.1 have been aligned to compare similar factors. In all countries the first factor – the one accounting for the greatest proportion of variance and also the greatest number of defining sorts – represents a similar identity pattern: the three factor sorts, G1, H1, and P1 are named: G1 – Cosmopolitan perspective; H1 – Liberal-democrat Identity; and P1 – Universalists. All express agreement with universalist value statements and tend to disagree with nationalist statements. The factors in the second data column share scepticism about a more federal European Union and support for assertions of national identity and traditional values. They are named: G2 – National perspective; H4 – Hestia National Identity; and P2 – Traditionalists. Similarities among the remaining factors in the third and fourth columns exist but are not as immediately apparent.

Comparative analysis and agreement with models of democracy

Quantitative comparative analysis of factors

The Q methodology based analysis provides quantitative data that can be used to construct measures of agreement and disagreement between factors identified in the analysis. Each factor consists of an array of 70 ranks ranging in value between -5 and +5. There are many ways to measure the distance or similarity/dissimilarity between factors. The correlation coefficient as a measure of similarity/ dissimilarity is employed in this study. Correlation coefficients are used to measure the relative similarity or dissimilarity between factors in the case studies – in the third sections (Country Factor Structure) of Chapters 3–5. At the country level, factors, to be distinct commonalities, must exhibit dissimilarity: correlation coefficients between factors will be less than 0.50.

Correlation analysis is also used to examine the similarities or dissimilarities of factors identified in the different case studies. Two factors from different case studies which are highly correlated may be indicative of a shared underlying commonality. The strength or weakness of such commonality can be assessed by examining those statements for which the highly correlated factors most closely agree and those statements for which they agree least. The analysis of such distinguishing similarities and differences between the factors identified in the three case studies is developed in Chapter 6.

Quantitative measurement of agreement with models of democracy

Q methodology analysis provides quantitative data that can be used to construct measures of agreement and disagreement with the three RECON models of democracy. Of the 70 statements used in the study the research group selected 30 statements that can be unambiguously associated with one of the three models. Ten statements are uniquely associated with the national (RECON 1) model of democracy; eleven statements are uniquely associated with the federal (RECON 2) model; and nine statements are uniquely associated with the cosmopolitan (RECON 3) model. The statements are listed in Annex 7. The ranks assigned to these statements by the factors identified in the case studies can be used to construct an index of agreement (or

disagreement) for each factor with respect to the three sets of statements relating to the democracy models.[8]

Figure 2.3 reproduces the 70 statement template. Suppose, for example, that a participant wished to express maximum possible agreement with the national model, represented by ten statements. In this case, these ten statement cards would be placed in the right-most columns (shown in dark grey). They would occupy the two positions in the +5 column, the four positions in the +4 column and four positions in the +3 column. The sum of these scores is 38 = 2x5 + 4x4 + 4x3; thus 38 is the maximum possible score for the national model. Maximum possible disagreement with the national model, as shown by the light grey cards in the same figure, results in a sum of scores of -38. To construct an index we divide the observed scores by the maximum possible score and multiply by 100. This results in a scale that ranges from -100 to +100 and that allows comparison with the scores for agreement with the other models which are represented by a different number of statements and therefore have different maxima and minima.[9]

Figure 2.3: Statement sorts indicating maximum agreement and disagreement

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[8] The RECON models are normative theoretical constructions; they are not positive hypotheses or predictive propositions. The agreement score analysis is exploratory and descriptive: it cannot and should not be interpreted as 'testing' the RECON models. See Kymlicka (2010) for an exploration of the challenge of testing normative theories.

[9] Formally the agreement score is expressed: Agreement Score$_{ij}$ = 100 X (Score$_{ij}$ / Maximum Possible Score$_{ij}$); for factors i to m, and models j = {national, federal, cosmopolitan}.

Keeping with our ten-statement national model example, Figure 2.4 illustrates a statement sorting showing relatively strong agreement with the national model (55.2); if one were to flip this diagram horizontally, the score would be negated (-55.2)

Figure 2.4: A statement sort indicating relatively strong agreement.

The third example is of a sort that shows net indifference to the national model, the sum of rank-scores is zero; a horizontal reflection of this sorting would also result in a sum of zero (see Figure 2.5).

Figure 2.5: A statement sort indicating net indifference.

It is important to emphasize that "agreement with model N" means agreement with the set of statements used to represent the model and as measured by the agreement score. Other sets of statements could have been employed to represent the models; indeed, alternative

representation of the models is a potentially fertile direction for future Q methodological research.[10]

It is also important to note that there is lack of symmetry among the three model statement sets. All statement sets contain statements designed to elicit respondent's loci of identity norms and their values regarding democratic practices and the distribution of power at the national, federal, and cosmopolitan levels, respectively. However, only the national and federal statement sets contain statements about institutions, power and governance; the cosmopolitan-model statement set lacks statements about the institutional configuration of democracy in Europe.[11] In part, this absence is an artefact of the ambivalence about domination and coercion in cosmopolitan theory and the lack of institutional specificity in the elaboration of the RECON-3 model itself.[12] The lack of statements about the existence or locus of military or fiscal authority in the cosmopolitan-model statement set thus biases the cosmopolitan-model agreement scores. We know from our country-level case studies that cosmopolitan factors are ambivalent or adverse to institutions of domination: they assign negative values to statements about domination in the national-model and federal-model statement sets. Because the cosmopolitan-model statement set lacks corresponding statements the agreement scores observed for the cosmopolitan model are higher than if statements about power had been included. Keeping these caveats in mind, the agreement scores do apply a common standard of measurement across factors and across countries and allow one to measure similarity and dissimilarity of identity patterns. The comparative analysis of agreement scores is reported in Chapter 6.

The inferential limits of Q methodology analysis

There are limits to what one can infer from Q methodological studies. One can infer that the identity patterns identified reflect underlying

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[10] Alternative agreement measures are possible as well. We have weighted the statements in our analysis; equally but unequal weights could be used as well.

[11] "As an organization form, modern democracy, at a minimum, requires both a polity and a forum." Eriksen and Fossum (2007), p. 16.

[12] For a literature review and the canonical descriptions of the RECON-3 model see: Eriksen and Fossum (2007), pp. 30–36 and 38–39; and Eriksen and Fossum (2009), pp. 26–32 and 35–36. Dryzek (2007) and Castiglione (2009) provide critical perspectives on the deliberative democracy and cosmopolitan identity, respectively.

common constellations of values and beliefs. They indicate individuals who share a common narrative, at a minimum, by those participants who are defining sorts. One can also develop propositions from comparing and contrasting factors. However, Q methodology cannot be used to make claims about the larger population; this is because Q methodology is not sample-based. Although in our case studies we have selected students from a diverse range of disciplines and ensured gender balance, this is not sufficient to be a representative or random sample. Thus there is no basis for concluding that, for example, if 22 per cent of respondents are defining sorts that resonate with model 3, then 22 per cent of university students share a liberal-universal-cosmopolitan identity. To make such statements a properly-designed, large-N survey is required.

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Chapter 3

Cosmopolitan, nationalistic, individualistic, statist
Young Germans' European identity patterns

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Introduction

Germany has been involved in the European project from its beginning and it can certainly be regarded as one of the core members of the EU. Generally, Germany supports the European unification process. But, if we look at the results from one of the Eurobarometer questionnaires we see that only 50 per cent of the German respondents report to feel attached to the EU. This number is slightly below the EU-25 average. In Hungary and Poland more citizens express attachments to the EU (63 and 61 per cent respectively).[1] As it is usually the case with the Eurobarometer surveys: We do not know what these items mean. What do the respondents have in mind, when they express attachment to and trust in the European Union? Do those, who do not

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[1]Eurobarometer 65, 2007, p.71. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65_en.htm. The attachment of Germans to the European Union ranges near to the European average (higher numbers are found, for example, in Italy, Spain and France; lower numbers are found, for example, in Denmark, Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom).

report to have such feelings, reject the EU? Attachment is a notion which can carry the most diverse connotations. And likewise, with regard to one of the most cited items of Standard Eurobarometer questionnaire[2], one must ask: What do respondents mean, when they call themselves 'European-German' or 'German-European'? Do respondents, who chose the same label share conceptions of European identity?

The present case study of German students deals with such questions of meaning; it does not deal with numbers (although it would be good to combine both, of course). The research is based on the assumption, that 'European identity' is something new. Moreover, we suppose that European identity is built up in a context of cultural plurality and diverse world views within the European countries. Thus, it is plausible to expect not one but several, more or less complex, patterns of European collective identities. The aim is to comparatively examine these patterns.

Collective identities refer to a specific field of meaning. This chapter employs a general concept of collective identity (Peters 1998, 2003). The most important elements of collective identities are: criteria of membership; collective self-images, self-attribution of certain characteristics; collective ideals and ideas about principles of social order; specific feelings of obligation, solidarity and trust among group members; collective pride and honour; collective memories and expectations for the future. Collective identities may (but need not) include a separation from other groups. Overall, collective identities may be of different variety and solidity. They may be vague and diffuse or highly differentiated and articulated. The collective strength and coherence of identity constructions may vary considerably.

Questions about collective identity are questions like 'who are we', 'what kind of group are we', and 'what does it mean to be a European', 'what binds us together', 'how do we interpret our

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[2] "In the near future do you see yourself as [Nationality] only? As [Nationality] and European? As European and [Nationality]? As European only?" These Eurobarometer questions provide the core evidence for most empirical studies of European identities.

common past', 'what are we striving for'. Europeans do not need to have a strong European collective identity but share mainly feelings of belonging to the European space that they frame in some way or another: for example as a citizen of a member state of the European Union, or as member of a post-national or supranational community or as a global citizen rooted in the regional European context. The theoretical framework of this study draws on the three RECON models of democracy in Europe and has been developed above.[3]

To survey the meanings of collective identities, an empirical method is needed that is designed for the discovery of patterns of meaning. Generally, qualitative methods are appropriate for research on symbolic systems; but purely qualitative research will typically include only small numbers of respondents. If the goal is to map the patterns of European identities, higher numbers of respondents should be involved. The methodological approach of this study – Q methodology – has been described in chapter 2 of this report[4] and shall not be repeated here.

For the German case study we have interviewed students at the University of Bremen and at the Julius-Maximilians-University in Würzburg. Thus, we included two different regional milieus in our study: Bremen is a former Hanse city, located in the northern part of West Germany. It has a world-open, somewhat internationalized outlook. Würzburg, located in the southern part of Germany, can be characterized as traditional and provincial.

The German sample consists of 38 interviews, because we eliminated two outliers from the data stock. Among the 38 interviews 21 were conducted in Würzburg and 17 in Bremen; 20 interviewees are women and 18 are men.

The analysis of the data set obtained from these 38 interviews demonstrates that 4-factors turn out to be decisive for describing the pattern of European identifications among the German students. The following starts, first, with describing the fourfold factor structure and interpreting each of the four factors as a distinct 'narrative' – or

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[3] See Chapter 1 by Ulrike Liebert, in this report.
[4] See Chapter 2 by David Skully, in this report.

perspective – regarding European identity. The second part explores the relationship of these factors to the RECON models.

German students' identifications with Europe

From the investigation of the German data 4 factors turned out to be decisive for capturing the pattern of students' identifications with Europe.[5] The first factors stands for a cosmopolitan and the second for a national perspective, respectively. The third factor stands for an individualistic perspective. In the following sections, the features of the factors will be described in more detail.

Table 3.1 shows that 32 out of 38 sorts appear as defining sorts in the analysis; thus, most of the interviews were represented through the four factors. The total explained variance is 52 per cent. Nearly half of the German interviews appear as defining sorts for the first factor, which covers 22 per cent of the explained variance.

Table 3.1: Factor characteristics

	Factors				
	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	sum
No. of defining sorts	18	5	5	4	32
% explained variance	22	11	9	10	52

Figure 3.1 illustrates the structure of the German factors. The triangle illustrates that the factors G-1, G-2 and G-3 are correlated at a medium level (0.3 and 0.36) with each other. And all these three factors are relatively strong correlated with the fourth factor G-4 (with correlations between 0.46 and 0.49).

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[5] We employed rather simple criteria for suitability: The analysis should produce meaningful factors with not too few defining sorts. In the German example an 8-factor analysis would produce only six interpretable factors; a 3-factor analysis would destroy the structure completely (in this case nearly all sorts of the sample would appear as defining for factor G-1); and an analysis with 6 or 5 factors would produce at least one factor with only two defining sorts. Thus the 4-factor analysis has been chosen.

Figure 3.1 German factor structure.

The following will, firstly, describe the 'narrative' for interpreting each of these factors, and secondly, analyse the relation between these empirical factors and the RECON models. The narratives are based on the factor arrays (which form a composite Q sort; see Annex 4) and especially on the interviews with the respondents to which the defining sorts of each factor belong.

The cosmopolitan perspective on Europe (factor G-1)

The first construction stands for a *cosmopolitan perspective.*

> **Most decisive features of the cosmopolitan perspective in the German case study:**
>
> The 'cosmopolitans' emphasize a *responsibility of individuals* as well as a *responsibility of the European Union* to foster democracy, closely connected with individual rights, group rights and generally Human Rights, not only in Germany or in Europe but all over the world. German cosmopolitans are strongly against chauvinism of all kinds, at all levels.

In all statements described by this factor, the highest rankings are given to statements which refer to rights: the interviewees think that individual freedom and choice should be protected and that cultural

groups have the right to be different. For German cosmopolitans, individual freedom and Human rights are closely connected. Additionally they emphasize that democracy means, first of, all participation of free individuals in common affairs. "Democracy could be improved through more direct participation of all citizens. Democracy, as it is now, is not efficient. Democracy means participation. And technically more direct participation would be possible" (Gb27phym) [6].

The respondents are proud of being European, which is usually grounded in a conception of Europe as a 'peace-project': "Europe stands for the overcoming of century old conflicts" (Gw20phym). Peace and individual rights (as well as democracy and Human Rights) are regarded as characteristic features of Europe. And these features are the basis for individual identifications with Europe. However, the cosmopolitans emphasize that they understand Europe as part of the world and they would call themselves citizens of the world at the first place.

In this young European cosmopolitan perspective, Europe's common culture is characterized by cultural diversity, but this does not hinder communication and understanding. Equality is an important value.[7] Cultural diversity requires taking care of differences in opinions. The respondents recognise much diversity in the world and while they admit that this might cause problems, they value diversity as generally good and desirable. "Diversity is a big chance. Of course, there may appear problems, but they are side issues. Essentially, diversity is a chance" (Gw20phym). Cultural diversity is understood as an asset, it is vivid, it is nice, and it augments the potential for adaptation, "because homogenous systems are practically dead" (Gw20phym).

Yet, diversity is perceived as only one aspect, one side of the picture. The other side is defined by commonalities. Cosmopolitans believe that certain interests are shared: "we all share interests at the global scale" (Gw20phym). And they believe that especially "young people

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[6] The acronyms like this one refer to the interviews. They denote the country, the university, the subject of study and the gender of the interviewee

[7] By the way: Gender equality is regarded as very important by the German cosmopolitans.

have a lot in common, not only at the European but also at the global level" (Gw02sozf).

With regard to differences between the Eastern and Western part of Europe, cosmopolitans believe that Germany, with its history of separation and re-unification, could form a bridge.

Young German cosmopolitans believe that the EU should have a constitution, because a constitution is the basis for democracy; but concerning this issue, they do not go much into detail. While they seem to regard the constitutional issue as a formality, the European Union has reality for them). With regard to the functioning of democracy, opinions diverge: Some cosmopolitans think that democracy works best at smaller levels, others believe in the possibility of political participation of free individuals at all levels. But all of them agree on the importance of participation. With regard to social welfare policies, opinions diverge: some cosmopolitans believe that welfare is a matter of national politics; others want to transfer the responsibility for welfare policy to the EU.

Young German cosmopolitans believe that foreign policy should be made at the European level and that the EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy. Like many other respondents, the supporters of the cosmopolitan view emphasize that a shared position in foreign policy means more power. In order to be heard in the world, Europe has to speak with one voice. The respondents believe that:

> In the near future, the European level will be more important for decision making than the national one. The problems to be solved are global and cannot be solved at the national level. The EU is a world-political actor. […] The power of the EU should be augmented. Well, at the moment the EU is relatively undemocratic, but that is an effect of the actions of nation states; nation states shift only the responsibility for unpopular decision to the EU. However, many proposals of the EU are really progressive in nature.
>
> (Gb21biom)

"It would be good, if the EU would be financially more independent; then it could do more than can do now" (Gw08tein).

Most young German cosmopolitans do not think that Europe should have a common European army (and they do not believe that Germany needs a national army). As the results of the interviews show, the reason for the negative ranking of these items is that the respondents are against the employment of force. Some interviewees think that a European army might be useful to secure peace in other parts of the world. But, many interviewees emphasize that they do not believe that political goals can be achieved through force (which some identified with violence). German cosmopolitans believe that debates and deliberation are the only appropriate political means in our time.

Young German cosmopolitans emphasize the responsibility of Europe against countries which are in a bad economic position. Partly, this responsibility is grounded on attempts to redress historical injustices; partly the wealth of Europe is seen as a sufficient reason: "We have many countries in Europe, which are financially strong. Thus, they bear responsibility. And part of this responsibility is the duty to help states which are not so well of" (Gb21biom).

The young cosmopolitans from Germany believe that the EU should do more at the global level than it does now. "It is not sufficient. The EU has a responsibility, which it doesn't fulfil" (Gb35geof). "There is so much poverty in the world; and partly Western states are to be blamed for it. It is necessary to invoke debates and to deepen debates. This could bring about changes. More engagement would be necessary" (Gb25iesm). "With regard to climate change EU countries have been among the main polluters. We should take more the global level into account; we protect the environment here, but elsewhere things are getting worse" (Gw29phym).

Human Rights and their protection are seen as the most important issues at all levels, where the EU is made particularly responsible with regard to protecting Human Rights: "The EU should set an example because there are not many institutions which could do that" (Gw02sozf). The EU should distribute the ideas of human rights and peace "through communication and through negotiations" (Gb21biom).

The young Germans' cosmopolitan identity construction comprises strong positions against chauvinism and, generally, against nationalistic conceptions of democratic order. The cosmopolitans

think that nationalism should definitely be left behind. While place of birth is not meaningless it should never be the basis for collective pride. German cosmopolitans do not appreciate at all ideas of national power. Generally, their European identity construction is rooted in their strong opposition to nationalistic perspectives.

The nationalists' perspective on Europe (factor G-2)

The factor G-2 stands for a perspective, which gives priority to the nation state.

Most decisive features of the national perspective on Europe in the German case study:

In this construction the *emotional identification* with the home country is very strong and respondents are proud of their nationality; this pride is related to German *culture and values*. German nationalists emphasize that *the EU is not 'Europe'*: Europe (Western Europe) stands for a cultural heritage. With regard to some aspects the EU is valued positively, but its influence on member states should be restricted and *national interests should have priority*. The EU is there to give the member states more weight at the global level.

Young German nationalists see the German constitution as the main source of rights and rules and they want the influence of the EU to be restricted.

> The national constitution is the main source of rights and laws, yes. And I feel betrayed when the EU tries to ignore the vote of citizens. […]The power of the EU should be limited. We do not need all these regulations. The EU should have power where it makes sense. […] We need a strong EU to influence world politics. We need the EU for this. The EU should therefore have a constitution; but it should not throw over the national constitutions. The EU could have a constitution that respects the national ones. […] The EU should speak with one voice in foreign politics; but that does not mean that the EU alone carries responsibility. If Europe should have influence the EU must speak with one voice.
>
> (Gw05ethm)

All supporters of the nationalistic perspective in the German sample believe that democracy works best at small. "Democracy has grown in this frame, and it makes sense in this frame. The responsibility of citizens can develop and solidarity is bigger within nation states. The EU has a democratic deficit" (Gw05ethm). The emphasis on small levels as the best domain for democracy does not imply that the respondents speak in favour of participatory models of democracy: The statement that democracy means, first and foremost, engagement of all citizens in public and common issues is not seen as important.

The views of democracy are rather coloured by mistrust. The young interviewees believe that politicians act mainly according to their own interest and that citizens are alienated from politics. Generally they believe that they can only trust family members and close friends. This is one of the contexts in which they emphasize individual rights. In another context the respondents use individual rights to differentiate between their own superior modern German culture and that of other groups, whom they conceive as are more traditional and less modern: "Individual rights mean that you are not bound by tradition" (Gb24inff). The respondents agree with the statement that groups should have the right to be different. However, when the respondents speak about groups, they tend to have national communities in mind.[8] With regard to other national groups, (like foreigners in German), the respondents refer less to the right to be different and more about the duty to assimilate. Overall, while they believe that many politicians act mainly according to their own interests and that certain groups have too much power, they agree with the statement "we need strong leaders".

Young German nationalists also like the idea that the national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one. They emphasize that Germany is their home. They explain the intensity of their attachment with feelings of familiarity and they report that comparisons with other countries and cultures strengthen their sense

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[8] The association between 'group' and 'nation' is not a specific feature of G-2, but can be found in other sorts too. This association is likely to be at least one reason for the co-appearance of the two statements on liberal rights (individual and group rights) in all German factors despite the differences between the conceptions behind the factors.

of belonging to the German culture. They do not believe that the same feeling of belonging would be possible with regard to the whole world or even to Europe. They are proud to be German, but this pride is not related to the German state but to the German culture and its values (especially religious ones). The interviewees strongly agree with the statement 'my home is my country'. Familiarity is seen as a characteristic feature of 'home': "My home is my country – that means simply familiarity; I know how it is. Wherever I will go, my country will remain my home" (Gb29matf). And, in fact, the young nationalists are proud of being German. This pride is regarded as 'natural'; whereas a feeling of belonging to the EU or to Europe is regarded as a 'surrogate identity' (Gw05ethm).

Young German nationalists emphasize that the EU is not 'Europe'. 'Europe' stands for a cultural heritage, for 'occidental, Christian values'. Here, too, emotional identifications, culture and the past are important issues. The respondents agree with the statement that common European culture is derived from diverse national sources; they disagree with the idea that Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values and they agree with the statement that we should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones. The nationalists rank the statement 'the past helps to understand the future' very highly; and they believe that their co-nationals deserve compensation for their sufferings in the past.

Yet, with regard to a few aspects the EU is evaluated positively: The interviewees emphasize that the EU facilitates travelling and that it gives us opportunities to work and study in other countries. Additionally, they think that the EU should take part in peace making on a global scale.

Different from traditional nationalistic conceptions, which would emphasize the priority of the political community, German nationalists rank the statement 'individual freedom and choice should be protected' highest (+5). Their agreement with the claim for group rights is weaker (+2).[9] Moreover, the respondents emphasize

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[9] And the interviewees think that women and men are equal (+3); but at the same time they support the idea that women should care more about family and home (+2).

the last part of the sentence: cultural groups have the right to be different *as long as they do not infringe on the freedoms and rights of others*. They believe that some groups demand too many rights. German young nationalists stress that immigrants should assimilate. "Some minorities demand too many rights – here, I have migrants in my mind. Migrants, who want to have it their way; who want, for example, Islamic education in schools. That is not justified" (Gb29matf).

Overall, three lines of reasoning (and feeling) define factor G-2: In one line the focus moves from the nation state to 'home', identifying both. In this line 'familiarity' is the key value. In another line the argumentation associates the favouring of small scale democracy with defending the priority of the nation state and national political interests. A third line brings feelings of mistrust to the fore: the respondents believe that generally 'other people', and especially politicians, cannot be trusted. In this argumentation, the construction of the group considers membership not a question of citizenship rights, but membership to be determined by the 'same culture'.

The individualistic perspective on Europe (factor G-3)

Factor G-3 stands for a perspective which emphasizes the priority of the (apolitical) individual.

> **Most decisive features of the individualistic perspective in the German case study:**
>
> The respondents give highest priority to individual and group rights. This prioritization of freedom is combined with the idea that democracy means participation and deliberation of free *individuals*. The perspective is characterized by distance to the European Union and even more distance to the global level of governance, while the nationalistic perspective does not reach high rankings either. German *individualists do not feel affiliated to any type of community*.

"Freedom is the highest good. It is also the highest good that politicians should protect" (Gw06bwlm). For some young German individualists the individual and the government are natural opponents. Overall, individualists view the democratic order, by and

large, as a given and they are mostly happy with it. However, they have several wishes for its improvement.

Young individualists emphasize the importance of the national constitution as a major source for individual rights and laws. They also think that only the nation states should have the right to collect taxes from the citizens. The EU is taken for granted as an institution and organization, but its democratic deficits are seen as problematic. On average, respondents agree with the statement that democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation state, because they do not want to see the EU to become a super-state. The interviewees stress that such a large political unit will make the protection of the individual both, more important and much more difficult. Thus, from an individualistic perspective on Europe, smaller scales of democratic order are to be preferred.

Not only individual freedom, but also the right of groups to be different is emphasized. Cultural diversity is valued positively. "Other cultures enrich our society" (Gw06bwlm). While the respondents agree with the statement, that groups have the right to be different, they want to grant group rights also explicitly to minorities within groups, especially within religious groups (GW03phaf). With regard to the EU member states, respondents emphasize that national diversity has a high potential to cause problems:

> I believe that nationalities have different identities and values. I believe that especially Eastern and Western mentalities differ; but the same is true with regard to the Southern and Northern countries. These differences produce problems and they make problem solving difficult.
>
> (Gw03phaf)

Young German individualists strongly emphasize citizenship rights and democracy. Yet, the respondents are convinced that democracy is expensive and that therefore poor countries will hardly establish a democratic order. In their view, this would justify the EU's involvement in fighting global poverty. And with regard to Europe, young individualists demand a common welfare policy, which should be oriented towards the standards at the upper end. On the other hand, as the EU is not regarded as truly democratic, the

respondents want its powers to be restricted, although with caution. For instance, the respondents fear that further enlargement may endanger the economic stability of Germany. Or they stress that EU enlargement should be subject to sustainability. The EU is seen as an actor at the global scale; however, it should not become a global power like the USA. Overall, factor G-3 represents a critical perspective of individuals who see themselves as privileged because they live in freedom in a wealthy democratic country.

We call this pattern of identifications with Europe 'individualistic"' for two reasons: Firstly, the respondents who share this perspective emphasize 'the individual' and the necessity to protect the rights of every single individual at all different levels, the state, the EU and groups. The individualists are strongly in favour of direct political participation. Secondly, individualists do not identify themselves with a collective. They show neither connectedness with the nation nor with a community of Europeans nor with smaller communities. Actually, they do not mention any belonging in terms of membership with groups, that is neither regional nor religious identities show up in these interviews.

A 'statist' perspective on European Union (factor G-4)

The fourth factor offers a somewhat fuzzy picture which makes it difficult to label it. It comprises projections of traditional communitarian, unitary or statist images onto the European Union; 'traditional' refers here to a conception of collective identity which is shaped by unitary conceptions of the national, state or European community.[10]

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[10] For a detailed discussion of this unitary statist conception of democracy, including the EU level, see Liebert 2010.

> **Most decisive features of the statist perspective on European Union in the German case study:**
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> The old nation state identity concept is the blueprint for the worldview of the 'European statists', especially with regard to issues of belonging and interest. Yet, they do not stick to their nation state; by contrast, they are ready to welcome a European state. Here, the somewhat fuzzy and uncertain shape of this construction is due to the fact that the current EU is perceived as not much more than a confederation of states.)

In their pattern of identifications with Europe, young European statists combine their emotional attachment to Germany with one to Europe. The respondents have a positive identification with Germany: The statement 'my country is my home' is ranked very high and the respondents express national pride. However, G-4 is the only factor in the German case study in which the statement 'I am proud to be European' reaches a positive rank (+1). Obviously, the respondents regard 'pride' in a political community as nothing problematic. But, they are not nationalists. And indeed, one respondent has spoken about the possibility that the EU will become an entity of the nation state type; and he expressed his readiness to become part of it.

The young European statists from Germany believe that Europe shares a common heritage and memory; and they believe that the common European culture is derived from diverse national sources. Additionally they agree with the statement that Europe is a state of mind and not a geographic term. The interviewees are convinced that the statement 'diversity causes problems' applies to the EU: "Different languages, different cultures, and different pasts. Look at the Britons, who in so many issues do not support the EU, because they do not want to give up their specificity" (Gb26winm).[11] However, despite such cultural differences, the EU has certain characteristics which set its member states apart from other countries. And: "the EU should demarcate itself from states which are different" (GB26winm).

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[11] It seems to be in this context that the interviewees agree with the statement, that 'it is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe'.

The interviewees think that the EU should have a constitution. The European level is defined by (democratically legitimized) common institutions and shared public policies. However, the respondents believe that democratic procedures work best at local and regional levels, and they think that national politicians should do their best to represent national interests at the European level. The interviewees do not agree with the idea that democracy means first of all the participation of all. The European statists believe that the national constitution continues to provide the main source of rights and laws (+3). The respondents also agree with the statement that German politicians should do their best to represent national interests at the EU level. But the statement that 'democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation state' is rejected (-4).

The EU is seen as Europe's foremost representation and as its very agent at the global level. The EU should respect, protect, spend money, and fight for universal human rights on a global scale. The EU should take part in peace making on a global scale and it should be involved with fighting global poverty. Additionally, the young European statists advocate the EU to export the European culture and values.

Culture plays a marked role in this perspective. The respondents believe that common European culture is derived from diverse sources, but they also believe that Europe shares a common heritage. Although they do not think that Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values, they do believe that Germany forms a bridge between the two.

Generally, the respondents think that it is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage. Their reasons for this view are diverse. In one variant, value is ascribed to culture as such:

> Humanity and the diverse cultures – both are equally important. If we have large organisations like the EU and if we make laws at a global scale we may not take every single culture into account. But we should take care for every cultural group.
>
> (Gw14phyw)

Overall, the model of the nation state and the idea of cultural differences between nation states conceived as specific kinds of

culturally homogenous units, are both present in the conception underlying this pattern of European level statism. The interviewees express their general readiness to expand feelings of belonging to the European community, provided the EU becomes a more integrated and homogenous entity. At the present moment, the young advocates of a European state notice important and (actually or potentially) problematic cultural differences within Europe. However, this does not lead them to the conclusion that the EU is a bad idea; it only means that the processes of unification and fusion into one European nation state will need a lot of time and patience.

Summary

The factor analysis of the German Q sorts has brought to the fore four factors, each standing for a different perspective on Europe. The narratives outlined above for interpreting these factors demonstrate that they represent distinct perspectives on the EU, the meanings of 'Europe', the role of nation states and that of the citizens. The narratives differ with regard to their understanding of culture and cultural difference. And they differ with regard to the relation between individual and group rights.

Obviously, each narrative condenses a great deal of information on lay concepts of European identities (or more exactly: on a specific segment of European identities, because our study has given special attention to questions of political order). Adopting the lenses of these rich factor narratives, the conventional labels used in European identity research, such as 'German', 'German-European', 'European-German' or 'European' appear relatively void of meaning. Moreover, while many of the German respondents see themselves as citizens of the world or as cosmopolitans, they would hardly be able to express their much more nuanced perspectives in the terms employed by the Eurobarometer standard questionnaires. Nevertheless, we have also asked the German students to respond to the famous Eurobarometer question. Table 3.2 summarizes their answers in relation to the four factors.

Table 3.2: Self-labelling in combination with identity constructions

[…] how would you call yourself?	Cosmopolitans	Nationalists	Individualists	Statists
European only	3	-	-	-
European and German	7	-	-	-
German and European	3	4	3	4
German only	1	1	1	-
Don't know; no answer	4	-	-	-

These numbers can only give some rough indications of the extent to which the more nuanced understandings, captured by our study of German students, of what it means to be a European to them evaporate. Obviously, to know that someone calls himself or herself German and European does not tell us much about the person's ideas about individual, state/nation and European Union. However, these findings also suggest that the differentiation between the labels is not completely meaningless. This line of survey research on European identities is not altogether wrong. But the instruments of survey research need improvement by qualitative methods such as Q methodology.

We will now turn to a comparison between the empirically detected four factors and theoretically defined democracy models.

German identity constructions and democracy models in Europe

According to Q methodology, for the collection of data through interviews, we have formulated sets of statements, several of them consisting of operationalization of the three RECON models.[12] These models stand for three different institutional configurations of democracy in Europe (see the first chapter in this report, above). In

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[12] The operationalization of the three RECON models was mainly worked out at a meeting in April 2009 in Krakow by the three country teams, with assistance from other colleagues from Krakow, Budapest and Bremen. The findings from the empirical pre-tests suggested some revisions of our first operationalizations; the revisions were done by the research team.

the following I will explore the relations between the findings from the German case study and the RECON models, based on quotations from Eriksen and Fossum (2009a).[13]

Model 1: Audit democracy

> *"The first model envisages democracy as being directly associated with the nation state" (Eriksen and Fossum 2009b: 16);*
>
> *"the Member States insist that the Union's legitimacy is derived from the democratic character of the Member States' (Fossum and Menéndez 2009: 56);*
>
> *"this model is set up to limit (a constitutional) synthesis at the European level precisely because the model understands constitutionalism to continue to be situated in the Member States"(ibid.: 59).*
>
> *"The EU-level structure is envisaged as a functional regime that is set up to address problems, which the Member States cannot resolve when acting independently" (Eriksen and Fossum 2009b: 17).*

The nation state is central in this model; thus, some 'classical' features of national constructions of order and of collective identity should be good indicators of attitudes related to this model.[14] The following statements represent RECON model 1 in our study.

Statements representing model 1:
    National constitution is the main source of rights and laws.
    Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation state.
    National borders should be controlled by individual member states.

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[13] During the life time of the Q – identity project (spring 2009 – 2011), the elaboration and refinement of the RECON democracy models has certainly evolved further; here I will limit myself to the version contained in this publication by Eriksen and Fossum (2009a).

[14] The name 'audit democracy' of this model (see Eriksen and Fossum 2009a) refers to the development that would be necessary for the democratisation of the EU if some basic assumptions (especially the central importance of the nation state) were taken as starting point.

> We need a strong national army.
> Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.
> The power of the EU should be limited.
> Our (Hungarian\German\Polish) politicians should do their best to represent national interests on the EU level.
> Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.
> My home is my country.
> I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).

These statements represent RECON model 1 in our study. Thus we expect that people, who believe that the nation state is central for democracy will show (relatively) strong support for many of these statements. *Additionally*, they may define trust as a matter of closeness; they may emphasize cultural differences between countries; and they may disagree with some other statements, for example, they may not believe, that Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values. However, opinions on trust are not closely related to certain democracy models (respondents may prefer the audit democracy, but they may not trust their fellow countrymen). The same is true for other statements.

Since symbols of unity may play an important role in identity constructions, we refer explicitly to some of them. We would expect that interviewees who support the first identity model would like the national flag more prominently displayed than the European one; likewise we would expect that they would not want to give up national passports, while supporters of the second identity model may like the idea to have European passports only.

While the nation state is central for model 1, it is not the only level in a globalising world. Moreover, model 1 reaches, by definition, beyond the sphere of the nation state, because the EU is defined as functional for the solution of some problems. An obvious example would be the solution of environmental problems. It is common knowledge today that environmental problems cannot be solved at the nation state level alone. Since it is common knowledge this perception is not specific for model 1, but we would expect this and similar statements to appear together with this model (as well as with the other models). Thus, it may well be the case, that supporters of a

national perspective share some opinions with, for example, supporters of a cosmopolitan view. Generally, the defining statements of a democracy model will appear in typical combinations with other statements. Q Method makes such patterns visible. The statements which define the RECON models in our study do not mirror the complete picture; they are approximations.

The first theoretical model does not cause problems of understanding and interpretation. This is slightly different in the case of the second theoretical model. Let us first look at some key quotations:

Model 2: The EU as federation of nationalities

The second RECON model sees the EU as "an emulator of the nation state but organised along federal lines (and modified to sit with multiple national identities). This conceptualisation portrays the Union as a political community based on a set of ethical values, shared by European citizens, and typically embedded in a common culture" (Fossum and Menéndez 2009: 61).

The concept is explicitly not constructed like old (culturally essentialist) national identity constructions. However: "A common identity […] not only helps to stabilise Union's goals and visions, but is also necessary for securing trust" (Fossum and Menéndez 2009: 61).

"The multinational federal state requires citizens' allegiance in the form of a constitutional patriotism, which portrays loyalty in political terms; it hinges on the validity of legal norms, the justification of policies, and the wielding of power in the name of fairness" (Eriksen and Fossum 2009b: 22);

"The Constitution will frame a socio-economic order which is reflective of citizen' mutual obligations, of what they owe to each other as members of a value-based community. Consequently, there should be a strong element of redistribution at the European level, which will reflect Europeans' allegiance to the Union" (Fossum and Menéndez 2009: 63).

It is difficult to operationalize model 2. and identify representations of it in practice, for several reasons. First, since the EU does not have a constitution yet, we cannot look for constitutional patriotism. Second, it is unclear whether model 2 stands for the reproduction of a nation state conception at the European level based on a homogenous

cultural community or for a multinational state. Empirically, we find statements which emphasise pan-European commonality and other statements which balance the member states as parts with the EU conceived as federal state and those which understand the EU as a guarantor of the rights of citizens.[15]

Statements representing model 2

EU should have a constitution.

The EU should create common welfare policy (common regulations, common distribution of social benefits).

Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.

EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.

Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration.

The Euro should become a common currency of Europe.

Europe should have one common army.

We should have only an EU passport.

I'm proud of being European.

The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.

The EU provides opportunity to protect citizens against their own administration.

There are some more statements, which we might expect to indicate model 2 in subjective identity constructions. These, however cannot be used as defining statements because they do not belong exclusively to model 2. Especially statements on rights and duties appear to be important for model 2 (see the additional statements below).

Let us turn to the third model, a non-state and post-national conception of European democracy, with cosmopolitan imprints.[16]

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[15] The last aspect may not fit with the theoretical outline of this model.

[16] The interpretation of this model has been difficult and still somewhat different readings exist in our research group. I will not reproduce the discussions here.

Model 3: A cosmopolitan democracy model

> *"This model is premised on democracy beyond the nation-state. It envisages the European Union as a political community based on the citizens' mutual acknowledgment of their rights and duties, but where these are embedded at the supranational level of government in a Union that is neither a state nor a nation" (Fossum and Menéndez 2009: 66).*
>
> *"This model is […] premised on democracy beyond the nation-state. It posits that the Union is a subset (or perhaps more appropriately a vanguard for) an emerging cosmopolitan order" (ibid: 70).*
>
> *"Political power emanates from citizens coming together in public forums and reaching agreement on the rules for social coexistence and the collective goals they should realise. Power is collective, communicative and inter-subjective by nature; it is created in the interaction between agents; it is only in operation and is only strong as the people are assembled and agree" (Eriksen and Fossum 2009b: 27).*

It should be emphasized again: Some of the features of model 3 appear in statements that cannot be called defining – or exclusive – for this model (because people with other conceptions can agree with them as well). Therefore, in the following, statements have been selected which refer to responsibilities of the EU at the global level as defining model 3. These statements cannot grasp the internal order of the EU, but how they view the global role of the EU in the world would be a good indicator for model 3 (and indeed, it is a good indicator, as our findings will show).

Statements defining model 3
 The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.
 The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crises.
 The EU should take part in peace making on a global scale.
 The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale.
 Global collective decision making should be fostered.
 We are all responsible for shaping global institutions.
 It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.
 I am a global citizen
 The whole world is my home.

This is, in short, our proposition of how to operationalize the theoretical democracy models in the field of subjective identity constructions. Overall, we have to keep in mind that neither single items nor the agreement with statements, which define a model, alone will present the patterns of meaning that we are searching for. Only the combinations of statements will reveal the complete picture. And, additionally, our study suggests that a number of additional statements will complement the democracy models: statements related to individual rights and duties (statements on individual freedom and choice as well as on group rights), statements on trust and mistrust and statements related to culture. The rankings of all these statements can only be interpreted in context. In the German sample, for instance, nearly every respondent would give individual and group rights a high positive ranking; however, especially group rights were given divergent, even opposed, meanings. It is obvious: The complexity of lack of clarity of the relations between model defining statements and supplementary statements makes their interpretation a difficult endeavour.

For assessing agreement between the German sample is making and the RECON models of democracy, in the following I make use of a data normalization procedure to compare the factor analysis of the German empirical data at one hand and the democracy models at the other hand (for details, see chapter).

Figure 3.2 shows that in factor G-1 those statements which define RECON model 1 in our study, are rejected or at least not regarded as important. Statements which define RECON model 3 (a kind of a cosmopolitan view) reach high rankings in factor G-1; and statements that define RECON model 2 get some support. And so on.

Figure 3.2: Agreement with RECON models

In this comparison the factors are differentiated, firstly, by their relation to RECON model 1, the model of an audit democracy. This puts factor G-1, the cosmopolitan perspective, on one side and the remaining three factors on the other. Likewise, three factors show, at least some agreement with RECON model 3 (the cosmopolitan democracy model). Only the third factor, the individualistic view, shows no positive relation with the cosmopolitan model. Finally, RECON model 2 does not get much support in the German sample: The first German factor shows some positive relation with this model while the second factor and especially the third one are in strong disagreement with the second democracy model. Thus, at one hand, we find traces of two of the three democracy models within the German data. At the other hand, we have two empirical identity constructions, with no relation to the theoretical models, which we have used as reference for our study.

This first comparison is informative. But, if we want to know more about the relation between the theoretical democracy models and our empirical factors, we have to go into more detail. We will start with the cosmopolitan perspective. Table 3.3 shows the rankings for those statements which we understood as defining for RECON model 3 (the cosmopolitan regional European perspective in theory).

Table 3.3: The cosmopolitan perspective (German case)

Cosmopolitan perspective in theory: RECON model 3	G-1 (factor arrays; the cosmopolitan perspective in the empirical study)
The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.	2
The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crises.	0
The EU should take part in peace making on a global scale.	3
The EU should respect, […] and fight for universal human rights on a global scale.	4
Global collective decision making should be fostered.	4
We are all responsible for shaping global institutions.	3
It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.	1
I am a global citizen	1
The whole world is my home.	1

Eight out of the nine statements were ranked positively. But, only two of these statements, which are meant to be defining for a cosmopolitan perspective, reach high rankings. Instead, some of the supplementary statements reach the highest rankings, namely: statements on individual and group rights. But this is in agreement with the theoretical model. Since statements on rights (as other supplementary statements) do not differentiate between the three democracy models, they could not be included in the list of defining statements.

Relation with the other theoretical models:

Relation with model 2: As Table 3.3 shows, factor G-1, the cosmopolitan perspective, is positively related with the second model (the EU as federation of nationalities). Behind this relation stands the positive ranking of four statements:

- The EU should have a constitution. (+3)
- The EU should create a common welfare policy […].(+1)
- Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.(+2)
- The EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy. (+2)

The *relation to the theoretical model 1* (the nationalistic view on Europe), is a decisive characteristic of factor G-1: The German cosmopolitans distance themselves widely from the national point of view.[17] Most German cosmopolitans reject the idea of national pride completely. Additionally, they are against national interest politics.

If we take all these details on rankings together with the cosmopolitan narrative in section 3, we may say that factor G-1 circumscribes an opinion pattern that looks a lot like the democracy model described in RECON model 3:

> This model is […] premised on democracy beyond the nation-state. It posits that the Union is a subset (or perhaps more appropriately a vanguard for) an emerging cosmopolitan order.
> (Fossum and Menéndez 2009: 70).

> Political power emanates from citizens coming together in public forums and reaching agreement on the rules for social coexistence and the collective goals they should realise. Power is collective, communicative and inter-subjective by nature; it is created in the interaction between agents; it is only in operation and is only strong as the people are assembled and agree.
> (Eriksen and Fossum 2009b: 27).

In addition, the young German cosmopolitans emphasize the role of the EU as a global actor.

Let us now have a closer look at the nationalistic perspective. The data in Table 3.4 show that seven out of the ten statements that define the audit democracy model (emphasizing the role of the nation state) are ranked positively.

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[17] None of the statements that define RECON model 1 in our study have reached a positive ranking in the composite factor arrays of the cosmopolitan factor G-1.

Table 3.4: The nationalistic perspective (German case)

RECON model 1 (audit democracy)	G-2 (national perspective in the empirical study)
National constitution is the main source of rights and laws.	3
Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation state.	-2
National borders should be controlled by individual member states.	-1
We need a strong national army.	1
Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.	-3
The power of the EU should be limited.	2
Our German politicians should do their best to represent national interests on the EU level.	3
Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	1
My home is my country.	5
I'm proud to be German.	3

The young German nationalists' perspective is somewhat more Europeanized than the audit-democracy-model suggests. For instance, German nationals want the EU to take responsibility in border control. The negative ranking of the statement on taxes should not be interpreted as willingness to pay taxes to the EU. The negative ranking means here that the respondents did not find this statement important. Likewise, the negative ranking of the statement "democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation state" does not imply the idea of more space for the EU. The German nationals see the EU as a federation of states and they want its influence on member states to be restricted. Thus, the interpretation of rankings can be misleading without the consultation of the interviews.

Relations between the national perspective and other models:

Relation with the cosmopolitan model: The respondents, whose sorts are summarized in factor G-2 (the national perspective), agree with four of the nine statements which represent the theoretically defined cosmopolitan perspective in our analysis. The respondents think:

- that the EU should be engaged in fighting global poverty   (+1)[18]
- that the EU should fight for Human rights on a global scale (+4)
- that the EU should take part in peace making on a global scale (+3)
- that global collective decision making should be fostered   (+2)

This is an impressive list for a nationalistic perspective. Obviously, German nationalists do look beyond the nation state and even beyond the European territory. (However, they strongly emphasize the priority of national interests.)

Relation with RECON model 2 (the EU as federation of nationalities): Model 2 is widely rejected; but two statements obtain positive rankings: The EU should have a constitution and foreign policy should be made at the EU level.

Taking all data together, the pattern of attitudes behind factor G-2 suggests strong resemblance with RECON model 1: "The first model envisages democracy as being directly associated with the nation state" (Eriksen and Fossum 2009b: 16); "the Member States insist that the Union's legitimacy is derived from the democratic character of the Member States' (Fossum and Menéndez 2009: 56); "this model is set up to *limit* synthesis at the European level precisely because the model understands constitutionalism to continue to be situated in the Member States" (ibid.: 59). "The EU-level structure is envisaged as a *functional regime* that is set up to address problems, which the Member States cannot resolve when acting independently" (Eriksen and Fossum 2009b: 17).

However, this theoretical description does not include expectations regarding what the EU might or should do as a representative of its member states at the global level. As is shown above, German nationalists want the EU to be active at the global scale. Moreover, the rationality behind the desired European engagement may go beyond mere national power politics and self-interest.
Finally, the remaining two factors of the German case study do not

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[18] The statement says that the EU is involved in fighting global poverty; thus, it is a factual statement. However, the interviewees appreciate this involvement.

have very clear references in the theoretical models. The individualists are mainly interested in claiming more participation within the existing political structures. The 'EU statists' might fit the second supranational model of European democracy only if this is conceived in the terms of traditional German notions of the homogenous nation state, however, projected onto the European level. But they are neither nationalists nor do they endorse a strong federal EU. To the contrary, they would accept a European state, but they do not believe that such a state can be realized under the current conditions.

Summary

The assessment of the patterns of agreement between the perspectives detected in the German case study with the theoretical models shows that two, the cosmopolitan perspective and the nationalistic perspective are quite close to the respective democracy models 3 and 1. These two perspectives are relatively well developed among (our sample of) young Germans.

The remaining two perspectives, the individualistic and the pan-European statist construction, do not have clear counterparts. This is not surprising, because these lay conceptions are neither coherent nor well developed, they are somewhat thin and they even include some (seemingly) contradictory statements. However, these perspectives do not appear meaningless, at all.

The 'statist' perspective on the EU reflects a German traditional way of identifying with a strong state in our case study. What makes this construction specific is the readiness of the respondents to transpose the nation state concept to the European level. While this transposition is currently only an idea, the respondents believe it might (and it should) become reality.

More important as this German specificity, however, is the individualistic perspective. Both, the emphasis on the individual and on individual rights as well as the strong demand for direct political participation represented in factor G-3are only extreme expressions of a tendency that colours the sample of young Germans. It is tempting

to speculate about how to interpret this pattern.[19] But given the present data set we are not in a position to develop empirically grounded explanations.

> Interpreting differences […] is where things become much less certain and much more difficult. The key, of course, is the truism that is consistent findings have to be interpreted in terms of what is common to the countries studied, the inconsistent findings have to be interpreted in terms of how the countries – or the studies – differ. This truism, unfortunately, gives no clue as to which of the many differences between countries or between studies lies at the heart of the differences in findings.
>
> (Kohn 1996: 35)

In one point we are fortunate: Our cooperative development of the research design reduces the probability that differences in empirical results are due to differences in the conceptions and methods of the country studies.

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[19] However, we may speculate that the process of individualization in modern, industrialized, Western, democratic societies stands behind this individualism. However, this explanation may be too broad to be really satisfying. A more specific explanation could refer to the image of post-war Germany as a post-national society (Kreckel 1993). In opinion polls typical features of national identity constructions, especially national pride and national culture, are not as strong as they are in neighbouring countries. Then, the individualism in the German sample would be a specificity of the FRG

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Chapter 4

Liberal-democratic, nationalistic, utilitarian Young Hungarians' European identity patterns

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Introduction

This case study on common identity conceptions among students is based on empirical research conducted in the summer of 2009 at two Universities in Hungary.[1] Various research projects – including RECON – have been searching for answers whether a collective European identity has already been formed or is under formation, and whether we are heading for an emerging global identity. What happens to our national identity? To what extent has the accession to the EU changed our conception of the EU, of our political and economic role, of our opportunities to live, work and study abroad, etc? Given that it is more common to live in one's national country, in the EU and in the global world at the same time, to enjoy the opportunity to cross borders freely, study and work abroad, and to experience multicultural diversity, while having international and

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intercultural experiences, what are the impacts of mobility on our traditional national identity or on any emerging European or global identity?

Theoretical and empirical research should find answers to these questions not only from an economic point of view but also with respect to social and political integration processes. We also want to know more about contemporary young people's attitudes, feelings, perceptions and reflections towards the EU and specific issues such as democracy; integration process, EU achievements and failures; depth and content of integration; local, European and global responsibilities; functioning of the EU and its institutions, etc. as young people perceive these questions and feel about them. Research should also attempt to find out to what extent young people's identity conceptions agree with different models of democracy in the European Union.

The present empirical comparative research aims at exploring the collective identity patterns that have formed recently among young Hungarian citizens. It draws on a comparative framework for analysing identity constructions among young people in three EU member states, comparing students across the Hungarian, Polish and German contexts. Thus, we seek to identify the concepts that young people attach to being a European Union citizen in Hungary, Germany or Poland. The research also aims at analysing which of the three theoretical RECON models of the EU[2] can be detected in young people's conception of the Union.

As in the other case studies, altogether 40 interviews[3] were conducted with university and college students, aged 18–25 in Hungary. This group of people participating in our empirical research cannot be considered representative in any sense, but representativeness was not an aim of the study. Actually, our principal goal was to make the group of interviewees as diverse as possible in order to include as

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[2] See Chapter 1 of this report.

[3] 'Interviews' comprise the process when students set the Q-set cards into the structured frame (see Annex 2 and 3) and then verbally provide us with the background meaning, their thoughts, beliefs and attitudes related to the structure of the set. By 'questionnaire' we mean a short list of questions that we conducted after the interviews (see Annex 4).

many mindsets as possible. Thus, we included students majoring in many different subjects (e.g., sociology, law, biology, physics, art theory, design, geography, architecture, medicine, agricultural engineering, etc.); in addition, both elite and less prestigious universities/colleges were interviewed, both in Budapest and in the countryside, and state-run as well as church-run institutions. Half of our interviewees were male and half were female in both the capital and the country towns. Given that students studying social sciences typically receive a greater quantity of and more specialized education on European issues and other social questions than others, we maximized the ratio of social science students to 30 per cent in the research.

Although the low number (only 40 cases) of questionnaires does not allow us to draw far-fetching statistical conclusions, it is still worth taking them into consideration. The data still shows quite well general trends regarding contemporary young people, for instance the frequency of speaking foreign languages or attitudes towards the EU. Spending time abroad, meeting foreign young people, and getting to know foreign cultures, lifestyles and values can all have important influence on a person's attitudes, skills and personality. These individual intercultural experiences can promote sensibility towards democracy, social justice, tolerance and solidarity as well as fostering cosmopolitan attitudes. According to our data, 34 students out of 40 have never spent three months or more in another country and there were some who had never ever been abroad. Three students had lived abroad for a longer period (five, seven and 13.5 years) because of family reasons (father or mother worked there). There were only three Hungarian students out of 40 who went abroad by their own initiative: one had spent 5 months in France as an au-pair, another one had spent 3 months in the USA at a world championship, and the third one had studied in Scotland for a year.

The empirical analysis developed in this chapter is structured in three parts: In the first part, we contextualise the Hungarian case study by drawing on findings from previous studies. The second part provides us with the Hungarian students' identification patterns in details. The final part contains the conclusion of our empirical research.

Contextualising the case study
Hungarian cultural values and traditional identities

The present comparative study is based on the assumption that identity is an important factor that explains patterns of participation in common affairs and decision making. It is also claimed that the institutionalisation of democratic political institutions in an enlarged European Union will strongly depend on citizens' feelings of belonging to this large political, economic and cultural entity. The case of Hungary is interesting because according to several sociological and socio-psychological analyses, the Hungarian population is characterised by a historically rooted peculiar identity complex, involving high national pride mingled with feelings of inferiority. Evidence for this can be found in sociological, historical and cultural studies on Hungarian identity.

Previous studies of Hungarian cultural values and traditional identity patterns found that Hungary has had various conflicts with minorities, nationalities and neighbouring countries based on identity problems (Csepeli 1997; Csepeli, Örkény and Székelyi 2000). The economic problems and unmet expectations of the post-communist period strengthened some of the negative traits of the society such as a closed mentality, a paternalist social welfare system, and racial and ethnic intolerance, as proved by various recent research studies (Enyedi, Erős and Fábián 2001; Kiss 2005; Csepeli, Örkény, Székelyi and Poór 2005). Public opinion surveys and other analyses also point at the utilitarian expectations of the citizens concerning enlargement: a large part of the population primarily looked forward to accession for material reasons, hoping for a quick increase of living standards (Lengyel and Göncz 2010; Heller 2010).

Fifteen years after the political transition in 1989, the political climate in Hungary was quite ambivalent regarding the EU accession on 1 May 2004. Party affiliations had a great influence on supporting or rejecting the integration. Political scientists (Fölsz and Tóka 2004; Karácsony 2004: 461) drew attention to the fact that public debates on possible advantages and disadvantages of joining the EU became more energised and hostile just before the referendum (2003). As a result, political attitudes played an increasing role aside from the usual utilitarian considerations. 83.76 per cent of the voters voted for the EU, which sounds high in international context, but considering the

actual turn-out (just 45.6 per cent), the doubts and passive resistance that divided a rather pessimistic Hungarian society are discernible.

Figure 4.1: Cultural value position of 44 countries

Notes
X axis: Closed thinking vs. open thinking (index value)
Y axis: Traditional-religious vs. secular-rational thinking (index value)
Source: Keller, 2010

Taking into account that many social factors, (level and state of public education and public health care, cultural values and mentality, opportunity for vulnerable groups to catch up) have a strong impact on the potential economic achievement and competitiveness of a country, we can conclude that development and economic growth highly depend on social and political processes in society. As part of an international comparison, TARKI conducted research for the World Value Survey, examining the influence of mentality, cultural

and other values and attitudes on the country's economic progress (TARKI 2009).

The survey yielded the following key findings:

- Hungarians' value systems are quite secularized, traditional communities are not as powerful as in other similarly developed countries.
- Hungarians are not open-minded and this appears to be a consistent feature. Hungary is located on the periphery of the Western Christian cultural world, forming a closed, introverted society.
- Examining values on the traditional - rational axis, Hungarian society appears to be rational and secularized. However, according to the survey, Hungary is much closer to the orthodox culture found in Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine or Russia, than to our direct neighbour, Slovenia.
- Civil and political rights, political participation, or active citizenship do not attract much attention.
- Hungarians do not appreciate or tolerate ways of thinking that differ remarkably from the mainstream.
- The society is characterised by a low level of trust.

At the turn of the millennium, Abramson and Inglehart (1995) came to the conclusion that although the ratio of people having post-materialist values is usually higher in developed, rich countries, Hungary is a striking example because the rate of people with materialist values was the highest and the rate of those with post-materialist values was lowest, even less than in India, China or Nigeria. Thus in the Hungarian culture, material goods, income and carrier are considered much more important than free time, cultural habits, spending time with friends or independence. (Andorka 2006: 577)

A recent European Social Survey (ESS) reveals a somewhat more optimistic picture with some positive changes. As we can see in Figure 4.2, in terms of social values, Hungary is placed approximately in the middle. Hungarian young people appear to consider values, such as equality, loyalty, protecting the environment and helping socially disadvantaged people as more important than youth in other post-socialist countries.

Figure 4.2: Average social-welfare factor scores in selected countries

Source: European Social Survey (ESS) (2001–2008) Aktív Állampolgárság Alapítvány, 2010

The presence of strong discriminative attitudes against minorities is a good indicator of a society's closed mentality. Between 1994–2002 – just before joining the EU–TÁRKI conducted a survey in Hungary on people's ethnic and political attitudes regarding Romany and Jewish minorities, as well as foreigners. TÁRKI was unable to state that anti-Semitism had decreased in the decade before accession to the EU, but the incidence of 'latency' (don't know answers and answer denials) had risen considerably. The researchers identified three types of anti-Semitism (political, discriminatory and religious), and shockingly, political anti-Semitism was as popular among young, highly educated adults as in the average population. In the case of the Romany minority, openly discriminatory opinions became less frequent, but negative attitudes and social distance towards them remained, potentially including anti-Roma attitudes, but in hidden forms. Hostile attitudes towards immigrants were also present and had increased significantly: 26 per cent (1997) vs. 43 per cent (2004) of people would not let any immigrants enter Hungary (Enyedi, Fábián and Sík 2004).

Similar data surfaced in another independent research study in 2009 (Vásárhelyi 2009). The Hungarian Academy of Science and ELTE Communication Research group conducted a survey with 700 youngsters aged 18-30. The survey aimed to test attitudes of young people towards Romany and Jewish people. Vásárhelyi discovered the presence of political anti-Semitism: 52 per cent agreed that Jewish people hold too much power in business life. The research identified

three different groups based on the relationship to Jewish people. 30 per cent of youngsters were directly hostile and anti-Semitic, 29 per cent believe in stable negative stereotypes, but were not as anti-Semitic as the first group. 38 per cent of youngsters belonged to the third group, which did not have negative stereotypes towards Jewish people. The main characteristics of the first group were conservatism, national radicalism, and sympathy towards the newly emerged extreme right wing party, Jobbik.

Based on attitudes towards Romany people, the research also identified three main groups. 47 per cent belonged to "*the militant racist group*" representing a hostile, segregating attitude, believing in all negative stereotypes. One-third of the respondents agreed with negative stereotypes concerning the Roma population and put the exclusive responsibility on them for their marginalization. Nevertheless, they did not want to force them to live in segregated environments; on the contrary, they believed that assimilation may bring an appropriate solution about. Only 17 per cent of youngsters expressed liberal attitudes. The study concludes that four fifths of Hungarian youngsters have strong and stable prejudices towards minorities and believe in radical, extreme solutions (Vásárhelyi 2009).

According to data from a recent Eurobarometer survey (Special Eurobarometer 2008) on perception of ethnic discrimination, 61 per cent of Hungarian people think that ethnic discrimination has become more widespread in Hungary in the last five years. The percentage of young people who think that discrimination is very wide-spread in the country is 28 per cent for ethnic discrimination, 19 per cent for discrimination against people living with physical or mental handicap and 18 per cent for age discrimination. As for gender discrimination, only half of Hungarian youth believed that equal wages for men and women for equal work is an important issue (Gáti 2010). According to Eurobarometer data (Eurobarometer 2008), Hungary is the only country where people think that gender discrimination is more widespread than it was five years ago.

Similar outcomes were revealed in a study (Gazsó 2007), based on a national survey conducted in 2007 with the participation of 1800 students studying in higher education. Key findings from this study are shown below:

- Hungarian students have ambivalent attitudes to the EU and its institutions.
- The EU topic in itself is not interesting enough for students and does not motivate them to look for detailed information.
- For Hungarian students it is not important to have up-to-date info on the EU.
- Only students who took courses on EU affairs have an opinion about the Hungarian Representative of the European Committee.
- There is a huge difference in how students from different generations consume media. The difference is especially striking in the case of the Internet.
- Sourcing information from TV is losing importance.

In light of these findings the question emerges whether the closed and pessimistic attitude of Hungarian's society and its low level of tolerance is also shared by the young generations - and regarding the future elite of the country, by University students, in particular.

Lack of competency in speaking foreign languages is an important factor that explains this phenomenon. According to data from the Youth 2008 survey (Bauer and Szabó 2009) English and German are still the most popular languages for students in Hungary. Youth 2008 revealed that approximately one-third of the informants spoke English or German at a basic level, and 35 per cent (English) and 21 per cent (German) at a medium level. Only a very small group of students are able to use these languages at a high level or as mother tongue (English: seven per cent and two per cent, German: four per cent and two per cent, respectively). Other languages are relatively rarely spoken by Hungarian students. Our sample reflects the results of the Youth 2008 survey. In our questionnaire, four students out of 40 claimed that they do not speak any languages (all of them studied in a countryside based university), 14 students that they speak one language (English or German), and 22 students said that they speak two or more languages. Nevertheless, many students referred to their knowledge as passive, and that they could not use their knowledge in communication with a foreigner and would not even try to.

Obtaining relevant foreign language skills is still not guaranteed after having studied a language for several years in school[4].

According to the findings of the Youth 2008 survey, (Bauer and Szabó 2009) young people are quite indifferent to political issues in Hungary: 60 per cent of them are not or absolutely not interested in politics. Of course their interest depends almost linearly on their level of education: students with higher degree are more likely to score higher on the scale measuring political interest than students with lower level of education. Beside political indifference, the youth survey also detected distrust among Hungarian young people of political institutions as well as certain civil institutions.

Some items of our questionnaire related to the EU, asking students whether they thought that joining the EU had been a success story for Hungary. On the whole, this small sample shows that most students consider our country's EU membership as a good thing, which closely matches Eurobarometer findings (Eurobarometer 2008): 55% of Hungarian students said the same. In fact, young students are much more positive about the EU than older people, and presumably see more opportunities of being part of it. Our interviews, however, tempered this positive picture, as we will see later on. The answers were more diverse when students were asked about their more nuanced images of the EU. Only one person had a very positive image of the EU, most students had a fairly positive image, 12 said that they are neutral while five out of 40 answered that they had a fairly negative image of the EU. Half of the students were satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU, 14 persons were more critical and commented on this, as we will see later on. There were

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[4] One of the weak points of the Hungarian foreign language education system is that it does not provide solid skills and does not encourage students to use the language actively to communicate. The political turnover brought significant changes: learning Russian was no longer compulsory; students could now choose from several Western languages, teachers became more qualified while the quality of teaching was increased due to higher quality language books, more diverse methods, etc. After the political transition the language teaching market widened significantly and the approaching EU accession further increased the demand for such services (Laki, 2006). However, the fact remains that financial reasons still hamper quality language learning. Most Hungarian students learn foreign languages at school and only a small group can afford the more intensive and effective private lessons or language schools.

three persons who were very satisfied, and three others who could not decide. By contrast, the Hungarian population is more pessimistic: only half of the respondents were satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU, and only 23 per cent said that democracy works properly in Hungary (Eurobarometer 2009).

The Youth survey (Bauer and Szabó 2009) also discloses another striking fact about Hungarian youth. According to the data, 14 per cent of 20–24-year-old young people (i.e., a similar age group as in our empirical research) said that under certain conditions, dictatorship were better than democracy, and one-third claimed that these political regimes did not make any difference for them. Only 42 per cent of the youngsters believe that democracy is better than any other political regime, and 11 per cent were not able to decide.

One of the questions of highest interest in the present context aims to explore whether participants see themselves in the future as being more Hungarian or more European. As we can see from Figure 4.3, most students think that they will be Hungarian in the first place and European in the second place. There were only seven 'Europeanised' individuals thinking the other way around, i.e. European in the first place and Hungarian in the second. There were still fewer who see themselves as Hungarian only, and none at all who can see him/herself in the future as only a European citizen. In the following, we will turn to the results from our Q research to develop these findings in detail.

The Q research that was conducted with 40 Hungarian students attempted to examine conceptions of democracy and views of the EU by operationalizing the three theoretical models in terms of a set of statements submitted to the informants for evaluation, and by analysing the interviews that were recorded during and after the Q sorting process. The research also attempted to find out whether the ongoing process of European development of constitutionalization and legal harmonisation have directly affected young people's concepts on the EU and democracy.

Hungarian students' identification patterns

The RECON framework proposes three main models of identification: one model directly associated with the nation state, one in which Europe is a federal multinational state, and a third one with

global, cosmopolitan characteristics (responsibility, etc.), leading to a model of deliberative democracy. The statements of the Q set were constructed according to these models. Nonetheless, our research conducted in Hungary demonstrates that the empirical types resulting from the Q-factor analysis represent mixtures of these characteristics rather than absolutely homogenous 'pure' types. There are certainly common characteristics that result from the interviews of most Hungarian young people but also characteristic differences among them.

Not surprisingly, most of the students set a high value on travelling and studying in the EU, common euro, etc., but many of them have a feeling of inferiority when describing themselves as European citizens. They have the impression that Hungary is lagging behind the EU and is treated as a second class country in many cases. Statements comprising words and expressions like 'world peace', 'solving environmental problems' or 'fighting against global poverty' are highly appreciated, especially among women, although the meaning attributed to them in the Hungarian context may be quite diverse. For instance, despite the following statement "The EU is involved in fighting global poverty" emphasizing the EU's responsibility in a global issue, the interviewees often translated it into "I believe that fighting against global poverty is important, so I agree with it." Thus, the interviewee did not take the role of the EU into consideration.

Both male and female respondents agree with the fact that "Women and men are equal". But while men tend to give the statement "Women should care more about family and home" a similarly positive value, women rather place this statement on the extreme negative side.

During the interviews some extremist or radical nationalistic views appeared among young people, but they were not frequent enough to be combined into an independent factor. We identified some students who do not accept the EU and claim some compensation for the injustices of the past. Such responses in our research clearly reflect

the increasing radical right-wing thinking among students and young people in general in Hungary[5].

We have identified four factors in the analyses of the Hungarian responses.[6] These can be assigned to diverse identity patterns affiliated to divergent politico-ideological orientations. The first factor represents a liberal democratic pattern of pro-European identity, the second factor a 'macho nationalistic' pattern of Eurosceptic identity, the third a utilitarian-instrumental identity pattern while the fourth one represents another variety of a Hungarian national identity that is more emotional and emphatic but less nationalistic than that of the 'macho nationalists'; therefore we call it 'Hestia' identity[7] pattern.

The liberal-democratic identification with(out) the EU (factor 1)

The liberal-democratic identity pattern emerged in all three countries, including Hungary. Seven Hungarian students' sorts belong to this factor. This provides us with a great opportunity to analyze information on this factor. In terms of gender distribution, we can see that this factor is mixed (4 female sorts and 3 male sorts), so this liberal view attracted both men and women.

The most important statements ranked by the first subgroup represent the third theoretical model, which is factually the most open, tolerant and liberal model, associating the EU with global issues, global responsibility etc. According to Eriksen and Fossum (2009a) identity formation attached to this notion of democracy "is based on universal norms, fundamental rights and democratic procedures" (Annex 1.).

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[5] This tendency can well be related to the growing popularity of the far-right party: Jobbik and its success during the 2009 EP elections where they obtained three seats in the European Parliament out of the 22 Hungarian mandates. In the 2010 national legislative elections, Jobbik obtained 12 % of mandates.

[6] To identify identity patterns, we began with computing correlations among the Q-sorts of the Hungarian students, subsequently, we applied the Q-factor analysis with the principal component analysis method that resulted in eight unrotated factors. We did not consider all the resulting eight factors to be important but eliminated some of them. Then we analytically rotated the factors by the Varimax procedure. Finally, we selected the four most relevant factors for interpretation, giving them meaning with the help of the background interviews.

[7] Hestia is the Greek goddess of the Olympian who took care of family and domesticity.

We examined the normalized factor scores and ranked the statements in descending order according to their importance. This helps to establish which the most important statements for the group are. The top two - therefore most central - statements of this factor are as follows: "Individual freedom and choice should be protected" and "The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale". In the case of each factor there are some distinguishing characteristics and special statements that subgroup members have ranked significantly higher or lower than the overall average from other subgroups. The above mentioned latter statement is a very important one that distinguishes this factor from all the other subgroups in which it was not ranked as highly. These two statements quoted above express the importance of individual and universal human rights, which were also highly supported during the interviews, too. This standpoint also attaches high importance to democratic norms and practices, such as importance of gender equality ("Women and men are equal") and mutual tolerance as regards community and cultural activities ("Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe on the rights and freedom of others" and also "Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone" were also important distinguishing statements). The appearance of this tolerant and democratic standpoint among our interviewees is of great importance because they are the counterpart of the strengthening extreme right wing movements that often wear a cultural disguise (see below).

Another finding from the analysis shows the characteristics of subgroups. By examining the statements that distinguish this factor from the other three factors, we can see that holding individual and fundamental human rights in high esteem is a core element of this identity pattern. It seems that people who belong to this type are concerned and associate the EU with universal rights and norms much more than other people belonging to other factors (as they rated these statements higher than the average of other subgroups). "The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale" statement received 5 at this factor, while at other factors it received only 1. Another statement: "Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone" received a positive value only at this factor, while it received 0 or negative value on other factors. Supporting an EU constitution is also a distinguishing feature of this factor, especially compared to factor 4

which contained a negative value for this statement ("The EU should have a constitution")

Students who belonged to this subcategory seem to be much more informed about everyday social and economic issues as well as about ongoing political debates and processes. Moreover, they are more conscious of environmental issues and apply energy saving practical solutions in their own lives according to the interviews.

The importance of individual freedom is supported by another highly ranked statement: "Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe on rights and freedom of others". This subgroup also agrees that gender equality ("Women and men are equal") is a very important issue, although still difficult to realize in reality ("There have been many attempts to realize gender equality but even in the EP it is not a successful story", interview6 2009). Not only women support equal rights, the following quotation comes from a man related to the statement "Women should care more about family and home": "All people have the right to decide on how much time to spend with house work, we cannot determine it" (interview12 2009).

As regards the negative scores of the ranked statements we can see that this subgroup is very much against using violence for achieving political goals, and prefer more peaceful co-operation (e.g., "It is somebody's mistake if problem solving turns into force.", interview12 2009). Moreover this group is almost free from the inferiority complex that characterizes the other subgroups, therefore the "We are the slaves of Europe" statement is placed on the negative (disagreement) side. In this group we see a high level of respect for diversity and tolerance towards minorities by rejecting the following statements: "Diversity causes problems" and "Some minorities demand too many rights" Disagreeing with these statements is more important for this subgroup than for any other subgroup in our research. Summarizing the results, the liberal-democratic subgroup can be characterized by cosmopolitan (less nationalistic) pro European identifications, and appears to be more open and tolerant towards diversity, gender equality and individual freedom.

The 'macho' nationalistic identity pattern (factor 2)
This factor consists of two defining sorts and both of them were sorted by male students who study at the medical university.[8]

The factor called *macho nationalistic identity* shows a high correlation with the fourth factor, the affective *'Hestia'-nationalistic identity pattern.* This is not coincidental, since factor 2 and 4 represent basically the masculine and feminine sides of a similar nationalistic pattern. Among Hungarian young women and men, we find strong, but gender differentiated attachments to nationalistic identity, with a number of notable variations.

The two top ranked ethno-centric statements of this factor were "My home is my country." and "I am proud of being Hungarian", both clearly indicating the 1st RECON model.

Nationalism is a rather typical characteristic of the Hungarian society and has not changed significantly over the last decades, especially not related to the political regime change, and has even become more central in public discourse (Heller and Rényi 1996). As a longitudinal study (Csepeli, Örkény, Székelyi and Poór 2005) shows, aggregated measures obtained from statements expressing nationalistic attitudes show very similar patterns in 1995 and 2003 in Hungary (see Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3 shows that the aggregated measure obtained from four statements for measuring nationalistic attitudes are very similar in both studies, although there are almost 10 years between them.

It is important to draw attention to the fact that the hidden feelings behind the statements that characterize factor 2 are very different from those feelings that arise in the case of factor 4, as we will see later on.

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[8] Originally there were three significant sorts belonging to this factor, but only two were defining sorts. The third sort had a significant factor load not only on the second but also on the first factor and thus represents a more open and more liberal national identity pattern compared to the two medical students.

Figure 4.3: Nationalism in Hungary between 1995 and 2003
Source: Csepeli, Örkény, Székelyi and Poór 2005

Despite their nationalistic feelings, respondents belonging to this factor are concerned with European issues, and have a European identity to some extent. This is the only factor that scored relatively high on the statement "I am proud of being European". In fact, people who are identified as 'macho nationalists' are rather pessimistic and sceptical towards democracy and the EU. They think that the EU should focus mainly on EU-related issues or global issues (such as global peace-making, global environmental issues or facts related to the 3rd world). This factor represents partly the 1st RECON model, but in part it also combines the first with features of the second RECON model.

The normalized factor scores for factor 2 show a relatively high score in the case of these two statements: "Women and men are equal" and "Women should care more about family and home", which seem to be quite contradictory at first sight. It is also worth mentioning that no female respondent shares this pattern. The latter statement is a distinguishing one for this factor, as none of the other subgroups ranked it as high on average. One of the interviewees argues as follows:

> Women are able to do everything that a man can do. There is legal equality today. But there are certain differences between

men and women, for example in their mentality or another example is that only women can give birth. Therefore their task is primarily to stay at home and take care of the home and domestic life.

(interview5 2009)

According to the male interviewees these two statements can stand together with similar weight without any problems. Members of this group believe that nowadays women concentrate too much on their jobs and career and do not pay enough attention to their families, husbands and homes. Theoretically they find gender equality important but at the same time in practice they prefer that women do the second shift at home. Our interviews reflect a significant difference between men and women concerning gender equality issues. Many women are inclined to rank these two statements as contradictory to each other. Men, however, often claim that women had more responsibility at home in creating a nice family atmosphere, and should therefore spend more time with cooking, taking care of children, etc.

A recent international survey (Pongrácz 2006) shows that Hungarian people assign an outstandingly high priority to women's mission of caring for family and children, much higher than for work (see Figure 4.4). Surprisingly, there is no difference between men and women respondents in that research. A part of our empirical research (regarding factor 4) supports this result, as the 'Hestia identity pattern' (affective nationalistic identity) among female young people is in agreement with gender differentiated roles. But our research results also signal the presence of a substantive gender equality conception and thus make us believe that a small part of the (female) younger generation think about gender issues somewhat differently, stressing equal rights and treatment.

Thus, Figure 4.4 shows that the Hungarian society is still very conservative and traditional regarding gender roles, even compared to other post-communist countries (Pongrácz 2006).

"*Although work is important, for most women home and children are more important*" —
average values assigned to the question, recalculated on a scale of 100, in international
comparison, at the turn of the millennium

Country	Index value
The Netherlands	33
East German regions	34
West German regions	41
Austria	43
Poland	58
Lithuania	65
Romania	65
Hungary	79

Index values

Figure 4.4: Importance of work vs. home and children for women, by country
Source: Pongrácz 2006.

As mentioned earlier, the 'macho nationalistic identity type is concerned with the importance of European economic issues ("The Euro should become a common currency of Europe") as well as with European diversity and values ("Common European culture is derived from diverse national sources", "Individual freedom and choice should be protected"), and it also sees the advantages of living in the EU (work and educational opportunities). Some statements, such as: "We need strong leaders" were typical for this factor and got a relatively high score. This identity pattern does not include characteristics reflecting the first liberal democratic identity pattern (3rd RECON model). For example, "being a global citizen" and "feeling at home in the whole world" are feelings that are far from this value-structure. On the one hand, although these young men would like to go to other countries, they would only go for a limited time period, but would definitely come back and live in Hungary. They can imagine their lives only in Hungary. On the other hand, according to one of the respondents (interview5 2009) a global citizen is "someone who not only visited many foreign places, was interested in other cultures and tolerated them, but also actively participated in global issues."

To sum up, this factor shows ethno-centric nationalistic traits and can be characterized by a conservative conception of gender differentiated roles. It is opposed to global cosmopolitan values and gives priority to national interests. The Q sorts and related interviews indicate that this pattern includes Euro-sceptic and pessimist perspectives with regard to democracy.

The utilitarian-instrumental European identity (factor 3)

There are three defining Q sorts that belong to this factor. This group is not as EU-sceptical as the second group. People belonging to it see many advantages in being an EU citizen although they share some feelings of inferiority as inhabitants of a 'late-comer' country.

Here, the top three ranked statements describe the power and economic utility of the 'progressive EU'. ("The Euro should become a common currency of Europe", "The EU should contribute financially to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution", "It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe"). This fact is supported also by the factor arrays. This factor is most closely related to the 2nd RECON model. The statements and the interviews reflect the expectations towards the EU as a multinational federal state that provides protection to citizens and member states. The respondents affirm that the EU also provides us with great opportunities like working and studying abroad, winning tender bids ('EU money'), which contribute to the development of our agriculture, infrastructure, etc. Not all respondents consider themselves EU supporters, but as one of them claims: "I am moderately euro-sceptical, which means ultraliberal in Hungary" (interview14 2009).

The high ranking of the statement: "Some minorities demand too many rights." at top can be interpreted in several ways. It is clear that the sentence has a certain discriminatory meaning, expressing anti-minority feelings or even racism. This intolerant view can be related to the feeling of frustration and inferiority complex of the late-comer countries compared to the more developed member states. The in-between status of the utilitarian group can be clearly seen in views, defining the minority group by a living standard that are below their own one, and from which they want to distance themselves. This sub-group does not want to look back to the past, but definitely looks for-ward to the future (very negative score for "We are the slaves of

Europe." and "Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.")

The 'Hestia' nationalistic identity pattern (factor 4)

The Hestia group does not exhibit nationalistic feelings that are as strong as those found in their male counterpart (factor 2). But the young women associated to it show protective, caring attitudes related to domesticity, and rather alien to the EU. This factor shows a high correlation with the second factor that represented *macho national identity patterns,* but Hestia national identity is its female side, with strong emotional, emphatic feelings. This factor can also be related to the 1st RECON model since it contains strong nationalistic attitudes. We named this subgroup after Hestia, as this name stands for the patron of the family and domesticity in Greek mythology and, thus, a strong protective attitude, emphatic solidarity and emotionally coded national feelings that characterize this identity type. The nationalists' attitude is not rooted in a masculine, dominant identity as in the case of the Macho identity factor 2. On the contrary, the interviewees seem to focus on caring and protecting and they ascribe value to women who stay at home and care for the family.

This factor consists of five defining sorts and all of them were sorted by female students.[9] This clearly reflects an attitude based on traditional gender roles. The first two sorts came from students studying in Budapest, and the other three from students studying in the countryside[10]. Six female sortings load heavily on factor 5, and do not load significantly on any other factors.

Examining the normalized Z factor scores, we can see that the two most significant statements are as follows: "My home is my country" and "I am proud of being Hungarian". The interviews show that these statements hide two types of feelings: These young women are attracted to a safe, secure shelter that is provided by the nation state, the motherland. This feeling can be detected in the importance they attach to their roots, to the place where the family and relatives live and have lived for decades. At the same time, a certain fear or

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[9] There were two other female sorts that might have belonged here, if they had not had strong loadings on the first factor, too.

[10] The subjects, they study, show quite a high variety.

repulsion can be detected from their answers revealing a considerable distance from the EU, which represents the unknown for them, a far-away place lacking the usual safety of the home. These emotions are reflected by statements, such as. "I would feel myself a foreigner anywhere else. I would miss my accustomed environment and my usual things." (Interview14). The same young women hold the opinion that abroad she could never feel at home, although she had never even left Hungary.11 Members of this group spoke about the EU as if it were a rich person who could provide help and assistance for Hungarians or people living in the 3rd World. They also see the EU as an interesting, pleasant place surrounding Hungary, but not attractive enough to actually live there. Thus, they reject the possibility of identifying either as a European or a global citizen in place of being Hungarian.

There are two other important statements that originally belong to the 3rd global model: "The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale" and "The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crisis". Taking the content of the background interviews into account, we can conclude however, that the real motivation behind such statements is in fact an idealistic "love, peace, and understanding" view, rather than a real cosmopolitan attitude. This is supported by the statement that received the lowest factor score: "Certain political goals can only be achieved by force", showing that according to this point of view force is something very negative and we always have to find the peaceful democratic solutions in solving a situation. The most powerful statements of the 3rd RECON model ("I am a global citizen", "The whole world is my home") also received the lowest scores after the above mentioned one. This rejection of universalistic values may find its sources in the fear of the unknown and that can be explained by the facts that these young women have never experienced foreign countries or have just been abroad for extremely short periods of time.

Comparative analysis and factor structure
Concerning the correlation among these four factors, the smallest one is that between factor 3 and factor 4. The meaning behind this statistical fact is that while factor 1 represents the most positive and

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11 It is quite meaningful that 2 girls out of 5 in this factor have never been abroad.

supportive attitude towards the EU, factor 4 is the most negative towards the success, the results and the utility of the EU. Members of the utilitarian group 3 are keen to live in the EU and rank all positive outcomes in the hope of being able to share the sunny side of life. They give positive evaluations especially to the economic achievements of the EU, such as economic stability and economic union. Their choice is not based on abstract values that are usually associated with the EU but on personal or collective interests, e.g. study or work abroad for a higher salary. They do not appreciate the EU because of intercultural adventures or the experience of cultural diversity. They only emphasise economic and personal advantages.

In the interpretation of the two gendered nationalistic factors we stressed the fact that Hungarian society is rather conservative and traditional where family as an institution is highly valued by both men and women. Unequal treatment of women is present in many spheres of society (low promotion opportunities, differences in salaries, low percentage of women in economic and political decision-making positions) and despite the high proportion of women with degrees, they are underrepresented in academia. Considering Hungary's cultural and traditional background in terms of gender-roles it is not surprising that overall expectations and orientations of women and men differ to a great extent.

Our two national factors (factor 2: composed only of men, and factor 4: composed only of women) clearly express these traditional differences in attitudes and values. The main differences between factor 2 and 4 are summarized in Table 4.1. The most important statement concerns an economic issue ("The Euro should become a common currency of Europe") and is important for the Macho identity type but not for the Hestia identity type. Instead, the second most important statement refers to a value-oriented question ("Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values"), which is not important at all for Hestia followers, but Macho followers consider it very important.

As we discussed above, although both subgroups set a high value on being proud Hungarians who believe that their country is the only possible place for 'home', the motivations and conceptions are fairly different between the male and the gender identity types.

Table 4.1: Summary of differences between factor 2 and factor 4

Factor	Name	More important	Less important
2	'Macho'	- Hungary is my home - proud Hungarian - common euro - equal men and women - women should care more about family, home	- some political goals can be achieved by force - the world is my home - democracy introduces order into the world - our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours
4	'Hestia'	- Hungary is my home - proud Hungarian - EU should participate in global peace-making and solving economic crisis - EU shares common cultural heritage	- the world is my home - being global citizen - same values in East and West - some political goals can be achieved by force

Another interesting difference relates to political institutions and participation including the inefficiency of democracy. While factor 2 shows that men are very sceptical about democracy and do not think that "Democracy introduces order in the world", people belonging to the Hestia identity factor 4 are not as negative about it. Similarly, opinions on gender issues differ to a great extent, as well as the importance of a common European army. While the men of the second group tend to agree with the idea of a common European army, women from the fourth group strongly disagree with it. There is another noteworthy difference between men and women: Concerning their feelings of being European, men from group 2 score quite highly, while the scores of women from group 4 are quite low.

Both male and female respondents from the two groups 2 and 4 reject the statement: "Some political goals can be achieved by force"; this needs further explanation. The interviewees make clear that their background ideologies and thus the meanings of this sentence to them are very different. While interpreting this sentence, women reject the idea of force, power and the underlying notion of army, while men focus on managing and arranging problems through the use of domination, even if it requires using force in some cases.

Figure 4.5 gives a geometrical meaning to the Hungarian factor structure. As we can see, factor 2 and factor 4 are located closest to each other, while factor 3 is located far from the others. The

correlation is the smallest between factor 3 and factor 4. The meaning of these distances will be discussed further below.

F3 (3)
Utilitarian-instrumental

0.41

F1 (8)
Liberal-democratic

0.19

0.42   0.36

0.32

F4 (8)   0.49   **F2 (3)**

Hestia national   *Macho national*

Figure 4.5 The Hungarian Factor structure

Summary of findings

For the Hungarian case, our analysis identified four factors.[12] Table 4.2 summarizes the most important findings of our analysis regarding each factor, which will help us to create summary profiles of each of the four identity patterns. In order to sum up the results, first of all we will take up the factor values for each subgroup, put them in order of the factor-specific sort (based on the normalized

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[12] As a rule of thumb, only subjects with a loading of at least 0.5 were considered to load significantly on a given factor. If a subject had more loadings of a value of at least 0.25, then we could consider the subject belonging unambiguously to one factor only if the loading on one factor was bigger than the double of the loading on any other factors. Every considered factor must have had at least two sortings that load on it, otherwise we could not distinguish what was the speciality of the factor and what came only from the unique sorting (basically it means that the reliability of the factor equals the reliability of the person).

Those subjects (Q-sorts) that loaded significantly on more than one factor were eliminated from the analysis. Considered factors had to have at least two sorts loaded on them. Finally, 7 defining sorts characterized the first factor, 2 the second factor, 3 the third factor and 5 defining sorts characterized the fourth factor.

factor scores), and flag the significant variables. These specific statements – that subgroup members ranked higher or lower than overall average – highlight the differences between subgroups. (Donner 2001).

Table 4.2: The original factor characteristics

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Sum
No. of defining sorts	8	3	3	8	22
% explained variance	16 %	7 %	6 %	13 %	42%
No. of new def. sorts	7	2	3	5	17

As we can see in Table 4.3, factor 2 shows a considerably high correlation with factor 4, while factor 3 and factor 4 show a relatively high correlation with factor 1. We can also see that the correlation between factor 3 and factor 4 is rather low. Also the correlation of factor 2 with factor 1 and factor 3 is very low.

Table 4.3: Correlations between factor scores

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Factor 1	1.0000	0.3618	0.4102	0.4213
Factor 2		1.0000	0.3150	0.4862
Factor 3			1.0000	0.1941
Factor 4				1.0000

The Q research does not aim at examining the factual knowledge of students on EU and EU related issues. It nevertheless becomes clear that the first subgroup (factor 1) has most knowledge about both the general and the specific statements, as well as about ongoing political issues and processes. (e.g., concerning the EU constitution, EU enlargement, decision-making processes, etc.).

Conclusion

The Hungarian case study confirms just as the afore-mentioned World Value Survey (TARKI 2009) that Hungarians are characterized

by a value system that is more secularized and closed than that of their neighbours. It also differs significantly from the mentalities of Western European countries. Moreover, the Hungarian value system appears to be rather resistant to change as it continues to prevail among the younger generation in Hungary.

In recent decades several research projects have aimed to explore how social changes and democratization processes have affected the Hungarian youth. Joining the EU has not yet affected many people's everyday lives and has not contributed to major changes in society. Young people's hopes and life expectations are still rather negative. They are afraid of unemployment, deprivation and decreasing living standards. Eurobarometer surveys report that 40 per cent of the Hungarians believed in 2008 that further negative changes will occur. Our research results also support these findings.

Our empirical research proved that young peoples' perceptions of the EU are rather undeveloped and closer to Model 1 of liberal democracy (see Eriksen and Fossum 2009a). Our Q-set research helped to identified four different identity types that reflect different concepts of political affiliation and participation. The four patterns were described as democratic-liberal European, utilitarian-instrumental and two genders differentiated nationalistic traditionalist varieties. The survival and strong presence of traditional, nationalistic, conservative values represent a closed, insular way of thinking, traditional gender roles, the prevalence of national identity compared to a European or global sense of belonging, the rejection of universalistic values, frustration due to new, unfamiliar ideas and surroundings, etc. To explain the persistence of these patterns founded on the same basic identity complex, it is probable that the transmission of the conservative value system from the older generations to the younger ones continues to be strong. European identity patterns, including the appreciation of democratic values and universal human rights seem to be weak among Hungarian young people. In our research, these patterns emerged only in one identity type. In a comparative analysis, this Hungarian 'Europeanism' disappears in comparison with young people living in other European countries, as the cross-country analysis of Germany, Poland and Hungary shows.

Negative attitudes towards minorities and the persistence of traditional mindsets (of both young men and women) regarding gender issues may be subject to change in the future, if the democratization process and consolidation of European and global universal norms further develop in Hungary.

These improvements will be necessary preconditions for the development of a colourful open, tolerant, democratic, multicultural and inclusive society where we would be happy and love to live.

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Chapter 5

Universalist, traditionalist, pragmatic, instrumental
Narratives of Europe among young Poles

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Introduction

The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 marked a historic moment in the development of European cooperation. Attention shifted to new member states, with a two-pronged focus – on the way EU accession affects new members and how their presence in integrated Europe affects the Union. Economic and political aspects aside, we wish to gain insight into identity issues in the newly-altered European constellation. Research teams from University of Bremen, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, the Jagiellonian University research team set out on a joint project under the auspices of the RECON (Reconstituting Democracy in Europe) Integrated Project. The aim of the study is to empirically examine identity patterns and the way they translate into support for different visions of democracy as formulated in the RECON project. To this end, Q methodology is employed to gather quantitative and qualitative evidence about students' identity patterns with special focus given to affiliation with the RECON models, namely RECON-1: national democracy, RECON-2: federal multinational democracy, and RECON-3: cosmopolitan democracy.

We interviewed 40 students aged 19-25 from two universities in Poland: Jagiellonian University in Krakow (JUK), a major university in Poland, whose history dates back to 14th century; and Marie Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin (UMSC), in eastern Poland. The choice of these two universities was determined by the desire to gather material among young people studying at a renowned academic establishment, with a well-developed network of international cooperation, based in a big city (JUK) and compare it with the data gathered from students of a lesser-known university with less experience in international cooperation. We assumed that students from a major, important university, gaining from contact with international students and professors may hold different opinions and have the ability to transcend a narrow perspective on the issues in question than students from a university that does not provide so many opportunities to broaden horizons.[1]

Another assumption in this project is that students, representing a young generation pursuing higher education, are likely to reflect on the developments and changes of the modern world in the process of their identity construction. We also believe that access to unrestricted information via modern technology, a desire to gain experience and explore the world, cross-border mobility and ever-increasing contacts with people from various cultures, nationalities and backgrounds create conducive environment for international integration and the creation of a broader, more inclusive sense of 'we'.

Since the objective of the research is to observe and plausibly quantify students' subjective perspectives of Europe, the EU, and various forms of democratic governance, Q methodology is employed. Q methodology combines quantitative and qualitative evidence and allows for a systematic study of subjective values, viewpoints, and opinions that individuals' hold on a given topic or issue. The ultimate product of Q-method study is the identification of common factors or constellations of values and opinions common to several individuals: we also refer to these structures as identity patterns.[2]

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[1] The analysis found no significant differences between JUK and UCMS respondents or between male and female respondents.
[2] More on Q methodology see: Brown (1991/1992; 1993) and Stephenson (1935; 1953).

We distinguish four factors – or identification patterns - in the Polish study, which we have labelled as follows:

- Universalists
- Traditionalists
- Pragmatists
- Instrumentalists

An elaboration of the narratives of these factors is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents the Polish factor structure and discusses how it was determined. Section 4 is a summary of the findings of the study and Section 5 presents conclusions. Annexes contain additional data tables with details about the four factors.

Four narratives of Europe

The analysis of the data gathered in Poland revealed four factors, which we labelled for the sake of investigation and description: the Universalists, the Traditionalists, the Pragmatists and the Instrumentalists. The first two have clearly distinguishable identity patterns and they stand in contrast with one another. The other two factors, Pragmatists and Instrumentalists, are distinct from the first two, but converge on many grounds; the distinctions between these two common identity patters are more subtle. The way they perceive political and social reality, assess the role of the nation-state and the European Union, reflects the contemporary state of affairs in Europe. They acknowledge the *status quo* and support further development in the same direction, namely sustaining the diversity drawn along the national lines, within a shared European framework. They embody the EU motto: 'Unity in diversity'. The observable difference is that the Pragmatists are Euro-centric, while the Instrumentalists are not. The former consider a strong European Union that respects its composite members as a natural point of reference and do not consider global issues – those beyond the boundaries of Europe – to be relevant. Instrumentalists focus on government as a means or instrument for solving problems: they support national, European and global action depending on the problem to be addressed.

Universalists (factor 1)

Universalists have clear views and preferences: they are the most likely to see Europe as 'a state of mind' and define it through shared common values (respect for human rights, respect for individuals,

gender equality, free movement of people within the EU, cooperation not rivalry at the local European level, respect for diversity) and shared culture. As one of our respondents stated, "I think that with time it is becoming more of a state of mind. Thanks to travel, meeting new cultures, we find out that in fact we are not that different" (Jkind)[3]. At the same time, Universalists extend their identity to global citizenship: "I am a global citizen – I like that very much. And I think that way too. I value it more than national values" (Mmpol), "The whole world is my home – absolutely yes, with the only possible barrier being language, which you can always learn and even a man with average education […] can feel at home wherever they are on the Earth […] To be a global citizen it suffices to know language and have basic knowledge" (Mmkul) and argue that human values are universal, not European or Polish: "European values? They are universal values – universal human rights. There is no such thing as European human rights" (Mkbib).

The Universalists were born in Poland and live in Poland but this does not generate any particular pride; on the contrary, they feel uncomfortable about the statement Q16 "I am proud of being Polish" and associate it with the nationalistic rhetoric that they oppose. Similarly they disagree with the statement Q68 "We are the slaves of Europe." They view being Polish as an accident of birth. Some note that being Polish may have lead to feeling of inferiority for older generations; but for this generation (and this group) being Polish is no liability: they are as comfortable in other European countries as they are in Poland. As one respondent said, "I live in Poland, but at the same time I am a European, because Poland is in Europe, and Europe is in the world – there are no borders" (Mkpra).

Universalists favour common European solutions (such as the common foreign policy); they see the EU as an active player in solving global problems but acknowledge the need and effectiveness of working at the local level. They are open to others and trust other people; they also have a sense of responsibility at the individual/local level and see the EU as having global responsibilities, for example,

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[3] J –Jagiellonian University in Krakow (JUK), and M - Marie Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin (UMSC), k - female, m- male , psych/chem/hist – abbreviated subject of studies.

for environmental protection and solving the global economic crisis. Universalists are particularly vocal in their annoyance about dwelling on the past or demanding compensation for the past faults. They also disagree that force is necessary or ever justified.

The impression we draw from the interviews is that Universalists are confident about their preferences, comfortable about their global identity and open to the 'other'. They value diversity, wish for more of it and state that it is not diversity that causes problems but that problems arise when diversity is not properly addressed, "[…] it is not diversity that causes problems, but lack of abilities, tolerance, ability to manage diversity […]" (Mmpol).

The confidence and comfort that Universalists reveal about their identity translates into trust. They strongly disagree with the statement Q51 "One can only trust family and close friends": "I am definitely in favour of trusting as many people as possible, thus encouraging them to trust others. If they show more trust, they will deserve trust in turn" (Jmgeo). This trust may also emerge from positive experiences in travel, study and work elsewhere in Europe. It is a distinguishing characteristic of Universalists that they extrapolate positive European experiences into a positive global outlook.

Universalists perceive democracy as a desired system and they regard it as functioning and efficient as long as it is participatory and equally recognizes all subjects engaged in unrestricted deliberation: "For me democracy means participatory democracy. Simply, when everybody can influence what is actually happening. And this is how I would imagine the world in the future – that ideal" (Jmgeo),

> Democracy means opportunity for the individual to express their opinion on a given topic. That is how I see it. Everybody has the right to speak, participate and express their opinion. If this regards state affairs – then in the confines of the state; if regards what is happening in Europe or globally – their opinion can be expressed anywhere.
>
> (Jmpie)

Generally speaking, after careful analysis of the Q statement distributions and explanatory interviews, we perceive Universalists as idealistic individualists, who have a very positive outlook on the future.

Traditionalists (factor 2)

The Traditionalists are sharply distinguished from other factors by their level of trust. Traditionalists limit their trust to the closest circle of family and friends because family "is a basic unit of society on which the healthy cooperation of the society rests" (Mmhis). This group is generally suspicious of anything public. They are suspicious of the institutions: "I don't trust any [EU] institutions because it is not possible for an average person to monitor how they work. […] Besides these institutions are so big that there must be something shady going on there for sure" (Mmhis). Nor do Traditionalists trust politicians; they believe politicians do not act in public interest:

> There is not a person out there who could represent me and also work in Poland's interest. People should recognize that they cannot represent others and see that they are dim-wits, that they are not suitable; such people should not run for office.
>
> (Mkmat)

They are not willing to grant competencies to the European Union, for example, to form a common army:

> The EU is too new of an institution to trust it with the army. The EU is shattered by the internal conflicts. The countries are always going to argue. It is a union of nation states that are going to have arguments among them.
>
> (Jmhis)

Thus, the national army is necessary for the national security: "The Warsaw Pact had one army. If you know history, you know the threat [of the non-national army]" (Mmhis). Their opposition to the common foreign policy also stands on the ground of national security: "Each country needs its own policy that is a function of its location. […] Our interests have to be represented. We do not have same interests, priorities as, for example, France that is a thousand kilometres away" (Jmhis).

Traditionalists have a pronounced Polish identity. Poland is their home: "I am from here. I speak Polish. Everything I did, I did here. Everything I've got, I have in Poland" (Jmhis);

> Poland is my home and I plan to stay here. I want to travel a lot but I want to return to Poland. […] Just because I can travel to different countries does not mean that the world can become my home.
>
> (Mkmat)

They are proud of being Polish: "I share [our] values such as our religiosity, especially our religious traditions. […] It is our tradition that I am Catholic, that I go to church, that I pray" (Mkmat). For Traditionalists, who are more socially conservative and identify themselves as Catholics, the common Christian legacy is what binds Europe together: "No matter how divided Europe used to be, between Eastern and Western Christianity, the values remained the same" (Jmhis).

Traditionalists do not reject the European Union, do not question the benefits of membership or want Poland to leave the EU. Their relationship with the EU is economic, focused on receiving goods and services: "I like the free flow of goods and people and that we can work and study where we want" (Mmhis). It is important to stress that the Traditionalists are not extremists or radicals. They do not advocate historical revisionism – "Our country suffered a lot from its neighbours. It is true but it doesn't matter now" (Mkmat) – but feel strongly about the preservation of competencies of the nation-state – "I think that social policy, regulations and social security should stay in the nation state" (Mmhis). The study found only one respondent, who sorted in the Traditionalists group, who spoke very critically about the EU and thought Poland would be better off without the membership:

> For me the European Union deals only with small, unimportant matters. It makes everything more difficult for citizens. […] When Poland was entering the EU there were all these cries about details, especially in agriculture. All these demands – they [the EU] cannot appreciate the best things we have. […] I don't agree that the EU unites countries. It is an obstacle. […] The EU is forcing some standards on us. Our politicians should demand more from the EU to grow our economy.
>
> (Mkmuz)

"Poland has so much to offer" (Mkmuz) is a common sentiment and a source of comfort for Traditionalists. Their identity and preferences are defined by and grounded in the experience of the nation-state. They are proud of Poland's history: "The Polish republic was really the first democratic country in the world where the Parliament stood above the king. A country where Muslims, Protestants, Christian-Orthodox, Jews lived together" (Jmhis). Symbols are important to them (national flag, national constitution, etc.). They feel Polish uniqueness should be preserved in the European Union:

> It is impossible to have one history book for Europe. Each country must present its point of view and justify its sins, show the sins of neighbors. A common history book in not achievable. It will not be objective […] well, history is never objective but in this case it will have to condemn some country.
>
> (Jmhis)

It may be the unspoken fear that their country may be condemned or not respected that makes the Traditionalist retreat into the familiar, into the comfort of what they know.

Pragmatists (factor 3)

The Pragmatists are most comfortable with the current arrangement of the European Union – the union of nation states. Their frame of reference is clearly defined by the contemporary experience of Poles living in an EU member state. For Pragmatists, a common and shared European heritage is a core asset and a fundamental value of the European Union:

It is a foundation on which Europeaness may be built, this Europe that is a state of mind and not a geographic term. A Turk may be more European than a Frenchman. […] I think about this state of mind as a composite of values, attitudes, trends or ways of thinking. An European will defend or rebel against different things than someone from China, South America or the Middle East.

(Mmfil)

The Pragmatists find global issues to be remote, external to their interests or concerns. They appreciate the here and now and do not focus on the unattainable. They are at ease with dual identity (Polish and European); it is not a source of tension for them: "Being Polish

and European is not contradictory" (Jkmed); "Pride of ones' national identity does not exclude the pride of being European – the recognition of being Polish should be present in the European identity" (Mmfil). They are Polish because they were born here; they are European because the European culture makes Europe familiar, known and secure:

> I live in this part of the world, I identify with the culture this part of the world represents […] I feel European. For example, when I travel to France or to Italy, I do not feel a stranger there. I am not exactly on my turf but near-by.
>
> (Mmfil)

They see Poland as part of Europe: "It is my little motherland in a grand European motherland" (Jmche).

The Pragmatists perceive Poland's membership in the EU as a desirable arrangement and an obvious fact. They are satisfied with the current state of affairs and the level of European integration. Some show no support for further integration of the EU: "We should not move toward full unification. Each state should preserve its uniqueness […] I support the union but the union of nations, the union of cultures" (Jkmed); "Each country has its own history, own culture that should not be restricted by some directives from above" (Jkepi) while others perceive integration as a logical outcome: "Honestly speaking there is no alternative to integration […] Unless Europe unites into a one real country, we will be marginalized" (Jmche). They conclude, however, that it is too early to give up the idea of the nation state: "The time to think about one and only Europe has not come yet. Not in our lifetime; maybe our grandchildren will be ready for it. For now there should be diversity of identities, emphasized by separate passports" (Jmche). At the same time, the Pragmatists support the idea of the EU enlargement as long as the new countries would share the 'European culture'. The particulars of which country may enter the EU differ. For example, some support Turkey's membership, some do not, but "It is not about religion. I have nothing against Islam. It is a question of mentality […] the European thinking" (Jmche).

The Pragmatists are also realists who understand the benefits of the European Union – the ease of travel, harmonization of laws and

norms: "I don't agree that the harmonization of laws threatens sovereignty" (Jkgeo); access to European institutions:

> The ability to go to the [Human Rights] Court in Strasbourg is very important. More so because Polish law is so poorly conceptualized […] Just read some acts. An aberration. So these [European] institutions are a guarantor of sensibility and normalcy of some laws here. Practically speaking, there is no other policeman.
>
> (Mminf)

They think that the EU should have a common foreign policy because speaking with one voice guarantees effectiveness and consistency. From Polish perspective, it also improves security: "When it comes to foreign policy, the biggest conflict is with Russia. It is a sensitive matter and I think that with Russia it is necessary to have a single policy" (Jkepi).

The Pragmatists live in the present. They are critical about building identity on the past:

> [it is] our national trait to become a martyr of Europe, to build our identity on suffering and to be a savior of the world […] other countries did the same, had their Spring of Nations; they moved on, we still have not. Does past help us understand the future? I don't think so. I think the social reality is dynamic, nations change, identities change, values are becoming homogeneous in some way. […] Twenty years ago nobody would have thought about being in the same community with the Germans; now we are and who knows what is going to be in twenty years.
>
> (Mmfil)

They understand and appreciate the value of democracy and responsible leadership: "A leader is a person who listens and can make a decision, take responsibility which is difficult for some […] move forward." (Jkepi). They value diversity – "diversity requires some effort but it is very, very cool" (Jkmed) – and think that more diversity would be good for Poland "to teach some of us to be more tolerant" (Jkgeo). Diversity is a problem only "when it is used as a weapon. Non-aggressive diversity cannot cause problems" (Mmfil).

Instrumentalists (factor 4)

The fourth factor distinguished in our study, the Instrumentalists, does not provide unambiguous classification. The Q statement distribution and explanatory interviews reveal a mixed, hybrid identity pattern. The Instrumentalists support the current state of affairs and the direction of its development. They make frequent references favouring a strong nation state, but at the same time view positively the workings of the European Union and would like to see some advancement on a global scale, especially with regard to universal rights, "The right to vote, equality of men and women, freedom of expression. […] I believe that the Union should also fight for this" (Jkmat). There is not an unequivocal support for realization of democratic order in the confines of the nation-state, or on European level. The Instrumentalists seem to be 'cherry picking' from the abundant pool of options they perceive at present. Thus, we named this factor 'the instrumentalists' to underline its shared trust in the systemic solutions, at the European and the global level. Based on the interviews, we conclude that this factor remains in search of identity, or rather in the process its construction.

However, this group is also characterized by a low level of knowledge and scant understanding of basic terms connected with democratic order, "[…] I do not know procedures, financial regulations or taxation" (Mkpsy). In the interviews, people in this factor admitted to having limited knowledge and to the lack of interest in the topics that were discussed, "And I do not know [if democracy is most effective on a local, state or the EU level]. I cannot find examples to support either way. I simply do not know" (Jminm). This may explain why they show a high degree of confidence in the politicians who are supposed to address state and public issues. It remains uncertain if their poor competency to talk about political issues is a result of lack of knowledge or of interest.

Instrumentalists perceive the European Union mainly in practical, instrumental terms, hence their name. Europe is understood as a geographical term and identification is the strongest with the state, "I have only one home, simply and I do not think that the whole world can receive me in the same way, or that I would feel anywhere at home" (Mkpsy); "My home, unfortunately, is Poland. […]I am Polish and would not like to be anything else so far."(Mmche). As much as they feel mostly Polish (culturally), there also refer to identification

with Europe, whereas global level seems to be more distant in identification, "Europe is not the world. We can somehow identify with Europe, but not necessarily with the whole world" (Jkmat). However, this derives mostly from the acknowledgement of some commonalities in the EU, which predominantly boils down to appreciation of practical solutions, such as opportunity to travel, work and study in other European countries, "[…] what applies to me mostly is education, job, internship opportunities abroad and is very, very important to me. […] opportunities which the EU provides" (Mkpsy); They also acknowledge benefits resulting from the membership in European structures in terms of the significance of the country on a global scale, "Obviously they will not attack a member of the EU, so we are more respected, since they look on us as a member of this community" (Mmche).

Instrumentalists also emphasize the need to keep pace with the progress in Europe, and here again the European Union is treated instrumentally, providing the right model to follow and facilitating development in the country, "It is important to develop knowledge and catch up with them, not to lag behind. Learn from them, pry out of them their technology to use it in order to strengthen our country" (Mmche).

Instrumentalists support the enlargement of the EU and some common policies in the name of solidarity with the poorer and weaker, and again they perceive it in practical, financial and economic terms,

> Since we, Poles, got such a chance, then other countries should also be given such an opportunity. […] Because there are the poorest countries of Europe left. […] Since the Union can afford it, there are countries which need help – geographically they belong to Europe […].
>
> (Jkmat)

> [Enlargement] is connected with the fact that the EU can afford it, and this is mainly about economy. The rest is less important, I mean politics.
>
> (Jminm)

Instrumentalists, similarly to our other factors, do not want to dwell on the past, "For me the argument that our country suffered a lot is senseless. Every country suffered. […] We suffered, but we also caused suffering" (Jkmat); "If everyone wanted to drag into the present all wrongs they experienced, they would not get far" (Jminm). They would prefer to focus on the present, to ensure effective functioning of the European Union, preservation of cultural and political integrity of the country and cooperation on a global scale. Global scale is referred to with regard to protection of values, universal rights, but in the process of development of global decision making the Union is granted a crucial role, "Any split is undesirable, so if we represent not particular countries, but the Union, then decisions should be taken jointly, […] on the Union level" (Mmfiz); "I believe this is one of the main aims of the European Union, to create one voice" (Jminm).

Polish identity patterns and models of democracy

This sub-section explores the relationship between the four Polish factors or common identity patterns and the three models of democratic governance. The Q-method process provides quantitative data that can be used to construct measures of agreement and disagreement with the various visions of democratic governance depicted in the three models.

Of the 70 statements in the Q-sort analysis, 30 statements are democracy-model-specific statements. There are 10 national-model statements, 11 federal-model statements and 9 cosmopolitan-model statements. The agreement score, explained in Chapter 2, is a quantitative measure of how strongly a factor agrees or disagrees with a set of democracy-model statements. The agreement score ranges from -100 per cent, representing maximum disagreement, to +100 per cent, representing maximum agreement. Values close to zero are interpreted as neutral or indifferent.

The objective of the Q-sort method is to identify distinct subsets of individual respondents based on their subjective sorting of statements. The Q-sort algorithm searches for groupings of respondents that maximize the differences between groups and minimize the differences within groups. The algorithm usually identifies implicit polarities: the present analysis corresponds to this common pattern. There is a strong, primary opposition between

Universalists and Traditionalists; and a weaker, secondary opposition between Pragmatists and Instrumentalists. Although the factors are determined based on the full set of 70 statements, these polarities persist in the analysis of the subset of 30 democracy-model-related statements.

Consider the primary opposition first. It is immediately apparent from Figure 'Democracy-Model Statement Agreement Scores' (Figure 5.1) that Universalists and Traditionalists are in opposition regarding all models. Universalists disagree (-42 per cent) with national-model statements, are indifferent (-7 per cent) to federal-model statements, and agree (+57 per cent) with cosmopolitan-model statements. In contrast, Traditionalists agree moderately (+26 per cent) with national-model statements, disagree strongly (-83 per cent) with federal-model statements, and are indifferent (-9 per cent) to cosmopolitan-model statements.

The Traditionalist's strong disagreement with federal-model statements is in contrast to the other 3 subjectivities which are indifferent to them, with agreement scores ranging from -7 per cent to +10 per cent. Only for Traditionalists do these statements elicit a strong reaction. The strong disagreement with a federal European Union and greater harmonization of policy among EU member states is coupled with mild agreement (+26 per cent) with national-model statements. With regard to cosmopolitan-model statements the Traditionalist factor is indifferent (-9 per cent). The distinguishing characteristic of the Traditionalists is not modest support for the nation state but strong opposition to a federalist European Union.

	Universalist	Traditionalist	Pragmatist	Instrumentalist
■ National	-42	26	5	11
■ Federal	-7	-83	-2	10
■ Cosmopolitan	57	-9	-20	17

Figure 5.1:Democracy-Model Statement Agreement Scores

An analysis of Traditionalist rankings of individual democracy-model-related statements reveals a complicated portrait. Traditionalist agreement with national-model statement is based on the high rankings given to largely symbolic issues. [+4] "I'm proud of being Polish"; [+4] "My home is my country"; [+3] "Our politicians should do their best to represent national interests on the EU level"; and [+2] "Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one." But Traditionalists voice disagreement or indifference regarding nation-state powers: [-2] "Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation state"; [-1] "The power of the EU should be limited"; [-1] "National borders should be controlled by individual member states"; [0] "We need a national army" and [0] "Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from citizens." Consequently, it not appropriate to interpret Traditionalists as firm supporters of the national model: Anti-Federalist is a more accurate characterization.

Comparing Traditionalist rankings across democracy-model statement sets one finds that being proud of being Polish (National) [+4] is consistent with being proud of being European (Federal) [+1]

and being a global citizen (Cosmopolitan) [+1]. Thus, for Traditionalists, pride in being Polish is primary but not exclusionary – they have pride in being European and as well as in being global citizens.

Universalists are unique in their disagreement with national-model statements (-42 per cent). No other subjectivity reveals aggregate disagreement with national-model statements: Traditionalists show mild support for nation-model-related statements (+26 per cent), while Pragmatists and Instrumentalists are indifferent or very weakly supportive (+5 per cent, +11 per cent, respectively). Universalist disagreement with national-model statements is coupled with agreement with cosmopolitan-model statements (+57 per cent) and indifference to federal-model statements (-7 per cent).

Two themes emerge from examining Universalist rankings of democracy-model statements. First, Universalists disagree with statements of a "patriotic" nature; this is best described as anti-chauvinism or aversion to being mistaken for being chauvinist. It holds at the national level: [-2] "Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one", [-1] "I am proud of being Polish", and [-1] "My home is my country" (National). And it holds at the EU-level: [-1] "I am proud of being European" (Federal)). However, universal, inclusive statements elicit strong agreement: [+4] "I am a global citizen" and [+3] "The whole world is my home" (Cosmopolitan).

Second, Universalists reveal an aversion to the coercive powers of government. They are strongly opposed to an army: [-4] "We need a strong national army" (National); [-4] "Europe should have one common army" (Federal). But they agree [+3] the "The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale" (Cosmopolitan); presumably by non-military means. Similarly, they view fiscal power unfavourably: [-2] "Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from citizens" (National); [-1] "Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration" (Federal). This accounts for much of the Universalist's apparent support for the cosmopolitan-model-related statement set; however, one should not conclude that this support is conclusive. The cosmopolitan model is deliberately vague about the locus of these coercive state powers. The aspects of state power Universalists oppose are unspecified in the cosmopolitan

model, thus there is nothing for them to oppose: they give all cosmopolitan-model-related statements non-negative ranks – a unique occurrence for a Polish factor-model pair. Thus it is difficult to interpret their high (+57 per cent) cosmopolitan-model statement agreement score with positive support for the cosmopolitan model; this pattern of agreement is also consistent with support for general Social Democratic values, a global development agenda and an aversion to power and political institutions.

The distinction between Pragmatists and Instrumentalists is subtle; it lacks the well-defined contrasts between Universalists and Traditionalists. Pragmatists and Instrumentalists are relatively indifferent to all democracy-model statement sets. The highest level of agreement or disagreement is found with cosmopolitan-model statements: Pragmatists reveal mild disagreement (-20 per cent) and Instrumentalists reveal mild agreement (+17 per cent). Instrumentalists are in borderline agreement with national-model statements (+11 per cent) and federal-model statements (+10 per cent); while Pragmatists are almost perfectly indifferent to them: (+5 per cent) and (-2 per cent).

The key to understanding the difference between Pragmatists and Instrumentalists is in examining the differences in their rankings of specific statements. Interviews with Instrumentalists revealed that they have relatively little interest in or knowledge of politics; however, they would like problems to be solved. They reveal support for institutions they believe capable of solving problems, this is true at all levels of governance: this is the primary source of their mild or borderline agreement with all models of democratic governance. Instrumentalists give ranks 3 or more points greater than Pragmatists on the following Q-sort statements. National: "Our politicians should do their best to represent national interests" (+4 vs +1 for Pragmatists) and "Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation state (-1 vs -4 for Pragmatists); Federal: "Foreign policy should be made at the EU level" (+2 vs -1 for Pragmatists) and "The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent […]" (+2 vs -2 for Pragmatists); Cosmopolitan: "The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale" (+3 vs 0 for Pragmatists) and "Global collective decision-making should be fostered" (+5 vs +2 for Pragmatists). On this last statement, Universalists rank it +1 and Traditionalists rank it -3. In contrast to Universalists, Instrumentalists

have a positive attitude about power if it is directed toward solving problems.

Pragmatists are distinguished by their lack of interest beyond the borders of Europe. They are the most proud of being Polish (+5 National) and the most proud of being European (+3 Federal). But they draw the border at Europe: they give the least support (-2) to "I am a global citizen" and (-4) to "The whole world is my home" (Cosmopolitan). They give the lowest ranks of all Polish factors to the global initiatives listed among the cosmopolitan-model-related statements.

The overall indifference Pragmatists and Instrumentalists reveal for all three democracy-model statement set emerges because there are aspects of each model that they favour and disfavour and, when summed, they cancel out and leave balances close to zero. Consider also that the respondents who comprise these two factors are not highly political, nor are they interested or perhaps even aware of the kinds of distinctions that distinguish the different models of democratic governance. They perceive politics as an amalgam of overlapping and sometimes contradictory spheres of governance, the crisp theoretical distinctions are not apparent to them.

We can summarize our analysis of the relation between Polish factors and models of democratic governance thus: There is no clean mapping between the Polish factors and models of democratic governance. The closest match is a negative match: the Traditionalist factor reveals strong Anti-Federalist attitudes. Traditionalists strongly oppose a more federalist European Union, but they are only mild supporters of the nation state and indifferent, to cosmopolitan-model-related statements.

The Universalist factor, which reveals superficial support for cosmopolitan-model-related statements, is best described as a composite of anti-nationalistic or anti-chauvinistic statements (anti-National), a general aversion to institutions of power (anti-National, indifference to Federal and lack of opposition to Cosmopolitan), and general support for Social Democratic values and a global development agenda. Combined, this produces net agreement with cosmopolitan-model-related statements. However, if institutions of power (fiscal, security) were concretely specified in the cosmopolitan

model, Universalist agreement with the cosmopolitan-model statement set would diminish.

The other two Polish factors, the Pragmatists and Instrumentalists, are essentially indifferent across all democracy-model-related statement sets. They support the distribution of power and competency at different levels of governance because different competencies work best at different levels. Support and opposition roughly balance for each democracy-model statement set. This may be an important result for the further elaboration of the RECON paradigm: it indicates that many respondents do not perceive the distinctions drawn between existing RECON models: rather, they view ideal governance as an amalgam of models, what matters for them is whether it works. Thus fair and effective governance may be a more important source of democratic legitimacy than the construction of post-national or cosmopolitan identities.

Polish Factor Structure

Figure 5.2 illustrates the relations between the four Polish factors. These are based on correlations between the four factors.

Figure 5.2: Polish Factor Structure

The bold equilateral triangle represents the correlations among factors P1, P3, and P4. These three factors are essentially "equally"

correlated with each other (49 per cent, 49 per cent, 51 per cent) and they are weakly correlated with P2 – Traditionalists (12 per cent, 8 per cent, 25 per cent). The three factors share a positive disposition toward Europe and the European Union but differ in 'flavour'. Factor P1 – Universalists – has 12 significant (or defining) sorts. Factor P3 – Pragmatists – has 6 significant sorts; factor P4 – Instrumentalists - has 5 significant sorts; and Factor P2 - Traditionalists – has 4 significant sorts.

Table 5.1 provides a summary of how the optimal factor structure was determined. The initial, 40-sort, 8-factor analysis is reported in the top part of the table. We report the per cent of significance explained by each factor and the number of defining (significant) sorts for each factor.

In the original 8-factor analysis factors 5, 6, 7 and 8 contain only one or two members. Factor 6 exists because respondent #40 gave +5 to Q69 "democracy is expensive" and factor 8 exists because respondent #4 gave +5 to Q57 "diversity causes problems." Both are unusual rankings and are therefore statistically significant. Factor 7 has statistical significance because respondents #10 and #37 gave an average of +3 to Q70 "certain political goals can only be achieved by force," an atypical ranking. On reading the interviews we discovered that the unusual rankings given by respondents #40 and #4 had little to do with their general political subjectivity: #40 supports democracy processes and #4 has no animosity to diversity and inclusion. Similarly, #24 (the defining sort, along with #19, for factor 5), gave +5 to Q46 "Europe is a state of mind"; but the interview reveals that the respondent simply liked the way the statement sounded – it had no particular significance; were it not for this answer, #24 would load significantly on factor 1. Therefore three sorts (#s: 4, 24, 40) were excluded from the statistical analysis. The bottom part of the table displays the results of the 37-sort analyses for 8, 6, 5, 4, and 3 factors. We selected the 4-factor analysis because it provides the highest number of significant sorts with the fewest number of factors; moreover, all factors have at least 4 defining sorts. This results in a longer list of distinguishing statements as well as more interview transcripts and is thus most supportive of the construction of plausible composite factor narratives.

Table 5.1: Determining the Optimal Factor Structure

All 40 Sorts	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Sum
% signif	*21*	*9*	*10*	*7*	*5*	*5*	*5*	*4*	*66*
# sorts	**11**	**3**	**3**	**3**	2	1	2	1	26
Defining		16	11	29	19	40	10	4	
sorts:		27	13	32	24		37		
		36	34	35					
Excluding sorts : 4, 24, 40									
% signif	*23*	*9*	*9*	*5*	*5*	*7*	*5*	*5*	*68*
# sorts	**11**	**3**	**4**	2	2	2	1	1	26
% signif	*23*	*9*	*10*	*9*	*5*	*5*			*61*
# sorts	**11**	**3**	**3**	**3**	3	1			24
% signif	*22*	*9*	*13*	*8*	*6*				*58*
# sorts	**12**	**3**	**7**	2	3				27
% signif	*22*	*10*	*13*	*10*					*55*
# sorts	**12**	**4**	**6**	**5**					27
% signif	*24*	*11*	*15*						*50*
# sorts	**13**	**4**	**7**						24

Conclusion

It has been several years since Poland acceded to the EU. The accession process and its consolidation effected numerous changes, including personal perceptions of national and European identity. Our study of the generation that grew up within a democratic system allows for the observation of emergent constructions of identity. Our analysis identifies four factors: the Universalists; the Traditionalists; the Pragmatists; and the Instrumentalists. While distinct, the four factors share several common characteristics.

There is a shift in the construction of identities, a movement from a national, monolithic identity – Polish – to a mixed one. Identity is perceived and understood in cultural terms. The respondents point to the commonality of European values, universal rights and symbols. There is little mention of political systems; most respondents reveal indifference or aversion to politics and the exercise of power.

The respondents are not obsessed with Polish history; they believe that one can learn from the past to avoid repeating mistakes, but

history should not be used to advance grievances, as atrocities afflicted all European nations. Polish students are focused on the present and are generally satisfied with the *status quo*. They appreciate and feel comfortable with Poland as a member of the European Union. The issues of belonging to Europe, being a part of Europe, or of the positive impact of the EU are not questioned. Even the Traditionalist sceptics, appreciate open borders, freedom of travel, and the ability to study in other countries.

A sense of security and the lack of perception of real external (military or cultural) threat to Poland and/or the EU are shared by our respondents. A few identified themselves as pacifists but the majority strongly disapproves of the use of force to achieve political goals. They appear to have internalized a concept of Europe as a peace project. Our respondents advocate conflict solving through negotiation, debate and discussion.

A democratic system of governance elicits strong support, be it on the national or European level. Although often viewed as costly and perhaps inefficient, it is the preferred system. However, our respondents display scant knowledge about the actual working of democratic processes. Support observed for a 'strong leader' means a desire for better politicians: professionals, with the requisite leadership skills who can capably represent the country in international fora. Such 'strong' leaders, however, should be elected: they are not viewed as an alternative to democracy or as remedy for the imperfections of the democratic system.

The respondents are generally open to further enlargement of the European Union as long as the aspiring states abide by common rules and share 'the European culture.' For example Turkey's membership in the EU is conditioned upon respect for human rights. The Balkans are perceived as a natural extension, as are Ukraine and Belarus; they would benefit from EU membership, as Poland did.

With regard to the conceptual framework of the RECON project, we conclude that there is no clean mapping between the Polish factors and the three theoretical models. The strongest relationship we find is negative: the Traditionalist factor disagrees strongly with the federal-model-related statements. Traditionalists are anti-federalists and oppose further strengthening of the European Union. However, they

are not strong supporters of the nation state and they are indifferent to cosmopolitan-model-related statements.

The Universalist factor shows agreement with cosmopolitan-model-related statements and disagreement with national-model-related statements. Disagreement with the national model is partly opposition to perceived nationalistic or patriotic statements. Universalists reveal an aversion to political institutions and power, this lowers their agreement scores with national-model and federal-model related statements and it raises their agreement with cosmopolitan-model statements because the cosmopolitan model lacks well-defined institutions of power.

The pronounced oppositional pattern between Universalists and Traditionalist mirrors the polarity in contemporary Polish political discourse. In contrast, Pragmatists and Instrumentalists are relatively indifferent to all three models of democratic governance. This reflects, in part, their relative lack of in interest in politics: they lack the polarized identity patterns of the Universalists and Traditionalists. It also reflects an acceptance of the status quo and of an amalgam of governance models – local, national, European, and, for Instrumentalists, international organizations can govern simultaneously. For them, multi-level governance is a logical way to govern. The legitimacy of governance lies in efficient public administration – in the quality of governance – it has little to do with national or European identity.

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Chapter 6

Commonalities amidst diversity
Identity patterns across national contexts

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Introduction

This concluding chapter brings the three country case studies together. It examines the similarities and differences among the twelve factors or identity patterns from the three country studies and provides assessments of how these similarities and differences can inform our understanding of national, European and cosmopolitan identities as well as inform the theoretical elaboration of RECON models of democracy in Europe.

Q methodology provides both quantitative and qualitative information on individual identity constructions and political values and preferences. Respondents' statement sorts provide the quantitative information needed for determining those respondents with similar identity patterns. Interviews with these respondents provide the qualitative information that allows the construction of the common narratives that distinguish each factor from the others.

This chapter first draws on the quantitative dimension of the twelve factors or identity patterns from the three country case studies and employs quantitative methods to identify commonalities among them

as well as distinguishing differences. The quantitative comparison results in four groupings of identity patterns. The similarities and differences within these groupings are explored by examining the rankings assigned to statements by each identity pattern.

Following the quantitative comparative analysis (Section 2), the factors are qualitatively compared across different national contexts and conclusions regarding their implications for the theoretical elaboration of RECON models are drawn. Finally, directions for future research employing Q methodology to investigating vernacular understandings of identity and democratic legitimacy are suggested.

Quantitative comparative analysis of the factors

The twelve factors found in the three country studies can be analyzed quantitatively to identify commonalities among factors as well as significant differences. In this section we report the results of two quantitative methods introduced in the methodology chapter (see Chapter 2): correlation analysis and agreement indexes. Correlation analysis uses correlation coefficients between factors as a means of identifying similar factors. This method employs the array of rankings of all 70 statements in the statement set. Agreement indexes use the subset of 30 statements most clearly associated with the three models of democracy in Europe to calculate an index of agreement or disagreement with each model. The two methods are related and yield mutually-consistent results with respect to the twelve factors identified in our case studies.

The quantitative analyses indicate that the twelve factors can be grouped into four sets of three factors each. The balance of this subsection introduces these four sets based primarily on correlation analysis. The subsequent subsections examine the sets in greater depth. Each subsection reports and discusses the indexes of agreement; examines those statements which distinguish the group from the other factors; and examines how the factors within the group are distinguished from each other.

Table 6.1 is the correlation matrix for the twelve factors identified in the 3 country studies. The highest correlations are found between the liberal, universalist and cosmopolitan factors (factors G1, H1, and P1; these are in bold font and bold borders). P1 has an almost equal correlation with G1 and H1, 0.78 and 0.79 respectively; G1 and H1

have a lower correlation value, 0.67. This is the only group of highly correlated factors. The similarities and differences among the cosmopolitan factors are explored further below.

Table 6.1: 12-Factor correlation matrix

	G1	G2	G3	G4	H1	H2	H3	H4	P1	P2	P3	P4
G1		0.30	0.36	0.49	**0.67**	0.16	0.39	0.17	**0.78**	-0.19	0.38	0.30
G2	0.30		0.30	0.48	0.38	0.20	0.08	0.39	0.47	0.36	0.50	0.35
G3	0.36	0.30		0.46	0.31	0.26	0.22	0.31	0.34	0.17	0.16	0.28
G4	0.49	0.48	0.46		0.55	0.32	0.25	0.43	0.53	0.09	0.60	0.54
H1	0.67	0.38	0.31	0.55		0.36	0.43	0.40	**0.79**	-0.01	0.55	0.60
H2	0.16	0.20	0.26	0.32	0.36		0.27	0.47	0.17	0.26	0.47	0.32
H3	0.39	0.08	0.22	0.25	0.43	0.27		0.16	0.31	-0.12	0.28	0.36
H4	0.17	0.39	0.31	0.43	0.40	0.47	0.16		0.30	0.48	0.50	0.49
P1	0.78	0.47	0.34	0.53	0.79	0.17	0.31	0.30		0.13	0.50	0.45
P2	-0.19	0.36	0.17	0.09	-0.01	0.26	-0.12	0.48	0.13		0.24	0.07
P3	0.38	0.50	0.16	0.60	0.55	0.47	0.28	0.50	0.50	0.24		0.44
P4	0.30	0.35	0.28	0.54	0.60	0.32	0.36	0.49	0.45	0.07	0.44	
SUM	3.82	2.81	2.18	3.75	4.02	2.27	1.64	3.11	3.78	0.48	3.63	3.20

The lowest correlation value in the matrix is between G1 and P2 (-0.19), the German cosmopolitan factor and the Polish traditionalist factor. P2 is also negatively correlated with H1 (-0.01) and with H3 (-0.12) and it has low correlations with all factors except G2 (0.36) and H4 (0.48). These three nationalist-traditional factors (factors G2, H4, and P2) reveal a common pattern of identity with regard to agreement or disagreement with the three models of democratic Europe. The distinctive similarities and differences of these three national-traditional factors are also explored further below.

Three factors are moderately correlated with one another: G4, P3 and P4. G4. The German factor indicating a European statist identity has a correlation of 0.60 with P3, the Polish pragmatist factor, and a correlation of 0.54 with P4, the Polish instrumentalist factor. P3 and P4 have a correlation of 0.44. Their commonalities and differences are discussed below.

The bottom row of the table reports the column sums of the correlation matrix. These values measure how similar or dissimilar a factor is to all other factors. P2 has the lowest column sum, 0.48: it has the least in common with other factors. Next in terms of general dissimilarity are H3 (Sum = 1.64) – the Hungarian utilitarian-instrumental factor; G3 (Sum = 2.18) – the German individualist factor; and H2 (Sum = 2.27) – the Hungarian macho national factor. These three 'unique' factors are discussed further below.

Comparative analysis of cosmopolitan identity patterns

Figure 6.1 shows the similarities of the three cosmopolitan-liberal-universalist factors with respect to their agreement with different models of democratic Europe. The agreement score is plotted (vertically) for each of the three models for the German, Hungarian and Polish cosmopolitan factors. The similarity is visually obvious, as are some minor differences. As expected, these factors exhibit strong agreement with the cosmopolitan statement set; in addition all exhibit relatively strong and consistent disagreement with the national model statement set; and weak agreement or indifference toward federal model statements. This polarity – support for the cosmopolitan model and opposition to the national model – is the most distinguishing characteristic of the cosmopolitan identity constructions.

The cosmopolitan factor rankings are highly correlated with each other, as noted above. If one were to treat a factor ranking as if it were an individual sort, then each cosmopolitan factor would qualify as a defining sort for the cosmopolitan factor in each of the other two countries. Analysis of correlations between individual sorts and factor rankings confirms that factor loading scores and correlation coefficients are themselves highly correlated. Thus, for example, the P1 factor ranking has a loading on the G1 factor in excess of .70, and vice versa. This is evidence that there is a cosmopolitan value construction common among university students in Germany, Hungary, and Poland. Q methodology, as noted in the methodology chapter, does not provide evidence on how widespread adherence to the value construction is among university students, but it does allow us to conclude that a commonality exists across the three different national contexts.

	National	Federal	Cosmopolitan
■ Poland 1	-42	-7	57
■ Germany 1	-50	12	54
■ Hungary 1	-39	17	40

Figure 6.1: Cosmopolitan identity constructions and RECON democracy models

Table 6.2 reports the distinguishing similarities of these three cosmopolitan factors. Specifically it identifies those statements (1) for which the three cosmopolitan factors assign similar rankings and (2) for which the average cosmopolitan factor ranking differs most from the average ranking assigned by non-cosmopolitan factors. For example, in the bottom row of the table, the three cosmopolitan factors assign the identical rank (-1) to the statement "my home is my country." The average ranking assigned to this statement by the nine non-cosmopolitan factors is +3.1. The difference between these two averages (-4.1) is reported in the fourth column of the table. The rows of the table are ordered by the values in this column.

Table 6.2: Distinguishing similarities among cosmopolitan factors

G1	H1	P1		Difference from non-cosmopolitan factors
0	1	1	2.7	EU facilitates/advances democratic development in our country.
5	4	4	2.6	Women and men are equal.
4	5	3	2.4	The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale.
1	2	2	2.3	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.
2	1	2	2.0	EU strengthens our role in global affaires.
1	2	1	2.0	The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.
5	4	5	1.6	Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe on rights and freedoms of others.
2	1	1	1.4	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.
-3	-2	-2	-1.6	You can only trust family members and close friends.
-5	-5	-5	-1.7	We are the slaves of Europe.
-3	-3	-4	-1.7	We need a strong national army.
-3	-2	-2	-2.1	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.
-3	-2	-3	-2.9	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.
-2	-4	-4	-2.9	Diversity causes problems
-2	-4	-3	-3.2	Some minorities demand too many rights.
-4	-4	-4	-3.6	Women should care more about family and home.
-1	-1	-1	-4.1	My home is my country.

Consistent with the agreement indexes for the cosmopolitan factors, the most distinguishing similarities are found among statements which disagree with traditional, nationalist or parochial values. They also assign more positive ranks to statements advocating the European Union as a defender of human rights and as an agent to fight global poverty and advance democratic development in Member states. Support for the equality of men and women and for free speech is seen as conditional upon it not being offensive to anyone and is also more positively ranked.

In the country case studies, the emphasis is on how the cosmopolitan factor is distinct from the other factors identified in that country context. In the present chapter, the focus is on how the otherwise similar cosmopolitan factors differ from each other. Table 6.3 lists the statements for which there are the greatest disagreements in rankings among the three cosmopolitan factors; it shows the factor rankings for each statement and the difference between the outlying ranking

(enclosed in a box) and the average of the other two ranks – which are always within one rank of each other.

Table 6.3: Differences between cosmopolitan factors

G1	H1	P1	Difference	Statement
4	0	1	3.5	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.
3	-1	0	3.5	We should have only EU passport.
2	0	-1	2.5	The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.
-3	0	-1	-2.5	I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).
-4	-2	-1	-2.5	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.
0	3	3	-3	The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.
-1	2	2	-3	Euro should become a common currency of Europe.
-2	2	1	-3.5	Our (HU\DE\PL) politicians should do their best to represent national interests on the EU level.
-1	3	-1	4	I'm proud of being European.
-3	1	-2	3.5	We need strong leaders.
0	3	0	3	EU should have a constitution.
0	3	0	3	It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe.
3	1	4	-2.5	It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.
0	-3	-1	-2.5	Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values.
2	-1	2	-3	The past helps to understand the future.
4	0	3	-3.5	The whole world is my home.
4	0	3	-3.5	Democracy means first of all participation and deliberation of free individuals in common issues.
1	-2	2	-3.5	Democratic procedure work best at a local or regional level.
-1	0	4	4.5	I am a global citizen.
-1	-1	-4	-3	Europe should have one common army.

Consistent with the correlation coefficients, P1 is most in agreement with the other two factors; G1 and H1 show the greatest differences. P1 stands out as having strong support for being a global citizen and strong opposition for a common European army; statements for which G1 and H1 are indifferent. H1 is distinguished by its pride in being European and support for strong leaders and an EU Constitution. It disagrees that democratic procedures work best at the local or regional level and gives neutral ranks to "the whole world is my home" and the statement on deliberative democracy – statements

given high positive ranks by G1 and P1. G1 is distinguished by high support for global collective decision making and only having an EU passport; and by its opposition (relative to H1 and P1) to the Euro as the common European currency, for the EU to be involved in global peace making and for German politicians to do their best to represent national interests on the EU level. This last rank may reflect, given Germany's federal system, also a tendency of young German cosmopolitans to identify more with their Lander and less with the national Federal state.

Comparative analysis of national-traditional factors

Figure 6.2 illustrates the similarities of the national-traditional factors. The agreement score is plotted (vertically) for each of the three RECON models for the German, Hungarian and Polish national-traditional identity patterns. The figure exhibits two notable findings.

	National	Federal	Cosmopolitan
■ Germany 2	32	-22	11
■ Hungary 4	24	-32	11
■ Poland 2	26	-83	-9

Figure 6.2: National-traditional identities and the RECON models

First, there is the expected agreement with the national model of democracy statements. Second there is disagreement with federal model statements and a relative indifference to the cosmopolitan model statements. The polarity observed in the national-traditional group between support for the national model and opposition to the federal model is not as strong as the respective polarity observed for the cosmopolitan group; but it is the distinguishing characteristic of the national-traditional identity constructions.

Unlike the cosmopolitan factors, the three national-traditional factors are not highly correlated with one another. The strongest correlation is between P2 and H4 (.48); these two factors are similarly correlated with G2 (.36) and (.39), respectively. Summarizing Table 6.4 'Distinguishing similarities among national-traditional factors' (see below), one notes strong support for basic or religious values, national pride, national symbols, and the importance of the past; and a negative evaluation of the Euro, EU passports, the EU as facilitating democracy, and stronger national–EU fiscal ties. The latter, negative distinguishing similarities are consistent with the observed anti-federalist sentiment observed in the analysis of agreement with the democracy models (Figure 6.2).

Table 6.4: Distinguishing similarities among national-traditional factors

G2	H4	P2		Difference from non-national-traditional factors
1	3	3	3.8	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.
4	4	5	3.6	The past helps to understand the future.
5	5	4	3.4	My home is my country.
1	2	2	3.2	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.
3	5	4	2.9	I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).
-2	-2	-4	-2.1	Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration.
-4	-3	-2	-2.2	EU facilitate s/advances democratic development in our country.
-4	-4	-4	-3.3	We should have only EU passport.
-1	-2	-3	-3.4	Euro should become a common currency of Europe.

The differences between the national-traditional factors are displayed in the Table 6.5. This table follows the format used above for the differences between the cosmopolitan factors: rankings that differ

most from the average of the other two factors are ranked by this difference. This allows us to identify different flavors of the traditionalist identity pattern: The German (G2) traditionalists generally have a mild positive evaluation of the centralization of some powers at the level of the European Union, in contrast to its negative evaluations shared by the other two factors; it is also opposed to statements about the need for strong leaders and the expense of democracy, which are given neutral rankings by H4 and P2. German traditionalists are also distinguished by their disagreement with the statement that "women should care more about family and home" and by their agreement with the statement that "some minorities demand too many rights."

The Hungarian female nationalists are most distinct from the other two national-traditional factors in their strong disagreement with the statement that one "can only trust family members and close friends." They reject being a global citizen but strongly support the EU contributing to solving the global economic crisis. It is also distinguished by a strong sense of a boundary between eastern and western Europe: it strongly supports the proposition that Europe shares a common heritage and gives the most negative rank (-5) to the statement that the Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values.

The Polish traditionalists are distinguished by their strong disagreement (-5) with the statements "it is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe" and "Europe should have one common army." They also give unusually high ranks to the statements "our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours" and "our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past." Finally, they differ most from the other national-traditional factors in their agreement that "democracy is inefficient."

Table 6.5: Differences between national-traditional factors

G2	H4	P2	Difference	
-4	3	0	-5.5	We need strong leaders.
-5	-1	0	-4.5	Democracy is expensive.
-4	1	0	-4.5	Some countries in the EU are second class.
-3	1	2	-4.5	Women should care more about family and home.
-2	2	2	-4	(Country name) is treated as second class in the EU.
-1	2	3	-3.5	It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.
3	-1	1	3	Some minorities demand too many rights.
1	-2	-3	3.5	EU strengthens our role in global affaires.
0	-3	-4	3.5	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.
2	-2	-1	3.5	The power of the EU should be limited.
2	-3	-3	5	Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.
2	-3	-4	5.5	EU should have a constitution.
1	-4	3	-6	You can only trust family members and close friends.
0	-4	1	-4.5	I am a global citizen.
4	0	4	-4	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.
-2	-5	-1	-3.5	Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values.
-1	2	-2	3.5	The EU helps solving environmental problems.
0	4	0	4	Europe shares a common heritage (Christian, Roman Law, democracy) and memory.
0	4	-1	4.5	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crises.
-1	1	-5	-5	It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe.
2	1	-3	-4.5	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.
-1	-2	-5	-3.5	Europe should have one common army.
-3	-1	2	4	Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.
-1	0	5	5.5	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.
-5	-3	2	6	Democracy is inefficient.

Comparative analysis of 'multi-level' identity patterns

Figure 6.3 illustrates the similarities of what we suggest calling here the 'multi-level' identity pattern, bringing together German European statists, Polish pragmatics and Polish instrumentalists (G4, P3 and P4). The figure is constructed in the same manner as the other agreement score figures: agreement scores are plotted (vertically) for each of the three models for the three multi-level factors. This grouping may, at first glance, appear curious; but these three factors share several distinctive characteristics. First, in contrast to the cosmopolitan and national-traditional patterns, the multi-level

identity does not show a strong support or opposition for any of the three models of democracy in Europe. All three show mild agreement or indifference to the national model, and weak agreement or indifference to the federal model. Where they differ is in their mild agreement or disagreement with the cosmopolitan model. The term multi-level is employed because these three factors support aspects from all three models of democratic Europe; they also disagree with aspects of each of the models, but overall, their assessment of Europe is positive – they lack the pronounced opposition or negative assessment of one of the models of democratic Europe which characterizes the other nine factors.

	National	Federal	Cosmopolitan
■ Germany 4	16	0	31
■ Poland 4	11	10	17
■ Poland 3	5	-2	-20

Figure 6.3: 'Multi-level' identities and the RECON models

The key distinguishing similarity of these three factors consists in their positive rankings of national pride and, at the same time, of

pride in being European. They also share a positive assessment of democracy and government capacity to solve problems. This support, however, refers mainly to local, national and the federal European, and to a lesser extent to the international level. This helps account for the observed lack of strong support or opposition for any of the models of democratic Europe.

Table 6.6: Distinguishing similarities among multi-level factors

G4	P3	P4	Difference from all other factors	
4	5	3	3.0	I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).
1	2	2	1.9	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.
1	3	2	1.8	I'm proud of being European.
-4	-5	-5	-1.6	We are the slaves of Europe.
-3	-4	-4	-2.1	Democracy is inefficient.
-2	-3	-1	-2.4	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crises.
-1	-3	-2	-2.8	Citizens are alienated because state and local administration do not serve their interests.

Turning to differences between the members of the 'multi-level' group, recall that G4 is moderately correlated with both P3 (0.60) and P4 (0.54). P3 and P4 are both Polish factors and by definition must be statistically distinct – their correlation coefficient is 0.44 – and it is between P3 and P4 that the greatest differences exist. G4, the German EU–statist factor, is distinguished from the other two factors by a more secular and less traditional perspective, consistent with its support for the cosmopolitan model. Notable, too, is their support (inferred from -4) for unconditional free speech. By contrast, most other groups – particularly the cosmopolitan group – assign positive rankings to the statement "free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone."

Table 6.7: Differences between multi-level factors

G4	P3	P4	Difference	
1	-3	-2	3.5	The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.
0	-4	-3	3.5	The whole world is my home.
-3	2	0	-4	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.
-4	2	0	-5	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.
-2	2	-4	5	Europe is a state of mind (and not a geographic term).
-2	1	-3	3.5	Democratic procedure work best at a local or regional level.
-1	2	-2	3.5	Democracy means first of all participation and deliberation of free individuals in common issues.
-2	1	-3	3.5	Some minorities demand too many rights.
0	-3	3	-4.5	Some countries in the EU are second class.
-4	-4	1	5	(Country name) is treated as second class in the EU.
0	-3	3	4.5	Some countries in the EU are second class.
-5	-2	1	4.5	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.
0	0	4	4	The EU should contribute financially to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution.
1	0	4	3.5	It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe.
-3	-4	0	3.5	You can only trust family members and close friends.
-4	-5	-1	3.5	Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.
0	0	-4	-4	We need a strong national army.
2	4	-2	-5	Our country forms a bridge between Eastern and Western parts of Europe.
3	3	-3	-6	The past helps to understand the future.

Because they are both 'Polish' factors, we can draw on the factor discussions of the Polish case study to illuminate the distinctions between P3, the Polish pragmatists, and P4, the Polish instrumentalists. P4 is called 'instrumentalist' because its defining sorts view the Europe Union as an instrument of progress, particularly for new member states; it is also viewed as an effective means or instrument for solving problems, such as environmental pollution, which require transnational coordination. P4 exhibits weak support for all three models of democratic Europe. This general positive assessment stems from an interest in seeing government take

action at whatever level is appropriate to the problem being addressed. P3, the Polish pragmatist factor, exhibits the greatest pride in being Polish (+5) and in being European (+3). Despite this dual, complementary pride, it shows indifferent support for both the national and federal models of democracy in terms of its agreement scores. This indifference results from mixed support and opposition to statements in relation to the models. They show less trust of government or desire for public action than P4. Their mildly negative assessment of cosmopolitan statements results from the negative rankings assigned to statements such as about EU funds or efforts for global initiatives: They are Polish and European, but not global citizens. It is with respect to the role of the EU as a global actor that Polish EU pragmatists (P3) differ most from German EU statists (G4), who are generally supportive of EU global actions.

Although there are major differences between the three multi-level factors, they do share a common pride in being both European and national and they share a common pattern of picking and choosing positive aspects from among the three models of democratic Europe. A third commonality is their shared lack of strong opposition to any particular model of democracy in Europe – which is consistent with a lack of a strong ideological or polarized political orientation.

Unique' factors in the Hungarian and German context

There is a final set of factors that we have called 'unique' factors. These factors are not closely correlated with each other. Figure 6.4 makes clear that these three factors stand alone statistically. Each one is characterized by strong opposition to one of the European democracy models; each is opposed to a different model.

H3, the Hungarian utilitarian-instrumental factor, strongly opposes the statements related to national model of democratic Europe. H2, the Hungarian macho-national factor, is strongly opposed to statements related to the cosmopolitan model of democratic Europe (See Chapter 2). Finally, G3, the German individualistic factor, strongly opposes the statements related to the federal model of democratic Europe (See Chapter 3).

We forego the analysis of distinguishing similarities for these 'unique' factors, because they do not share any. An analysis of differences with their common similarity would equally lack any

meaning. These idiosyncratic factors are best interpreted within the diverse national contexts of the case studies.

	National	Federal	Cosmopolitan
■ Hungary 3	-50	12	0
■ Germany 3	8	-44	-17
■ Hungary 2	3	7	-43

Figure 6.4: Unique identities and RECON democracy models

Interpreting the research findings in theoretical and cross-national perspectives

In this section, we examine how our empirical findings relate to the fundamental hypotheses that are debated in European identity research and to the theoretical RECON models of democracy.

The strong commonalities found among the German, Hungarian and Polish factors evidenced by this study confirm other studies reporting that the differences between 'old' and 'new' Europe are minor and diminishing. This is particularly so when attention is limited to younger, well-educated respondents. However, given the contemporary politicization of national and European political issues, it would be surprising not to find polarized identity patterns. But the

polarization in all three cases is not between European and national identities as theorized in the RECON framework (Góra et al. 2009); rather, the contestation is over different constructions of national identities, within the German, the Hungarian and the Polish contexts.

We adopt a comparative perspective to discuss three more specific questions from a Polish angle: First, is there a zero-sum relationship between national and European identity constructions? We find that among the young Poles, the zero-sum assumption does not hold: all four factors reveal both Polish and European identities. Second, how polarized are the European identity patterns if compared across different national contexts? For re-examining the Polish factors in light of the 12-factor comparative analysis, we organize our discussion in terms of polarized and non-polarized identity patterns. Third, how can we inform the further development of the RECON models of democracy in Europe, if we focus on what the Polish factor narratives tell us about the perceived democratic legitimacy of the European Union?

Zero-sum or positive-sum (multiple) identities

We first consider how the empirical results of this study inform the debate in the literature on national and European identities. As discussed in the first chapter, Góra et al. (2009) theorize that there is a zero-sum relationship between national and European identities. They also take a forceful methodological position and dismiss evidence derived from opinion surveys that contradicts the zero-sum assumption.

> […] efforts have been made to demonstrate that co-existing plural identities are not only possible, but also normal (Herrmann et al. 2004). Academic work can thus indirectly back the identity-selling efforts of European institutions, by demonstrating, for instance, through opinion surveys that individuals can, and in fact do, hold multiple identities (Risse 2004). […] By measuring collective identities at the aggregated level of individual attitudes, they are usually relying on predefined categories to which the respondents have to react,

but in which the individual life histories of the people tend to disappear.[1]

(Góra et al. 2009: 290)

Q methodology does use predefined statements, but it also provides individual respondents discretion in how they order these statements and, in the narratives they construct, to explain their orderings. Q method is sufficiently discursive to conform to Góra et al.'s methodological prescriptions for investigating identity and for the empirical evaluation of the zero-sum assumption.

As our empirical results clearly demonstrate, the narratives of the four Polish factors do not support the zero-sum assumption: The discursive boundaries revealed in the four identity pattern narratives indicate plural or multiple identities: each reveals both Polish and European identities. The four narratives differ in how they define Polishness and Europeanness, but these identities are not mutually-exclusive as the zero-sum assumption requires: rather, a consistent positive-sum relationship is observed. These empirical findings are consistent with other contributions to opinion-survey-based comparative analyses of national and European identities surveyed comprehensively by Risse (2010).

> It is no longer controversial among scholars and, increasingly, policy makers that individuals hold multiple social identities. People can feel a sense of belonging to Europe, their nation-state, their gender, and so forth. It is wrong to conceptualize European identity in zero-sum terms, as if an increase in European identity necessarily decreases one's loyalty to

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[1] Also, Góra et al. (2009: 280-81): "For the operationalisation of the RECON models in relation to collective identities, this means that we cannot allocate collective identities to polity models by simply asking people whether they feel national or European. We can, for instance, not conclude that a European identity exists, if the majority of Europeans feel attached to Europe and the EU or are proud to be European. We can also not measure 'support' to the EU and to democracy as an indicator of the coming into being of a European demos that would substantiate a federal model of European democracy. […] Opinion polls remain 'meaningless' as long as they are not becoming themselves the object of identity politics, for instance, by using the results of an opinion poll to claim for the existence of a European identity. This is the irony of the literature on a European collective identity, which in order to avoid producing 'meaningless results' is forced to enter itself into the arena of identitarian politics."

national or other communities. Europe and the nation are both "imagined communities" and people can feel that they are part of both communities without having to choose a primary identification.[2]

(Risse 2010:39-40)

The narratives indicating a positive-sum relation between Polish and European identities also confirm Polish case studies such as by McManus-Czubińska et al., (2003) and Moes (2009). This result is not surprising: for Poles it is self-evident that they are Europeans. Poles view Poland as the heart of Europe; the canonical national narrative concerns Poland's sacrifice for Europe, defending it from external threats. Consequently, Poles are variously perplexed or offended by the often condescending attitude of so-called 'old' or core' Europeans who question whether Poland is European or sufficiently European.

Polarized and non-polarized identities
In the 12-factor comparative analysis above we observe polarized and non-polarized identity patterns. The cosmopolitan and national-traditional factors are polarized: each agrees with one model and opposes another. The multi-level factors are non-polarized: they are relatively indifferent to all RECON models.

The polarization of the cosmopolitan and traditionalist factors in the Polish context reflects the on-going struggle over ownership of what it means to be Polish. A waning faction of Polish society forcefully asserts a conservative, (Polish)-Catholic, Euro-skeptical vision of Poland rooted in the Romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century with an emphasis on martyrdom and victimhood and the need to protect Poland from Germany, Russia and against secularism in general. This vision finds its greatest support among elderly, rural, less-educated, church-attending Poles. In the perception of many other Poles, particularly the young, urban and university-educated, Polish identity appears to be captured by a nationalist minority; this leaves them ambivalent about making positive assertions regarding their own constructions of Polish identity. A counter-movement is evident in the growing anti-clerical sentiment in Poland: the assumed

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[2] This quotation is an almost verbatim reproduction of Risse (2004: 248), the focal point of Góra et al.'s methodological critique, cited above.

primordial Catholic nature of Poland is openly questioned; and the presumed central role of the Church in political and social matters is increasingly challenged.[3]

In such a polarized political environment it would be surprising not to find polarized identity patterns. But the polarization in this case is not between European and Polish identities as theorized in the RECON framework (Góra et al. 2009); rather, the contestation is over different constructions of Polish identity.

The Polish universalist factor (Poland 1), which belongs to the 12-factor cosmopolitan group, exhibits a deep aversion to the Polish nationalist identity construction and desires a more diverse and open-minded Poland. They are named universalists here to emphasize that do not consider themselves cosmopolitans. They are mobile and may think globally, but their frame of reference is Poland and Europe: they lack the unbounded reflexivity characteristic of cosmopolitanism.[4] The Polish traditionalist factor (Poland 2), which belongs to the 12-factor national-traditional group, supports national constructions and expresses concerns about threats to traditional values. It also supports Poland's membership in the European Union and current EU policies; namely, liberalization of trade, travel and labor. However, it has reservations about deeper integration; thus its disagreement with statements related to the federalist model.[5]

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[3] See Brzezińska et al., (2011) and Risse (2010: 76-81). Since our interviews in summer 2009 the latent tensions in Poland have become manifest. The airplane-crash death of one Kaczynski brother (the Polish President) in April 2010 and the defeat of the surviving twin in the Presidential election called to fill the vacancy in July 2010 resulted in the latter accusing the current President and Prime Minister of having conspired with the Russian government to engineer the murder of his brother (and 95 others). The Polish Catholic hierarchy has been complicit in treating the late Kaczynski as a national Catholic martyr and allowing a cult of martyrdom (defenders of the cross) to coalesce around the Smolensk plane crash; its undisguised support for Kaczynski in the 2010 election has also fueled anti-clerical sentiment. Popular support for PiS (the Kaczynski-led party) and respect for the Church have declined as a result.

[4] See Beck and Sznaider (2006) who also discuss the universal-cosmopolitan distinction.

[5] Many conservative Polish Catholics have a deep sense of being European and some, now that Poland is in the European Union, feel they have a mission to restore European (Catholic) values to a fallen, secularized Europe. See Góra and Mach (2011:230ff.)

While the narratives supporting the two polarized factors generally voice strong feelings about political issues, the non-polarized factor narratives are relatively apolitical: the Polish political context is less evident. The multi-level factors are so-called because they pick and choose among the models, favoring government action at the most appropriate level. Both the Pragmatists (Poland 3) and the Instrumentalists (Poland 4) support the European Union and voice strong European (and Polish) identities. Although Instrumentalist express concern about global issues and Pragmatists do not, both factors have a sense of a boundary between Europe and non-Europe. Pragmatists draw the boundary based on cultural values; Instrumentalists see view it more in terms of costs and practicality.

The absence from the four Polish narratives of an exclusive national identity cannot be generalized to Poland as a whole: there are exclusive nationalists in Poland as there are in other EU member states. Our study is limited to university students, the group least likely to exhibit this type of identity construction and most likely to identify as 'inclusive nationalists' and European. They are the most likely to benefit from the economic and social changes induced by the post-communist transition and EU membership and the mostly likely to view such changes as positive and legitimate.[6]

Implications for the RECON democracy models
Can empirical research inform a normative project? Yes, some normative propositions are also empirical propositions; their theoretical value is weakened or even negated if they are contradicted by observed social practices. The assumption about a zero-sum relationship between national and European identities, for example, is contradicted by this study among numerous others. Thus RECON model assumptions about the relationships between demos, collective identity and legitimacy need to be reconsidered.[7]

Deliberative democracy is the normative yardstick used to evaluate

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[6] See Fligstein (2008, 2009), Risse (2010:46–49) and McManus-Czubinska et al. (2003). On the distinction between "exclusive nationalists" and "inclusive nationalists" see Risse (2010: 13; 39–46; 229–34).

[7] A critical deconstruction of the zero-sum assumptions of the RECON framework and an empirically-based alternative reconstruction are presented in Czajkowska (ed.) (2011); see pp. 1–7 and 133–135, respectively.

the three RECON models.[8] In our study we encounter factors whose primary criterion for democratic legitimacy is that government works, that it is efficient; for them deliberation is not essential for legitimate governance. This is most evident in the Multi-level group of factors which appears to embody what Cram (2009), building on Billig (1995), describes as banal Europeanism. This, she argues, provides the basis of legitimacy for the European Union just as banal (as opposed to heroic) nationalism supports the legitimacy of contemporary nation states. Examining the 'is' of legitimacy can inform the 'ought' of legitimacy.

Finally, in the conclusion we develop some further directions for future research employing Q methodology to investigate vernacular understandings of identity and democratic legitimacy.

Conclusion: Future directions for Q-studies of democracy and identity

The polarization of identities observed in many of the factors in the three country studies both informs and impedes informing: we learn a great deal about the axis of polarization, but these signals are often so strong that they overwhelm less salient differences that exist along other axes. Our statement set included statements designed to elicit strong reactions from respondents in the dimensions of national and European identity as well as the generally less- emotive topic of democratic legitimacy; consequently, we observe more about the former and less about the latter. Although our study has been fruitful and other future studies could be conducted productively following our model, future Q-method studies might also consider focusing on only one of the dimensions and inducing respondents to make more subtle discriminations.

A statement set focused on identity might explore how 'the other' is constructed in subtly different contexts; focusing on either the subjective bounds of 'national' or 'European'. Similarly, the meaning of 'cosmopolitan' is contested in theory; Q-method could contribute

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[8] Eriksen and Fossum (2007: 3; 2009: 11)

to addressing the empirical challenges it poses and thereby resolve some of its ambiguity.[9]

A set statement set constructed to explore democratic legitimacy could examine the vernacular resonances of constitutional patriotism, republican and cosmopolitan citizenship and banal Europeanism, among others. Are the subtle distinctions of political theory perceptible or meaningful to individual citizens? Querying whether deliberative democracy as intrinsic to legitimacy as asserted in the RECON models would also be useful.

The absence of what used to be called 'class' is conspicuously absent in the elaboration of the RECON models; the RECON framework is constructed on replicating national solidarity at the European level or universalizing it in some non-territorially-bound cosmopolitan order. It excludes other potential bases of transnational solidarity within the European Union. A statement set focused on the possible attributes of a common European social policy would generate informative results particularly if conducted in a cross-country framework like the current study and if it drew on respondents from different social classes and age groups.

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[9] See Skrbis and Woodward (2007) for an empirical analysis of various forms of cosmopolitanism.

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Annex 1: Requirements for three democratic orders in Europe

	'Audit democracy'	'Federal multinational democracy'	"'Regional-European democracy'
Sovereignty	The Member States are formally sovereign entities The Union is derived from the Member States	The Union is recognized as a sovereign state, in accordance with international law	Polity sovereignty is multi-dimensional and shared among levels, subject to cosmopolitan principles of citizens' sovereignty
Coercive capabilities	The Union level has no own coercive capabilities Military and police forces are controlled at the Member State level	The Union level has state-type military and police capabilities The Member States have police functions	Military and police authority shared among all levels.
Authoritative decision-making	Constitutional limits on Union-level competencies Union-level: Problem-solving on the basis of delegated authority; Union-level: Decision-making and sanctioning ability confined to Common Market matters Member-States: Sustain final authority in all matters, in accordance with national constitutions	State-based constitution delineating the competencies of the Union and the Member States. Institutions for authoritative decision-making at both core levels (Union/member states) within their respective areas of competence Sanctioning ability available for norm enforcement and policy implementation, at both core levels of government (member state and European)	Constitutionally entrenched delineation of powers and responsibilities along both horizontal and vertical lines, Union sanctioning ability is limited; Union subjects its actions to higher-ranking principles Authoritative law-making through democratically regulated deliberative procedures
Resource acquisition and allocation	EU-level: no independent taxing powers and limited scope for redistribution Member States decide autonomously over tax and redistribution within their territories	EU-level: redistributive measures; independent fiscal policy and taxing ability Member-state level: redistributive and taxing powers	EU level: no independent taxing powers and limited redistributive powers All levels: committed to global redistribution

Membership/ border-setting	The Union is open to all European states that qualify in functional terms	The Union's borders are set in accordance with designation of Europeanness	The Union's borders are drawn in accordance with democratic criteria for a self-sustainable democratic entity and with regard to the development of similar regional associations.
Territorial exit	Provisions for exit – subject to approval from Union (majoritarian support required)	Provisions for legal secession of any sub-unit from the Union – subject to constitutional provisions	The Union has provisions for territorial exit for sub-units (subject to the constraints of cosmopolitan law)
Mode of legitimation	Audit (derivative) democracy at Union level Representative democracy at Member State level	Popularly elected bodies based on representative democracy at all levels; competencies divided in bi-polar federal manner	Popularly elected bodies within a system of legally 'hierarchicalized' competences
Identity formation and sustenance	EU-level: weak and with legal constraints on Union's scope of action Member-state-based: strong but 'Europeanised'; subject to each member state's own provisions	EU-level: strong and founded on constitutional patriotism. Member-state level: provisions for citizens' retention of distinctive national identities Mechanisms for mutual recognition of European and national identities	EU-level: post-national and based on universal norms, fundamental rights and democratic procedures Member-state level: respect for diversity; significantly constrained by European and cosmopolitan norms and values
Public sphere	Public sphere confined to the nation state	European-wide public sphere	Multiple overlapping (European and global) discourses

Source: Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum, 'Europe's Challenge: Reconstituting Europe or Reconfiguring Democracy?', in Eriksen and Fossum (eds) RECON - Theory in Practice, RECON Report No 8, 2009, pp. 35-36.

Annex 2: Lists of statements for the Q-sorting

Statements indicating RECON Model 1 'Audit democracy':

1) National constitution is the main source of rights and laws.
2) Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.
3) Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.
4) We need a strong national army.
5) The power of the EU should be limited.
6) National borders should be controlled by individual member states.
7) Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.
8) My home is my country.
9) Further enlargement may endanger economic stability of our country.
10) The EU helps solving environmental problems.
11) Our (Hungarian\German\Polish) politicians should do their best to represent national interests on the EU level.
12) EU facilitates travelling.
13) EU strengthens our role in global affairs.
14) EU facilitates/advances democratic development in our country.
15) EU gives us opportunity to work and study in different countries.
16) I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).

Statements indicating RECON Model 2 'Federal multinational democracy':

17) The EU provides opportunity to protect citizens against their own administration.
18) Europe should have one common army.
19) Europe shares a common heritage (Christian, Roman Law, democracy) and memory.
20) Common European culture is derived from diverse national sources.
21) The EU should create common welfare policy (common regulations, common distribution of social benefits).
22) Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration.
23) Euro should become a common currency of Europe.
24) EU should have a constitution.
25) We should have only EU passport.
26) I'm proud of being European.
27) Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.
28) EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.
29) The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.
30) It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe.

Statements indicating RECON Model 3 "Regional European democracy":

31) I am a global citizen
32) The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.
33) Remembrance of atrocities in European history makes us obliged to protect values related to the idea of humankind.
34) It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.
35) The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crises.
36) The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.
37) Individual freedom and choice should be protected.
38) Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe on rights and freedoms of others.
39)   Global collective decision-making should be fostered.
40) The whole world is my home.
41) We are all responsible for shaping global institutions.
42) The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale.
43) Democracy means first of all participation and deliberation of free individuals in common issues.
44) The EU should contribute financially to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution.
45) Further enlargement of the EU should be subject to sustainability.
46) Europe is a state of mind (and not a geographic term).

Supplementary statements:

47) Our country forms a bridge between Eastern and Western parts of Europe.
48) We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.
49) Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbors.
50) Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values.
51) You can only trust family members and close friends.
52) Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.
53) Citizens are alienated because state and local administration do not serve their interests.
54) The past helps to understand the future.
55) Democratic procedure work best at a local or regional level.
56) Democracy introduces order into the world.
57) Democracy is expensive.
58) Democracy is inefficient.
59) We need strong leaders.
60) Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.
61) Some minorities demand too many rights.
62) Women and men are equal.
63) Women should care more about family and home.
64) Certain groups have too much power and control.
65) Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.
66) Some countries in the EU are second class.
67) (Country name) is treated as second class in the EU.
68) We are the slaves of Europe.
69) Diversity causes problems
70) Certain political goals can only be achieved by force.

Annex 3: Short additional questionnaire

1. **Socio Economic data:**
   Year of birth:
   Place of birth:
   What year did you start the university?
   For how long have you been at the university (in semesters)?
   Place of living (Where do you live? Only in one place or in more than one?):
   Have you ever spent a longer time abroad (3 month or longer)? Where? For what purpose?
   Do you speak another language? Which one?

2. **In the near future do you see yourself as:**
   (nationality) only
   (nationality) and European
   European and (nationality)
   European only
   Don't know

3. **What is your opinion about a constitution for the EU?**
   For
   Against
   Don't know

4. **Are you satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?**
   Very satisfied
   Fairly satisfied
   Not very satisfied
   Not at all satisfied
   Don't know

5. **What is your image of the EU?**
   Very positive
   Fairly positive
   Neutral
   Fairly negative
   Very negative
   Don't know

6. **Do you think that our country has benefited or not benefited from EU-membership?**
   Our country's membership in the EU is:
   A good thing
   A bad thing
   Neither nor
   Don't know

7. **Do you intend to participate in the next election of the European parliament?**
   Yes
   No
   Don't know

Annex 4: Q-sort tables for the German study

Table 1: Factor Q-Sort Values for Each Statement – German Factors

No.	Statements	factor arrays			
		G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4
1.	National constitution is the main source of rights and laws.	0	3	-1	3
2.	Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.	-1	-3	1	-1
3.	Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.	-2	-2	1	-4
4.	We need a strong national army.	-3	1	-4	0
5.	The power of the EU should be limited.	-2	2	2	-2
6.	National borders should be controlled by individual member states.	-2	-1	0	-2
7.	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	-3	1	-2	0
8.	My home is my country.	-1	5	3	5
9.	Further enlargement may endanger economic stability of our country.	-2	1	3	1
10.	The EU helps solving environmental problems.	1	-1	3	1
11.	Our (Hungarian\German\Polish) politicians should do their best to represent national interests on the EU level.	-2	3	4	3
12.	EU facilitates travelling.	2	1	4	3
13.	EU strengthens our role in global affaires.	2	1	1	1
14.	EU facilitates/advances democratic development in our country.	0	-4	-2	-2
15.	EU gives us opportunity to work and study in different countries.	3	2	3	2
16.	I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).	-3	3	-1	4
17.	The EU provides opportunity to protect citizens against their own administration.	-1	-2	-2	-3
18.	Europe should have one common army.	-1	-1	-3	0
19.	Europe shares a common heritage (Christian, Roman Law, democracy) and memory.	0	0	-1	2
20.	Common European culture is derived from diverse national sources.	1	0	0	4
21.	The EU should create common welfare policy (common regulations, common distribution of social benefits).	1	-2	1	2
22.	Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration.	1	-2	-1	-1

23.	Euro should become a common currency of Europe.	-1	-1	-3	0
24.	EU should have a constitution.	0	2	-2	2
25.	We should have only EU passport.	3	-4	-3	-1
26.	I'm proud of being European.	-1	0	-3	1
27.	Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.	0	2	-1	-1
28.	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.	2	0	1	1
29.	The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.	2	-1	-2	0
30.	It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe.	0	-1	0	1
31.	I am a global citizen.	-1	0	-3	1
32.	The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.	1	1	2	1
33.	Remembrance of atrocities in European history makes us obliged to protect values related to the idea of humankind.	2	1	4	1
34.	It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.	3	-1	0	2
35.	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crises.	1	0	1	-2
36.	The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.	0	2	-1	3
37.	Individual freedom and choice should be protected.	3	5	5	5
38.	Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe on rights and freedoms of others.	5	4	5	4
39.	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	4	2	-2	2
40.	The whole world is my home.	4	-2	-4	0
41.	We are all responsible for shaping global institutions.	3	-1	-1	0
42.	The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale.	4	3	2	4
43.	Democracy means first of all participation and deliberation of free individuals in common issues.	4	0	3	-1
44.	The EU should contribute financially to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution.	3	0	0	0
45.	Further enlargement of the EU should be subject to sustainability.	2	-1	4	2
46.	Europe is a state of mind (and not a geographic term).	2	-3	0	-2

47.	Our country forms a bridge between Eastern and Western parts of Europe.	1	0	-1	2
48.	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.	-3	1	-5	-3
49.	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.	-4	-1	-4	-5
50.	Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values.	0	-2	-1	-1
51.	You can only trust family members and close friends.	-3	1	2	-3
52.	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.	-1	4	0	-2
53.	Citizens are alienated because state and local administration do not serve their interests.	1	2	1	-1
54.	The past helps to understand the future.	2	4	1	3
55.	Democratic procedure work best at a local or regional level.	1	2	-1	-2
56.	Democracy introduces order into the world.	0	0	2	3
57.	Democracy is expensive.	-1	-5	2	-1
58.	Democracy is inefficient.	-2	-5	0	-3
59.	We need strong leaders.	-3	-4	-2	-1
60.	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.	1	3	-3	-4
61.	Some minorities demand too many rights.	-2	3	1	-2
62.	Women and men are equal.	5	4	1	-1
63.	Women should care more about family and home.	-4	-3	-2	-3
64.	Certain groups have too much power and control.	0	1	3	0
65.	Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.	-5	-3	-5	-5
66.	Some countries in the EU are second class.	-1	-4	2	0
67.	(Country name) is treated as second class in the EU.	-4	-2	0	-4
68.	We are the slaves of Europe.	-5	-2	-4	-4
69.	Diversity causes problems	-2	-3	2	1
70.	Certain political goals can only be achieved by force.	-4	-3	0	-3

Table 2: Distinguishing Statements for Factors 1–4

		Distinguishing Statements for Factor 1							
		(P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)							
		Factors							
		1		2		3		4	
No.	Statement	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
39	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	4	1.43	2	0.65	-2	-0.71	2	0.85
44	The EU should contribute financially to limit the consequences of environmental pollution.	3	1.43*	0	0.09	0	-0.03	0	0.10
41	We are all responsible for shaping global institutions.	3	1.13*	-1	-0.72	-1	-0.40	0	-0.21
46	Europe is a state of mind (and not a geographic term).	2	0.96*	-3	-1.30	0	-0.06	-2	-0.73
40	The whole world is my home.	1	0.57*	-2	-0.75	-4	-1.36	0	-0.24
60	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.	1	0.43*	3	1.38	-3	-0.94	-4	-1.24
14	EU facilitates/advances democratic development in our country.	0	-0.01	-4	-1.51	-2	-0.90	-2	-0.67
8	My home is my country.	-4	-0.25*	5	2.16	3	1.17	5	1.90
9	Further enlargement may endanger economic stability of our country.	-2	-0.71*	1	0.42	3	1.24	1	0.36
69	Diversity causes problems.	-2	-0.87	-3	-1.37	2	0.64	1	0.13
11	Our politicians should do their best to represent national interests on the EU level.	-2	-0.91*	3	1.44	4	1.33	3	1.00
4	We need a strong national army.	-3	-1.17*	1	0.41	-4	-2.01	0	-0.17
16	I am proud of being German.	-3	-1.28*	3	1.14	-1	-0.31	4	1.69
7	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	-3	-1.42*	1	0.35	-2	-0.57	0	0.10

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 2

(P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

No.	Statement	Factors 1 RNK	1 SCORE	2 RNK	2 SCORE	3 RNK	3 SCORE	4 RNK	4 SCORE
52	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.	-1	-0.54	4	1.48*	0	0.07	-2	-0.79
60	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.	1	0.43	3	1.38*	-3	-0.94	-4	-1.24
61	Some minorities demand to many rights.	-2	-0.81	3	1.05	1	0.31	-2	-0.76
53	Citizens are alienated because state and local administration do not serve their interests.	1	0.29	2	0.84	1	0.23	-1	-0.42
12	EU facilitates travelling.	2	0.87	1	0.36	4	1.45	3	1.30
48	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.	-3	-1.37	1	0.31*	-5	-2.37	-3	-1.08
49	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.	-4	-1.78	-1	-0.37*	-4	-1.56	-5	-2.30
45	Further enlargement of the EU should be subject to sustainability.	2	0.87	-1	-0.72*	4	1.48	2	0.71
67	Germany is treated as second class in the EU.	-4	-1.59	-2	-0.84	0	-0.15	-4	-1.75
21	The EU should create common welfare policy.	1	0.31	-2	-1.10*	1	0.24	2	0.99
65	Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.	-5	-1.96	-3	-1.10*	-5	-2.06	-5	-2.41
2	Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.	-1	-0.50	-3	-1.24	1	0.57	-1	-0.40
69	Diversity causes problems.	-2	-0.87	-3	-1.37	2	0.64	1	0.13
66	Some countries in the EU are second class.	-1	-0.56	-4	-1.49*	2	0.61	0	-0.27
59	We need strong leaders.	-3	-1.01	-4	-1.51	-2	-0.84	-1	-0.35

No.	Statement	1 RNK	1 SCORE	2 RNK	2 SCORE	3 RNK	3 SCORE	4 RNK	4 SCORE
14	EU Facilitates/advances democratic development in our country.	0	-0.01	-4	-1.51	-2	-0.90	-2	-0.67
57	Democracy is expensive.	-1	-0.47	-5	-1.60*	2	0.74	-1	-0.63

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 3

(P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

No.	Statement	Factors 1 RNK	1 SCORE	2 RNK	2 SCORE	3 RNK	3 SCORE	4 RNK	4 SCORE
37	Individual freedom and choice should be protected.	5	2.03	5	2.02	5	2.73	5	1.92
45	Further enlargement of the EU should be subject to sustainability.	2	0.87	-1	-0.72	4	1.48	2	0.71
9	Further enlargement may endanger economic stability of our country.	-2	-0.71	1	0.42	3	1.24*	1	0.36
64	Certain groups have too much power and control.	0	0.16	1	0.54	3	1.17	0	-0.10
8	My home is my country.	-1	-0.25	5	2.16	3	1.17	5	1.90
57	Democracy is expansive.	-1	-0.47	-5	-1.60	2	0.74*	-1	-0.63
66	Some countries in the EU are second class.	-1	-0.56	-4	-1.49	2	0.61*	0	-0.27
2	Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.	-1	-0.50	-3	-1.24	1	0.57*	-1	-0.40
62	Women and men are equal.	5	1.83	4	1.88	1	0.55*	-1	-0.41
3	Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.	-2	-0.82	-2	-0.82	1	0.41*	-4	-1.76
61	Some minorities demand too many rights.	-2	-0.81	3	1.05	1	0.31	-2	-0.76

#	Statement								
52	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.	-1	-0.54	4	1.48	0	0.07	-2	-0.79
46	Europe is a state of mind (and not geographic term).	2	0.96	-3	-1.30	0	-0.06	-2	0.73
58	Democracy is inefficient.	-2	-0.90	-5	-1.51	0	-0.08*	-3	-1.03
67	Germany is treated as second class in the EU.	-4	-1.56	-2	-0.84	0	-0.15	-4	-1.75
70	Certain political goals can only be achieved by force.	-4	-1.45	-3	-1.34	0	-0.17*	-3	-1.01
36	The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.	3	1.01	2	0.60	-1	-0.29*	3	1.25
16	I am proud of being German.	-3	-1.28	3	1.14	-1	-0.31*	4	1.69
24	EU should have a constitution.	3	1.00	2	1.04	-2	-0.54*	2	0.97
7	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	-3	-1.42	1	0.35	-2	-0.57	0	0.10
39	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	4	1.43	2	0.65	-2	-0.71*	2	0.85
18	Europe should have one common army.	-1	-0.61	-1	-0.32	-3	-1.20	0	-0.24
31	I am a global citizen.	1	0.72	0	0.08	-3	-1.28*	1	0.53
26	I am proud of being European.	0	0.16	0	-0.18	-3	-1.33*	1	0.13
40	The whole world is my home.	1	0.57	-2	-0.75	-4	-1.36	0	-0.24
4	We need a strong national army.	-3	-1.17	1	0.41	-4	-2.01*	0	-0.17
48	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.	-3	-1.37	1	0.31	-5	-2.37*	-3	-1.08

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 4

(P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

No.	Statement	Factors 1		2		3		4	
		RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
20	Common European culture is derived from diverse national sources.	1	0.38	0	0.14	0	-0.12	4	1.45*
56	Democracy introduces order into the world.	0	0.29	0	0.28	2	0.61	3	1.42
21	The EU should create common welfare policy.	1	0.31	-2	-1.10	1	0.24	2	0.99
19	Europe shares a common heritage (Christianity, Roman Law, democracy)	0	-0.07	0	-0.27	-1	-0.31	2	0.81*
62	Women and men are equal.	5	1.83	4	1.88	1	0.55	-1	-0.41*
53	Citizens are alienated because state and local administrations do not serve their interests.	1	0.29	2	0.84	1	0.23	-1	-0.42
3	Democracy can only be sutained in the confines of the nation-state.	-2	-0.82	-2	-0.82	1	0.41	-4	-1.76*

Annex 5: Q-sort tables for the Hungarian study

Table 1: Distinguishing Statements for Factors 1–4

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 1

(P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

No.	Statement	Factor 1 RNK	Factor 1 SCORE	Factor 2 RNK	Factor 2 SCORE	Factor 3 RNK	Factor 3 SCORE	Factor 4 RNK	Factor 4 SCORE
42	The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale.	5	1.50*	1	0.36	1	0.61	1	0.47
24	EU should have a constitution.	3	1.05	0	-0.02	1	0.24	-3	-1.37
60	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.	2	1.01*	-1	-0.63	-4	-1.56	0	0.14
23	Euro should become a common currency of Europe.	2	0.96	4	1.61	5	2.01	-2	-0.83
32	The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.	2	0.91*	-1	-0.52	-2	-0.76	0	0.17
35	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crises.	2	0.88	-3	-1.05	0	-0.16	4	1.42
14	EU facilitates/advances democratic development in our country.	1	0.49*	-1	-0.55	-2	-0.59	-3	-1.10
13	EU strengthens our role in global affaires.	1	0.38	-2	-0.76	-1	-0.32	-2	-0.86
59	We need strong leaders.	1	0.34*	3	1.28	4	1.61	3	1.41
40	The whole world is my home.	0	0.07*	-5	-1.77	2	1.08	-4	-1.68
16	I'm proud of being Hungarian.	0	0.04*	5	1.70	-2	-0.82	5	1.71
53	Citizens are alienated because state and local administration do not serve their interests.	-2	0.81*	3	1.18	2	0.80	0	0.27

No.	Statement	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
50	Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values.	-3	1.28*	0	0.02	-1	-0.32	-5	-2.03
63	Women should care more about family and home.	-4	1.40*	4	1.51	0	0.12	1	0.50
61	Some minorities demand too many rights.	-4	1.98*	-2	-0.94	4	1.53	-1	-0.31
69	Diversity causes problems.	-4	2.03*	-2	-0.96	3	1.17	-1	-0.35

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 2

(P < .05 ; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

		Factors							
		1		2		3		4	
No.	Statement	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
63	Women should care more about family and home.	-4	-1.40	4	1.51*	0	0.12	1	0.50
58	Democracy is inefficient.	-3	-1.40	2	0.79*	-4	-1.40	-3	-1.24
55	Democratic procedure work best at a local or regional level.	-2	-0.55	1	0.42	-1	-0.45	-1	-0.48
2	Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.	-1	-0.40	1	0.27	-2	-0.92	-1	-0.39
44	The EU should contribute financially to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution.	4	1.42	1	0.25	5	1.81	2	0.95
33	Remembrance of atrocities in European history makes us obliged to protect values related to the idea of humankind.	3	1.27	0	0.01*	-3	-1.25	3	1.05
68	We are the slaves of Europe.	-5	-2.04	-1	0.42*	-5	-2.26	-3	-1.30
60	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.	2	1.01	-1	-0.63	-4	-1.56	0	0.14

No.	Statement	1 RNK	1 SCORE	2 RNK	2 SCORE	3 RNK	3 SCORE	4 RNK	4 SCORE
35	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crises.	2	0.88	-3	-1.05	0	-0.16	4	1.42
36	The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.	3	1.18	-3	-1.18	0	-0.25	4	1.65
49	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.	-2	-0.69	-4	-1.45	0	-0.25	0	-0.12
56	Democracy introduces order into the world.	0	0.08	-4	1.70*	0	0.05	-1	-0.20

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 3

(P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

		Factors							
		1		2		3		4	
No.	Statement	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
61	Some minorities demand too many rights.	-4	-1.98	-2	-0.94	4	1.53*	-1	-0.31
69	Diversity causes problems.	-4	-2.03	-2	-0.96	3	1.17*	-1	-0.35
40	The whole world is my home.	0	0.07	-5	-1.77	2	1.08*	-4	-1.68
25	We should have only EU passport.	-1	-0.38	-1	-0.62	2	0.88*	-4	-1.49
22	Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration.	-1	-0.22	-1	-0.63	1	0.48	-2	-0.77
70	Certain political goals can only be achieved by force.	-5	-2.36	-5	-2.00	1	0.44*	-5	-2.12
35	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crises.	2	0.88	-3	-1.05	0	-0.16	4	1.42
36	The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.	3	1.18	-3	-1.18	0	-0.25	4	1.65
20	Common European culture is derived from diverse national sources.	2	0.96	3	1.33	-1	0.27*	3	1.09

No.	Statement	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
16	I'm proud of being Hungarian.	0	0.04	5	1.70	-2	0.82*	5	1.71
21	The EU should create common welfare policy (common regulations, common distribution of social benefits).	1	0.25	2	0.86	-3	1.09*	1	0.43
33	Remembrance of atrocities in European history makes us obliged to protect values related to the idea of humankind.	3	1.27	0	-0.01	-3	1.25*	3	1.05
60	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.	2	1.01	-1	-0.63	-4	-1.56	0	0.14
65	Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.	-3	-1.25	-4	-1.41	-5	2.46*	-1	-0.19

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 4

(P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

		Factors							
		1		**2**		**3**		**4**	
No.	Statement	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
19	Europe shares a common heritage (Christian, Roman Law, democracy) and memory.	1	0.30	1	0.77	2	0.72	4	1.45
35	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crises.	2	0.88	-3	-1.05	0	-0.16	4	1.42
62	Women and men are equal.	4	1.45	4	1.56	3	1.49	2	0.82
7	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	-2	-0.72	-3	-1.24	-3	-1.13	2	0.72*
3	Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.	-4	-1.51	-1	-0.66	-3	-1.29	0	0.17
32	The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.	2	0.91	-1	-0.52	-2	-0.76	0	0.17

No.	Statement								
60	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.	2	1.01	-1	-0.63	-4	-1.56	0	0.14
65	Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.	-3	-1.25	-4	-1.41	-5	-2.46	-1	-0.19*
23	Euro should become a common currency of Europe.	2	0.96	4	1.61	5	2.01	-2	-0.83*
18	Europe should have one common army.	-1	-0.43	2	0.90	1	0.17	-2	-0.01
68	We are the slaves of Europe.	-5	-2.04	-1	-0.42	-5	-2.26	-3	-1.30*
24	EU should have a constitution.	3	1.05	0	-0.02	1	0.24	-3	-1.37*
28	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.	1	0.50	0	-0.24	0	0.00	-3	-1.44*
25	We should have only EU passport.	-1	-0.38	-1	-0.62	2	0.88	-4	-1.49*
51	You can only trust family members and close friends.	-2	-0.74	0	-0.23	-2	-0.88	-4	-1.58
50	Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values.	-3	-1.28	0	0.02	-1	-0.32	-5	-2.03*

Table 2: Factor Q-Sort Values for Each Statement – Hungarian Factors

No.	Statement	1	2	3	4
1	National constitution is the main source of rights and laws.	-1	-2	1	1
2	Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.	-1	1	-2	-1
3	Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.	-4	-1	-3	0
4	We need a strong national army.	-3	-3	-3	-2
5	The power of the EU should be limited.	-3	-1	-2	-2
6	National borders should be controlled by individual member states.	-2	-2	-4	-2
7	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	-2	-3	-3	2
8	My home is my country.	-1	5	-3	5
9	Further enlargement may endanger economic stability of our country.	-3	-3	-4	-2
10	The EU helps solving environmental problems.	1	0	0	2
11	Our (Hungarian\German\Polish) politicians should do their best to represent national interests on the EU level.	2	2	2	3
12	EU facilitates travelling.	4	1	3	1
13	EU strengthens our role in global affaires.	1	-2	-1	-2
14	EU facilitates/advances democratic development in our country.	1	-1	-2	-3
15	EU gives us opportunity to work and study in different countries.	3	3	4	3
16	I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).	0	5	-2	5
17	The EU provides opportunity to protect citizens against their own administration.	0	-2	0	-1
18	Europe should have one common army.	-1	2	1	-2
19	Europe shares a common heritage (Christian, Roman Law, democracy) and memory.	1	1	2	4
20	Common European culture is derived from diverse national sources.	2	3	-1	3
21	The EU should create common welfare policy (common regulations, common distribution of social benefits).	1	2	-3	1
22	Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration.	-1	-1	1	-2
23	Euro should become a common currency of Europe.	2	4	5	-2
24	EU should have a constitution.	3	0	1	-3
25	We should have only EU passport.	-1	-1	2	-4
26	I'm proud of being European.	3	4	0	-1
27	Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.	0	-3	-1	-3
28	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.	1	0	0	-3

29	The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.	0	-2	-1	-1
30	It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe.	3	2	4	1
31	I am a global citizen.	0	-4	-1	-4
32	The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.	2	-1	-2	0
33	Remembrance of atrocities in European history makes us obliged to protect values related to the idea of humankind.	3	0	-3	3
34	It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.	1	2	0	2
35	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crisis.	2	-3	0	4
36	The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.	3	-3	0	4
37	Individual freedom and choice should be protected.	5	3	2	2
38	Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe on rights and freedom of others.	4	3	3	1
39	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	0	-2	-1	1
40	The whole world is my home.	0	-5	2	-4
41	We are all responsible for shaping global institutions.	1	0	1	0
42	The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale.	5	1	1	1
43	Democracy means first of all participation and deliberation of free individuals in common issues.	0	-1	2	1
44	The EU should contribute financially to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution.	4	1	5	2
45	Further enlargement of the EU should be subject to sustainability.	1	1	3	2
46	Europe is a state of mind (and not a geographic term).	2	1	2	0
47	Our country forms a bridge between Eastern and Western parts of Europe.	-1	-1	-1	0
48	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.	-2	2	-1	3
49	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.	-2	-4	0	0
50	Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values.	-3	0	-1	-5
51	You can only trust family members and close friends.	-2	0	-2	-4
52	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.	2	0	1	0
53	Citizens are alienated because state and local administration do not serve their interests.	-2	3	2	0
54	The past helps to understand the future.	-1	2	-2	4
55	Democratic procedure work best at a local or regional level.	-2	1	-1	-1
56	Democracy introduces order into the world.	0	-4	0	-1
57	Democracy is expensive.	-1	0	-2	-1
58	Democracy is inefficient.	-3	2	-4	-3

59	We need strong leaders.	1	3	4	3
60	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.	2	-1	-4	0
61	Some minorities demand too many rights.	-4	-2	4	-1
62	Women and men are equal.	4	4	3	2
63	Women should care more about family and home.	-4	4	0	1
64	Certain groups have too much power and control.	0	1	3	0
65	Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.	-3	-4	-5	-1
66	Some countries in the EU are second class.	-1	0	1	1
67	(Country name) is treated as second class in the EU.	-2	1	0	2
68	We are the slaves of Europe.	-5	-1	-5	-3
69	Diversity causes problems.	-4	-2	3	-1
70	Certain political goals can only be achieved by force.	-5	-5	1	-5

Table 3: Summary of Factor 1 Analysis: Liberal Democratic Identity (n=7)

No.	Statement	Score	Note
37	Individual freedom and choice should be protected.	5	
42	The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale.	5	High1
38	Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe on rights and freedom of others.	4	
62	Women and men are equal.	4	
44	The EU should contribute financially to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution.	4	
12	EU facilitates travelling.	4	
33	Remembrance of atrocities in European history makes us obliged to protect values related to the idea of humankind.	3	
15	EU gives us opportunity to work and study in different countries.	3	
36	The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.	3	
26	I'm proud of being European.	3	
24	EU should have a constitution.	3	High2
30	It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe.	3	
60	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.	2	High3
20	Common European culture is derived from diverse national sources.	2	
11	Our (Hungarian\German\Polish) politicians should do their best to represent national interests on the EU level.	2	
23	Euro should become a common currency of Europe.	2	
32	The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.	2	

35	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crises.	2	
52	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.	2	
46	Europe is a state of mind (and not a geographic term).	2	
45	Further enlargement of the EU should be subject to sustainability.	1	
10	The EU helps solving environmental problems.	1	
34	It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.	1	
41	We are all responsible for shaping global institutions.	1	
28	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.	1	
14	EU facilitates/advances democratic development in our country.	1	
13	EU strengthens our role in global affaires.	1	
59	We need strong leaders.	1	
19	Europe shares a common heritage (Christian, Roman Law, democracy) and memory.	1	
21	The EU should create common welfare policy (common regulation, common distribution of social benefits).	1	
27	Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.	0	
29	The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.	0	
39	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	0	
17	The EU provides opportunity to protect citizens against their own administration.	0	
56	Democracy introduces order into the world.	0	
40	The whole world is my home.	0	
31	I am a global citizen.	0	
16	I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).	0	
43	Democracy means first of all participation and deliberation of free individuals in common issues.	0	
64	Certain groups have too much power and control.	0	
22	Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration	-1	
1	National constitution is the main source of rights and laws.	-1	
66	Some countries in the EU are second class.	-1	
57	Democracy is expensive.	-1	
25	We should have only EU passport.	-1	
2	Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.	-1	
8	My home is my country.	-1	
18	Europe should have one common army.	-1	
54	The past helps to understand the future.	-1	

47	Our country forms a bridge between Eastern and Western parts of Europe.	-1	
55	Democratic procedure work best at a local or regional level.	-2	
67	(Country name) is treated as second class in the EU.	-2	
49	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.	-2	
7	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	-2	
51	You can only trust family members and close friends.	-2	
53	Citizens are alienated because state and local administration do not serve their interests.	-2	
48	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.	-2	
6	National borders should be controlled by individual member states.	-2	
5	The power of the EU should be limited.	-3	
65	Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.	-3	
50	Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values.	-3	
9	Further enlargement may endanger economic stability of our country.	-3	
4	We need a strong national army.	-3	
58	Democracy is inefficient.	-3	
63	Women should care more about family and home.	-4	Low3
3	Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.	-4	
61	Some minorities demand too many rights.	-4	Low2
69	Diversity causes problems.	-4	Low1
68	We are the slaves of Europe.	-5	
70	Certain political goals can only be achieved by force.	-5	

Table 4: Summary of Factor 2 Analysis: Macho National Identity (n=2)

No.	Statement	Score	Note
8	My home is my country.	5	
16	I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).	5	
23	Euro should become a common currency of Europe.	4	
62	Women and men are equal.	4	
63	Women should care more about family and home.	4	High1
26	I'm proud of being European.	4	
20	Common European culture is derived from diverse national sources.	3	

37	Individual freedom and choice should be protected.	3	
38	Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe on rights and freedom of others.	3	
59	We need strong leaders.	3	
15	EU gives us opportunity to work and study in different countries.	3	
53	Citizens are alienated because state and local administration do not serve their interests.	3	
48	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.	2	
34	It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.	2	
54	The past helps to understand the future.	2	
11	Our (Hungarian\German\Polish) politicians should do their best to represent national interests on the EU level.	2	
18	Europe should have one common army.	2	
30	It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe.	2	
21	The EU should create common welfare policy (common regulation, common distribution of social benefits).	2	
58	Democracy is inefficient.	2	High2
19	Europe shares a common heritage (Christian, Roman Law, democracy) and memory.	1	
46	Europe is a state of mind (and not a geographic term).	1	
64	Certain groups have too much power and control.	1	
12	EU facilitates travelling.	1	
67	(Country name) is treated as second class in the EU.	1	
55	Democratic procedure work best at a local or regional level.	1	High3
42	The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale.	1	
45	Further enlargement of the EU should be subject to sustainability.	1	
2	Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.	1	High4
44	The EU should contribute financially to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution.	1	
57	Democracy is expensive.	0	
41	We are all responsible for shaping global institutions.	0	
66	Some countries in the EU are second class.	0	
50	Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values.	0	
33	Remembrance of atrocities in European history makes us obliged to protect values related to the idea of humankind.	0	
24	EU should have a constitution.	0	
52	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.	0	
51	You can only trust family members and close friends.	0	

28	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.	0	
10	The EU helps solving environmental problems.	0	
68	We are the slaves of Europe.	-1	
47	Our country forms a bridge between Eastern and Western parts of Europe.	-1	
32	The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.	-1	
14	EU facilitates/advances democratic development in our country.	-1	
5	The power of the EU should be limited.	-1	
25	We should have only EU passport.	-1	
60	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.	-1	
22	Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration.	-1	
3	Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.	-1	
43	Democracy means first of all participation and deliberation of free individuals in common issues.	-1	
29	The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.	-2	
13	EU strengthens our role in global affaires.	-2	
1	National constitution is the main source of rights and laws.	-2	
17	The EU provides opportunity to protect citizens against their own administration.	-2	
6	National borders should be controlled by individual member states.	-2	
39	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	-2	
61	Some minorities demand too many rights.	-2	
69	Diversity causes problems.	-2	
27	Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.	-3	
35	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crises.	-3	Low4
9	Further enlargement may endanger economic stability of our country.	-3	
36	The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.	-3	Low3
7	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	-3	
4	We need a strong national army.	-3	
31	I am a global citizen.	-4	
65	Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.	-4	
49	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.	-4	Low2
56	Democracy introduces order into the world.	-4	Low1
40	The whole world is my home.	-5	

70	Certain political goals can only be achieved by force.	-5	

Table 5: Summary of Factor 3 Analysis: Utilitarian Identity (n=3)

No.	Statement	Score	Note
23	Euro should become a common currency of Europe.	5	
44	The EU should contribute financially to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution.	5	
30	It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe.	4	
15	EU gives us opportunity to work and study in different countries.	4	
59	We need strong leaders.	4	
61	Some minorities demand too many rights.	4	High1
62	Women and men are equal.	3	
45	Further enlargement of the EU should be subject to sustainability.	3	
38	Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe on rights and freedom of others.	3	
69	Diversity causes problems.	3	High2
12	EU facilitates travelling.	3	
64	Certain groups have too much power and control.	3	
40	The whole world is my home.	2	High3
43	Democracy means first of all participation and deliberation of free individuals in common issues.	2	
11	Our (Hungarian\German\Polish) politicians should do their best to represent national interests on the EU level.	2	
37	Individual freedom and choice should be protected.	2	
25	We should have only EU passport.	2	High4
53	Citizens are alienated because state and local administration do not serve their interests.	2	
46	Europe is a state of mind (and not a geographic term).	2	
19	Europe shares a common heritage (Christian, Roman Law, democracy) and memory.	2	
42	The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale.	1	
66	Some countries in the EU are second class.	1	
22	Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration.	1	High5
70	Certain political goals can only be achieved by force.	1	High6
52	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.	1	
1	National constitution is the main source of rights and laws.	1	
24	EU should have a constitution.	1	

41	We are all responsible for shaping global institutions.	1	
18	Europe should have one common army.	1	
34	It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.	0	
63	Women should care more about family and home.	0	
26	I'm proud of being European.	0	
56	Democracy introduces order into the world.	0	
28	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.	0	
67	(Country name) is treated as second class in the EU.	0	
35	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crisis.	0	
17	The EU provides opportunity to protect citizens against their own administration.	0	
10	The EU helps solving environmental problems.	0	
49	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.	0	
36	The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.	0	
20	Common European culture is derived from diverse national sources.	-1	Low6
47	Our country forms a bridge between Eastern and Western parts of Europe.	-1	
29	The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.	-1	
13	EU strengthens our role in global affaires.	-1	
50	Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values.	-1	
39	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	-1	
27	Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.	-1	
48	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.	-1	
55	Democratic procedure work best at a local or regional level.	-1	
31	I am a global citizen.	-1	
14	EU facilitates/advances democratic development in our country.	-2	
54	The past helps to understand the future.	-2	
32	The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.	-2	
57	Democracy is expensive.	-2	
16	I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).	-2	Low5
51	You can only trust family members and close friends.	-2	
2	Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.	-2	
5	The power of the EU should be limited.	-2	
8	My home is my country.	-3	

21	The EU should create common welfare policy (common regulations, common distribution of social benefits).	-3	Low4
7	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	-3	
33	Remembrance of atrocities in European history makes us obliged to protect values related to the idea of humankind.	-3	Low3
4	We need a strong national army.	-3	
3	Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.	-3	
9	Further enlargement may endanger economic stability of our country.	-4	
6	National borders should be controlled by individual member states.	-4	
58	Democracy is inefficient.	-4	
60	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.	-4	Low2
68	We are the slaves of Europe.	-5	
65	Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.	-5	Low1

Table 6: Summary of Factor 4 Analysis: Hestia National Identity (n=5)

No.	Statement	Score	Note
8	My home is my country.	5	
16	I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).	5	
36	The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.	4	
19	Europe shares a common heritage (Christian, Roman Law, democracy) and memory.	4	High1
35	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crisis.	4	High2
54	The past helps to understand the future.	4	
59	We need strong leaders.	3	
11	Our (Hungarian\German\Polish) politicians should do their best to represent national interests on the EU level.	3	
48	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.	3	
20	Common European culture is derived from diverse national sources.	3	
33	Remembrance of atrocities in European history makes us obliged to protect values related to the idea of humankind.	3	
15	EU gives us opportunity to work and study in different countries.	3	
44	The EU should contribute financially to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution.	2	
37	Individual freedom and choice should be protected.	2	
34	It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.	2	

62	Women and men are equal.	2	
7	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	2	
67	(Country name) is treated as second class in the EU.	2	
10	The EU helps solving environmental problems.	2	
45	Further enlargement of the EU should be subject to sustainability.	2	
12	EU facilitates travelling.	1	
1	National constitution is the main source of rights and laws.	1	
43	Democracy means first of all participation and deliberation of free individuals in common issues.	1	
38	Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe on rights and freedom of others.	1	
63	Women should care more about family and home.	1	
42	The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale.	1	
30	It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe.	1	
21	The EU should create common welfare policy (common regulations, common distribution of social benefits).	1	
66	Some countries in the EU are second class.	1	
39	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	1	
64	Certain groups have too much power and control.	0	
52	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.	0	
53	Citizens are alienated because state and local administration do not serve their interests.	0	
47	Our country forms a bridge between Eastern and Western parts of Europe.	0	
3	Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.	0	
32	The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.	0	
60	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.	0	
46	Europe is a state of mind (and not a geographic term).	0	
41	We are all responsible for shaping global institutions.	0	
49	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.	0	
65	Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.	-1	
56	Democracy introduces order into the world.	-1	
61	Some minorities demand too many rights.	-1	
29	The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.	-1	
69	Diversity causes problems.	-1	
2	Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.	-1	

26	I'm proud of being European.	-1	
55	Democratic procedure work best at a local or regional level.	-1	
17	The EU provides opportunity to protect citizens against thei	-1	
57	Democracy is expensive.	-1	
22	Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration.	-2	
4	We need a strong national army.	-2	
23	Euro should become a common currency of Europe.	-2	
13	EU strengthens our role in global affaires.	-2	
6	National borders should be controlled by individual member states.	-2	
9	Further enlargement may endanger economic stability of our country.	-2	
18	Europe should have one common army.	-2	
5	The power of the EU should be limited.	-2	
27	Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.	-3	
14	EU facilitates/advances democratic development in our country.	-3	
58	Democracy is inefficient.	-3	
68	We are the slaves of Europe.	-3	
24	EU should have a constitution.	-3	Low5
28	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.	-3	Low4
25	We should have only EU passport.	-4	Low3
51	You can only trust family members and close friends.	-4	Low2
31	I am a global citizen.	-4	
40	The whole world is my home.	-4	
50	Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values.	-5	Low1
70	Certain political goals can only be achieved by force.	-5	

Annex 6: Q-sort tables for the Polish study

Table 1: Distinguishing Statements for Factors 1–4

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 1 "Universalists"

(P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

		Factors							
		1		2		3		4	
No.	Statement	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
62	Women and men are equal.	4	1.83*	1	0.28	1	0.55	1	0.56
31	I am a global citizen	4	1.76*	1	0.46	-2	-0.82	-1	-0.34
40	The whole world is my home.	3	1.15*	0	-0.10	-4	-1.38	-3	-1.08
44	The EU should contribute financially to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution.	2	0.82	0	0.20	0	-0.07	4	1.38
52	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.	1	0.54	4	1.52	0	-0.02	-3	-1.00
14	EU facilitates/advances democratic development in our country.	1	0.53*	-2	-0.76	-1	-0.18	-1	-0.42
32	The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.	1	0.29*	-2	-0.83	-3	-1.10	-2	-0.55
28	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.	1	0.22	-4	-1.73	2	0.75	2	0.95
39	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	1	0.19	-3	-1.37	2	0.67	5	2.01
46	Europe is a state of mind (and not a geographic term).	0	0.12*	-2	-0.96	2	0.89	-4	-1.35
27	Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.	0	0.08	-3	-1.31	-1	-0.43	2	0.60
25	We should have only EU passport.	0	0.01*	-4	-1.83	-1	-0.70	-4	-1.64
8	My home is my country.	-1	-0.03*	4	1.96	2	0.99	2	0.77

#	Statement								
29	The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.	-1	-0.14	-3	-1.13	-2	-0.70	2	0.79
53	Citizens are alienated because state and local administration do not serve their interests.	-1	-0.20	2	0.57	-3	-1.07	-2	-0.73
26	I'm proud of being European.	-1	-0.21	1	0.42	3	1.39	2	0.92
16	I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).	-1	-0.24*	4	1.57	5	1.85	3	1.13
59	We need strong leaders.	-2	-0.86*	0	0.02	3	1.50	1	0.46
51	You can only trust family members and close friends.	-2	-0.87	3	1.05	-4	-1.41	0	-0.12
7	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	-2	-1.09*	2	0.87	0	-0.16	1	0.55
2	Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.	-2	-1.14	0	0.00	0	0.07	-1	-0.51
58	Democracy is inefficient.	-3	-1.18	2	0.58	-4	-1.85	-4	-1.83
3	Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.	-3	-1.31	-2	-0.60	-5	-1.96	-1	-0.26
48	Women should care more about family and home.	-3	-1.33*	3	1.38	2	0.61	0	-0.20
63	Women should care more about family and home.	-4	-1.55*	2	0.75	-1	-0.43	-2	-0.74
70	Certain political goals can only be achieved by force.	-5	-2.03*	-2	-0.85	-3	-1.16	-5	-2.87

Factor 1 "Universalists"   has 12 Significant Loadings:

P39mmpol	84	P06jkind	65
P18jminf	83	P28mkpra	64
P15jmgeo	83	P20jmpie	61
P38mmkul	78	P12jmche	61
P02jkeko	72	P09jksoc	58
P23mkbib	70	P22mkani	66

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 2 "Traditionalists"

(P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

No.	Statement	Factors 1		2		3		4	
		RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
54	The past helps to understand the future.	2	0.71	5	2.03*	3	1.01	-3	-1.06
49	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.	-1	-0.40	5	2.01*	-2	-0.72	1	0.27
8	My home is my country.	-1	-0.03	4	1.96*	2	0.99	2	0.77
52	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.	1	0.54	4	1.52*	0	-0.02	-3	-1.00
48	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.	-3	-1.33	3	1.38	2	0.61	0	-0.20
51	You can only trust family members and close friends.	-2	-0.87	3	1.05*	-4	-1.41	0	-0.12
63	Women should care more about family and home.	-4	-1.55	2	0.75*	-1	-0.43	-2	-0.74
65	Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.	-3	-1.38	2	0.63*	-2	-0.77	-3	-0.89
58	Democracy is inefficient.	-3	-1.18	2	0.58*	-4	-1.85	-4	-1.83
53	Citizens are alienated because state and local administration do not serve their interests.	-1	-0.20	2	0.57*	-3	-1.07	-2	-0.73
15	EU gives us opportunity to work and study in different countries.	3	1.31	1	0.47	3	1.18	4	1.87
31	I am a global citizen.	4	1.76	1	0.46	-2	-0.82	-1	-0.34
38	Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe on rights and freedom of others.	5	1.94	1	0.45	4	1.72	3	1.13
69	Diversity causes problems.	-4	-1.48	0	0.20	-3	-1.30	-1	-0.51

No	Statement								
66	Some countries in the EU are second class.	-2	-0.91	0	0.03*	-3	-1.06	3	1.13
40	The whole world is my home.	3	1.15	0	-0.10*	-4	-1.38	-3	-1.08
55	Democratic procedure work best at a local or regional level.	2	0.60	-1	-0.28	1	0.48	-3	-0.98
68	We are the slaves of Europe.	-5	-2.00	-1	-0.36*	-5	-2.49	-5	-2.24
10	The EU helps solving environmental problems.	2	0.63	-2	-0.91	-1	-0.24	1	0.47
21	The EU should create common welfare policy (common regulations, common distribution of social benefits).	1	0.26	-2	-1.12	-1	-0.47	0	0.11
17	The EU provides opportunity to protect citizens against their own administration.	0	0.12	-3	-1.24*	0	-0.14	0	-0.16
13	EU strengthens our role in global affairs.	2	0.63	-3	-1.27*	1	0.31	1	0.25
23	Euro should become a common currency of Europe.	2	0.64	-3	-1.27*	2	0.82	2	0.80
27	Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.	0	0.08	-3	-1.31*	-1	-0.43	2	0.60
39	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	1	0.19	-3	-1.37*	2	0.67	5	2.01
24	EU should have a constitution.	0	0.01	-4	-1.71*	1	0.50	0	-0.18
28	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.	1	0.22	-4	-1.73*	2	0.75	2	0.95
30	It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe.	0	0.14	-5	-1.91*	0	0.07	4	1.82

Factor 2 "Traditionalists" has 4 significant loadings:
P27mkmuz   76
P36mmhis   74
P16jmhis   73
P26mkmat   62

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 3 "Pragmatists"

(P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

No.	Statement	Factors							
		1		**2**		**3**		**4**	
		RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
20	Common European culture is derived from diverse national sources.	2	0.83	2	0.89	4	1.60	1	0.31
19	Europe shares a common heritage (Christian, Roman Law, democracy) and memory.	0	0.09	0	-0.18	4	1.56*	1	0.27
47	Our country forms a bridge between Eastern and Western parts of Europe.	0	0.11	1	0.41	4	1.54*	-2	0.61
59	We need strong leaders.	-2	-0.86	0	0.02	3	1.50*	1	0.46
46	Europe is a state of mind (and not a geographic term).	0	0.12	-2	-0.96	2	0.89*	-4	-1.35
39	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	1	0.19	-3	-1.37	2	0.67	5	2.01
48	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.	-3	-1.33	3	1.38	2	0.61	0	-0.20
24	EU should have a constitution.	0	0.01	-4	-1.71	1	0.50	0	-0.18
33	Remembrance of atrocities in European history makes us obliged to protect values related to the idea of humankind.	4	1.48	4	1.73	1	0.49*	-1	-0.31
52	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.	1	0.54	4	1.52	0	-0.02	-3	-1.00
7	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	-2	-1.09	2	0.87	0	-0.16	1	0.55
10	The EU helps solving environmental problems.	2	0.63	-2	-0.91	-1	-0.24	1	0.47
27	Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.	0	0.08	-3	-1.31	-1	-0.43	2	0.60
21	The EU should create common welfare policy (common regulations, common distribution of social benefits).	1	0.26	-2	-1.12	-1	-0.47	0	0.11

25	We should have only EU passport.	0	0.01	-4	-1.83	-1	-0.70*	-4	-1.64
35	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crisis.	0	0.09	-1	-0.27	-3	-1.26*	-1	-0.47
51	You can only trust family members and close friends.	-2	-0.87	3	1.05	-4	-1.41	0	-0.12
3	Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.	-3	-1.31	-2	-0.60	-5	-1.96*	-1	-0.26

Factor 3 "Pragmatists" has 6 significant loadings:

P34mmfil   72
P11jmche   65
P03jkepi   64
P08jkmed   54
P05jkgeo   53
P37mminf   45

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 4 "Instrumentalists"

(P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

No.	Statement	Factors 1		2		3		4	
		RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE	RNK	SCORE
39	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	1	0.19	-3	-1.37	2	0.67	5	2.01*
12	EU facilitates travelling.	3	1.22	3	0.97	3	1.32	5	1.97
15	EU gives us opportunity to work and study in different countries.	3	1.31	1	0.47	3	1.18	4	1.87
30	It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe.	0	0.14	-5	-1.91	0	0.07	4	1.82*
44	The EU should contribute financially to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution.	2	0.82	0	0.20	0	-0.07	4	1.38
66	Some countries in the EU are second class.	-2	-0.91	0	0.03	-3	-1.06	3	1.13*
38	Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe on rights and freedom of others.	5	1.94	1	0.45	4	1.72	3	1.13
29	The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.	-1	-0.14	-3	-1.13	-2	-0.70	2	0.79*
27	Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.	0	0.08	-3	-1.31	-1	-0.43	2	0.60
49	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.	-1	-0.40	5	2.01	-2	-0.72	1	0.27
51	You can only trust family members and close friends.	-2	-0.87	3	1.05	-4	-1.41	0	-0.12*
48	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.	-3	-1.33	3	1.38	2	0.61	0	-0.20*
33	Remembrance of atrocities in European history makes us obliged to protect values related to the idea of humankind.	4	1.48	4	1.73	1	0.49	-1	0.31*
69	Diversity causes problems.	-4	-1.48	0	0.20	-3	-1.30	-1	-0.51

47	Our country forms a bridge between Eastern and Western parts of Europe.	0	0.11	1	0.41	4	1.54	-2	-0.61*
55	Democratic procedure work best at a local or regional level.	2	0.60	-1	-0.28	1	0.48	-3	-0.98
52	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.	1	0.54	4	1.52	0	-0.02	-3	-1.00*
54	The past helps to understand the future.	2	0.71	5	2.03	3	1.01	-3	-1.06*
70	Certain political goals can only be achieved by force.	-5	-2.03	-2	-0.85	-3	-1.16	-5	-2.87*

Factor 4 *"Instrumentalists"* has 5 significant loadings:

P32mmche   67
P07jkmat   60
P29mkpsy   57
P17jminm   56
P35mmfiz   50

Table 2: Factor Q-Sort Values for Each Statement – Polish Factors

No.	Statement	1	2	3	4
1	National constitution is the main source of rights and laws.	1	1	1	3
2	Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.	-2	0	0	-1
3	Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.	-3	-2	-5	-1
4	We need a strong national army.	-4	0	0	-4
5	The power of the EU should be limited.	-2	-1	-1	-1
6	National borders should be controlled by individual member states.	-3	-1	-1	-2
7	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	-2	2	0	1
8	My home is my country.	-1	4	2	2
9	Further enlargement may endanger economic stability of our country.	-1	-1	-2	-1
10	The EU helps solving environmental problems.	2	-2	-1	1
11	Our (Hungarian\German\Polish) politicians should do their best to represent national interests on the EU level.	1	3	1	4
12	EU facilitates travelling.	3	3	3	5
13	EU strengthens our role in global affairs.	2	-3	1	1
14	EU facilitates/advances democratic development in our country.	1	-2	-1	-1
15	EU gives us opportunity to work and study in different countries.	3	1	3	4
16	I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).	-1	4	5	3
17	The EU provides opportunity to protect citizens against their own administration.	0	-3	0	0
18	Europe should have one common army.	-4	-5	-2	-2
19	Europe shares a common heritage (Christian, Roman Law, democracy) and memory.	0	0	4	1
20	Common European culture is derived from diverse national sources.	2	2	4	1
21	The EU should create common welfare policy (common regulations, common distribution of social benefits).	1	-2	-1	0
22	Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration.	-1	-4	-2	0
23	Euro should become a common currency of Europe.	2	-3	2	2
24	EU should have a constitution.	0	-4	1	0
25	We should have only EU passport.	0	-4	-1	-4
26	I'm proud of being European.	-1	1	3	2
27	Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.	0	-3	-1	2
28	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.	1	-4	2	2

29	The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.	-1	-3	-2	2
30	It is important not to fall behind the progressive Europe.	0	-5	0	4
31	I am a global citizen.	4	1	-2	-1
32	The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.	1	-2	-3	-2
33	Remembrance of atrocities in European history makes us obliged to protect values related to the idea of humankind.	4	4	1	-1
34	It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.	4	3	3	2
35	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crisis.	0	-1	-3	-1
36	The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.	3	1	0	3
37	Individual freedom and choice should be protected.	5	3	5	3
38	Cultural groups have the right to be different as long as they do not infringe on rights and freedom of others.	5	1	4	3
39	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	1	-3	2	5
40	The whole world is my home.	3	0	-4	-3
41	We are all responsible for shaping global institutions.	1	-1	-1	1
42	The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale.	3	-1	1	2
43	Democracy means first of all participation and deliberation of free individuals in common issues.	3	0	2	-2
44	The EU should contribute financially to limit the negative consequences of environmental pollution.	2	0	0	4
45	Further enlargement of the EU should be subject to sustainability.	-1	-1	0	0
46	Europe is a state of mind (and not a geographic term).	0	-2	2	-4
47	Our country forms a bridge between Eastern and Western parts of Europe.	0	1	4	-2
48	We should care more about our basic values, especially the religious ones.	-3	3	2	0
49	Our country has suffered a lot from its neighbours.	-1	5	-2	1
50	Eastern and Western parts of Europe share the same values.	-1	-1	-1	-2
51	You can only trust family members and close friends.	-2	3	-4	0
52	Politicians act mainly according to their own interests.	1	4	0	-3
53	Citizens are alienated because state and local administration do not serve their interests.	-1	2	-3	-2
54	The past helps to understand the future.	2	5	3	-3
55	Democratic procedure work best at a local or regional level.	2	-1	1	-3
56	Democracy introduces order into the world.	0	-2	1	0
57	Democracy is expensive.	-2	0	-2	-1
58	Democracy is inefficient.	-3	2	-4	-4

59	We need strong leaders.	-2	0	3	1
60	Free speech should not violate the feelings of anyone.	2	1	2	0
61	Some minorities demand too many rights.	-3	1	1	-3
62	Women and men are equal.	4	1	1	1
63	Women should care more about family and home.	-4	2	-1	-2
64	Certain groups have too much power and control.	1	2	0	0
65	Our country deserves compensation for the abuses of the past.	-3	2	-2	-3
66	Some countries in the EU are second class.	-2	0	-3	3
67	(Country name) is treated as second class in the EU.	-2	2	-4	1
68	We are the slaves of Europe.	-5	-1	-5	-5
69	Diversity causes problems.	-4	0	-3	-1
70	Certain political goals can only be achieved by force.	-5	-2	-3	-5

Table 3: Data underlying Figure 5.1 "Democracy-model statement agreement scores"

	RECON-model-related statements	Factor rankings of statements			
		P1	P2	P3	P4
No.	**RECON model 1 - Nation-State Perspective**				
1	National constitution is the main source of rights and laws.	1	1	1	3
2	Only member states should have right to collect taxes from citzens.	-2	0	0	-1
3	Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.	-3	-2	-5	-1
4	We need a strong national army.	-4	0	0	-4
5	The power of the EU should be limited.	-2	-1	-1	-1
6	National borders should be controlled by individual member states.	-3	-1	-1	-2
7	Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.	-2	2	0	1
8	My home is my country.	-1	4	2	2
11	Our politicians should do their best to represent national interest on the EU level.	1	3	1	4
16	I'm proud of being Polish.	-1	4	5	3
	RECON model 2 - Federal Perspective				
17	The EU provides opportunity to protect citizens against their own administration.	0	-3	0	0
18	Europe should have one common army.	-4	-5	-2	-2
21	The EU should create common welfare policy (regulations, social benefits).	1	-2	-1	0

		P1	P2	P3	P4
22	Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration.	-1	-4	-2	0
23	Euro should become a common currency of Europe.	2	-3	2	2
24	EU should have a constitution.	0	-4	1	0
25	We should have only EU passport.	0	-4	-1	-4
26	I'm proud of being European.	-1	1	3	2
27	Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.	0	-3	-1	2
28	EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.	1	-4	2	2
29	The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.	-1	-3	-2	2
	RECON model 3 - Post-national, "Cosmopolitan" Perspective				
31	I am a global citizen	4	1	-2	-1
32	The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.	1	-2	-3	-2
34	It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.	4	3	3	2
35	The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crisis.	0	-1	-3	-1
36	The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.	3	1	0	3
39	Global collective decision-making should be fostered.	1	-3	2	5
40	The whole world is my home.	3	0	-4	-3
41	We are all responsible for shaping global institutions.	1	-1	-1	1
42	The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights	3	-1	1	2
	Raw Summation of statement rankings	**P1**	**P2**	**P3**	**P4**
	RECON-1 statement set: 10 statements, maximum possible score = 38	-16	10	2	4
	RECON-2 statement set: 11 statements, maximum possible score = 41	-3	-34	-1	4
	RECON-3 statement set: 10 statements, maximum possible score = 35	20	-3	-7	6
	Agreement Score (relative to maximum possible score, then x 100)	**P1**	**P2**	**P3**	**P4**
	RECON 1	-42	26	5	11
	RECON 2	-7	-83	-2	10
	RECON 3	57	-9	-20	17

Annex 7: Statements representing RECON models in the Q methodology statement set

RECON Model 1 - Nation-State Perspective
National constitution is the main source of rights and laws.
Only member states should have the right to collect taxes from their citizens.
Democracy can only be sustained in the confines of the nation-state.
We need a strong national army.
The power of the EU should be limited.
National borders should be controlled by individual member states.
Our national flag should be more prominently displayed than the European one.
My home is my country.
Our (Hungarian\German\Polish) politicians should do their best to represent interests on the EU level.
I'm proud of being (Hungarian/German/Polish).
RECON Model 2 - Federal Perspective
The EU provides opportunity to protect citizens against their own administration.
Europe should have one common army.
The EU should create common welfare policy (common regulations, common distribution of social benefits).
Our taxes should be split between national and the EU administration.
Euro should become a common currency of Europe.
EU should have a constitution.
We should have only EU passport.
I'm proud of being European.
Foreign policy should be made at the EU level.
EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy.
The EU institutions can be trusted to protect and represent our interests.

RECON Model 3 - Post-National Cosmopolitan Perspective
I am a global citizen.
The EU is involved in fighting global poverty.
It is important to preserve the common global cultural heritage.
The EU should contribute to the financial efforts to solve global economic crises.
The EU should take part in peace-making on a global scale.
Global collective decision-making should be fostered.
The whole world is my home.
We are all responsible for shaping global institutions.
The EU should respect, protect, spend more money and fight for universal human rights on the global scale.

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Of the possible paths of European democratic development, the RECON project suggests three democratic configurations: a confederation of nation states; a multi-national federation; and a post-national, cosmopolitan democracy. To a lesser or larger degree they all require a collective identity for the legitimacy of the polity. What kind of collective identity or narrative is required for a federal European Union or a post-national polity? Based on empirical evidence, this report explores what identity narratives prevail among the university students of three member states – Germany, Hungary and Poland.

Based on their evaluations about democratic processes and civic membership, this report uses Q methodology, a quantitative-qualitative method, to elicit and construct identity narratives of German, Hungarian and Polish students. The report explores whether these vernacular narratives correspond to the three RECON democracy narratives. It finds considerable resonance; but also some dissonance: most narratives express both a national and a European identity; the opposition assumed in theory is not found in practice. Some narratives mix elements of the three RECON models in unexpected ways, raising questions about conceptual distinctions. Comparing the three parallel country studies reveals several cross-border commonalities among identity narratives and few differences between so-called 'old' and 'new' member states.

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